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I. INTRODUCTION
Cities are pursuing various initiatives to implement President Clinton's
National Information Agenda ("NIP').' The NII encourages public/private
partnerships to build an advanced telecommunications infrastructure known as
the Information Highway. These initiatives include upgrading cities' internal
government networks or Private Virtual Networks ("PVNs") 2 and expanding
Municipal Utilities3 into, or developing new, Regional Telecommunication
Networks ("RTNs"). This article will focus on city initiatives as developers,
regulators, and users of RTNs and will highlight California's efforts in these
areas. RTNs are region wide, open, switched digital broadband networks with
the capability to provide voice, data, cable, and videoconferencing services at a
reasonable cost to homes, businesses, and public buildings.4 RTNs compete
with existing and other providers for telecommunication services and are
regulated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Act").5
Cities have a vested interest in RTNs for several reasons: 1) to protect the
public safety and welfare; 2) to enhance internal operations and the admini-
stration of services to the public; 3) to foster economic development; and 4) to
1. The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025
(1993).
2. Private Virtual Networks are networks which service a city's internal or regional needs
for government operations and administration. Examples would include communication and
data networks for libraries, schools, fire, police, and public works. See San Diego Data
Processing Corporation Request for Proposals to Provide Telecommunications Infrastructure
7 (1995) [hereinafter San Diego RFP].
3. "Municipal Utilities" are municipally owned public utilities that can provide telephony
or other communications and other public works, such as electric, gas, water, sewer and/or
other utility services to residents. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 12801 (Deering 1990)
(regarding Municipal Utility District Act).
4. See San Diego RFP, supra note 2, at 1; August E. Grant & Lon Berquist, Exploring the
Emerging Municipal Information Infrastructure (visited Dec. 11, 1996) <http://ksgwww.
harvard.edu/iip/grant.html>; City of Seattle Request for Proposals for an Information Highway
1 (1994) [hereinafter Seattle RFP].
5. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
[hereinafter the Act]. The Act overhauls the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48
Stat. 1064 (1934).
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ensure universal access to telecommunication services at affordable prices. 6 In
addition, many cities rely on revenue generated from telecommunication
providers through franchise fees, compensation for use of public rights-of-way,
and utility user taxes.7
Spurred by recent passage of the Act, cities struggle to pursue strategies
as regulators, users, and/or providers of telecommunication networks and
services.8 As municipal providers and users, the Act establishes a framework
for open competition to all telecommunications 9 services l by lifting restric-
tions imposed on telephone companies and cable companies. and creating a
new class of provider called "telecommunication carriers."' 1 Telecommunica-
tion carriers can provide telecommunication services by constructing their own
facilities or reselling services of existing providers. By lifting the restrictions,
new entrants are allowed to compete in city and regional markets. As regula-
tors, the Act restricts local franchise authority to regulate telecommunication
carriers 12 but may provide compensation to cities for use of their rights-of-
way.' 3 These restrictions threaten to reduce cities' revenue base as the variety
of telecommunication services available is increasing and the transactional
costs for businesses are decreasing.
As cities compete to retain current and attract new businesses, some
believe that cities must build RTNs to ensure that residents and businesses
have equal and universal access to new services at affordable prices. However,
6. See San Diego RFP, supra note 2, at 1; Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 5-7; Seattle
RFP, supra note 4, at 1-3; Telecommunications Policy for the City of Sunnyvale, California at
5-6 (November 10, 1995) (adopted February 1996) <http://reality.sgi.comcsp/sunnyvalel
telecom-policy.html> [hereinafter Sunnyvale Telecommunications Policy].
7. Utility user taxes are imposed on users of utilities which include electric, telephone,
cable, gas, and water. The common thread is that they all use public rights-of-way to provide
service.
8. See Sunnyvale Telecommunications Policy, supra note 6, at 5; Andrea L. Johnson,
Legal and Regulatory Issues Confronting Cities in Developing an Interconnected Fiber Optic
Network" The San Diego Model, 20 RurrERs COMPurER & TECH. LJ. 489, 512-25 (1994).
9. 'Telecommunications" is defined as "the transmission, between or among points
specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or
content of the information as sent and received." Telecommunications Act § 3(a)(48).
10. 'Telecommunications service" is defined as the "offering of telecommunications for a
fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to
the public, regardless of the facilities used." Id. § 3(a)(51).
11. A "telecommunications carrier" includes any provider of information services on a
common carrier basis, for a fee directly or indirectly to the public, without regard to the
facilities used. See id. § 3(a)(49), (51).
12. Id. § 253(a).
13. Id. § 253(c).
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financial constraints, uncertainty in technological standards, lack of technical
expertise, and actions by existing telecommunication providers to thwart
competition, challenge cities to remain competitive.
14
The first section of this article will examine how the Act fosters competi-
tion and delegates authority to regulate telecommunication providers and the
reaction from state Public Utility Commissions ("PUCs") and industry. The
second section will discuss critical issues that must be resolved by cities as
providers of RTNs. The third section will discuss how cities seek to leverage
their role as users to get favorable rates and ensure universal access. The
fourth section will discuss the impact of the Act on city initiatives as regulators
of RTNs and sugggests alternate revenue sources.
I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
The Act provides a general framework for how competition of interstate,
or interLATA, 15 and intrastate, or intraLATA, 16 telecommunications services
will be achieved and the delegation of authority at the federal, state, and local
levels. This framework enables cities to participate as providers of RTNs to
compete for telecommunication services and as users to leverage favorable
terms with telecommunication providers. Implementation of the Act has been
delegated to the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") and state
PUCs.
A. Fostering Competition
The Act fosters competition for telecommunications services in several
ways. First, state restrictions and antitrust decrees limiting competition in
local exchange and long distance markets have been lifted, thereby allowing
both to expand their offerings. 17 This means that long distance companies 8
14. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 9-11.
15. A LATA, meaning Local Access and Transport Areas, is a geographical boundary that
was established as part of the divestiture of AT&T under Judge Harold Greene's Consent
Decree in 1981. InterLATA telephone services are services, revenues, and functions of long
distance carriers that begin in one LATA and terminate in another. United States v. AT&T,
552 F. Supp. 131 (1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
Most LATAs are defined by local telephone exchanges or area codes, which are usually within
16 miles from the exchange.
16. IntraLATA services are services, revenues, and functions provided by the local ex-
change carriers within a single LATA.
17. Telecommunications Act § 601(a).
[Vol. 21:515
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can provide local exchange services, and local exchange carriers ("LECs")19
can .provide long distance services.2 However, there are restrictions imposed
upon LECs, such as Pacific Bell, before they can provide interLATA services
originating within their service market.2' Such services can only be provided
in partnership with separate or independent affiliates22 of LECs and would be
provided on a negotiated basis.23
Second, cross ownership restrictions for cable 24 and LECs25 have been
eliminated,26 although they are subject to a ten percent cap on financial interest
and ownership 27 in their service area. As a result, cable companies can now
provide telephony, and telephone companies can provide cable or open video
28
services.
Third, LECs must provide interconnection to their facilities, 29 including
physical or virtual collocation of equipment,30 and network access to private
18. Long distance companies include AT&T, MCI, Sprint, and Competitive Access Pro-
viders.
19. Local exchange carriers are the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies: 1) Amer-
itech; 2) Bell Atlantic; 3) Bell South; 4) Nynex; 5) Pacific Telesis; 6) Southwestern Bell; and
7) U.S. West.
20. Telecommunications Act § 27 1(a).
21. In effect, the FCC regulations require that the LEC satisfy a "14-point checklist" of
provisions before the FCC will allow them to enter long distance markets. Essentially the
FCC must find that local markets have been opened up to competition. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B).
22. Section 274 of the Act also prohibits a LEC from providing electronic publishing
using its own or an affiliate's basic telephone facilities, or from forming a joint venture for
electronic publishing, except through a separate and independent affiliate. The Act does,
however, allow: 1) joint telemarketing or referral services on a nondiscriminatory basis; 2)
teaming arrangements for electronic publishing so long as BOC provides only the facilities,
services and basic telephone service and does not own the arrangement; and 3) nonexclusive
joint ventures for electronic publishing where the BOC has no more than 50% equity interest
or royalty interest. Id. § 274(c)(2).
23. See generally id. §§ 272-274.
24. The Act relaxes the rules governing cable television systems under the 1992 Cable
Act. Id. § 301. By March 31, 1999, all rate regulations on all cable services except the "basic
tier" that includes over-the-air channels and public and educational channels are to be
removed. Telecommunications Act § 301(b).
25. Id. § 301(b).
26. See id. § 651(a).
27. Id. § 652(a). This ownership interest can be larger (up to 35%) in rural areas. Id. §
652(d)(1)..
28. Telecommunications Act § 653(a)(1).
29. Section 251(b) imposes on all LECs obligations to provide resale, access to rights-of-
way, and to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transportation and termination
of traffic. Id. § 251(b)(1), (4)-(5).
30. Id. § 251(c)(6).
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rights-of-way, utility poles, and conduits on a nondiscriminating basis.31 In
addition, LECs are prevented from discriminating in charges and practicing
unfair competitive tactics,32 which means LECs must provide network access
and interconnection at just and reasonable rates.33 The terms of interconnec-
tion are determined by negotiation between LECs and other telecommunica-
tion providers, 34 subject to approval by state PUCs. 35 State PUCs have the
authority to arbitrate complaints among providers,36 and the FCC has the
authority to resolve jurisdictional issues. Federal courts provide judicial
review of FCC decisions.
Fourth, the Act preempts the states and cities from promulgating any rules
or taking any actions which will be unreasonable and have the effect of
creating market barriers to entry in interstate or intrastate markets.37 The FCC
also has the authority under the Act to preempt city authority where it is found
to violate the Act or state PUC rules, such as prohibiting market entry.38
31. Id. § 251(b)(4), (c)(2)(D). The Act requires interconnection to telecommunication
carriers at any feasible point at least equal in quality to what is provided by LECs to their
affiliates. Id.
32. 47 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). This section provides that it is illegal for common carriers
to:
[M]ake any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifi-
cations, regulations, facilities, or services for or in connection with like commu-
nication service, directly or indirectly, by any means or device, or to make or
give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person,
class of persons, or locality, or to subject any particular person, class of persons,
or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.
Id. § 202(a). This regulation allows the FCC, as a federal agency, to fine violators with a
$6,000 penalty. Id. § 202(c).
33. Rates must be tariffed or not higher than the per unit basis charged to others. Tele-
communications Act § 274(c)(2)(D).
34. Id. § 252(a)(1).
35. Id. § 252(e). Such agreements shall be approved so long as they do not discriminate
against a telecommunications carrier not a party to the agreement and are not inconsistent with
the public interest, convenience, and necessity. Id. § 252(e)(l)-(2).
36. Id. § 252(b). In the first instance, the state PUC would be the arbiter of disputes
between telecommunication carriers and LECs regarding interconnection and charges.
Telecommunications Act § 252(b). Moreover, there is some suggestion that the state PUC
would also address access to rights-of-way and regulatory or negotiated fees imposed by a
city, with appeal rights to the FCC. Id. See generally id. §§ 252, 703.
37. Id. § 253(a). The Act states that "[n]o State or local statute or regulation, or other
State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of
any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." Id.
38. Telecommunications Act § 253(d).
[Vol. 21:515
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B. Delegation of Authority
The FCC is empowered to establish procedures for network planning and
can participate in developing network interconnectivity standards.39 The FCC
has also created an alternative dispute resolution committee to resolve any
conflicts regarding industry-wide standards.4 The state PUCs are empowered
under the Act to establish baseline rates for interconnection, services, and
network elementsl Local authorities retain jurisdiction over access to their
rights-of-way; however, city franchise authority has been restricted for
telecommunications services, regardless of the provider.
The FCC has recently adopted a series of rules to implement the Act,42
although final adoption is likely to be delayed by legal challenges from
industry and state PUCs. Several state PUCs and LECs have challenged the
FCC's interpretation that the Act confers to it a specific grant of intrastate
pricing authority.43 The FCC rules require discounts of between 17% and 25%
off of their retail phone rates and discounts of between 50% and 60% off the
retail rate of network equipment." If new competitors enter a carrier's market
at wholesale rates, the FCC intended that they could resell telecommunications
services at below market rates because they are willing to accept lower profit
margins.45 LECs feel, however, that the discounts represent illegal confisca-
tion of their property.
C. State Reaction
State reaction to passage of the Act has been varied. Some state PUCs
view the FCC rules in part as a way to neutralize the playing field to enable
new entrants to compete for telecommunications services. The FCC plan
39. Telecommunications Act § 256(b). The parties can agree to terms without regard to
the FCC Rules. The FCC creates a baseline of terms and conditions for all arbitrated
agreements. Commission Adopts Rules to Implement Local Competition Provisions of
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (August 1, 1996) <http:llwww.fcc.gov/nrcc6052.html>.
40. Telecommunications Act § 256(b).
41. Id. § 252(d).
42. See Report on the FCC Implementation of the Telecommunications Act (visited Nov.
21, 1996) <http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/imp-rpt.html>.
43. The Act expressly requires the FCC to refrain from enacting, applying, or enforcing
unnecessary regulations related to charges, practices, and classifications. Telecommunications
Act § 401.
44. Leslie Cauley & Bryan Gruley, Telecommunications: Baby Bells Win Possible Delay
of Competition, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1996, at B1.
45. R. Clark Wadlow & Rosalind M. Parker, Goal of '96 Communication Act is to Foster
Competition, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 11.
1997]
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reflects a concern that state PUCs enjoy a long-standing relationship with
LECs which may cause them to favor LECs.46 However, it seems that many
states have taken heed of the FCC plan. For example, Texas regulators have
approved a plan for AT&T competition with SBC Communications with a
resale discount of 21.5%, within the range proposed by the FCC.47 State
regulators from Iowa, Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania have followed suit,
approving a twenty-two percent discount for reseller services. 48
It is clear that those states that are serious about facilitating competition
are moving forward notwithstanding legal challenges to the Act. There are
more than 180 pending state arbitrations on interconnection agreements among
LECs and other local companies.49 The Washington Utility and Telecommu-
nications Commission ("WUTC"), for example, has already conducted seven
arbitration proceedings under the Act.50 The WUTC is proceeding on generic
costing and pricing rules.51 The arbitrations are leading to interim rates, while
the generic pricing rules will determine long-term pricing.
2
Unfortunately, these efforts are not necessarily the norm. Other state
PUCs feel that the Act and current litigation surrounding FCC interconnection
rules will delay or hinder their efforts to promote intrastate competition. 53 This
is not necessarily due to inaction by state PUCs but rather to efforts by industry
advocates to lobby the FCC and states to accept various interpretations of the
Acti' 4 For example, Brooks Fiber Communications of Grand Rapids, Michi-
gan was haggling for more than a year over an interconnection pact with
Ameritech. The talks were halted after passage of the Act. In addition, in late
1995 prior to passage of the Act, WUTC issued a benchmark decision requir-
46. Cauley & Gruley, supra note 44, at B 1.
47. Gautam Naik & Edward Felsenthal, Business Brief. Justice Thomas Rejects Request
to Reinstate Phone-Market Rules, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1996, at B4.
48. Id.
49. Id. AT&T requested a higher rate of 35%, and SBC only wanted to offer only 13%.
Id.
50. Telephone Interview with Tom Wilson, Regulatory Consultant, Washington Utilities
and Transportation Commission (Dec. 21, 1996). There have been three arbitration decisions,
44 agreements pending negotiation, no final agreements, and two interconnection agreements
under review. See Summary of Federal Telecommunications Act of 1995 (visited July 1,
1996) <http://www.washington.edu: 1 180/wutc/news/fedtelecom.html>.
51. Interview with Tom Wilson, supra note 50.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Cf. Statement of Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission on
Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance Committee on Commerce (July 18, 1996)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/reh7l896.html> [hereinafter Statement of Reed E. Hundt].
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ing local interconnection for U.S. West and GTE.55 Since passage of the Act,
however, they have started the interconnection contract process all over
again.56
D. Industry Reaction Since Passage of the Act
The goal for all providers is to be full service providers, bundling such
existing and new services as local, long distance, and wireless services. Since
the passage of the Act, providers have pursued various strategies to diversify
into other areas, while protecting existing markets. One direct by-product of
the Act is a flurry of mergers.57 There have also been notices of new offerings
with subsequent scaling back of plans, no price reductions, but proposed price
increases.58 Whether the net effect of these efforts will result in competition
remains to be seen.59
Long distance companies and LECs have already begun fierce competi-
tion for the $70 billion long distance market and the $100 billion local service
market.60 Long distance companies, anxious to get into local telephone
markets, have filed for local certification in all fifty states. In a move to
compete for local exchange service, AT&T is proposing to offer preemptive
discount pricing to new customers in several local markets.61 Under this plan,
AT&T would expand pricing discounts to areas such as Illinois, to compete
with Ameritech, by offering three months of free, unlimited "local toll"
55. Implementing the Telecommunications Act '96 (Nov. 30, 1996) <http:www.
Washington.edu/wutc/telecom/act9.html>.
56. Interview with Tom Wilson, supra note 50.
57. Regulators have approved a merger between Bell Atlantic and Nynex and between
Time-Warner and Turner Broadcasting. SBC has bought Pacific Telesis, pending approval
from regulators. LDDS/World Com has bought UUNet, an Internet Provider. World Corn
then bought MFS to make the fourth largest telecommunication vendor in the United States.
British Telecom has bought MCI, to be called Concert. This merger, subject to approval by
the FCC and the Department of Justice, will result in the second largest global carrier after
AT&T. See Charles Stein, For New Year, State Will be Ringing in Much of the Old; Same
Boring Trends Should Mean Good News, B. GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1997, at D6.
58. Mark Robichanx, TCI to Boost Cable Rates, Add Channels in a Bid to Improve Oper-
ating Margins, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1996, at A4. But see Mark Robichanx, Bad Call:
Malone Says TCI Push into Phones, Internet Isn't Working for Now, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2,
1997, at Al.
59. See John R. Wilke & Bryan Gruley, Long-Distance Pitch Hits Snag for Ameritech,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1997, at B5; John R. Wilke, FCC Sees Slow Growth in Competition,
May Have to Review Deregulation Plans, WALLST. J., Jan. 6, 1997, at B6.
60. John J. Keller, Telecommunications: AT&T Discounts Signal a National Price War
WALL ST. J., May 30, 1996, at BI.
61. Id.
1997]
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calling.62 These discounts are designed to counter efforts by the LECs, in
areas such as Connecticut, to steal market share for long distance service.
Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, and Pacific Telesis have opted to sidestep
regulators to compete for long distance and local telephone service by setting
up separate affiliate local phone companies through long-distance subsidiar-
ies.63 Such companies are unregulated as a result of a loophole created in the
Act.64 This arrangement would permit these LECs to resell local service while
they await approval to compete for long distance service. Essentially, these
65LECs would resell local service to these companies. Many fear, however,
that they will offer better interconnection agreements, thereby undercutting
competition from long distance providers. 66  Moreover, critics argue that
creating separate facilities does not eliminate LEC monopolies in local
markets. While under the LECs' new scheme the name and logo would be
modified, such as Bell Atlantic Communications and Bell Atlantic or Pacific
Bell Communications and Pacific Bell, it is likely that customers will be
confused about where one company ends and the other begins.
67
Notwithstanding these efforts, many existing LECs, long distance, and
cable providers are going to great lengths to protect their own turfs to forestall
competition. 68 Among LECs, Ameritech has persuaded customers to "freeze"
their accounts, which makes it harder for customers to move to new rivals. 69 In
addition, U.S. West has asked regulators to withdraw its Centrex office phone
service to prevent newcomers from reselling Centrex service by its rivals. By
halting Centrex service, U.S. West is effectively undermining competition.
70
Moreover, American Communications Services ("ACSs") has filed a com-
plaint against Bellsouth for charges for network changes. Bell South charges
ACSs only $152 if they alter their network, but charges $17,000 if they move
62. Id.
63. Leslie Cauley, Three Bells Sidestep Rules, Thwart Rivals, WALL ST. J., July 15, 1996,
at A3.
64. Under the Act, LECs must open up their networks to rivals and sell services at non-
discriminatory rates. Such obligations, however, do not extend to their unregulated business,
including long distance service, because it is ancillary to their primary business.
65. Cauley, supra note 63, at A3.
66. Il
67. Id. Polls indicate that some customers still believe AT&T offers local service or that
the Bells offer long distance, something they have been prohibited from doing since 1983. Id.
68. Leslie Cauley, Telecommunications: Telecom Concerns Love Rivalry Fostered by
New Law, Unless It's in Their Market, WALL ST. J., March 25, 1996, at B 1.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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to a competitor.71 Long distance carriers such as AT&T are pushing regulators
to bar the LECs from sharing customer data or marketing. Cable companies
have followed suit. Time-Wamer's HBO network refuses to provide its
programming to Ameritech for Bell's new cable systems. In addition, exclu-
sive contracts with Continental Cablevision, Inc. block it from selling to
Ameritech.
7 2
Whether these current trends will continue remains to be seen. What is
beginning to seem clear is that competition will likely take longer and grow on
a smaller scale than what was initially presumed.
II. CITY INMATrVES AS PROVIDERS OF RTNs
Most governments either own municipal utilities73 or have contracts with
existing telecommunication providers to develop and/or maintain government
information and communications systems. City initiatives involve municipal
utilities who are upgrading or expanding their PVNs,74 or who have accepted
the challenge to upgrade or build municipal RTNs.75 As PVNs are not
regulated by the Act, this discussion will focus on municipal RTNs. RTNs are
subject to regulation under the Act to the extent they provide telecommunica-
tion services to the public indiscriminately, or act as public switched net-
works.76
71. Id.
72. ld.
73. The Constitution of the State of California, for example, permits a municipal corpora-
tion to own or operate public works to provide communications services to the municipality.
CAL CONST., art. XI, § 9(a). Division 5-6 of the California Public Utilities Code ("CPUC")
pertains to the Municipal Utility District Act. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 11501-14403.5
(West 1994). Moreover, a district may construct or own works for supplying the district with
telephone services or other means of communications. Id. § 12801.
74. PVNs do not compete with existing providers for public services and are therefore
exempt from regulation under the Telecommunications Act. There is some indication that at
the point the PVN links to the public switched network it would be subject to state PUC
jurisdiction under the Act. See Rulemaking on the Commission's Own Motion to Govern
Open Access to Bottleneck Services and Establish a Framework for Network Architecture
Development of Dominant Carrier Networks, No. 93-08-026, 1993 Cal. PUC LEXIS 525, at
*5 (Aug. 4, 1993).
75. These cities include: Glasgow, Kentucky; Holland, Michigan; Orangeburg, South
Carolina; Austin, Texas; Denton, Texas; Manassas, Virginia; Seattle, Washington; Anaheim,
California; and Cedar Falls, Iowa. See Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 5.
76. See Telecommunications Act § 202(49).
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There are approximately 100 municipal RTN programs underway
throughout the country, most of which were initiated before the Act.77 These
programs reflect a "bottom-up" approach to infrastructure development where
cities, instead of the state, pursue RTNs.78 A "bottom-up" approach has been
used in California, for example, where the cities' needs are too diverse to be
effectively addressed by a statewide initiative. As a result, California cities
undertake infrastructure development on their own, or in partnership with other
cities or counties. California cities such as Anaheim, Santa Clara, San Jose,
and Palo Alto are upgrading existing municipally-owned utilities for residen-
tial telecommunications services. 79 The City of Anaheim, for example, has a
municipally run electric utility and internal telephone system. It has chosen to
compete with existing providers by building a Universal Telecommunications
System connecting the City's businesses, schools, residents, and government
buildings.80 The Anaheim system will utilize fifty miles of the Public Utility
Department existing fiber optic infrastructure.8' The issues confronting these
cities are: 1) how to leverage their role to develop strategic partnerships with
other cities and/or private providers to build RTNs; 2) extract favorable rates
and terms to resell from existing and new providers; or 3) some combination of
the above.
A. Critical Issues in Developing RTNs
Cities must resolve three critical issues in deciding whether to pursue
RTNs. First, cities must decide what type of network architecture will be
employed.8 2 There are a variety of network configurations that can be em-
ployed, such as fiber in the loop,8 3 hybrid fiber/coax84 systems employed by
77. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 2 (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 1 (citation omitted).
79. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 491-92.
80. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 11.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 10.
83. This is an all fiber configuration where fiber is laid up to a node, be it a subscriber's
curb, a building, or a service area. This technology employs a fiber-fed node with dedicated
drops from that node to the subscriber. See also Hamid H. Lalani, The First Hundred Feet:
The Local Access Network Perspective (visited Dec. 11, 1996) <http:// ksgwww. harvard. edu/
iip/ lalani. html>.
84. Cable companies traditionally used a tree and branch configuration. To take full
advantage of fiber's greater bandwidth, cable companies have converted to a fiber-to-the-
feeder ("FTTF") or star-star-bus ("SSB") architecture. The hybrid fiber-coaxial configuration
send digital video via fiber to hubs within the community and then utilize existing coaxial
lines into subscribers' homes. See Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 4.
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cable companies, 5 or hybrid fiber/copper or twisted pair systemss employed
by telephone and electric companies. Each type of system has its advantages
and limitations. However, as technology continues to develop, what is state of
the art today could well be outdated by the time the network is completed. 7
Some cities are taking a gamble and selecting one standard over another.88
Most cities, however, are ill equipped to gamble on one or another inasmuch as
many cities currently utilitize multiple architectures.8 9 For this reason, there is
some advantage for cities to maintain a degree of flexibility in designing a
hybrid system which can be upgradable in five to ten years.
90
Second, cities must decide the nature and extent of equity participation,
and whether they want to compete with existing providers. 9' Cities often seek
equity participation to ensure openness and universal access.92 The level of
equity participation that can be negotiated, however, often depends upon a
city's contribution to the partnership and the extent to which it is willing to be
"at risk" for the debt obligations of the project.93 Cities typically have public
facilities, property, and rights-of-way including poles, which can be contrib-
uted, as well as having the authority to waive fees and taxes as incentives for
equity participation. 94 In Anaheim, California, for example, the City is to
receive a one-time payment of $6 million and annual revenues of $1 million or
five percent of gross revenues (whichever is greater) for its rights-of-way and
85. This configuration enables broadband, passive transmissions, generally required for
video delivery systems. Id. at 3. It is not, however, very effective with switched or interactive
services such as telephony.
86. Telephone companies use a circuit-switched star configuration, which remains un-
changed by introducing fiber. What has changed by using fiber is the conversion from analog
to digital and the need for advanced digital switching equipment, as well as fiber transmitters,
receivers, and amplifiers. While this configuration has worked well for switched voice,
telephone companies have introduced other standards to facilitate better video quality such as
ATM, asynchronous transfer mode, or SONET, synchronous optical network. Id. at 3-4.
87. Id. at 9.
88. The City of Austin, Texas, which operates a municipal utility, decided to look for a
strategic partner to build an advanced telecommunications network. After two years and 34
respondents, Austin selected Central & South West communications to build a hybrid
fiber/coax network to interconnect all homes, businesses, and institutions. Id. at 5-9.
89. See also Lalani, supra note 83, at 1.
90. See also Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 4, 10.
91. Id. at 9
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See sources cited supra note 4.
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existing fiber optic infrastructure.95 Anaheim is still in negotiations with its
strategic partner, SpectraNet International, and the system has not been built.
96
Whether the city of Anaheim will realize this revenue remains to be seen.
The possibility of equity participation must be offset by the associated
risks of being obligated on the debt. In Austin, Texas, for example, regulators
concluded that voters would not approve tax free municipal bond financing for
constructing their RTN, so they had to accept less equity participation. 9
Austin's proposal required a high bond debt of nearly one half of one billion
dollars, almost equal to their biggest municipal project, an airport.98 This
factor contributed significantly in their selection process for a provider.
It is important to note that in both the Anaheim and Austin scenarios, their
strategic partners are Competitive Access Providers ("CAPs"). CAPs and
some long distance carriers seem willing to give cities equity interests because
such partnerships give them entry into new markets and assure them a sub-
stantial customer to support their investment. Unfortunately, their proposals
often include associated risks-risks that all areas will not be serviced or self
funded, which many cities are unwilling to accept.99 Such proposals for equity
participation, however, do not seem forthcoming from existing providers. In
San Diego, for example, neither of the existing providers proposed equity
participation for the City, notwithstanding that it was an important evaluation
criteria and goal for the City.1°°
Finally, cities must contemplate how they will finance the project.
Financing plans in which a city is not at risk are highly speculative. Anaheim,
California is using project financing to develop its network at a cost of $50
million to $60 million.' 0 ' This means that financing for subsequent phases will
be contingent upon revenue generated from completed phases. Phase one will
connect commercial, industrial, and government buildings with fiber optic
cable. Phase two of the plan will extend the telecommunications system to
residential areas. 0 2 However, if there is insufficient revenue from phase one
of the project, phase two may never be built.
95. Anaheim City Council Approves Memorandum of Understanding with SpectraNet to
Build a Fiber Optic Universal Telecommunications System (Aug. 20, 1996)
<http://www.anaheim.netlutility/telecom5.html>.
96. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 11.
97. Id. at 8.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 11.
101. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at I1.
102. Id.
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In some instances, the financial risks are such that existing plans must be
modified or abandoned. The cities of San Diego, California and Seattle,
Washington, for example, abandoned plans to build RTNs or expand their
existing public utility after passage of the Act, citing financing risks and
technology concerns.103 Both cities have opted, instead, to upgrade their
existing PVNs.1' 4
B. Municipal Initiatives for Strategic Partnerships
There is no prohibition against cities forming strategic partners with
existing providers or CAPs. However, as suggested earlier, existing providers
seem to have little incentive to develop strategic partnerships with cities or
with each other. This may be due to a variety of factors.
First, existing providers are already making the capital investment to
compete for existing and new telecommunications services. It is generally
private industry, not local governments, that has the financial and technical
means to develop the infrastructure. As a result, there seems to be little value
added in having the government as an equity partner. Moreover, the govern-
ment could pose a threat to existing providers as a competitor for these
services. It is unclear, however, whether the marketplace in most metropolitan
areas can support competition by telephone and cable companies, CAPs, and
local governments. In addition, some critics question whether this is an
appropriate role for cities.
Second, partnerships among providers to create seamless, ubiquitous
RTNs are unlikely. Interconnectivity among providers is impractical because
telephone companies, cable companies, and CAPs employ different, compet-
ing, and oftentimes incompatible technologies to provide the same services.
105
Consequently, from the government's perspective, it may be more prudent to
maintain existing relations with multiple providers until the industry becomes
more mature.
Third, in many areas, local governments are already contracting with one
or more providers for a variety of telecommunication and video services. This
dependency would not be eliminated by cities developing a new RTN.
Assuming that financing is available, it would still take years before a RTN
was developed. The Austin, Texas project, for example, is projected to take
six years to complete after a final franchise agreement is completed.1 6 In
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See discussion supra pp. 526-27.
106. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 9.
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Anaheim, phase one is expected to be completed within two years, while
building phase two of their RTN will be done over five years thereafter.'07
In the interim, these governments would presumably still have to contract
with existing providers or resellers to ensure that government operations
continue to function effectively. This will likely result in redundant networks
being maintained. In addition, this problem is not eliminated by dealing with
CAPs or resellers. Resellers and CAPs must still negotiate interconnectivity
with existing providers, which has been found in many instances to be very
difficult.
Fourth, building a RTN from the bottom up without a partner is often-
times not fiscally possible. The capital costs are significant and there is great
uncertainty about the applications and services which are needed to generate
the revenue to support such a network. There are also recurring management
and administrative costs, which often cannot be met from existing revenue
sources. Many cities lack the in-house technical support to perform these
tasks, which means those services must be contracted to outside vendors.
Existing providers and resellers have a competitive advantage here because
they have the benefits of economies of scale achieved by restructuring their
services using shared resources. This gives them existing revenue streams to
offset the capital costs of upgrading their systems. Existing providers are
being conservative in their expansion plans by upgrading their systems in
stages to ensure that revenue from new applications and services will justify
their investment. Consequently, it is doubtful that a city could offer more
competitive rates and services in the short term than would be available from
existing providers.
C. Regulation of Municipal RTNs Under the Act
There are two ways a municipal RTN can provide telecommunication
services to the public. The first is as a facilities-based carrier, where a city
would own, control, operate, and/or maintain. 1°8 The second is as a reseller,
where a city would not construct any facility but would purchase unbundled
network elements from the LEC or resell an incumbent's retail service."°9
As a facilities-based carrier, a municipal RTN can sell or lease their
facilities, lines, or conduits to any person." 0 A municipal RTN would be
107. Id. at 11.
108. Commission Adopts Rules to Implement Local Competition Provisions of Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 (August 1, 1996) <http:llwww.fcc.gov/nrcc6052.html>.
109. Id.
110. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 12804-12808 (Deering 1990).
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required to file tariffs with the state PUC for telecommunications services, as
would other telecommunication carriers. In addition, a facilities-based carrier
must also make its services available for resale to other telecommunication
carriers on a nondiscriminatory basis."'
In California, for example, municipal facilities-based carriers must
provide service to any customer who requests it and is located within 300 feet
of their transmission facilities.1 2 They are not required to build out facilities
further than 300 feet, although it could readily service such customers through
the use of unbundled wireline or wireless local loops obtained from a LEC.
Additionally, such carriers must submit a Proponent's Environmental Assess-
ment for any construction project that will withstand review under the Califor-
nia Environmental Quality Act.1 13
Cities can also be resellers of LECs such as Pacific Bell or GTE for local
and intraLATA services, as well as for interLATA services from any other
certificated provider. As a reseller, a city would not be limited to providing
services within the city or the surrounding region, but could apply for state-
wide authority."14
As any other telecommunications carrier, a city RTN would be required
to serve all customers requesting service within its designated territory on a
nondiscriminatory basis." 5 The service area map must be filed with the state
PUC. The bulk of certification requirements pertain to financial qualifications
that a city should be able to meet."
16
RTN providers will likely qualify for a Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity ("CPCN") for local, intraLATA, and interLATA telecommuni-
cations services within the state. The certification requirements are not
onerous and are easier for resellers, who do not have to construct facilities,
111. Id. § 1001. Decisions granting Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity for
all facilities-based carriers are further required to provide services for the Deaf and Disabled
(they can be the resale of LEC services) and 611 repair service. Finally, redlining is prohib-
ited and subject to strong action by the FCC. Id. § 4.
112. California Public Utilities Commission Decision 96-02-072 app. E, at 8 § F(2) (Feb.
23, 1996).
113. See id. at app. E.
114. See California Public Utilities Commission Decision 95-12-056, app. C, at 9 § F
(Dec. 20, 1995).
115. Id. The city would be required to provide 1+ presubscription or l0xxx equal access
to any interexchange carrier which subscribes to its switched access services. Id. § F(5).
116. See California Public Utilities Commission Decision 95-12-056, app. C (Dec. 20,
1995).
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than for facilities-based services. 17 Many facilities-based providers are also
authorized resellers.
If a municipal RTN uses any type of satellite services, the FCC has the
authority to regulate such services." 8 The FCC has the exclusive jurisdiction
over Direct Broadcast Satellite services and can preempt tariff and rate
regulation of competitive telecommunications companies without market
power.119 As a result, cities cannot impose any taxes or fees on satellite
services providing direct-to-home programming,' 20 nor can they impose any
assessment or tax for the privilege of doing business, regulating, or raising
revenue. 121
Municipal RTN services provided through radio bands or microwave
technologies would require an FCC license, 12 if they have not already ob-
tained such authority.'23 Many municipally-owned public utilities are set up as
cooperatives and are therefore exempt from regulation governing utilities,
rights-of-way, or pole attachments. 24 As a result, municipal utilities would
have broad discretion in their service offerings and operations.
While the Act generally permits a reasonable rate of return on intercon-
nection fees of a LEC or a facilities-based provider, cities such as San Diego,
California generally are precluded from making a profit on business enterprises
absent specific authorization.125 Municipal utilities, generally, may set rates
and charges for their services which will allow them to be self-supporting.' 26
However, they are restricted in being able to charge for large expenditures and
the interest thereon for future needs.12 7 As a result, municipal RTNs could not
include a profit charge for access or fees.
117. Neither certification process is particularly difficult, and many state PUCs try to
expedite the processing of all such applications.
118. Telecommunications Act § 205(b).
119. Id.
120. Id. § 602(a).
121. Id. § 602(b)(5).
122. The FCC maintains statutory authority to grant licenses to the communications
industry. T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 328 (West Publishing, 4th
ed. 1994).
123. See also Commission Adopts Streamlined Licensing Rules and Procedures for Fixed
Microwave Services, Report No. DC 96-10, 1996 WL 54272, at *1 (F.C.C. Feb. 8, 1996).
124. See Matter of Helicon Group, 1996 FCC LEXIS 821, at *6 n.9 (citing 47 U.S.C. §
224 (1994) (utility does not include any entity that is cooperatively owned)). Municipal
utilities are exempt from regulation under the Pole Attachment Act. Id.; CAL PUB. UTIL
CODE § 767.5(a)(1) (Deering 1990).
125. See Ravettino v. San Diego, 160 P.2d 52, 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945).
126. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 12809 (Deering 1990).
127. Id.
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IV. CITY INITIATIVES AS USERS OF RTNs
As users of a RTN, cities have two primary goals: 1) to ensure favorable
rates for city government services and 2) to ensure that all city residents have
universal access to telecommunication services at affordable prices. In some
ways, these two goals seem at odds with each other. The need for reasonable
access and interconnection rates from providers must be reconciled with
universal access which must be subsidized by providers. While universal
service will likely be achieved through federal and state regulation, it is
included as a "user need" because cities can sometimes leverage their role as
users to obtain favorable disposition for their residents.
A. Leveraging City User Needs for Favorable Rates
Cities who choose not to build RTNs may instead opt to upgrade their
existing PVNs and rely upon competition from private providers to address
city concerns.'2 Sunnyvale, California chose not to compete as a gateway
with private providers. Instead, the City has formed a strategic partnership
with nine other Santa Clara counties to aggregate their purchasing power with
existing providers. 129  This partnership is negotiating with Pacific Bell to
rebuild its county infrastructure to enable video and data services in addition to
voice services.130 To meet internal needs, the City has designed, administered,
managed, and maintained its own PVN. The PVN provides interconnectivity
to other government sites using a FDDI13 1 fiber backbone with inter and
intranet nodes and wired remotes sites using ISDN 32 lines.3 The school
districts operate autonomously but will have access to the City's network.
The City of San Diego has joined with San Diego County to develop a
Private Virtual Network to service their internal and regional needs.' 34 The
PVN will be composed of San Diego's existing networks called SanNet'
35
128. See Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 11.
129. Sunnyvale Telecommunications Policy, supra note 6, at 20.
130. Id.
131. FDDI means Fiber Data Distributed Interface. It is a two-ring configuration which
is counterdirectional to ensure redundancy in the network.
132. Integrated Services Digital Network is an international set of recommendations and
standards for digital networks. WIAM STALUINGS, INTEGRATED SERvIcEs DIMAL
NETwORKS 103 (1988).
133. Telephone Interview with Shawn Hernadez, Director of Information Services, City
of Sunnyvale (Dec. 18, 1996).
134. San Diego RFP, supra note 2, at 1.
135. Id. at 4.
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which serve the city government, city and county libraries, and several regional
justices within the San Diego LATA. This network includes a private,
switched, integrated PBX telephone network and a broadband data network
136linking Local Area Networks. It is proposed that this network will be
upgraded and expanded with fiber nodes.
Where cities or regions have decided to aggregate their collective user
needs, they have been able to negotiate favorable terms, such as postalized
rates, for access from existing providers. Postalized rates are flat rate charges
that are not based on distance. 137 The State of Ohio, for example, has been
able to obtain favorable postalized rates for government and institutional users
negotiating directly with existing carriers, Ameritech and LCI. 138 While such
rates do not include commercial or resell use, it does seem to indicate that
existing providers are amiable to providing some discounts for aggregated
services.
B. Universal Service
The challenge for universal access is to design a market system that will
drive subsidy levels down over time.13 9 Traditionally, "universal service" has
meant access to basic telephone service.14° Under the Act, "universal service"
will mean affordable telecommunications services for everyone, including
136. Ie. at 7.
137. Postalized rates are generally divided into interLATA and intraLATA rates but not
based upon a per mile distance. In some instances, these rates can also include flat rates not
tied to per minute or per usage units, typically found in switched lines. Interview with Fredric
Goldberg, Senior Network Architect, NASA Lewis Research Center (Dec. 27, 1996).
138. Interview with Paul Karas, Contractor for the Department of Administrative Ser-
vices, State of Ohio (July 1996). Ohio originally proposed to build a $180 million statewide
broadband fiber optic network known as State of Ohio Multi-Agency Communications System
("SOMACS") to connect state buildings, local governments, schools, libraries, and universi-
ties. Telecommunications Subcommittee Report, Prepared for Inter-Agency Telecommunica-
tions Committee, State of Ohio, 10-14 (1993). The State rationalized that it was not cost
effective or reliable for the government to manage, maintain, and service the network, even
though the State was interested in some equity participation. As a result, the State concluded
that it was better to contract with existing carriers to service its needs on their networks.
These carriers were selected over other existing providers in part because of their superior
pricing schedule and willingness to postalize the rates. The SOMACS system is restricted to
state functions including government and institutional operations. Id.
139. Statement of Reed E. Hundt, supra note 54, at 7.
140. Brenda J. Tralnor, Manager Regional Telecommunications, Clark County, Nevada,
The Local Government Perspective: Can the Harmonica Play in the Symphony, Address at the
New York Law School's Conference: Universal Service in Context: A Multidisciplinary
Perspective (Dec. 6, 1995), at <http://cdinet.comBenton/Retrieveluniv-service l.txt>.
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every classroom, library, and health care facility.' 41 When and how this will be
achieved has been delegated to a new joint State-Federal Board (the "Board")
established under the Act.' 42 It is noteworthy that city participation has been
conspicuously excluded from the Board. This is a fundamental flaw in
implementing universal service because all communications efforts begin and
end with the local loop. 143 Until this is remedied, the cities' only leverage to
ensure universal access is through their role as a user or contractor in negoti-
ating agreements with existing providers.
What is known is that the universal service pool will require subsidies of
approximately $12 billion.' 44 The largest piece will be for residential rate
assistance.145  One proposal is to fund the pool using a nondiscriminatory
compensation structure that includes a variety of payment forms: "cash,
capacity, service and cooperative local infrastructure development."
14'
The Act requires the Board to make recommendations to the FCC, which
is authorized to establish and conduct periodic reviews' 47 of rules to define
148
and promote universal service and access. 49 The Act provides certain conces-
sions for municipal institutions, 50 subject to some restrictions.' 51  Rates
141. See Statement of Reed E. Hundt, supra note 54, at 7. The Board recently redefined
universal service to reflect "evolving" levels of services including access to advanced services
that change as technology improves.
142. Section 254(b) establishes the following principles for ensuring universal access: 1)
to provide quality services at just, reasonable, and affordable rates; 2) to furnish all regions of
the Nation with advanced telecommunications and information services; 3) to provide all
consumers with access to similar service; and 4) to try to nondiscriminatorily preserve and
advance universal service. Telecommunications Act § 254(b).
143. Trainor, supra note 140, at 5.
144. Statement of Reed E. Hundt, supra note 54, at 7.
145. Id.
146. Trainor, supra note 140, at 4.
147. See Telecommunications Act § 402(a).
148. Id. § 254(c)(3). This definition currently includes special services provided to
schools, libraries, and health care providers.
149. Id. § 254(c).
150. Id. § 254 (h)(5)(C).
151. The city would be specifically precluded from reselling any services provided to the
schools, health care providers, or libraries for compensation. Id. § 254(h)(3). Providers
cannot, for example, resell Internet access to third parties if it was provided under this
program. The city would, however, be eligible for favorable cost treatment for any schools
with an endowment of less than $50,000,000 or libraries that participate in state-based funds
under Title III of the Library Services and Construction Act. Telecommunications Act §
254(h)(4).
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provided by "eligible telecommunications carriers" 152 for service to public
schools and libraries for educational purposes shall be discounted by an
amount determined by the FCC and the state PUC to ensure affordable
access. 53 The FCC is also required to establish "competitively neutral" rules
to enhance advanced telecommunications and information services for all
public and nonprofit elementary and secondary school classrooms, health care
providers, and libraries. Moreover, a telecommunications carrier would not be
able to cross subsidize non-competitive services with competitive services.
15 4
This means that the pricing of government-based services would be indepen-
dent of pricing for educational related services. What is unclear is whether
these provisions will ensure more favorable rates than if cities, by aggregating
their needs, negotiated with ineligible carriers.
Another option for cities is to provide incentives to providers for access to
public rights-of-way in exchange for universal service. Sunnyvale, California,
for example, advocates that providers be required to maintain open networks
through their common carrier obligations.15 5 The City wants to allow private
investors access to public rights-of-way for no or low cost as compensation in
lieu of full or partial encroachment fees.' 56 By leveraging municipal resources
and facilities, cities may be able to ensure that residents get affordable access
to telecommunication services such as Internet access.
V. IMPACT OF ACT ON CrrY INITIATIVES AS REGULATORS OF RTNs
Cities regulate RTNs under the Act through control over access to public
rights-of-way 57 and in exercise of their franchise authority. 58 The major issue
for cities as regulators is the extent to which they can impose recurring or
annual fees or other charges on telecommunication providers pursuant to their
152. Eligible telecommunications carriers are common carriers or entities designated as
such by the state PUC as eligible to receive Federal Universal Service Support for health,
education, and library services. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1994). This section was amended by
section 102(e)(1) of the Telecommunications Act.
153. Telecommunications Act § 254(h)(1)(B).
154. Id. § 254(k).
155. Sunnyvale Telecommunications Policy, supra note 6, at 20.
156. IcL
157. See, e.g., Saathoff v. City of San Diego, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 354 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995). Section 105 of the San Diego City Charter vests control in the City over the use of the
streets and other public places.
158. See, e.g. SAN DiEGO Crry CHARTER ch. 44 (1993), § 103 Franchises; § 103.1 Regu-
lation of Public Utilities; § 104 Term and Plan of Purchase; and § 105 Right of Regulation
(granting San Diego the power to grant franchises to any person, firm, or corporation).
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franchise authority. 59 A franchise is "created when a governmental agency
authorizes private companies to set up their infrastructures on public property
in order to provide public utilities to the public."1'6
A. Franchise Fee Obligations on Video Providers
Cities exercise local franchise authority over cable companies and other
video providers by granting nonexclusive franchises. 6' These franchises are
adopted by city ordinance through a negotiated franchise agreement. The grant
of a franchise neither precludes cities from building their own video delivery
system, 62 nor prevents cities from granting other franchises. 63 Under cable
franchise agreements, entities are generally required to pay annual franchise
fees tied to a percentage of their gross revenues. In addition, cities may
negotiate other concessions, such as public access channels.' 64
In Sunnyvale, California, for example, the City currently has franchise
agreements for wireless communications with MetroCom and for cable TV
services with TCL 65 Under these agreements, the franchisee pays five percent
of gross revenues to the City which are deposited in the general fund.
66
Notwithstanding local franchise authority, cities are expressly preempted
from imposing franchise obligations on cable companies providing telecom-
159. In San Diego, for example, the City Council is empowered to: 1) provide reasonable
terms and conditions of operation; 2) certify franchises for specific terms in accordance with
the laws of the State; 3) terminate the franchise where the welfare of the City necessitates; 4)
vest in the City plenary control over all primary and secondary uses of the City's streets and
public places; and 5) grant franchises as prescribed by ordinance with the franchisee paying
compensation to the City in the amount set forth in such ordinance. Id. § 105.
160. Saathoff, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 356.
161. In San Diego, for example, the City Council granted a nonexclusive franchise to
American Television and Communications Corporation. San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 0-15213
(Mar. 10, 1980). This franchise covers all areas in the corporate limits of the City of San
Diego and automatically terminates in the year 2010 with the provisions of the ordinance
renegotiable every fifth year. Id. § 6.
162. A franchisee does not have a cause of action for diminished value should the city
build a RTN which focuses on video program services. In Helena Water Works Co. v.
Helena, 195 U.S. 383, 388 (1904), the Supreme Court clearly stated that "the grant of the
franchise does not of itself raise an implied contract that the grantor will not do any act to
interfere with the rights granted" to the franchise holder.
163. For example, the San Diego Ordinance governing cable franchisees does not restrict
cable competition regardless of need. San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 0-15213 (Mar. 10, 1980).
See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494-96 (1986).
164. 47 U.S.C. § 543 (1988).
165. Telephone Interview with Shawn Hernadez, supra note 133.
166. Sunnyvale Telecommunications Policy, supra note 6, at 12-13.
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munications services under the Act.167 This means that while cities could grant
competing franchises for cable television services, 168 they could arguably not
extract additional concessions from existing franchisees seeking to provide
telecommunications services. 169 Moreover, they could not condition the grant
of any franchise or renewal on providing telecommunications services. 170 In
the event of a sale, however, this would not preclude cities from negotiating
favorable concessions from a cable company. The City of Seattle, Washington
for example, following a sale of the cable franchise by Viacom to TCI, is
leveraging its position to negotiate with TCI for favorable residential high
speed Internet access.'
7
'
Cities may also impose fees on LECs that provide video programming
under "open video systems."' 72 These fees are tied to the gross revenue in lieu
of franchise fees in cities subject to statewide franchises. The only caveat is
that the rates cannot exceed the fees imposed on cable operators.
173
B. Just Compensation for Use of Rights-of-Way
Cities are specifically authorized by the Act' 74 and the state PUCs 175 to
receive "just and reasonable" compensation for use of their rights-of-way, as
well as for roof rights for wireless service proceeding. Moreover, these rights
may not be unnecessarily withheld. Cities are permitted to establish such fees
167. Telecommunications Act § 303(a)(3)(C).
168. A "cable television system" is defined as a system of antennas, cables, wires, lines,
towers, waves guides, or any other conductors, converters, equipment, or facilities designed
and constructed for the purpose of producing, receiving, amplifying, and distributing, audio,
video, and other forms of electronic or electrical signals. Id.
169. Id. § 303(a)(3)(D).
170. Id.
171. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 11.
172. Telecommunications Act § 653.
173. Id. § 653(c)(2)(B).
174. Section 253(c) provides in pertinent part: "Nothing in this section affects the
authority of a... local government to manage the public rights-of-way or to require fair and
reasonable compensation from telecommunications providers, on a competitively neutral and
nondiscriminatory basis, .. if the compensation required is publicly disclosed by such
government." Id. § 253(c).
175. The CPUC provides in part:
It is therefore the intent of the Legislature that public utilities and publicly owned
utilities be fairly and adequately compensated for the use of their rights-of-way
and easements for the installation of fiber optic cable, and that.., publicly
owned utilities have the ability, if they so desire, to negotiate a purchase, lease, or
rent of access to those fiber optic cables for their own use.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 767.7(b) (Deering 1990).
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by negotiated contracts on a nondiscriminatory, competitively neutral basis. 76
Once the fees have been established, they must be filed with the state PUC.177
The FCC and state PUCs have jurisdiction to review such fees following a
complaint that they are unreasonable.
Some argue that any fees imposed must be tied to actual or incremental
costs, or some related cost formula versus a revenue based formula. 178
Moreover, while there is no specific language that fees may be charged on an
on going basis, reliance on the pole attachment provisions suggest that cities
may be able to charge annual fees if they own and operate RTNs, or own their
conduits or poles. The problem confronting many cities like San Diego is that
they do not own existing utilities or facilities.
The Act preempts cities from taking any action that would be construed as
imposing a market barrier.179 Whether cities have violated this restriction is
left to the states, 80 which generally are sympathetic to existing providers to
protect their interests and to foster competition.181 Neither the FCC, nor most
state PUCs, have addressed city entitlements to compensation for private use
of public rights-of-way. As a result, city authority to regulate RTNs is limited,
and the scope of their ability to receive.compensation remains unclear. This is
particularly problematic for some cities in states like California.
C. Franchise Fee Obligations on Public Utilities
Franchise requirements are generally imposed on any public utility, which
include the entities supplying inhabitants with light, water, power, heat,
transportation, telephone service, or other means of communication.18 2
Telephone companies'83 in states like California, however, have a statewide
franchise which limits a city's ability to collect annual fees. 84 This statewide
176. Id.
177. See Telecommunications Act § 252(h).
178. See id. § 252(d); see also CAL. PUB. UTIL CODE § 767.5 (Deering 1990).
179. Section § 253(a) provides: "No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or
local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity
to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." Telecommunications Act
§253(a).
180. See id. §§ 252(b)(1), 703 (regarding arbitration and pole attachments).
181. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 9.
182. See, e.g., SAN DiEGo CrrY CHA'rER ch. 44, § 105 (1993).
183. The California Public Utilities Code defines telephone corporation as "every corpo-
ration or person owning, controlling, operating, or managing any telephone line for compen-
sation within this State." CAL PUB. UTIL CODE § 234 (Deering 1990).
184 Section 7901 states that a "telephone corporation may construct lines.., along and
upon any public road...." CAL PUB. UTI CODE § 7901 (West 1996).
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franchise applies to all telephone companies operating within the state, even if
they also provide video and data services. 185 This restriction does not apply,
however, to other public utilities like electric companies, nor does it preclude
cities from imposing utility user taxes.
Sunnyvale, California for example, proposes to create an advanced
digital, broadband, telecommunications infrastructure. 186 Pacific Bell, as the
LEC, and alternative service providers are exempt from local franchising
requirements including franchise fees, but must obtain encroachment permits
for underground construction.' 87 The City also has an indefinite franchise
agreement with Pacific Gas & Electric for gas and electric service, under
which it pays a franchise fee of one percent of gross revenues. PG&E has
unrestricted access to rights-of-way, although it also must obtain an encroach-
ment permit, but it is not subject to the customer service standards imposed on
TCI as its cable provider.
While state PUCs like the California Public Utilties Commission preclude
cities from collecting franchise fees from telephone companies, PUCs do allow
annual, recurring fees' 88 to be assessed by telephone companies and other
public utilities. This is in addition to an "annual cost of ownership"' 89 for
access to private utility poles and supporting structures.' 9° This disparity in the
ability to collect compensation for public and private rights-of-way is unjusti-
fiable. In essence, these cities cannot collect annual franchise fees from
telephone companies for use of public streets even though these same compa-
nies can charge others for access to their privately owned conduits.' 91 This
185. Id. § 7901(3).
186. Sunnyvale Telecommunications Policy, supra note 6, at 6.
187. Id. at 7.
188. In California, for example, the annual fee for pole attachment shall be $2.50 in the
first year. Thereafter, the annual fee shall be $2.50 or 7.4% of the public utility's annual cost
of ownership for the pole and supporting anchor. CAL. PUB. UTIL CODE § 767.5 (c)(2)(A)
(Deering 1990).
189. The ."[a]nnual cost of ownership' means the sum of the annual capital costs and
annual operation costs of the support structure[s] ... owned by the public utility. The basis
for computation of annual capital costs shall be historical capital costs less depreciation." Id.
§ 767.5(a)(9).
190. "Supporting structure" includes a duct or conduit, manhole, or handhole. Id. §
767.5(a)(2).
191. The Telecommunications Act imposes on all LECs obligations to provide resale,
access to rights-of-way, and establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transport and
termination of traffic. Telecommunications Act § 251(b).
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means that these cities arguably will not receive franchise fees from resellers
of LEC telecommunication services or others who interconnect with LECs. 192
Cities do have the right to impose permit fees, such as the encroachment
fees previously discussed. 193 Such fees are fixed, one time costs that are
nominal and would not account for on going maintenance of public rights-of-
way.
D. Alternatives for Non-Municipal Utility Cities
There are two possible alternative sources of revenue that may be
available to cities who do not own municipal utility facilities, such as poles or
conduits, and/or who are subject to statewide franchise restrictions. The first is
for cities to build municipally-owned conduits for public and private access.
The second is imposing utility user taxes on telecommunication providers.
Under the first option, cities would continue to process permit applica-
tions of existing carriers for access to existing private conduits or poles, until
they reach capacity. Cities could then require that all new installation of lines
or networks be through conduits that the city would install and/or maintain.194
This action would presumably be pursuant to a telecommunication policy that
recognized the city's role as a facilitator or regulator to coordinate access and
use of public rights-of-way.
It is ill-advised to apply this requirement to existing conduits because
such action would likely constitute a taking, requiring compensation by the
government. A phased-in approach, however, allows existing facilities to
continue to operate while addressing the likely proliferation of new telecom-
munications carriers, and, therefore, the increased need in access to infra-
structure conduits.
Such an approach could be justified on four grounds. First, cities have the
authority pursuant to their police powers to coordinate among access providers
192. It is noteworthy that section 7901 of the CPUC is outdated and needs to be revised
to account for new technology such as fiber optics and the convergence of services which
allow cable to provide telephony over its coaxial lines. Instead, it focuses upon the method of
transmission as a point of distinction for application of statewide franchise rules. CAL PUB.
UTIL CODE § 7901.
193. See SAN DIGO MUNICIPAL CODE § 62.0102 (1992) (governing city rights-of-way).
The Code also allows the City Council to establish a schedule of fees for permits to improve
or encroach within rights of way. Such fees may include fixed charges to cover the City costs.
Id. § 62.0109.
194. It is possible that this may be subject to legal challenge as a market entry barrier to
the extent it precluded a carrier from engineering its network in the most efficient manner
from a technical and economic perspective.
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and establish a process for gaining access to city rights-of-way. 195 If all new
cables, lines, etc. were passed through city owned conduits, it would minimize
the likely disruption to streets which cause congestion and a potential public
hazard. In this way, cities would be leasing space in their conduits, which is
consistent with their rights as municipal utilities or telecommunication carriers.
Second, the Act clearly contemplates that interconnection for telecommu-
nications services be implemented through a coordinated planning process.
196
Establishing a process through city ordinance would effect the purpose to
minimize redundancy, maximize planning and coordination, and facilitate
interconnectivity. Third, as long as the rates were competitively neutral,
nondiscriminatory, reasonable, and did not prohibit any telecommunications
carrier from entering the market, there likely would be no basis for state or
federal preemption.
Finally, the LECs and cable companies still would be able to utilize their
existing conduits for internal expansion, or lease space on their poles and
conduits to third parties until they reach capacity. As new providers would
have a choice in who to lease capacity from, this approach would not likely be
construed as anticompetitive.
97
Cities could also consider imposing utility user taxes on users of utility
services which include public utilities, cable and telephone companies, and
arguably telecommunications carriers.' 98  The City of Sunnyvale imposes a
utility-user tax of two percent on all utilities, including PG&E and Pacific
Bell. 199 In many instances, utilities collect the tax from users to give to the
state. States then distribute to cities on a proportional basis. Such taxes are
authorized generally by federal statute2°° but also must be specifically author-
195. Section 62.0105(c) provides:
A permittee shall notify all public utilities of his request to construct improve-
ments or encroachments with the rights-of-way and shall coordinate with the
public utilities in order that any necessary relocations of existing facilities may be
done in an orderly fashion without interrupting the continuity of service or en-
dangering life or property.
SAN DIEGO MUNICIPAL CODE § 62.0105(c).
196. Section 256(a)(1) of the Act established procedures used when there is an oversight
by the Commission regarding coordinated network planning and design by telecommunica-
tions carriers and other providers for interconnectivity. Telecommunications Act § 256(a)(1).
197. See, e.g., Jerry L. Beane, Antitrust, 25 TEX. TECH L. REv. 453, 458 (1994).
198. The City of Sunnyvale imposes the utility user tax on alternative access providers.
Sunnyvale Telecommunications Policy, supra note 6, at 12.
199. Id.
200. The Internal Revenue Code permits the imposition of a 3% tax on local telephone
service, toll, and teletype service. I.R.C. § 4223 (1997). This tax does not apply to private
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ized in each state's constitution and under city charter or authority.201 Utility
user taxes are not specifically addressed by the Act.
It is important to note that while such taxes may not be viewed as a
market barrier, taxes generally are perceived by industries as disincentives to
economic development in an area. San Diego, for example, uses the fact that it
does not impose user taxes as an attraction for new businesses to the area.
Consequently, imposing a utility user tax is recommended only as a last
alternative and where there are other incentives that can offset any adverse
perception.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no question that RTNs will be developed and that cities will play
critical roles. The exact nature of that role will undoubtedly depend upon a
variety of factors. Chief among them will be a city's existing resources, such
as whether it owns its own utility; the level of risk it is willing to assume; and
the level of interest from existing and new providers to form strategic partner-
ships. It is this author's opinion that cities should focus attention on develop-
ing strategic partnerships among themselves and other institutional users which
can be leveraged in negotiating favorable terms from existing providers. In
many ways the uncertainty associated with technology may warrant that cities
use a combination of technologies until network systems become ubiquitous.
It is likely that the revenue generator for cities will be applications and services
it chooses to provide, rather than revenue from owning the pipeline. What is
important is that cities move forward in some direction now. The information
highway is being built, and cities need to have access to some infrastructure
that enables them to compete on it.
systems or enhanced services, defined as communication services furnished to a subscriber
that gives subscriber exclusive or priority use of channel or to intercommunication systems for
the subscriber's station regardless of whether connected through switching network. Id.
201. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 521-22. Taxes should be distinguished from fees in
that taxes are a public burden imposed on citizens for government purposes without reference
to particular individual or property. They are generally imposed to raise money for the
government. An assessment or fee is imposed for improvements and is beneficial to particular
individual and imposed in relation to benefit. See also Fenton v. City of Delano, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments.... Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made avail-
able to all on equal terms.
-Chief Justice Earl Warren)
I. INTRODUCTION: TITLE IX
On February 26, 1992, the United States Supreme Court, in Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools,2 announced that "[i]n sum, we conclude
that a damages remedy is available for an action brought to enforce Title
IX.' '3 This decision has ushered in the post-modern era of Title IX activity.
June 23, 1997 will mark the silver anniversary of the passage of Title IX.
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
2. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
3. Id. at 76.
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This article examines the representative issues and battles being fought in
the educational forum concerning sex discrimination in academics and
athletics. The years 1994 and 1995 represented a mixed bag for Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"). The year 1996 resulted in
an avalanche of major decisions in this area, which will also be explored.4
The Title IX statute states that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 5 This article focuses on Title IX as it
pertains to interscholastic and intercollegiate athletic programs and activi-
ties. Due to the influx of decisions concerning Title IX generally, all of the
Title IX decisions rendered since 1994 will be probed. There were no
changes to the Title IX statute itself, though Congress enacted a truth-in-
advertising type of statute, entitled the "Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics
Act,"6 and the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") implemented regulations.
The new Act concerns compiling and making available financial information
relating to intercollegiate athletic departments which receive federal funds,
either directly or indirectly, through their universities.
The Title IX regulations were enacted in 1975.8 To date, no changes
have been made. The 1979 Health Education & Welfare ("HEW") Policy
Interpretation addressing intercollegiate athletics also remains unchanged.9
The United States Department of Education, through the OCR, is the main
entity responsible for enforcement and compliance with Title IX. During
April 1990, the OCR unveiled a new Title IX Athletics Investigators Manual.
No changes were made to the Manual despite the meetings that were held
during this period to review it. The OCR's actual budget for fiscal year 1995
4. See Education Amendments of 1972 §§ 901-909, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
6. See Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382 (Oct. 20, 1994),
which contained the Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics Act. See also Jim Naughton &
Rachanee Srisavasdr, Data on Funds for Men's & Women's Sports Became Available as New
Law Takes Effect, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 25, 1996, at A45.
7. 34 C.F.R. § 668 (1996).
8. 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (1996).
9. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979). The OCR is excepted from having to comply with refer-
ences to the Women's Equity Action League v. Harris case contained therein due to the
decision in Women's Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 44
Fed. Reg. at 71,418.
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totaled the incredulous amount of $58,236,000.10 Congressional hearings
were held on Title IX during May 1995. As a result, during September
1995, the OCR delivered a draft policy clarification entitled "Clarification of
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three Part Test." During
January 1996, the OCR issued the official "Clarification of Intercollegiate
Athletics Policy Guidance." The states directed few bills to the issue of
gender equity in academic athletic programs and activities.1
The major issues raised in this time period are: 1) should the "effective
accommodation" test be used in analyzing whether a school is satisfying the
interests and abilities of students of each sex when separate athletic pro-
grams and activities are provided; 2) whether a Title IX cause of action
exists for an employee of an educational institution based on sex discrimina-
tion, as opposed to merely a Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII")'2
cause of action; 3) assuming arguendo that Title X does allow a private
cause of action for athletic department employees of educational institutions,
then what protection does Title IX provide where the coach of the women's
athletic team is paid less than the coach of the men's team, coaching the
same sport, primarily due to the sex of the athletes involved; 4) what
standard applies to analyze a Title IX sexual harassment action; and does the
standard differ based on whether the sexual harassment concerns a student
versus an educational employee, or when the offending party is another
student (peer sexual harassment), or another individual; 5) procedurally,
10. Clinton's Fiscal 1997 Budget Plans for Higher Education & Science, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Mar. 29, 1996, at A43. The estimated OCR budget for fiscal year 1996 was
$53,951,000, and the amount requested for fiscal year 1997 was an even $60 million. Id.
11. For example, on January 5, 1995, a bill was introduced in Missouri prohibiting
"colleges and universities from discriminating on the basis of gender in athletics programs."
State Legislation Relating to College Athletics, NCAA NEws, Jan. 25, 1995, at 5. On January
30, 1995, a bill was introduced in New York, S. 1352, which would provide that educational
institutions must provide each student with equal opportunity in athletics programs without
regard to each student's sex or familial status. State Legislation Relating to College Athletics,
NCAA NEws, Feb. 22, 1995, at 14. In Tennessee, a bill was introduced, S. 694, which would
require the payment of "equal base salaries to athletic directors and coaches with equal
experience limits this requirement to sports in which both men's and women's teams compete
at the intercollegiate level." Id. An Illinois bill, S. 269, would allow tuition waivers to female
student athletes at public universities in the state. State Legislation Relating to College
Athletics, NCAA NEws, May 31, 1995, at 5. Representative Kahn of Minnesota introduced a
state bill which would amend "the Human Rights Act to permit the restriction of membership
on an athletics team (program or event) to participants of one sex whose overall athletics
opportunities previously have been limited." State Legislation Relating to College Athletics,
NCAA NEWS, Dec. 2, 1996, at 19.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (1994).
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which statute of limitations should be used for a Title IX cause of action,
and; 6) does Title IX foreclose a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
vice versa.13 Is Title IX really an enigma?
The overwhelming number of cases commenced, subject to court
decisions, or settled concerned female employees of athletic departments-
coaches, athletic directors, or trainers-were predicated on claims of sexual
discrimination or retaliation pursuant to three possible federal statutes: Title
IX, Title VII, or the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("Equal Pay Act").' 4 There
continues to be an absence of a uniform judicial standard concerning these
cases from a Title IX perspective.' 5 There was a lot of activity concerning
female collegiate students seeking to enforce gender equity. A handful of
cases were brought by male collegiate students, all seeking to forestall
internment of their varsity sports teams. The courts turned back all their
attempts. The first co-ed gender equity claims relating to athletics were
commenced during the time period. Surprisingly, there was scant legal
action instituted concerning interscholastic athletic programs, which contin-
ues the trend of 1992-93. Interestingly, the courts rendered the first of a
handful of decisions concerning educational programs and activities afforded
female prisoners in this country, which underscored their second-class status
in this institution.
Collectively, the decisions rendered during 1994-95, with a few
exceptions, have a meandering quality about them. Conversely, the deci-
sions handed down during 1996 were being delivered at a staccato pace, with
the effect of a volcanic eruption. 16 Part Two reviews decisions involving
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988).
15. There continues to be no judicial decision interpreting "equal opportunity" as it per-
tains to coaches, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(5)-(6), or the following regulations concerning
employment: 34 C.F.R. § 106.7 (Effect of employment opportunities), 34 C.F.R. § 106.51
(Employment), 34 C.F.R. § 106.52 (Employment criteria), 34 C.F.R. § 106.54
(Compensation), 34 C.F.R. § 106.55 (Job classification and structure). See Diane Heckman,
The Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in Intercollegiate Athletics During 1992-93: Defining
the "Equal Opportunity" Standard, 1994 DEr. C.L. REv. 953, 998-1016 (1994).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (single-sex military
schools) (discussed infra p. 555); Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th
Cir. 1996) (discussed infra p. 623); Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir.
1996) (discussed infra p. 551); Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 1395 (5th Cir.
1996) (Title IX sexual abuse) (discussed infra p. 640); Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ.,
76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996) (Title IX sexual harassment) (discussed infra p. 625); Davis v.
Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996) (Title IX peer sexual harass-
ment) (discussed infra p. 641); Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 357 (1996) (Title IX employment); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir.
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procedural aspects of Title IX. Part Three examines cases dealing with
education generally, including separate programs for men and women at
public military schools and at prisons (federal and state). Part Four switches
to athletic departments, programs, and activities, and monitors decisions
involving student athletes and prospective student athletes on the interscho-
lastic and intercollegiate level. Part Five showcases decisions concerning
athletic department employees or former employees-brought pursuant to
Title IX, but frequently pursuing other federal statutes-in four areas:
hiring; equal pay and benefits or comparable pay; termination claims
predicated on sex discrimination; and retaliation claims. Part Six focuses on
educational employment termination or retaliation generally. Part Seven
details the implosion of Title IX case law pertaining to sexual harassment of
students or educational employees. This area is subdivided into six catego-
ries depending on the status of the individual who allegedly engaged in the
harassing actions and the status of the individual allegedly harassed, and
includes: coach/student athlete; teacher/student; supervisor/student;
other/student; student/student (peer sexual harassment); and educational
employment sexual harassment. Part Eight monitors the congressional and
federal regulatory action of the United States Department of Education and
the OCR.
IX. PROCEDURALLY
In Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College,17 the Eighth Circuit
utilized the Minnesota six-year statute of limitations utilized for personal
injury actions for a Title IX claim, eschewing a one-year statute of limita-
tions pertinent to the state civil rights actions (Minnesota Human Rights
1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussed infra p. 565;
Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496 (D. Kan. 1996) (Title IX contact sport participation)
(discussed infra p. 564); Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La.
1996) (Title IX equal opportunity for female collegiate student athletes) (discussed infra
p. 580); Bartges v. University of N.C. at Charlotte, 908 F. Supp. 1312 (W.D.N.C. 1995)
(discussed infra p. 608); and Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 900
F. Supp. 844 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 99 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussed infra p. 631).
See also Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
165 (1996) (declining review of the Fifth Circuit's decision).
17. 72 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 1995). See Nelson v. University of Me. Sys., 914 F. Supp. 643,
648 (D. Me. 1996) (applying Maine's six-year personal injury statute of limitations, rather
than the civil rights statute of limitations) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)). See
also Nelson v. University of Me. System, 923 F. Supp. 275 (D. Me. 1996).
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Act).18 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit, in Lillard v. Shelby County Board of
Education,19 applied the Tennessee personal injury statute of limitations,
rejecting the 180-day period used for filing Title VI administrative com-
plaints. Moreover, during 1994, the district court in Linville v. Hawaii"
concluded that the statute of limitations for filing a Title IX claim is separate
and distinct from the statute of limitations imposed for Title VII claims, even
if the underlying facts triggering both claims are the same.
In Topol v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania,2' the plaintiff was
allowed to add a claim of retaliation under Title IX. The district court in
Mann v. University of Cincinnati22 held that the Title IX scheme is compre-
hensive enough to subsume 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims based on other consti-
tutional guarantees, while the Sixth Circuit resolutely came to the opposite
conclusion during 1996 in Lillard.23 During 1994, the district court in Stern
v. Milford Board of Education4 resolved that an elementary student could
pursue a Title IX claim for sexual harassment against the school board due to
peer sexual harassment, even though a state claim had been filed. The
Seventh Circuit, in Waid v. Merrill Area Public Schools,2s determined that a
state claim did not prevent a female employee from pursuing a Title IX claim
against the school district.
There is a growing judicial consensus that the parents of a student are
not proper party plaintiffs in Title IX actions. 26 However, whether individ-
18. This would contradict the federal district court's position in Deli v. University of
Minn., 863 F. Supp. 958, 962 (D. Minn. 1994), which applied a mere one-year statute of
limitations utilized for civil rights actions.
19. 76 F.3d 716, 729 (6th Cir. 1996). See also Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882
F.2d 74, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying the Pennsylvania personal injury statute of limita-
tions).
20. 874 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Haw. 1994).
21. 160 F.R.D. 474 (E.D. Pa. 1995). See also Murray v. New York Univ. College of
Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995) (claim of retaliation under Title IX by female dental
student implicitly recognized) (discussed infra p. 638).
22. 864 F. Supp. 44, 48 (S.D. Ohio 1994). See also Nelson v. University of Me. Sys.,
914 F. Supp. 643, 648 n.2 (D. Me. 1996); Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 59-60 (D.
Conn. 1995).
23. Lillard, 76 F.3d at 729. See also Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Schs., 890 F. Supp.
1452, 1461 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
24. 870 F. Supp. 30 (D. Conn. 1994).
25. 91 F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e can see that Congress closed the avenue
created by § 1983 to all plaintiffs who could follow the way created by Title IX.").
26. See, e.g., Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1207-08
(N.D. Iowa 1996) (claims by parents lack merit); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F.
Supp. 1006, 1020 (WD. Mo. 1995); Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1123 (D. Utah
19971
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ual coaches and teachers are proper party defendants, pursuant to Title IX,
has resulted in opposite conclusions.27 Nonetheless, it would behoove the
plaintiffs' practitioner to continue to include such individuals in the lawsuits
since other causes of action alleged may necessitate such inclusion.
HI. EDUCATION
A. Generally
In Clemes v. Del Norte Country Unified School District,28 the district
court found that a former teacher, a white male, supervising an Independent
Studies Program, which had an enrollment of Native Americans, the major-
ity of which were females, had standing under Title IX to pursue a claim of
retaliation, allegedly attributed to his actions in seeking to protect the rights
of the aforementioned.29
1994); R.L.R. v. Prague Pub. Sch. Dist. 1-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526, 1530 (W.D. Okla. 1993);
Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576-77 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
27. See Plotzke v. Boston College, No. 94-12329-EFH (D. Mass. 1995) (allowing indi-
vidually named defendants to remain as parties to the lawsuit); Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F.
Supp. 53, 56 (D. Conn. 1995). But see Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 862
(7th Cir. 1996) ("The creation of this incentive indicates that Congress intended to place the
burden of compliance with civil rights laws on educational institutions themselves, not on the
individual officials associated with those institutions."); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864
F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988); Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162,
166 (N.D.N.Y 1996); Pailett v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Tenured
professor charged with sexual harassment named as a defendant "is not a proper party either as
an employer or a teaching institution. The federal claims against him are dismissed on the
court's own motion."); Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 140, 143
(W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, No. 95-50811, 1997 WL 66087 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 1997) (discussed
infra pp. 620, 632); Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947, 953 (W.D. Tex.
1995), rev'd, Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996); Garza v.
Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437, 1438 (S.D. Tex. 1994) ('The Title IX claim
must be dismissed against individual defendants because Title IX claims may not be asserted
against individuals."); Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 145-46 (W.D. Tex. 1994);
Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867, 876 (M.D. Ga. 1993); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist.,
830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576-77 (N.D. Cal. 1993). See Slaughter v. Waubonsee Community
College, No. 94 C 2525, 1994 WL 663596, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1994) (referred to in Doe
v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 1395, 1400 n.9 (5th Cir. 1996)). See also Nelson v.
Temple Univ., 920 F. Supp. 633, 638 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (cause of action was not established
against a defendant who was the administrator of student organizations and activities at the
University).
28. 843 F. Supp. 583 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
29. Id at 590.
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A male nursing student challenged his expulsion from the nursing
program in Andriakos v. University of Southern Indiana,30 claiming sex
discrimination in violation of Title IX. The Seventh Circuit upheld the
lower court's determination that the expulsion was based on his failure to
satisfy safe and professional nursing skills.31
A New York state trial court in Starishevsky v. Hofstra University32
determined that recipients of federal funds are required to adopt and publish
grievance procedures, which is in accordance with the directive of the
specific Title X regulations. 33 In another case, a male student at Vassar
College received two messages on tape which contained abusive language
and threats of physical violence directed at him due to his homosexuality. A
male student was charged with having violated the college's sexual harass-
ment policy. He brought suit in Fraad-Wolff v. Vassar College, 4 alleging
that the school violated a New York state law in not following prescribed
procedures in the investigation and adjudication of this matter. On July 12,
1996, the district court disposed of the lawsuit by granting summary judg-
ment to the college stating that "nothing in the student handbook or in the
Panel's rules required defendant to declare plaintiff innocent if the Panel
was unable to reach a decision. 35
The female plaintiff in Ivan v. Kent State University36 was enrolled in a
joint masters/doctorate program at the University, which required her to
complete a master's thesis within two years and maintain a 3.3 grade point
minimum. Subsequently, the plaintiff requested permission to skip a fall
semester (during which time she gave birth to her child) and forego employ-
ment as a graduate assistant for that semester and the following semester.
When she returned for the Spring semester, she received an "IP" (in prog-
ress) grade for her clinical practicum class. She claimed discrimination in
30. 867 F. Supp. 804 (S.D. Ind. 1992), af'd, 19 F.3d 21 (7th Cir. 1994).
31. Andriakos v. University of S. Ind., 19 F.3d 21 (7th Cir. 1994).
32. 612 N.Y.S.2d 794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). See also 34 C.F.R. § 106.9.
33. Starishevsky, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
34. 932 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
35. Id. at 93.
36. 863 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ohio 1994), aff'd mem., 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996). See
EI-Attar v. Mississippi State Univ., 68 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 817
(1996). In EI-Attar, the Title IX claim was dismissed concerning University's denial to a
doctoral program by the female plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed the denial was based solely on
her GMAT score, which disparately impacted on women and individuals who speak English
as a second language. The court rejected this argument as the University's admission policy
did not focus solely on the GMAT scores.
1997]
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receiving that grade based on her gender and her pregnancy condition. 37 On
September 14, 1995, the federal district court granted the University's
motion for summary judgment on both the Title VII and Title IX claims.
The district court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting standard
used in Title VII cases to the Title IX argument, finding that the defendant's
articulated legitimate reasons for the IP grade were not rebuffed by the
plaintiff as being pretextual.3 s The court focused solely on the employment
aspect. Parenthetically, the First Circuit, in Cohen v. Brown University,
39
left open the question of whether the burden-shifting standard should be
used in Title IX employment cases.
A female dental student failed to complete ten of her twenty-eight
courses and was notified by the college that she was required to repeat her
second year in Murray v. New York University College of Dentistry.4 She
alleged Title IX sexual discrimination based on a hostile environment
created by the actions of one of the patients involved in the school's dental
clinic4' and retaliation in having to repeat the aforementioned school year,
after she had allegedly complained about the harassment.
On June 16, 1995, the Second Circuit stated:
We have noted that in order to make out a Title IX claim based on
an educational institution's allegedly discriminatory motivation in
taking disciplinary action against a student, the complaint must set
forth a "particularized allegation relating to a causal connection
between the flawed outcome and gender bias" and must point to
"particular circumstances" supporting an inference of gender bias,
such as "statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, state-
ments by pertinent university officials, or patterns of decision-
making that also tend to show the influence of gender." No lesser
showing is necessary when the educational institution's challenged
37. Ivan, 863 F. Supp. at 584.
38. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas
provides that after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, including being
a member of the protected class, the burden shifts to the employer to advance some legitimate
reason for the adverse action. Id. at 802. Then if the employer has advanced a non-
discriminatory reason for the action, the plaintiff must establish that such reason was
pretextual. Id. at 804. See also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
39. 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussed infra p. 565).
40. 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussed infra p. 638).
41. Id (discussing the hostile environment claim).
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action is not disciplinary but is rather an enforcement of its facially
neutral academic standards.
42
On March 22, 1996, the district court, in Hall v. Lee College,43 deter-
mined there was no Title IX violation where a female student was suspended
from a private college for allegedly engaging in premarital sex in contradic-
tion of a school policy. The court determined that the plaintiff failed to
advance any evidence that the policy would not have been equally applied to
male students and thus there was no intentional discrimination on the basis
of sex.
B. Public Military Schools
The right of females to attend all-male public military schools was
examined in Faulkner v. Jones44 and United States v. Virginia.45 Title IX
excludes these schools from coverage. 6 On July 22, 1994, the district court
in Faulkner ruled that The Citadel, a public all-male military college, had to
admit Shannon Faulkner into the Corps of Cadets.47 Three weeks later, the
42. It. at 251 (citation omitted).
43. 932 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
44. 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995). See also Faulk-
ner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993) (entitling female student to attend state-appointed
all-male military school pending resolution of her equal protection claim).
45. 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994) (applying the intermediate scrutiny test, the dis-
trict court refused to require Virginia Military Academy ("VMI") to admit women), affd, 44
F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). However, it had to provide a
comparable program at an all-female state college. The female program was not required to be
a mirror-image of VMI or to adopt the same or similar methodology used at VMI. See also
United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated and remanded, 976
F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). The district court entered
judgment for the defendant, Commonwealth of Virginia, and directed the University to
undertake one of the following actions: 1) admit women to VMI; 2) establish a parallel
institution or programs; or 3) abandon state support. Id
46. Section 901(a)(5) of the Education Amendments directs that "in regard to admissions
this section shall not apply to any public institution of undergraduate higher education which
is an institution that traditionally and continually from its establishment has had a policy of
admitting only students of one sex." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5). Another subdivision, section
901(a)(4), provides that "this section shall not apply to an educational institution whose
primary purpose is the training of individuals for the military services of the United States, or
the merchant marine." See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4). However, the federal military service
academies have admitted women since 1976.
47. Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp 552, 569 (D.S.C. 1994), aff'd, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995).
1997]
42
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
Fourth Circuit granted the school's stay pending the appeal. 48  During
August 1995, Faulkner entered The Citadel, in Charleston, South Carolina,
becoming the first female cadet.49 Faulkner withdrew within the first week
indicating that to stay would only risk her health. On October 16, 1995, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that her action was moot and denied
Nancy Mellete' s motion to intervene or add a party.50
In United States v. Virginia,51 a female student challenged Virginia
Military Institute's ("VMr') decision refusing her admittance to the all male
military school. In this case predicated on violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Circuit affirmed and
remanded the case, holding that Virginia could maintain single gender
college programs as long as comparable programs were offered to both men
and women. 2 A strong dissent was registered as to the two component
arrangement and whether the particular separate-but-equal arrangement
proposed by the Commonwealth and adopted by the district court could
survive intermediate equal protection scrutiny.53 The United States Supreme
Court agreed to hear this appeal.54
On June 26, 1996, the Court, in a 7-1 decision,5 5 held that such an all-
male military college education violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause.56 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, writing for the majority,
stated that "[w]omen seeking and fit for a VMI-quality education cannot be
offered anything less ....,5 The Court framed the issue as "[niot whether
'women-or men-should be forced to attend VMI;' rather, the question is
whether the state can constitutionally deny to women who have the will and
capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely af-
fords."5 8 The Court explained:
48. Faulkner, 51 F.3d at 450.
49. See Susan Faludi, The Naked Citadel, NEw YORKER, Sept. 5, 1994, at 64 (describing
Faulkner's legal odyssey to attend The Citadel).
50. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. at 352.
51. 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995).
52. Id at 1242.
53. Id at 1250 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
54. United States v. Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
55. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). Justice Clarence Thomas did not
participate, as he has a son enrolled at the Virginia Military Institute. Id. at 2287.
56. Id. at 2269.
57. Id at 2287.
58. Id. at 2280. One commentary noted:
Because the Constitution does not regulate private conduct, the VMI ruling does
not apply to private women's colleges, as the 26 private women's colleges who
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Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must
demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for that ac-
tion .... Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of oppor-
tunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must deter-
mine whether the proffered justification is "exceedingly persua-
sive." The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely
on the State.... The justification must be genuine, not hypothe-
sized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must
not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females.59
The Court further cautioned that
such classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create
or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.
Measuring the record in this case against the review standard just
described, we conclude that Virginia has shown no "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for excluding all women from the citizen-
soldier training afforded by VMI.6
In reviewing the "parallel" program for women offered at VMI, while
excluding all females from VMI's programs and activities, the Court
commented, "[h]owever 'liberally' this plan serves the state's sons, it makes
no provision whatever for her daughters. That is not equal protection."
6
'
Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion, predicated on his disa-
greement with utilizing the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard,
but agreeing with the result of the majority.62 Justice Antonin Scalia
authored a dissent in which he commented that "[t]oday the court shuts
down an institution that has served the people of the Commonwealth of
Virginia with pride and distinction for over a century and a half. I do not
filed a Supreme Court brief against VMI's position understood.... Rather than
sounding the death knell for single-sex education, the VMI decision stands for
the proposition that individual merit must prevail over stereotyped notions of
women's talents and interests.
Marcia D. Greenberger & Deborah L. Brake, Point of View, The VMI Decision: Shattering
Sexual Stereotypes, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 5, 1996, at A52.
59. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274-75.
60. Id. at 2276 (citations omitted).
61. M at 2279.
62. Id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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think any of us, women included, will be better off for its destruction."
63
The decision will affect The Citadel. 64 VMI did not vote to admit women
until September 21, 1996, and thus, the first class with women would not be
until 1997.65 The Citadel ushered in four female cadets during August 1996.
C. Prison Education
Jeldness v. Pearce66 represents the first in a series of decisions brought
by female prisoners challenging educational programs. Female inmates in
Oregon state prisons asserted that differing educational programs and
procedures provided to them violated Title IX.67 Unlike men, women
prisoners were searched in order to travel between prisons and often arrived
late for classes. There was no apprenticeship program at women's medium
security prisons, and women could not participate in the mechanical trade
apprenticeship programs. Male prisoners were entitled to merit pay for
participating in vocational training courses, unlike the female prisoners.
The Ninth Circuit held that Title IX does not provide an exemption for
educational programs provided at state prisons, which are recipients of
federal funds.68 Further, the appellate court disregarded the Equal Protection
63. Id. at 2291 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See James S. Kunen, One Angry Man: Even on a
Conservative Court, Antonin Scalia Manages to Seem Embattled, TIME, July 8, 1996, at 48-
49; David J. Garrow, The Rehnquist Reins, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 6, 1996, at 68-69.
64. See Associated Press, Judge Calls Recess in Citadel Case, NEWSDAY, Aug. 13, 1996,
at A13 (reporting that attorneys for the United States Department of Justice, on behalf of the
three women who plan to attend The Citadel during the 1996-97 academic year, and the
school's counsel, were working out details to accommodate the females' attendance at the
formerly all-male military college). See also Douglas Lederman, Judge Orders Virginia to
Report on Progress in Enrolling Women at VMI, CHRON. HIGHER EDuC., Dec. 13, 1996, at
A34 (relating that the Fourth Circuit "ordered Virginia to 'formulate, adopt, and implement a
plan' for enrolling female students."). Fourteen of the 355 applications for the next academic
year are from women.
65. See Mike Allen, Defiant V.M.I to Admit Women But Will Not Ease Rules for Them,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 22, 1996, at 1, 36. VMI and The Citadel expended approximately $10
million and $7 million, respectively, in legal costs. Id. at 36.
66. 30 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1994). See also Archer v. Reno, 877 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Ky.
1995); Women's Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp.
634 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part and modified in part, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 1995).
67. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1222.
68. Id. at 1225. Title IX defines "educational institution" as "any public or private pre-
school, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of vocational, professional, or
higher education .... 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(c).
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Clause "parity" level in favor of the Title IX "equality" standard.69  The
court stated that "Title IX and its regulations do not require gender-
integrated classes in prisons." 70 Furthermore,
[s]trict one-for-one identity of classes may not be required by the
regulations. But there must be reasonable opportunities for similar
studies at the women's prison and women must have an equal op-
portunity to participate in educational programs.... And facilities
such as labs, classrooms, and workshops must be comparable to
each other.
71
The court stressed, "[a]nd the inmates must be aware of the opportunity for
participation in various programs before their interests can be assessed.,72
The most important aspect of the Ninth Circuit's opinion was its statement
that "the absence of discriminatory motive does not transform a policy which
discriminates on its face into a neutral policy with only a discriminatory
effect .... This constitutes disparate treatment, not merely disparate im-
pact .... Such disparate treatment is clearly forbidden by Title IX and its
regulations."
73
In Women Prisoners of District of Columbia Department of Corrections
v. District of Columbia,74 the women prisoners were allegedly subjected to
sexual assaults by the prison guards. The male prisoners attended full-time
adult basic education ("ABE") and General Education Development
("GED") classes, while the women had one teacher, who taught one three-
hour ABE class and one three-hour GED class. The female residents also
did not receive comparable recreational (exercise) facilities. On December
69. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1226. "Research has disclosed no opinion holding that Title IX
is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause." id. at 1228.
70. IU.
71. Id. at 1229. The "regulations provide that institutions may administer scholarships
provided by foreign institutions or wills that are restricted by sex, as long as they make
'available reasonable opportunities for similar studies for members of the other sex."' Id. at
1228 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 86.31(c)). See also Glover v. Johnson, 931 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D.
Mich. 1996) (regarding educational opportunities available to female prisoners in Michigan;
the action asserted no Title IX cause of action).
72. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1228 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 1231 (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.31, .51 (1993)).
74. 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part and modified in part, 899 F. Supp.
659 (D.D.C. 1995), rev'd in part, 93 F.3d 910 (D.D.C. 1996).
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13, 1994, the district court highlighted that "[tlhe denial of access to course
offerings on the basis of sex is forbidden. 75 Therefore, the
number of classes offered should at least be proportionate, not just
to the total number of inmates, but to the number of inmates desir-
ing to take educational programs. In addition, a desire to preserve
the state's limited resources can not be used to justify an allocation
of those resources which unfairly denies women equal access to
programs routinely available to men.
76
Query, whether the court's proportionate directive is the appropriate one,
rather than offering equivalent classes for the female prisoners? The court
also elaborated on the aspect of discriminatory intent and stated that
"[d]iscriminatory intent, however, is only an issue in cases involving facially
neutral policies.... When a classification is expressly defined in terms of
gender, an inquiry into intent is unnecessary. Defendant's policy of segre-
gating male and female prisoners is just such a gender-based policy. 77
On August 14, 1995, the district court found that Title IX reaches the
prison industries, recreation, work details, and work training.78 However, on
August 30, 1996, the District of Columbia Circuit had reservations over
certain of the district court's findings, specifically that "Title IX and equal
protection principles are not applicable here because the male and female
prisoners whom the district court compared were not similarly situated. 79
The majority noted that "[t]he threshold inquiry in evaluating an equal
protection claim is, therefore, 'to determine whether a person is similarly
75. Id at 674.
76. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The money excuse has been discounted by
the courts in the Title IX athletic equal opportunity cases. See, e.g., Favia v. Indiana Univ. of
Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 583 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Homer v. Kentucky
High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussed infra p. 585).
77. Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 675 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 659. See Klinger v. Nebraska Dep't of Correctional Svcs., 824 F. Supp. 1374
(D. Neb. 1993) (finding that the failure of the state of Nebraska to provide regularly scheduled
pre-release programs for female prisoners, where such programs were provided for the male
prisoners violated Title IX, as the pre-release programs were deemed educational), rev'd, 31
F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1177 (1995).
79. Women's Prisoners of the D.C. Dep't of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d
910 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The appellants did not challenge the provisions that related to
educational (academic and vocational) programs. However, they objected to ones that
required "them to upgrade the work, recreational, and religious programs available to female
inmates, and that relate to law library hours, group events, and transportation to job inter-
views." Id. at 924.
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situated to those persons who allegedly received favorable treat-
ment.' ... We believe the same principle should apply in Title IX cases. 80
Thus, the court in comparing the population size of the prison, security level,
types of crimes, length of sentences, and special characteristics, rendered the
prisoners dissimilarly situated.81 The appellate court stated that
an inmate has no constitutional right to work and educational op-
portunities. But even though we do not address the scope of Title
IX in the prison context, we admit to grave problems with the
proposition that work details, prison industries, recreation, and re-
ligious services and counseling have anything in common with the
equality of educational opportunities with which Title IX is con-
cerned.82
Judge Rogers, who issued an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, took exception to the majority's determination on the equal protec-
tion analysis, stating that "[e]ven assuming the government may constitu-
tionally provide separate programs for the sexes, the programs must be
substantially equivalent."83  Thus, "[e]ven if the District may properly
segregate prisoners by sex, it does not follow that it may segregate them by
sex into unequal facilities. 8 4  This opinion recognized the heightened
scrutiny test mandated by the Court in Virginia.8 5  It argued that "[t]he
District may not treat men and women dissimilarly and then rely on the very
dissimilarity it has created to justify discrimination in the provision of
benefits., 8 6 While this equal protection analysis seems more persuasive than
the majority approach, the issue would then be a question of fact pursuant to
Title IX as to whether certain of the claimed inequities the women prisoners
allegedly suffered from came under "educational programs and activities."
80. Id. (quoting United States v. Whiton, 48 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1995).
81. Id. at 925. The court continued "[w]e do not suggest that these mechanical ratios are
a test of comparability; merely that, standing alone, the difference in the number of programs
provided by prisons having vastly different numbers of inmates can not be taken as evidence
that those in small institutions that offer fewer programs have been denied equal protection.
More than that is required." Id.
82. Women's Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 927.
83. Id. at 955 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. Id. at 951.
85. Id
86. Id.
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In the third action, the Eastern District of Kentucky, in Archer v.
Reno,87 determined that there was no violation of Title IX where female
prisoners were prevented from completing educational courses to become
certified dental technicians. On January 5, 1996, the court ruled that Title
IX applies to educational programs or activities conducted by state or local
governments. "The statute is silent as to the United States and its agen-
cies.... [Thus] the Court concludes that Title IX is not applicable to the
national apprenticeship program offered to federal inmates through the
dental lab at [the Federal Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky]. 88
Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to state a Title IX claim of action.
IV. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ON BEHALF OF STUDENTS
The most significant aspect of the Title IX regulations that pertain to
athletic programs or activities is the requirement of equal opportunity for
members of both sexes. Specifically, it states that "[a] recipient which
operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural
athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both
sexes." 89  The regulations then go on to list ten specific, non-exclusive
program areas to be analyzed to determine whether equal opportunity has
been satisfied. The first program area, and the one which has been at the
core of the intercollegiate athletics litigation battles during the 1990s,
evaluates "[w]hether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both
sexes." 90 The 1979 Policy Interpretation provides that the effective accom-
modation of student interests and abilities will be assessed in any of the
following ways:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for
male and female students are provided in numbers substantially
proportionate to their respective enrollments; or (2) Where the
87. 877 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
88. Id. at 379. Title IX states that "[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the term 'program
or activity' and 'program' mean all of the operations of (1)(A) a department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government; or (B) the entity
of such State or local government that distributes such assistance and each such department or
agency (and each other State or local government entity) to which the assistance is extended,
in the case of assistance to a State or local government." 20 U.S.C. § 1687.
89. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (emphasis added).
90. Id. § 106.41(c)(1).
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members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history
and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstra-
bly responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the mem-
bers of that sex; or (3) Where the members of one sex are under-
represented among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution can-
not show a continuing practice or program expansion such as that
cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and
abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and effectively
accommodated by their present program.
91
A. Cross-Over Cases
The Title IX regulations permit qualified separate teams for members of
each sex "where the selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill
or the activity involved is a contact sport." 92 There were no cross-over cases
(cases brought by members of one sex seeking to participate on established
teams of the other sex, generally pursued on the interscholastic level by
female athletes seeking participation on established all-male teams) on either
91. HEW Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (1979) (emphasis added).
92. Section 106.41(b) provides:
(b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this
section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each
sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity
involved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a
team in a particular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no
such team for members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members
of that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be
allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact
sport. For purposes of this part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby,
ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of
which involves bodily contact.
See generally Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title JX,
9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPoRTs L. REv. 1, 47-56 (1992).
Michigan state law defines baseball as a "non-contact" sport for interscholastic athletic
activities. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 380.1289(3) (West 1988), which provides that
[f]emale pupils shall be permitted to participate in all noncontact interscholastic
athletic activities, including archery, badminton, baseball, bowling, fencing, golf,
gymnastics, riflery, shuffleboard, skiing, swimming, diving, table tennis, track
and field, and tennis. If a school has a girls' team in a noncontact interscholastic
athletic activity, a female shall be permitted to compete for a position on any
other team for that activity. This subsection shall not be construed to prevent or
interfere with the selection of competing teams solely on the basis of athletic
ability.
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the interscholastic or intercollegiate levels instituted or reviewed during
1994-95, except for the Supreme Court denying certiorari in Williams v.
School District of Bethlehem.93 Although not covered by Title IX, this
scenario would also apply to the Olympic and professional levels. However,
on February 2, 1996, the district court in Adams v. Baker94 ruled that a
school district policy which prohibited a female high school student from
competing on the boys wrestling team, designated a "contact" sport, would
violate her rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction. 95 The court
recognized that "wrestling is, not surprisingly, defined as a contact sport
' 96
under the Title IX scheme. The court nonetheless continued that "[a]lthough
Congress may specify remedies available for a violation of a federally
protected right, Congress can not thereby substantively limit constitutional
rights. 97  The court also disregarded the school district's argument that
participation by a female could lead to sexual harassment charges.98 The
court emphasized that wrestling was an athletic activity and not a sexual
activity. 99 The case was settled during the spring, whereby the plaintiff was
allowed to tryout for the wrestling team. The agreement is partially confi-
dential.' ° In light of the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Vir-
ginia,'0' a real concern emerges as to whether the ostensible demarcation of
93. 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing male student who wanted to participate on
the all-female interscholastic field hockey team where no team was provided for the boys).
94. 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1500 (D. Kan. 1996) ("Evidence was presented that there are over
800 girls competing in wrestling in the United States.").
95. See Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1123 (E.D.
Wis. 1978) (announcing that "[i]t is declared that the defendants' exclusion of the [female]
plaintiffs and the class they represent from participation in a varsity interscholastic athletic
program in a particular program where such a program is provided for male students violates
the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment."). But see Kelley v.
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938
(1995). See also discussion infra p. 589.
96. Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1503.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1504.
99. Id.
100. Telephone Interview with Charles O'Hara, counsel for plaintiff (August 22, 1996).
Interestingly, in deciding whether to permit the female student to participate on the wrestling
team or disband the team, the three female members of the School Board voted to eliminate
the team, while the four male members of the board agreed to allow a co-ed wrestling team,
according to plaintiffs counsel. Id.
101. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (discussed supra p. 556).
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certain sports for men only, under the "contact sport" classification, would
withstand equal protection scrutiny.
B. Female Student Athletes
1. Intercollegiate Level
a. Cases Commenced Pre-1994 Seeking Reinstitution of Varsity
Teams
(i) Cohen v. Brown University: The Trial
On September 26, 1994, the federal trial commenced in Cohen v. Brown
University,1°2 in which the plaintiff was seeking a permanent injunction to
restore two women's teams to varsity status. The case was partially settled
on September 28, 1994, which ensured comparable treatment for men's and
women's varsity programs. 10 3 The agreement indicated:
The University maintains the right to distribute University funds as
it sees fit, provided that such distribution does not disproportion-
ately affect one gender in comparison to the other, provided fur-
ther, however that this... be construed to require comparison on a
team by team or overall gender basis of actual money expenditures.
Comparability shall be determined by the nature of the programs,
not the cost. It is understood and agreed that comparability does
not imply or mean that every team will be provided identical fund-
ing or any other item provided to any other team. Further, different
teams may receive different levels of support.
104
The issue of the effective accommodation of the interests and abilities of the
students at the Ivy League University, raised in 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1),
remained viable.
102. 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (granting plain-
tiffs a preliminary injunction ordering the retention of the two women's varsity teams). See
Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: Testimony Before the House Subcomm. on
Postsecondary Education, Training and Life-Long Learning, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement
of Vartan Gregorian, Ph.D., President of Brown University).
103. Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 92-0197-P (D.R.I. 1995), Settlement Agreement and
Stipulation of dismissal in Regard to Equality of Treatment [hereinafter Agreement]. The
Agreement "settles claims in this matter concerning the relative support provided to men and
women student athletes and potential student athletes at Brown ... and shall remain in effect
for a period of three years from the date of its execution by the parties." Id. at 1, 3. See also
Oscar Dixon, Title IX Suit Settled in Part by Brown, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 1994, at C13.
104. Agreement, supra note 103, at 4-5.
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On March 29, 1995, the district court in Cohen'0 5 ruled the defendant
University violated Title IX in not accommodating the interests and abilities
of the female students. 1' 6 In a sixty-nine page decision, the court painstak-
ingly explicated the "effective accommodation" test under the directive of
the First Circuit's 1993 decision. 10 7 Again, the court stressed that "an
institution complies with the three prong test if it meets prong one of the
analysis and no other."'0 8
The trial judge specifically elaborated on the first prong which requires
"substantial proportionality" between the percentage of students and student
athletes.1°9 The court adopted a plain meaning approach, in that the number
of female and male athletes would be based on the number of participation
opportunities as manifested by the NCAA squad lists, which was a tangible
and easily identifiable number."0 The court noted that "[t]he Policy Inter-
pretation's three prong test does not mandate statistical balancing. In fact,
the test is designed to avoid an absolute requirement of numerical equal-
ity.""' The court ruled that "[a]n institution satisfies prong one provided
that the gender balance of its intercollegiate athletic program substantially
mirrors the gender balance of its student enrollment."'1
2
"First, prong one compliance is assessed by comparing the gender ratio
of the entire intercollegiate athletic program."' 13 The court highlighted that
when "significant numerical changes did occur in the intercollegiate athletic
105. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 101 F.3d 155 (Ist Cir. 1996). The decision cited Heckman, supra note 15. Id. at 188.
See Walter B. Connolly, Jr. & Jeffrey D. Adelman, A University's Defense to a Title IX
Gender Equity in Athletics Lawsuit: Congress Never Intended Gender Equity Based on
Student Body Ratios, 71 U. DEr. MERCY L. REv. 845 (1994) (Mr. Connolly is one of the
attorneys for Brown University in this lawsuit.). See Walter B. Connolly, Jr. & Jeffrey D.
Adelman, How a University Can Best Comply with Title IX and Win a Lawsuit: Practical
Suggestions, (undated eight-page handout distributed at an April 1996 Title IX forum
sponsored by the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA")) (on file with the Nova
Law Review); Walter B. Connolly, Jr., "University In-House Audit of Employment Related
Issues to Determine Compliance with Title VII and Title IX and Other Related Issues"
(undated) (104 page handout distributed at an April 1996 Title IX forum sponsored by the
NCAA) (on file with the Nova Law Review).
106. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 211 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1)).
107. Id. at 194.
108. Id. at 200.
109. Id. at 201-02.
110. ld. at 202.
111. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 199
112. Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
113. Id at 202.
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program as a whole, these changes were within the control of the univer-
sity.' 1 4 For example, the University controls the recruiting of student
athletes." 5 During the 1993-94 academic year, the percentage of students
comprised 48.86% men and 51.4% women, with 61.87% male athletes and
38.13% female athletes." 6 This accounted for a 13% differential between
female students and female student athletes. The court also identified "that
the 'participation opportunities' offered by an institution are measured by
counting the actual participants on intercollegiate teams," rather than
counting teams' filled and unfilled athletic slots, as the defendant argued.
1
'
7
Thus, the 13% disparity did not satisfy the first prong of the effective
accommodation test.
The court examined the University's unique two-tiered system. The
University characterized its varsity athletic offerings as varsity intercolle-
giate teams ("university-funded" teams), on the one hand, and donor-funded
varsity teams (also known as "club varsities" or "intercollegiate club"
teams)." 8 The court determined that "university-funded" varsity teams were
not comparable to "donor-funded" varsity teams.119 "During the 1994/95
seasons Brown guaranteed the volleyball team university-funded varsity
status for the next five years."' 20 Furthermore, "[g]ymnastics is currently
supported as a university-funded team as required by court order. However,
in the absence of this order, Brown has acknowledged that it would demote
gymnastics to donor-funded status."
121
Second, the University did not satisfy the second prong of a continuing
practice of intercollegiate program for women, the underrepresented sex.
Rather, the court emphasized that "[s]ince the 1970s, the percentage of
women participating in Brown's varsity, athletic program has remained
remarkably steady."' 22 Finally, the court concluded Brown did not currently
fully and effectively accommodate the interests and abilities, specifically
with regard to "maintaining women's water polo at club status and by
demoting women's gymnastics where these teams have demonstrated the
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 192.
117. Id. at 202.
118. Id. at 189.
119. Id. at 212.
120. Id. at 192 n.17.
121. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 192 n.18.
122. IdM at211.
1997]
54
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
interest and ability to operate as varsity teams."' 23 The court also rejected
Brown's argument "that it may accommodate less than all of the interested
and able women if, on a proportionate basis, it accommodates less than all of
the interested and able men."' 24
In conclusion, the court required Brown University to submit a compli-
ance action plan within 120 days, but stayed this directive pending an
appeal.12 During April 1995, the University filed an appeal. On May 4,
1995, Judge Pettine modified his March 29, 1995, judgment, truncating the
time for the University to submit its Title IX compliance plan from 120 to 60
days and the court eliminated the stay of the provision requiring the Univer-
sity to submit the plan pending the outcome of an appeal. 126
On August 17, 1995, the trial court rejected the University's proposed
compliance plan, filed on July 7, 1995, which concentrated on adding junior
varsity teams for female student athletes, rather than adding new women's
varsity teams and cutting men's sports, and crafted its own plan requiring the
University to upgrade the women's varsity teams. 127 The court, in terse
language responding to the University's proposed plan, stated:
The proposed plan artificially boosts women's varsity numbers by
adding junior varsity positions on four women's
teams.... Counting new women's junior varsity positions as
equivalent to men's full varsity positions flagrantly violates the
spirit and letter of Title IX; in no sense is an institution providing
equal opportunity if it affords varsity positions to men but junior
varsity positions to women.'2
123. Id at 212.
124. Id. at 208.
125. Id at 214.
126. Modified Order at 4, Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 92-197-P (D.R.I. May 4, 1995).
127. 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aft'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993). On March 29,
1995, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that the University had discrimi-
nated in violation of Title IX. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), aff'd, 101 F.3d 155
(1st. Cir 1996).
128. Order at 6, Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 92-197-P (D.R.I. Aug. 16, 1995). The court
further stated that "[a]n institution does not provide equal opportunity if it caps its men's
teams after they are well-stocked with high-caliber recruits while requiring women's teams to
boost numbers by accepting walk-ons." Id. at 8.
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(ii) First Circuit Affirms that Brown University Violated Title IX
On November 21, 1996, the First Circuit, in a 2-1 decision comprising
forty-four pages, affirmed the district court's determination in Cohen v.
Brown University that the University violated Title IX in not effectively
accommodating the interests and abilities of its female student athletes. 29
The First Circuit found
no error in the district court's factual findings or in its interpreta-
tion and application of the law in determining that Brown violated
Title IX in the operation of its intercollegiate athletics program.
We therefore affirm in all respects the district court's analysis and
rulings on the issue of liability. We do, however, find error in the
district court's award of specific relief and therefore remand the
case to the district court for reconsideration of the remedy in light
of this opinion.
130
First, the appellate court summarized in detail the relevant determina-
tions of the district court, concluding that "[t]he district court did not find
that full and effective accommodation of the athletics interests and abilities
of Brown's female students would disadvantage Brown's male students."
131
Second, the First Circuit summarized the Title IX predicates and made the
first judicial reference to the OCR "Clarification Memorandum," issued on
January 16, 1996,132 "which does not change the existing standards for
compliance, but which does provide further information and guidelines for
assessing compliance under the three-part test.' ' 133 Third, Senior Circuit
Judge Bownes underscored that "[i]n Cohen II, a panel of this court squarely
rejected Brown's constitutional and statutory challenges to the Policy
Interpretation's three-part test, upholding the district court's interpretation of
the Title IX framework applicable to intercollegiate athletics ... ."134 Then,
in addressing the University's argument, which was in essence to begin to
129. 101 F.3d 155 (lst Cir. 1996).
130. Id. at 162.
131. Id. at 164.
132. UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CLARIFICATION OF
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICs POLICY GUIDANCE: THE THREE PART TEST (1996).
133. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 167. The court continued, explaining that "[t]he Clarification
Memorandum contains many examples illustrating how institutions may meet each prong of
the three-part test and explains how participation opportunities are to be counted under Title
IX." Id.
134. Ia
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decide ab initio the question of Title IX liability, the court pondered the
issue of the "law of the case doctrine"1 35 and concluded that "[t]he precedent
established by the prior panel is not clearly erroneous; it is the law of this
case and the law of this circuit. 1 36 Fourth, the court found that Title IX
complies with the Fifth Amendment. 37  An intervening Supreme Court
decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena'38 does not change the
disposition in Cohen.139 The First Circuit articulated that the intermediate
standard of scrutiny applies to gender-based classifications,"40 underscoring
that, "[a]s explained previously, Title IX ... is distinct from other anti-
discrimination regimes in that it is impossible to determine compliance or to
devise a remedy without counting and comparing opportunities with gender
explicitly in mind."''I Fifth, any excluded evidence was deemed harmless. 42
The University's three most charismatic and dispositive Title IX
substantive attacks were: 1) Title IX is an affirmative action or quota
statute; 43 2) Title IX should adopt the "relative interest" of the student
athletes to determine compliance; 144 and 3) the Title VII standard should
have been applied. 45
135. Id. at 168. "For the reasons that follow, we conclude that no exception to the law of
the case doctrine applies, here and, therefore, that Cohen II's rulings of law control the
disposition of this appeal." Id. at 169.
136. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 169.
137. Id. at 182.
138. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (remanding for a determination of whether a federal statute
which awarded minorities contracts of less than 5% of the total value of contracts per year
served a compelling government interest).
139. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 155.
140. Id. at 182. "Under intermediate scrutiny, the burden of demonstrating an exceed-
ingly persuasive justification for a government-imposed, gender-conscious classification is
met by showing that the classification serves important governmental objectives, and that the
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.... Applying
the test, it is clear that the district court's remedial order passes constitutional muster." Id. at
183-84. Amy Cohen, the named plaintiff in Cohen, expressed that "[t]here are little girls out
there who need women athletes to look up to. And if you take away their opportunity to have
women's sports, you take away their interest." Rachanee Srisavasdi, Athlete Who Sued Brown
is Happy With Outcome, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 6, 1996, at A61.
141. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 184.
142. Id. at 185.
143. Id. at 170.
144. Id. at 174.
145. Id. at 176.
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(iii) First Circuit Disposes of Quota-Affirmative Action Argument
Brown argued that the district court misconstrued and misapplied the
three-part effective accommodation test and that such prior determination
"effectively renders Title IX an 'affirmative action statute' that mandates
preferential treatment for women by imposing quotas in excess of women's
relative interests and abilities in athletics."'146 The court recognized:
Title IX is not an affirmative action statute; it is an anti-
discrimination statute, modeled explicitly after another anti-
discrimination statue, Title VI. No aspect of the Title IX regime at
issue in this case-inclusive of the statute, the relevant regulation,
and the pertinent agency documents-mandates gender-based pref-
erences or quotas, or specific timetables for implementing numeri-
cal goals. Like other anti-discrimination statutory schemes, the Ti-
tle IX regime permits affirmative action. In addition, Title IX, like
other anti-discrimination schemes, permits an inference that a sig-
nificant gender-based statistical disparity may indicate the exis-
tence of discrimination.
147
Furthermore, the three-part effective accommodation test applied was
proper. 48 The court stated that "[w]e reject Brown's kitchen-sink charac-
terization of the Policy Interpretation and its challenge to the substantial
deference accorded that document by the district court."'149 Thus, "[w]e hold
that the district court did not err in the degree of deference it accorded the
regulation and the relevant agency pronouncements."' 50 Furthermore, actual
athletic participation opportunities are the measure for determining the first
prong addressing substantial proportionality between the percentage of
students and student athletes of one sex.'
5
'
146. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 169.
147. Id. at 170-71 (emphasis added). Moreover, the majority stressed that "[flrom the
mere fact that a remedy flowing from a judicial determination of discrimination is gender-
conscious, it does not follow that the remedy constitutes 'affirmative action.' Nor does a
'reverse discrimination' claim arise every time an anti-discrimination statute is enforced." Id.
at 172.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 173.
151. Id. '"he district court's definition of athletics participation opportunities comports
with the agency's own definition." Id. at 173.
19971
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(iv) Court Rejects Brown University's "Relative Interests" Argument
Perhaps the most novel approach, which, if adopted, would effectively
dismantle Title IX, was Brown University's argument that
an athletics program equally accommodates both genders and com-
plies with Title IX if it accommodates the relative interests and
abilities of its male and female students. This 'relative interests'
approach posits that an institution satisfies prong three of the three-
part test by meeting the interests and abilities of the underrepre-
sented gender only to the extent that it meets the interests and
abilities of the overrepresented gender.
152
The majority emphasized that
[w]e agree with the prior panel and the district court that Brown's
relative interests approach 'cannot withstand scrutiny on either le-
gal or policy grounds,' ... because it 'disadvantages women and
undermines the remedial purposes of Title IX by limiting required
program expansion for the underrepresented sex to the status quo
level of relative interests.'15 3
In pressing the University's quota argument, especially as to the third prong,
the court stated that "[i]n any event, the three-part test is, on its face, entirely
consistent with § 1681(b) because the test does not require preferential or
disparate treatment for either gender."15 4 Furthermore,
[o]nly where the plaintiff meets the burden of proof on these ele-
ments [the first and third prongs] and the institution fails to show
as an affirmative defense a history and continuing practice of pro-
gram expansion responsive to the interests and abilities of the un-
derrepresented gender will liability be established. Surely this is a
far cry from a one-step imposition of a gender-based quota. 155
The court summarized that "[i]n short, Brown treats the three-part test for
compliance as a one-part test for strict liability."'
56
152. Id. at 174.
153. ld. (citations omitted).
154. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 175.
155. Id.
156. Md
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The court recognized that "Brown also fails to recognize that Title IX's
remedial focus is, quite properly, not on the overrepresented gender, but on
the underrepresented gender; in this case, women.... It is women and not
men who have historically and who continue to be underrepresented in
sports, not only at Brown, but at universities nationwide."' 57
In discarding and dismantling the University's relative interest argu-
ment, the appellate court stated:
We view Brown's argument that women are less interested than
men in participating in intercollegiate athletics, as well as its con-
clusion that institutions should be required to accommodate the in-
terests and abilities of its female students only to the extent that it
accommodates the interests and abilities of its male students, with
great suspicion. To assert that Title IX permits institutions to pro-
vide fewer athletics participation opportunities for women than for
men, based upon the premise that women are less interested in
sports than are men, is (among other things) to ignore the fact that
Title IX was enacted in order to remedy discrimination that results
from stereotyped notions of women's interests and abilities. Inter-
est and ability rarely develop in a vacuum; they evolve as a func-
tion of opportunity and experience. 58
The court continued:
Thus, there exists the danger that, rather than providing a true
measure of women's interest in sports, statistical evidence pur-
porting to reflect women's interest instead provides only a measure
of the very discrimination that is and has been the basis for
women's lack of opportunity to participate in sports. Prong three
requires some kind of evidence of interest in athletics, and the Title
IX framework permits the use of statistical evidence in assessing
the level of interest in sports. Nevertheless, to allow a numbers-
based lack-of-interest defense to become the instrument of further
discrimination against the underrepresented gender would pervert
the remedial purpose of Title IX. We conclude that, even if it can
be empirically demonstrated that, 4t a particular time, women have
less interest in sports than do men, such evidence, standing alone,
cannot justify providing fewer athletics opportunities for women
than for men. Furthermore, such evidence is completely irrelevant
157. Ma
158. Id. at 178-79.
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where, as here, viable and successful women's varsity teams have
been demoted or eliminated.'59
The court stated that, "[f]inally, the tremendous growth in women's partici-
pation in sports since Title IX was enacted disproves Brown's argument that
women are less interested in sports for reasons unrelated to lack of opportu-
nity."' 6  The court observed further that, "[h]ad Congress intended to
entrench, rather than change, the status quo-with its historical emphasis on
men's participation opportunities to the detriment of women's opportuni-
ties-it need not have gone to all the trouble of enacting Title IX.,,
1 61
(v) The Lady or the Tiger: Should a Title VII Analysis Be Applied to a
Non-Employment Title IX Case?
Brown posited that the district court did not properly apply Title VII
standards to its analysis of whether Brown's intercollegiate athletics pro-
gram complies with Title IX. The court replied that
[i]t does not follow from the fact that § 1681(b) was patterned after
a Title VII provision that Title VII standards should be applied to a
Title IX analysis of whether an intercollegiate athletics program
equally accommodates both genders. While this court has ap-
proved the importation of Title VII standards into Title IX analysis,
we have explicitly limited the crossover to the employment con-
text.
162
The majority stated:
To the extent that Title IX allows institutions to maintain single-sex
teams and gender-segregated athletics programs, men and women
do not compete against each other for places on teams rosters. Ac-
cordingly .... the Title VII concept of the 'qualified pool' has no
place in a Title IX analysis of equal athletics opportunities for male
and female athletes because women are not 'qualified' to compete
for positions on men's teams, and vice-versa.
163
159. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 179-80.
160. Id. at 180.
161. Id. at 180-81.
162. Id. at 176.
163. Id. at 177.
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The court elaborated:
Brown's approach fails to recognize that, because gender-
segregated teams are the norm in intercollegiate athletics programs,
athletics differs from admissions and employment in analytically
material ways. In providing for gender-segregated teams, inter-
collegiate athletics programs necessarily allocate opportunities
separately for male and female students, and thus, any inquiry into
a claim of gender discrimination must compare the athletics par-
ticipation opportunities provided for men with those provided for
women. For this reason, and because recruitment of interested
athletes is at the discretion of the institution, there is a risk that the
institution will recruit only enough women to fill positions in a
program that already under represents women, and that the smaller
size of the women's program will have the effect of discouraging
women's participation.
In this unique context, Title IX operates to ensure that the gen-
der-segregated allocation of athletics opportunities does not disad-
vantage either gender. Rather than create a quota or preference,
this unavoidably gender-conscious comparison merely provides for
the allocation of athletics resources and participation opportunities
between the sexes in a non-discriminatory manner.... In contrast
to the employment and admissions contexts, in the athletics con-
text, gender is not an irrelevant characteristic.1
64
(vi) The Remedy
The only conflict uncovered by the First Circuit was that "the district
court erred in substituting its own specific relief in place of Brown's statuto-
rily permissible proposal to comply with Title IX by cutting men's teams
until substantial proportionality was achieved."'' 65  Brown's proposed
compliance plan called for elevating certain women's junior varsity teams.
The plan also proposed that "if the Court determines that this plan is not
sufficient to reach proportionality, phase two will be the elimination of one
or more men's teams."'166 The First Circuit agreed with the district court
"that Brown's proposed plan fell short of a good faith effort to meet the
164. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 177-78 (citations omitted).
165. Id at 185.
166. Id. at 186. Thus, the district court had ordered Brown to "elevate and maintain
women's gymnastics, women's water polo, women's skiing, and women's fencing to
university-funded varsity status." Id. at 187.
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requirements of Title IX .... ,1 67 However, "[i]t is clear, nevertheless, that
Brown's proposal to cut men's teams is a permissible means of effectuating
compliance with the statute.... Brown therefore should be afforded the
opportunity to submit another plan for compliance with Title IX.... In all
other respects the judgment of the district court is affirmed."'168
(vii) Dissenting Opinion
Chief Judge Torruella issued the dissenting opinion finding that the
Supreme Court's determinations in Adarand16 9 and the United States v.
Virginia 17 applied to Cohen.17 1 "What is important for our purpose is that
the Supreme Court appears to have elevated the test applicable to sex
discrimination cases to require an 'exceedingly persuasive justification.'
This is evident from the language of both the majority opinion and the
dissent in Virginia."'72  Herein, such a justification was absent in the
dissent's view.'
73
Second, this judge would eliminate "contact sports" from the analysis
of the effective accommodation test. 7 4 "Even assuming that membership
numbers in varsity sports is a reasonable proxy for participation opportuni-
ties-a view with which I do not concur--contact sports should be elimi-
nated from the calculus."'' 75 The Chief Judge rationalizes this position by
noting that the controlling regulation 76 allows schools to operate single-sex
teams in contact sports.
The Chief Judge's opinion is susceptible to rebuttal on several fronts.
First, this position is another version of the 1974 Tower Amendment, which
would have in effect eliminated revenue-producing sports from the analysis,
i.e., men's contact sports, such as football and basketball. Congress has
never adopted such proposals to remove any teams from a Title IX analy-
sis. 177 No discussion of the legislative history was included in this part of
the dissent. Second, the essence of Title IX is the "equal opportunity"
167. Id.
168. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 187-88.
169. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
170. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2287 (discussed supra p. 556).
171. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 191.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 192.
176. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
177. See Heckman, supra note 92, at 12-13.
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mandate. The dissent attempts to elevate the "separate teams" portion of the
regulation, which contains the contact sport language, to the superior or
primacy position, relegating the "equal opportunity" portion to a secondary
or subservient position. Such an attempt belies the Title IX vitality. Even
the district court in Gonyo v. Drake University, 178 when examining the other
regulation, which instructs specifically on athletics concerning the distribu-
tion of athletic scholarships, 179 found that it is the "equal opportunity"
directive which must take precedence. 80 Third, the contact sport dichotomy
sanctioned the status quo by permitting schools to continue to prevent
individual, talented females from participating in established all-male
contact sports. The Chief Judge, who was quick to cite Virginia, should
have gone a step further and, based on his reliance on this part of the
regulation, determined whether, in light of the "exceedingly persuasive
justification" standard articulated in Virginia,181 the contact sport distinction
could withstand constitutional scrutiny.
As to the three-part effective accommodation test, the dissent concludes
as to the third prong that "[e]ven a single person with a reasonable unmet
interest defeats compliance."' 82 First, such was not the case herein, and so
any such musings must be characterized as dicta. The reality is that during
the nearly twenty-five year tenure of Title IX, it is the prospective female
student athletes who have had to jump through the obstacle course to have
their participation opportunities created, not the males, who have had
established teams in place years before enactment of Title IX and thereafter
and thus were not required to offer justifications, petitions, and lawsuits.
The difference was that the men need only show up and they were suited up,
compared to the women who also showed up, accompanied by their attor-
neys with court orders or settlement agreements. One need only note the
struggle of female student athletes at Colgate University to have a club ice
hockey team elevated to varsity status, while male student athletes already
had a varsity ice hockey team.18 3 Third, regardless of the dissent's dismay
178. 879 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
179. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c).
180. See Diane Heckman, Case Summary: Gonyo v. Drake University, NOLPE NOTES,
June-July 1995, at 7-9.
181. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274-75.
182. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 196.
183. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 992 F.2d 17
(2d Cir. 1993). The case was re-instituted as a class action in Bryant v. Colgate Univ., No.
93-CV-1029, 1996 WL 328446 (N.D.N.Y. June 11, 1996) (settled in January 1997 subject to
the court's approval) (discussed infra p. 579).
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with the possibility that "one-woman" tennis, golf, and archery teams might
have to be established to fully and effectively accommodate the interests and
abilities of the underrepresented sex, clearly whether one person can
constitute an intercollegiate athletic team would be a question of fact and a
hypothetical clearly not before this court.
Fourth, the dissent apparently ignores the Policy Interpretation, which
does not automatically mandate the creation of such teams. A further
condition is required for establishment of both contact and non-contact
sports. For contact sports,
[e]ffective accommodation means that if an institution sponsors a
team for members of one sex in a contact sport, it must do so for
members of other sex under the following circumstances: (1) The
opportunities for members of the excluded sex have historically
been limited; and (2) There is sufficient interest and ability among
the members of the excluded sex to sustain a viable team and a rea-
sonable expectation of intercollegiate competition for that team. 184
Moreover, these same two conditions apply to "non-contact" sports with a
further requirement: "(3) Members of the excluded sex do not possess
sufficient skill to be selected for a single integrated teams, or to compete
actively on such a team if selected."'' 85 There was no mention of these
further impediments by the dissent. "All of the negative effects of a quota
remain, and the school can escape the quota under prong three only by
offering preferential treatment to the group that has demonstrated less
interests in athletics.' 86 Fifth, the dissent's statement belies the facts in this
case. Clearly, the female student athletes who originally brought this case
were not "less" interested in athletics. Rather, they were forced to go to
court to retain teams in sports in which they were very much interested in
participating.
Finally, the dissent intimates a possible First Amendment violation due
to the private status of this University, stating that the majority
"[i]nstead... established a legal rule that straight-jackets college athletics
programs by curtailing their freedom to choose the sports they offer."' 87 No
184. 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418 (1979).
185. Id.
186. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 196-97.
187. Id..
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mention is made of the Supreme Court decision in Grove City College v.
Bell,188 which upheld Title IX as companionable with the First Amendment.
The parties in Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania89 have
agreed to put the case on the inactive docket, while still abiding by the
pending preliminary injunction.' 90
b. Cases Commenced Pre-1994 Seeking Elevation of Club Teams
During August 1993, female students filed a class action lawsuit in
Bryant v. Colgate University'9' alleging sex discrimination in the intercolle-
giate athletics program. On January 21, 1994, the plaintiffs filed a motion
for summary judgment, and the defendants filed a cross motion for summary
judgment. Finally, during the spring of 1996, the judge issued his decision
denying both motions. 192 The trial was scheduled for August 1996. How-
ever, the trial was rescheduled to February 2, 1997, in order to allow the
parties to update discovery material. This case was commenced after a prior
lawsuit, Cook v. Colgate University,193 was brought by individually-named
female members of the club ice hockey team alleging Title IX violation and
seeking to upgrade their team to varsity intercollegiate status, where the men
had a varsity intercollegiate ice hockey team. 194 Colgate University has
since hired a full-time coach for the women's club ice hockey team and
permitted it to compete in a league comprised of varsity teams. On January
17, 1997, the parties settled the Bryant case, with the elevation of the
women's club team to varsity status (Division M1), effective for the 1997-98
academic year, subject to the court's approval. 195
c. Cases Commenced During 1994-96 Seeking Elevation of Club
Teams
There were no cases commenced during the three-year period from
1994 through 1996 seeking reinstitution of varsity teams. Rather, a slew of
federal class action lawsuits were commenced during 1994 and 1995 seeking
elevation of club teams to varsity status. During January 1994, members of
188. 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (discussing associational rights).
189. 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993) (denying University's request to modify an injunction
requiring the University to reinstate women's gymnastics and field hockey).
190. Letter from plaintiff's co-counsel to author (Oct. 4, 1996).
191. No. 93-CV-1029 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
192. Bryant, 1996 WL 328446, at *11.
193. 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
194. Id. at 739-40.
195. Telephone Interview with plaintiffs counsel (Jan. 17, 1997).
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the women's field hockey, softball, lacrosse, and crew club sports com-
menced a federal class action lawsuit in James v. Virginia Polytechnic
Institute & State University,196 seeking elevation of their teams to varsity
status. Thereafter, on April 17, 1995, the district court approved a settle-
ment which provided that by the end of the 1996-97 academic year the
percentage of female student athletes would be within three percentage
points of the percentage of female undergraduate students.
197
An interesting aspect was the provision that if the Supreme Court, the
Fourth Circuit, or Congress sets forth a certain percentage of female athletes
as the minimum required, then either party can petition the court to modify
the order. A women's lacrosse team would be added during the 1994-95
academic year, and women's varsity softball would be offered by 1995-96.
The women's athletic scholarships would be within five percentage points of
the percentage of undergraduate female students by 1997-98, continuing
through 2000-01. Comparable facilities for practice, training, and competi-
tive games for female student athletes will also be provided. A new softball
facility would be constructed for use during the spring 1996 season. The
plaintiffs' attorneys were accorded $50,000 in fees.
On March 31, 1994, members of the women's soccer team at Louisiana
State University ("LSU") commenced a federal class action lawsuit entitled
Pederson v. Louisiana State University'98 seeking elevation of a women's
club soccer team to varsity status. 199 Thereafter, a companion case was
commenced on January 3, 1995, by Cindy and Karla Pineda in Pineda v.
Louisiana State University2w in the Eastern District of Louisiana, requesting
declaratory and injunctive relief against the University and, in particular,
seeking a preliminary injunction adding fast pitch softball as a varsity sport.
On July 5, 1995, the district court denied the plaintiffs' request for a pre-
liminary injunction requiring: "(a) institution of intercollegiate varsity fast
196. No. 94-0031-R (W.D. Va. 1994).
197. Id. (Proposed Settlement Order, Apr. 7, 1995). See also Press Release from Virginia
Tech's Women's Intercollegiate Sports Expansion Plan (May 16, 1994) (distributed at a 1996
NCAA Title IX forum) (on file with the Nova Law Review).
198. 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996). Thereafter, on May 16, 1994, the plaintiffs filed
a motion for a preliminary injunction, and for class certification and a request for an expedited
hearing. Id. at 897. The court dismissed plaintiffs' motion on October 28, 1994. Id. at 898.
A stipulation was entered into by the parties in Pederson that the instatement of women's
varsity soccer team in the fall of 1994 made this request moot. Id. at 898 n.2. On September
19, 1994, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 897.
199. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 897.
200. Id. at 899. Defendants' motion to consolidate the Pineda and Pederson cases was
granted on March 30, 1995. Id.
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pitch softball in Fall 1995, (b) requesting LSU present a plan for compliance
with Title IX, and (c) freezing current expenditures and administrative
support for male varsity sports at Louisiana State University.
201
On October 10, 1995, the trial commenced in Pederson/Pineda v.
Louisiana State University. On January 12, 1996, the district court found
that the University had violated Title IX.2o2 However, the court emphasized
that Title IX distinguishes between "claims for unequal treatment of athletes
based on sex ['treatment claims'] and, on the other hand, claims for ineffec-
tive accommodation of demands of female and male athletes, i.e., equality of
opportunity to participate in athletics., 20 3 The court elaborated that "[a]ll
five plaintiffs asserted a claim for unequal treatment of female varsity
athletes, including unequal pay to coaches, lesser quality facilities, and other
related grievances. An unequal treatment claim presupposes that the
claimant was a varsity athlete who was treated unequally based upon her
sex.' 2°4 The court stressed the prevailing sentiment that the University is not
required to provide any athletic opportunity for its students, but if it elects to
do so, it "must provide equal athletic opportunity for both sexes and not
exclude either group from participation because of their sex.... Opportunity
is the possibility of participation, not the guarantee of participation. 2 °5
In reviewing the available Title IX precedents and case law, the court
stated critically that "[t]he Policy Interpretation has not been approved by
either the President or Congress, however, and is also susceptible, in part, to
an interpretation distinctly at odds with the statutory language." 206 In
examining the three-part effective accommodation test, the first prong would
require statistical proportionality between the percentage of students of each
sex and the percentage of student athletes; if satisfied, this would constitute
compliance with the effective accommodation test. Despite the fact that the
First,207 Third,208 Sixth,2 9 Seventh,210 and Tenth21 1 Circuits have respectively
201. Id. at 899. The court's more detailed ruling was contained in an October 28, 1994
ruling. Id
202. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 917.
203. Id. at 904.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 905.
206. Id. at 911-12. The court nonetheless continued that "[d]espite these drawbacks, the
Policy Interpretation definitely has a role to play in ascertaining the proper analysis of
compliance with Title IX." Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 912. Regardless, "[lt is the question of
how to evaluate equality of opportunity in levels of competition which provides a significant
sticking point in the Policy Interpretation's framework." Id.
207. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussed supra p. 565).
208. See Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (1993) (discussed supra p. 579).
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condoned the tripartite test,2 12 this district court emphatically stated that as to
the first prong, "[t]his Court disagrees with either proposition and the
analysis leading to such a result, and denies most emphatically so to hold. 213
It stated that
[w]ithout some basis for such a pivotal assumption, this Court is
loathe to join others in creating the "safe harbor" or dispositive as-
sumption for which defendants and plaintiffs argue. Rather, it
seems much more logical that interest in participation and levels of
ability to participate as percentages of the male and female popula-
tions will vary from campus to campus and region to region and
will change with time. To assume, and thereby mandate, an unsup-
ported and static determination of interest and ability as the corner-
stone of the analysis can lead to unjust results. 214
Moreover,
Title IX does not mandate equal numbers of participants. Rather, it
prohibits exclusion based on sex and requires equal opportunity to
participate for both sexes. As appears in the Policy Interpretation,
inherent in this prohibition and mandate is knowledge of the desire
to participate, the ability to participate and the level of competi-
209. See Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994)
(discussed infra p. 586).
210. See Kelly v. Board of Dirs. of Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 938 (1995) (discussed infra p. 589).
211. See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993).
212. See Heckman, supra note 180, at 8.
213. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 913. The Title IX statute mandates:
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to require
any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the
members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to
the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving
the benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in comparison with
the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any community, State,
section, or other area: Provided, That this subsection shall not be construed to
prevent the consideration in any hearing or proceeding under this chapter of sta-
tistical evidence tending to show that such an imbalance exists with respect to the
participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such program or activity by the
members of one sex.
20 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
214. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 913-14. Furthermore, "the jurisprudential emphasis on
numerical 'proportionality' is not found within the statute or the regulations; rather, it is
inferred from language in the Policy Interpretation and the statute which argues against such
an inference." Id. at 914.
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tion involved. Ceasing the inquiry at the point of numerical pro-
portionality does not comport with the mandate of the statute.
215
The district court found that
[n]o plan exists to institute a method to identify the interests and
abilities within the male and female student populations at LSU,
nor a plan to evaluate the athletic opportunities presented in light of
those identified interests and abilities, nor even a plan to effectively
and timely implement the decision it has already made to add inter-
collegiate varsity women's soccer and fast pitch softball.
21 6
Thus, the court directed that LSU "come into compliance immediately or
provide this Court with an adequate plan to do so with all due haste. 217 The
University filed a compliance action plan on February 1, 1996; however, as
of February 3, 1997, the court has yet to officially sanction such plan
through a court order.21 8
The court further concluded that the "plaintiffs failed to prove the
requisite element of intent necessary to justify monetary damages.,!2 19 This
was based on its finding that
[a]lthough the question is a very close one, this Court holds that the
violations are not intentional. Rather, they are a result of arrogant
ignorance, confusion regarding the practical requirements of the
law, and a remarkably outdated view of women and athletics which
created the byproduct of resistance to change.... LSU is saved
from the conclusion that it intended to discriminate in part by the
fact that the jurisprudence and regulations regarding Title IX have
been confused and unclear from the very beginning and [the ath-
letic director's] contradictory actionsY °
The court ruled the Pederson plaintiffs did not have standing.22' The
plaintiffs have filed an appeal concerning this issue. Howevei, due to an
215. Iaat 914.
216. Id. at 921-22.
217. Id. at 924.
218. Telephone Interview with Counsel for Plaintiffs (Feb. 4, 1997).
219. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 918.
220. Id. at 918-19.
221. Id. at 908. "Plaintiffs have not alleged any experience of the effect, impact or al-
leged injury resulting from any other alleged discriminatory practices Within LSU's existing
women's varsity athletics." Id. at 904.
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intervening Supreme Court decision concerning Eleventh Amendment
immunity,22 this state University filed a motion to dismiss with the district
court; the decision remains outstanding as of February 3, 1997.
During August 1994, female student athletes sought redress in Ulett v.
University of Bridgeport223 against the state University alleging discrimina-
tion in the athletic department and requested reinstatement of the women's
varsity gymnastics team. The complaint indicated that females comprised
54% of the students and 42% of the student athletes. 224 The men's volleyball
team was also eliminated. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive
relief. A consent decree was entered into among the parties on July 7, 1995,
with the University agreeing to retain the gymnastics team at least through
the 1997-98 academic year.2z
On May 8, 1995, a class action lawsuit commenced by members of the
women's club lacrosse and softball teams in Boucher v. Syracuse Univer-
222. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1118 (1996). Seminole Tribe
was a 5-4 decision proclaiming that "each State is a sovereign entity in our Federal system."
Id. at 1122. The Supreme Court held that "notwithstanding Congress' clear intent to abrogate
the States' sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Congress" the
power to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment Immunity. Id. at 1119. Thus, "[e]ven when
the Constitution vests Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the
Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against
unconsenting States." Id. at 1131. Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion, wrote: "[F]or the
first time since the founding of the Republic... Congress has no authority to subject a State
to the jurisdiction of a Federal court at the behest of an individual asserting a Federal right."
Id. at 1145 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also David J. Garrow, The Rehnquist Reins, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1996, § 6, at 71. The Eleventh Amendment states that "[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONsT. Amend. XI. But cf. Lipsett v. University of P.R.,
864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (requiring that in order to go forward with a Title IX claim
against this public University, part of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the plaintiff had to
establish that either the University waived its sovereign immunity or that Congress did so
when it enacted this federal statute). But see the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1994), which provides that "[a] State shall not be immune under the
Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a
violation of... [T]itle IX of the Education Amendments of 1972." See also Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Doe, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (No. 95-1694) (1996) (currently pending in the Supreme
Court). More recently, in a post-Seminole Tribe case, a federal district court determined that
"the University of Minnesota does not have state immunity from an employee's lawsuit under
the Americans with Disabilities Act." University of Minnesota Loses Bid for Legal Immunity,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUc., Dec. 13, 1996, at A35.
223. No. 3:94CV01460(PCD) (D. Conn. July 5, 1995) [hereinafter Consent Decree].
224. IM; Plaintiffs' Complaint at 4, 6.
225. Ulett, Consent Decree at 4.
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sity226 sought elevation of those teams to varsity status. The University has
announced plans to offer a women's varsity soccer team during the 1996-97
academic year and to offer varsity lacrosse in 1988. On June 12, 1996, the
district court granted partial summary judgment to the University, and
dismissed the causes of action alleging unequal financial assistance and
unequal benefits and opportunities for female varsity athletes.227 Some
controversy exists as to whether class certification should be provided for all
the plaintiffs' differing club sports that are seeking elevation. The plaintiffs
are awaiting the judge's determination on the plaintiffs' claim for class
action status. The defendant filed another motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiffs were awaiting rebuttal motion papers due on January 21, 1997.
d. Other Cases Commenced During 1994-96
On July 7, 1995, a lawsuit initiated by a softball player, a student
assistant softball coach, and a graduate assistant volleyball coach sought
proportionate facilities and funding at Northeast Louisiana University in
Hale v. Northeast Louisiana University.228 A federal district court in Harker
v. Utica College of Syracuse University2 9 found no violation of Title IX
when members of women's athletic teams had to share locker rooms,
whereas members of the men's teams did not.230
2. Interscholastic Level
On December 22, 1994, the Sixth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision in Homer v.
Kentucky High School Athletic Association,231 affirmed in part the lower
court's granting of summary judgment that no Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause claim of discrimination existed where the defendants, the
Kentucky High School Athletic Association ("KHSAA") and the Kentucky
State Board for Elementary and Secondary Education ("KSBESE"), sanc-
tioned fewer sports for females than the boys and refused to sanction girls'
interscholastic fast pitch softball, despite offering baseball for the boys.
226. No. 95-CV-620, 1996 WL 328444 (N.D.N.Y. June 12, 1996).
227. Id at *4.
228. See Will Kowalski, Athletes, Coaches Turn to Lawsuits to Spur Changes, USA
TODAY, Nov. 8, 1995, at 4C.
229. 885 F. Supp. 378 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
230. Id. at 392.
231. No. C-92-0295-L(J) (W.D. Ky. Jan 11, 1993) (applying a program-wide analysis to
determine whether a violation of Title IX had occurred where the state athletic association did
not sanction fastpitch softball for females), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 43 F.3d 265 (6th
Cir. 1994).
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However, the appellate court reversed and remanded the case as to the
district court's grant of summary judgment on the plaintiffs' Title IX
claim.232 The court found that both the defendants were recipients of federal
funds.z 3  For example, the KHSAA "receive[s] a portion of its revenues
from dues paid by member schools. 234 The court recognized that while the
Title IX "regulations do not impose an independent requirement that an
institution always sponsor separate teams for each sport it sanctions ... the
regulations do require that institutions provide gender-blind equality of
athletic opportunity to its students. 235 The Sixth Circuit also adopted the
three-part effective accommodation test.236 Again, limited finances will not
be countenanced as an excuse for not complying with Title IX, as the court
stated "[t]hus, a recipient may not simply plead limited resources to excuse
the fact that there are fewer opportunities for girls than for boys. 237  A
dissent was filed by Judge Alice M. Batchelder, based on her opinion that
the plaintiffs failed to present a prima facie case.238 Thereafter, on March
10, 1995, the Sixth Circuit denied the petitions by the defendants for a
rehearing en banc.
239
232. Id. at 276.
233. Id. at 272.
234. Id. at 270.
235. Id. at 273.
236. Homer, 43 F.3d at 273.
237. Id. at 275.
238. Id. at 276. On July 15, 1994, the Kentucky Assembly approved the following
amendment to the relevant state statute to include the following:
(a) The state board or its designated agency shall assure through promulgation of
administrative regulations that if a secondary school sponsors or intends to spon-
sor an athletic activity or sport that is similar to a sport for which National Col-
legiate Athletic Association members offer an athletic scholarship, the school
shall sponsor the athletic activity or sport for which a scholarship is offered. The
administrative regulations shall specify which athletic activities are similar to
sports for which National Collegiate Athletic Association members offer scholar-
ships.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 156.070(2)(a) (1996).
Thereafter, the KHSAA "passed a similar by-law, making an exception for schools in
which the underrepresented gender votes otherwise." Erin Cook, Title IX Report Card,
Implementation of Fast Pitch Softball Offers New Scholarship Opportunities for Kentucky's
Female Athletes, WOMEN'S SPORTS EXPERIENCE, Oct. 1995, at 13 (newsletter of the Women's
Sports Foundation).
239. Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994). A
meeting between the parties' attorneys was scheduled for August 1, 1995, "in which a plan
was to be devised to remedy the existing Title IX violations that surfaced during the trial."
Cook, supra note 238, at 13.
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On April 5, 1995, four lawsuits, including Thomsen v. Fremont Public
School District # 1,240 were simultaneously filed on behalf of female students
in a federal district court in Nebraska against school districts in Fremont,
North Platte, Minden, and Holdrege, alleging unequal opportunities and
unequal benefits and treatment. The lawsuits seek compensatory damages in
unspecified monetary amounts, injunctive and declaratory relief based on
violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Title IX, and the Nebraska "Equal
Opportunity in Education Act" statute. 241
C. Male Student Athletes
All the "equal opportunity" cases brought on behalf of males concerned
male collegiate students. The three-year time period also showcased the first
co-ed cases brought by collegiate students. As Donna Lopiano, the Execu-
tive Director of the Women's Sports Foundation underscored, "[c]utting the
level of men's participation needs to be a last choice. 242
On June 3, 1994, the State University of New York at Albany an-
nounced plans to drop men's wrestling, men's tennis, and men's and
women's swimming, and add women's field hockey and women's golf. In
an anomalous situation, the first of its kind, both male and female student
athletes commenced an article 78 lawsuit in state court in In the Matter of
240. No. 4CV95-3124 (D. Neb. 1995) [hereinafter Complaint] (on file with the Nova
Law Review). The Complaint alleges that "Thomsen desires to participate in softball at the
varsity interscholastic level (funded by Fremont, as opposed to the privately-funded club sport
level), but Defendants refuse to provide such an opportunity." Id. at 6. See Liberty v.
Holdrege Pub. Sch. Dist. # 44, No. 4:95CV3127 (D. Neb. 1995) (complaint on file with the
Nova Law Review). See also Fritson v. Minden Pub. Sch., No. 4:95CV3129 (D. Neb. 1995);
Praster v. North Platte Sch. Dist., No. 4:95CV3128 .(D. Neb. 1995). All four cases were
settled with the parties agreeing to the establishment of female interscholastic softball teams at
the respective school districts. Telephone Interview with Plaintiffs' Counsel, supra note 218
(Feb. 26, 1997).
241. Complaint at 19, Thomsen (No. 4CV95-3124). The Nebraska statute provides:
The Legislature finds and declares that it shall be an unfair or discriminatory
practice for any educational institution to discriminate on the basis of sex in any
program or activity. Such discriminatory practices shall include but not be lim-
ited to the following practices: ... (2) denial of comparable opportunity in intra-
mural and interscholastic programs.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-3003 (1990) ("Equal Opportunity Act").
242. Donna Lopiano, Title IX: It's Time to Live Up to the Letter of the Law, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 6, 1996, at B7. See also Heckman, supra note 15, at 997 (recommending
scrutiny of men's athletic budgets and over-all team sizes).
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Kane v. State University of New York at Albany243 challenging the Univer-
sity's actions as not being in conformity with procedural requirements. On
August 19, 1994, the state supreme court trial judge issued a temporary
restraining order on behalf of the plaintiffs, precluding the University's
planned actions. 244 Thereafter, on August 26, 1994, a stipulation and order
was entered into reinstating the aforementioned teams for the 1994-95
academic year, requiring that prompt notice of any future decisions to
terminate programs be given and that "all defendants in programs shall be in
compliance with federal law and made in accordance with appropriate
university procedure. 245
During May 1995, litigation commenced in a New York state court in
Lichten v. State University of New York at Albany246 challenging contempt of
the court's August 19, 1994 order in Kane. Subsequently during August
1995, the state trial court ruled that although there were some discrepancies
in the decision making process to eliminate three men's teams and a
women's team (swimming), where other women's teams were established,
they did not result in an arbitrary or capricious decision or in violation of
Title IX.2 47 The court found that the proposed actions would bring the state
University into closer compliance with Title IX.248 The decision was upheld
on appeal.249
Members of the men's swimming team at the University of California at
Los Angeles ("UCLA") sought a preliminary injunction to reinstate their
team at the University. On May 17, 1994, a California state court in Kurth v.
University of California Regents250 declined to issue a preliminary injunc-
tion.
The court found that a university is permitted to eliminate propor-
tional overrepresentation of male student-athletes to achieve the
goal of proportional equality. The plaintiffs have appealed the de-
243. No. 4834-94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). See also Lichten v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Al-
bany, 646 N.Y.S.2d 402 (N.Y.A.D. 1996) (asserting failure to comply with the court order in
Kane and seeking restitution of the same sports slated for extinction as in Kane).
244. No. 4834-94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 19, 1994).
245. Id.
246. 646 N.Y.S.2d 402 (N.Y.A.D. 3d Dept. 1996). The percentage of female student
athletes has risen from 35% to 47%. Karla Haworth, Court Upholds Cutting 4 SUNY-Albany
Teams, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 9, 1996, at A32.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. No. SC-029577 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Los Angeles, May 17, 1994).
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cision. UCLA had previously announced that it was also cutting
women's gymnastics, but reinstated the sport after female student-
athletes threatened to challenge such action as a violation to Title
Ix.25
1
Members of the men's varsity swimming team sought the reinstatement
of their team in Kelley v. Board of Trustees of University of ilinois,2- where
the women's swimming team was not also scheduled for elimination. On
September 1, 1994, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's granting
of the defendant's motion for summary judgment.25 3 The appellate court
supports the principle that "an institution may violate Title IX solely by
failing to accommodate effectively the interests and abilities of student
athletes of both sexes"254 and endorsed the three-part effective accommoda-
tion test set forth in the HEW 1979 Policy Interpretation. 25" The court noted
that "[m]en's swimming was selected for termination because, among other
things, the program was historically weak, swimming is not a widely offered
athletic activity in high schools, and it does not have a large spectator
following."
256
The Seventh Circuit held that
[t]he university could, however, eliminate the men's swimming
program without violating Title IX since even after eliminating the
program, men's participation in athletics would continue to be
more than substantially proportionate to their presence in the Uni-
versity's student body. And as the case law makes clear, if the per-
centage of student-athletes of a particular sex is substantially pro-
portionate to the percentage of students of that sex in the general
student population, the athletic interests of that sex are presumed to
have been accommodated.5 7
The appellate court also found that the Title IX regulation, 34 C.F.R. §
106.41, "is not manifestly contrary to the objectives of Title IX" and,
251. ACHIEVING GENDER EQUITY: A BAsIc GUIDE TO TITLE IX FOR COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES BY THE NCAA 34 (1995).
252. 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill. 1993), aff'd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 938 (1995).
253. 35 F.3d 265, 273 (7th Cir. 1994).
254. Id. at 268.
255. Id.
256. IM. at 269.
257. Id. at 270.
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therefore, "this Court must accord it deference. '258 Furthermore, the court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the regulation imposes a gender-based
quota system?2 9 Also, "[r]equiring parallel teams is a rigid approach that
denies schools the flexibility to respond to the differing athletic interests of
men and women. ' 2 °
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the school's
decision to eliminate men's swimming while retaining women's swimming
would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.261
The Seventh Circuit instead found that Congress has broad powers under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to remedy past discrimina-
tion.262
Title IX's stated objective is not to ensure that the athletic opportu-
nities available to women increase. Rather its avowed purpose is to
prohibit educational institutions from discriminating on the basis of
sex. And the remedial scheme established by Title IX and the ap-
plicable regulation and policy interpretation are clearly substan-
tially related to this end.263
On January 23, 1995, the Supreme Court denied the request to hear the
plaintiffs' appeal. 2 4
In the second case evaluating whether a University violated Title IX
when it dropped a men's sport, the district court in Gonyo v. Drake Univer-
sity265 denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction seeking the
retention of the men's varsity wrestling team at this private University
during October 1994.266 On March 10, 1995, the district court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Title IX, the Fifth Amend-
ment "equal protection clause," and the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.267 The court had previously denied
258. Kelly, 35 F.3d at 270-71.
259. Id. at 271.
260. Il
261. Id. at 272.
262. Id.
263. Kelly, 35 F.3d at 272.
264. 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995).
265. 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
266. Id. at 990.
267. Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
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the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to refrain from eliminating
268the men's varsity wrestling team at the end of the 1992-93 academic year.
The governing regulation 269 directs substantial proportionality between
the percentage of athletes and athletic scholarships. 270 The plaintiffs argued
that the University was not in compliance with this regulation, identified as
the "scholarship test."271 The plaintiffs argued that a violation of either
section 106.37 or section 106.41 should constitute a violation of Title IX. 2
The court disagreed, stating:
[The 'safe harbor' of proportional participation extends beyond
the question of compliance under section 106.41. As I read Title
IX and the implementing regulations, the paramount goal of Title
IX is equal opportunity to participate.... Scholarships may be a
significant aspect of this opportunity, and an important tool in cre-
ating opportunity, but they remain only a part of the larger picture,
logically subordinate to the overarching goal.273
During February 1995, male wrestlers instituted a suit in a New York
state court in Cooper v. Peterson274 after St. Lawrence University announced
the decision to drop wrestling after the 1994-95 seasons. The case was
predicated primarily on alleged breach of contract. 5 No Title IX claim was
made. New York has no state statute comparable to Title IX as it pertains to
intercollegiate athletics. The defendant thereafter filed a motion to dismiss,
which the state trial court judge granted during April 1995.276 "In dismissing
the claim for sex discrimination, the court noted that the wrestlers had failed
to present sufficient information demonstrating that they had been excluded
on the basis of gender or subjected to discrimination in the athletics pro-
gram. 277 No appeal was taken.
268. Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 996.
269. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c).
270. Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1004.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1005.
273. Id.
274. 626 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
275. Id..
276. Id at 435.
277. Governmental Affairs Report, NCAA NEws, Aug. 30, 1995, at 5.
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Members of the men's soccer and wrestling teams at Illinois State
University commenced a lawsuit during September 1995 seeking reinstitu-
tion of their teams. 278
V. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETIC EMPLOYMENT
As indicated, the bulk of cases revolved around the "equal opportunity"
cases on behalf of female athletic employees or coaches of female teams, all
on the post-secondary level.279 Title VII states in pertinent part that
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--(1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin .... 280
Title VII, which prohibits sex discrimination in certain employment situa-
tions, requires satisfaction of either claim: a disparate treatment claim where
the individual alleges intentional discrimination by the employer, or a
disparate impact claim where a facially neutral or nondiscriminatory practice
has a disproportionate negative impact on the hiring, firing, or terms and
conditions of that employment for members of one sex over the other.81
The crux of the Equal Pay Act is that equal pay must be accorded to
employees of the opposite sex "for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are per-
formed under similar working conditions ..... 282 The Ninth Circuit, in Hein
278. Kowalski, supra note 228.
279. See Heckman, supra note 15, at 998-1018, for exploration of the three federal stat-
utes (Title IX, Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act) routinely used in educational employment
cases and for additional background and discussion of the case law issued concerning the
athletic employment cases commenced prior to 1994.
280. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). See also Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(Supp. V. 1993).
281. See EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters. Inc., 60 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1995), rev'd,
117 S. Ct. 660 (1997) (addressing the issue of the number of employees working, as Title VII
only covers employers that have "fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.")
282. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988). See Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151 (5th Cir.
1993) (female English literature professor at Rice University failed to establish a claim of
discrimination pursuant to the Equal Pay Act or Title IX). See also Houck v. Virginia
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 10 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing female professor who
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination pursuant to the Equal Pay Act).
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v. Oregon College of Education,23 determined that the Equal Pay Act
focuses on jobs that require equal skills and not to employees that possess
equal skills. The Eleventh Circuit, in Brock v. Georgia Southwestern
College 4 stated that "[i]t is important to bear in mind that the prima facie
case is made out by comparing the jobs held by the female and male employ-
ees and showing that these jobs are substantially equal, not by comparing the
skills and qualifications of the individual employees holding those jobs." 5
While the Title VII and Equal Pay Act statutes have been thoroughly
vetted by the courts, Title IX, which pertains only to employment at educa-
tional institutions which are recipients of federal funds, has yet to be fully
fleshed out. A patchwork of case law is developing, borrowing on the other
two federal employment related statutes, but still not explicitly focusing on
the Title IX regulations that address employment 6 or the requirement
within 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)5-6 that where schools provide separate teams
for members of each sex, that those students must have equality in coaching.
Inexplicably, there has not been one court decision, to date, involving
sex discrimination by a coach or athletic director at an educational institution
which discusses any of the specific Title IX regulations governing employ-
ment, not even in dicta, or a footnote. Query: Where University A hires a
nationally renown successful male basketball coach for the men's intercolle-
giate basketball team with a salary to reflect that distinction, however, the
women's intercollegiate basketball team is coached by a female former
player, whose salary is appreciably less than that of the men's team-has the
school triggered Title IX sexual discrimination in employment and has the
school provided equal coaching to both the men's and women's team, and
the attendant student athletes, as required by Title IX regulations? Second:
Does paying a coach of a men's team a greater amount than the coach of the
women's team for the same sport, on the same divisional level, trigger a
violation of Title IX, as opposed to the Equal Pay Act? For example, the
NCAA has three divisions: Division I (most prestigious); Division II; and
283. 718 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1983) (concerning litigation by a female assistant professor in
the physical education department whose coaching duties approximated one-third of her
responsibilities and teaching duties comprised two-thirds, as compared to the men's varsity
basketball coach whose coaching duties approximated one-fourth and teaching duties three-
fourths).
284. 765 F.2d 1026 (lth Cir. 1985).
285. Id. at 1032 (emphasis added).
286. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.7 (Effect of employment opportunities); § 106.51
(Employment); § 106.52 (Employment criteria); § 106.54 (Compensation); § 106.55 (Job
classification and structure).
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Division III (non-athletic scholarship). Third: Should courts place merit
when the men's male coach has greater accomplishments than the women's
female coach, considering the following two factors?
First, ostensibly, women have been and continue to be almost exclu-
sively absent from coaching men's teams on the collegiate, and thereafter,
the Olympic, and professional levels.28 7 During the 1995-96 season, on the
collegiate level, there was not one woman coaching Division I men's
football, baseball, or hockey. A lone female, Kerri-Ann McTiernan, was
coaching a men's intercollegiate (non-Division I) basketball team at
Kingsborough Community College, in New York, and Dot Murphy is an
assistant football coach at Hinds Community College, a non-NCAA institu-
tion in Mississippi. No women coached any of the United States men
competing in the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta.288 While affirmative
efforts have been voiced about bringing more black (male) coaches into the
professional ranks, there has not been even any rhetoric about commencing
the inclusion of women into this segment of the job market, despite the
passage of almost twenty-five years since Title IX's enactment, or the
expanse of time after Title VIl's enactment. No real progress has been
made, no trickle up effect has occurred due to the generation of females who
have played interscholastic and intercollegiate sports. 9 Consider the
287. For example, in 1996, there was not one woman coaching in the National Football
League ("NFL"), the National Basketball Association ("NBA"), Major League Baseball
("MLB"), or the National Hockey League ("NHL"). Moreover, there has never been a female
referee in either MLB, the NFL, NHL, or Major League Soccer. Julie Sommer, Gender is
Deciding Factor for International Referees: Highly Qualified Referee Denied Opportunity,
WOMEN'S SPORTS EXPERIENCE, Dec. 1996, at 11-12.
288. Moreover, parity still has not been reached in the number of athletic events available
for men and women. For example, for the first time women competed in softball at the 1996
Summer Olympics, but presently it has not received status as a permanent sport to be included
for female athletes at future Olympics. Females comprised 34% of all athletes at the Summer
Olympics. Women's basketball was not added as an Olympic sport until 1976, and a women's
marathon was not included until the 1984 Summer Olympics. Moreover, only ten out of 113
members of the influential International Olympic Committee are women. There is only one
woman on the IOC Executive Board, Anita DeFrantz. See Christopher Clarey, Perspective:
Swifter, Higher, Stronger... Gender, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1996, § 8, at 9. Within the next
10 years, each of the 197 participating countries will be required to have women comprise at
least 10% of their decision-makers, which the IOC will be required to do so by the year 2000.
Jody Smith, International Olympic Committee Increases the Role of Women, WOMEN'S
SPORTS EXPERIENCE, Feb. 1996, at 13. The New York Times devoted an entire issue of its
Sunday magazine to women's participation in the Olympics. N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, June 23,
1996, § 6 (24th anniversary of Title IX).
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second factor: Since there are few outlets for women to coach professional
female athletes 290 a class comparison of a male coach with a female coach
impacts to the detriment of a female coach-and so could be used in perpe-
tuity to relegate the female coach to a lesser salary than her male counter-
part. So when the judges compare the backgrounds of a George Raveling to
a Marianne Stanley, or a Butch Beard to a Sanya Tyler, it is not surprising
that the men are coming out on top. However, even if the courts allow this
approach for an Equal Pay Act analysis (despite the aforementioned appel-
late decisions that instruct that the focus should be on the job skills, rather
than individual skills), there has yet to be a direct answer as to whether this
approach can be utilized when examining a Title IX cause of action. The
essence of this commentary was first raised in 1994. Three years later, there
has been no advancement in the Title IX panorama.
The 1995 Women's Basketball Coaches Association ("WBCA") survey
found inequities between coaches of NCAA men's versus women's basket-
ball teams in the percentages of radio and television shows, amenities (such
as country club memberships, automobiles and amenities), bonuses for team
performance, and program support (such as secretarial assistance, promotion
and sport information staff time)-all not surprisingly favoring coaches of
the men's NCAA Division I basketball teams compared to coaches of the
women's basketball teams.291
A. Hiring
There were no cases initiated concerning hiring policies of women
coaching men's teams, which continues the dearth of case law in this area
289. This coincides with the complete blackout of any women athletes employed by the
men's teams in the NFL (there has never been a female NFL player), NBA (likewise, there has
never been a female NBA player), MLB (the Colorado Silver Bullets, a women's baseball
team had played against minor league baseball players, but the women are not part of the
Major League Baseball Players' Association), or the NHL (during the early 1990s, a Canadian
female player, Manon Rheaume, briefly played on a minor league team).
290. For example, since Title IX's enactment, there have been sporadic professional
women's basketball leagues; however, 1996-97 will feature two women's basketball leagues,
including the American Basketball League, which commenced operation during the Fall 1996,
and the National Basketball Association sponsored one, the Women's National Basketball
Association, which will commence operation during the summer of 1997. See Kate McCor-
mick, Spotlight: Women's Sports on the Professional Track-Part I, WoMEN's SPORTS
EXPERIENCE, Oct. 1996, at 19-21. While the women's baseball team, the Colorado Silver
Bullets has been playing for the last couple of years, the Women's Professional Fastpitch
League will debut during June 1997. 1& at 19.
291. WBCA 1995 Division I Salary Survey (1995) (on file with the Nova Law Review).
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since Title IX's inception.292 The results of the ongoing longitudinal study
done by Professors Acosta and Carpenter concerning NCAA colleges and
universities revealed further disturbing news with their latest update. As of
1996, only 47.7% of the coaches of women's teams are women, a decline
from the 1994 figure of 49.4%.293 Furthermore, only 18.5% of all women's
programs are headed by a woman, also a decrease from the 1994 figure of
21%; and only 11.9% of colleges and universities with a full-time sports
information director had a woman at the helm.294 In Division I in 1996, the
research indicated that men comprised a startling 91.2% of the athletic
directors of women's programs.295 In 1996, only a few Division I schools
296had any women in athletic administration positions. Merely five of theNCAA's Division I-A athletic directors are women.297
B. Equal Pay
The Title IX regulation governing compensation states:
A recipient shall not make or enforce any policy or practice which,
on the basis of sex:
(a) Makes distinctions in rates of pay or other compensation;
(b) Results in payment of wages to employees of one sex at a rate
less than that paid to employees of the opposite sex for equal work
on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
292. See Grebin v. Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 18 (8th Cir. 1985) (teaching
position for which a female applied was filled by a man, who could also coach football). In
this Title VII case, the Eighth Circuit determined the school district had a legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff, as the male applicant was better qualified. Id. at
21. See also Sennewald v. University of Minn., 847 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1988) (discussing
another Title VII case concerning a female assistant softball coach who was not promoted to a
full-time position).
293. R. Vivian Acosta & Linda Jean Carpenter, Women in Intercollegiate Sport: A Lon-
gitudinal Study-Nineteen Year Update 1977-96, at 1 (unpublished manuscript on file with the
Nova Law Review) [hereinafter Acosta & Carpenter]. Cf Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Black
Women, Gender Equity and the Function at the Junction, 6 MARQ. SPoRTs L.J. 239 (1991)
(examining, inter alia, the low number of African-American women coaching).
294. Acosta & Carpenter, supra note 293, at 11.
295. Id
296. Id. at 12.
297. The women athletic directors are Andrea Seger of Ball State University, Deborah
Yow of University of Maryland, Cary Groth of Northern Illinois University, Sandy Barbour of
Tulane University, and Barbara Hedges of University of Washington. Arena, NEWSDAY, Sept.
14, 1996, at A28.
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responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions.2
98
There has yet to be a court decision in the area of athletics employment at an
educational institution which addresses this specific regulation.299
There were only two cases exploring the equal pay considerations for
coaches, who were still in their positions while the litigation ensued. The
jury trial in Tyler v. Howard University was conducted in a District of
Columbia Superior Court during 1993.300 The jury rendered a verdict of
$2.39 million for Sanya Tyler, the women's basketball coach at Howard
University. On June 29, 1993, the judge reduced the verdict, based on
duplicate recovery for the same injuries under alternate legal theories, to
$1.06 million against the University, and retained the original $54,000
verdict against the individual defendant.
301
On September 15, 1995, the trial judge finally issued an order and
memorandum opinion responding to the July 1993 post-trial motions filed by
the defendants.30 2 The four causes of action asserted were: 1) Equal Pay
Act; 2) sex discrimination pursuant to Title IX and a District of Columbia
statute; 3) retaliation; and 4) defamation. The court granted the defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the Equal Pay Act
based on the plaintiff not being selected as the Athletics Director in 1991
and a claim of retaliation.
Tyler had been the full-time Associate Athletic Director since 1986, and
part-time women's basketball coach since 1980, for an aggregate salary of
$62,000. On July 1, 1990, a full-time men's basketball coach was hired at an
annual salary of $78,500, plus access to a leased car, with a four-year
contract with an option for an additional year.30 3 Tyler was paid $44,436.3°4
298. 34 C.F.R. § 106.54 (emphasis added). Note that the regulation does not include the
language, on the basis of sex of the individual, to track the Title VII verbiage.
299. See Heckman, supra note 15, at 1014-15.
300. See Tyler v. Howard Univ., No. 91-CAl1239 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Sept. 15, 1995)
(Memorandum Opinion) [hereinafter Mem. Op.]; Pitts v. Oklahoma, No. 93-1941-A (W.D.
Okla. 1993) (discussed in Heckman, supra note 15, at 1010).
301. Id. The court awarded $600,000 for lost wages pursuant to Title IX and the District
of Columbia Human Rights Act; $138,000 damages pursuant to the Equal Pay Act; $72,00 for
emotional distress under the sex discrimination claim; $250,000 damages for emotional
distress under the retaliation claim; and $54,000 for the defamation claim. Il
302. The court stated that resolution of the post-trial motions was intentionally delayed
awaiting the development of appellate judicial precedent under the Equal Pay Act and Title
IX. Mem. Op., supra note 300, at 2 n.1.
303. Id. at 9.
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Tyler applied for the top position, which went to another candidate outside
the University.
The court noted that the issue concerning the Equal Pay Act was
whether this federal statute was violated due to the difference in salary and
conditions paid to the men's and women's basketball coaches.305  The
University argued that although the head full-time basketball coaches have
the same job title and the same general job description, this did not entitle
them to the same or identical salary.306  Rather, the jobs must be
"substantially equal., 30 7 The court cited an appellate opinion which stated
that "[s]kill includes consideration of such factors as experience, training,
education and ability.... Responsibility involves the degree of accountabil-
ity required in the performance of the job; the controlling factor is not job
title but job content-'the actual duties that the respective employees are
called upon to perform."' 30 8 The court found the Ninth Circuit decision in
Stanley v. University of Southern California309 was persuasive on the equal
pay issues.
Howard University's men's basketball coach was a former NBA player
and coach, who authored a book and did television color commentary, and
according to the University, the school "was forced to compete with market
forces," in obtaining his services.310 Clearly, he had more playing experi-
ence and a higher level of coaching experience than the plaintiff. However,
considering the limited or nonexistent professional basketball opportunities
for women in this country, certain men will always come in with an advan-
tage (as result of historical discrimination against women in athletic and
employment situations, which necessitated federal statutes such as Title IX,
Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act).
The court also relied on the fact that the men's basketball team
304. Id
305. Id. See also Debra E. Blum, Pay Equity for Coaches: Some Colleges Give Substan-
tial Raises to Mentors of Women's Teams, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 6, 1994, at A53
(designating specific universities which are awarding coaches of their women's teams with
considerable raises to more closely align their salaries with those of the men's coaches, such
as women's basketball coaches at The Florida State University, Texas A & M University,
University of Florida, and University of Kansas).
306. Mem. Op., supra note 300, at 2 n.1.
307. Id
308. Id. at 11.
309. 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994).
310. Mem. Op., supra note 300, at 15-16.
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also served to generate income from the viewing public and spec-
tators, the media, and from other sources to a far greater degree
than did the women's basketball team. This revenue-generating
function and responsibility placed far greater pressure on Coach
Beard to win than was the degree of pressure placed on Ms. Tyler
with reference to the women's basketball team. Thus, for this rea-
son, their jobs were not substantially equal 311
The court noted that
[a] question may be raised as to whether societal factors, such as
far greater spectator interest in men's basketball than women's
basketball, and greater media and television interest and coverage
of men's sports, as external factors, should be allowed to justify a
disparity or differential in the pay of men and women coaches for
the same athletic activities.
312
The court responded that
[t]his Court is constrained to follow the existing judicial precedent
and leave it to the appellate courts to grapple with the issue of such
market forces, as spectator interest and television and media cover-
age, justifying paying women less compensation than their male
counterparts for basically the same function, except for the impact
of these market forces over which universities and colleges claim
they have no control.313
The defendant's motion was denied as to the sex discrimination claims
of being undercompensated as women's basketball coach, involving the pay
and working conditions, pursuant to Title IX and a District of Columbia
statute. As to the retaliation claim, the court expounded:
While there was some dispute and misunderstandings as to office
space assignment, available funds because of budget restraints, and
other minor related issues, this Court concludes that the evidence
concerning these matters did not rise to the level of establishing the
311. Id.
312. Id
313. IL at 18.
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required nexus so that a reasonable jury could find that this activity
was retaliation for complaining of sex discrimination. 314
Additionally, the motion was denied as to the defamation action alleged
against an individual defendant, who allegedly in a single publication to a
professional colleague of the plaintiff, intimated that the plaintiff was a
lesbian. In conclusion, the court granted the defendant's motion for a new
trial or remititur, only as to damages on the two sex discrimination claims of
the District of Columbia statute and Title IX, or accepting a reduction to
$250,000; and on the defamation claim a reduction from $54,000 to $10,000.
Thereafter, the parties settled the case during November 1995.
C. Termination
1. Cases Commenced Pre-1994
On January 6, 1994, the Ninth Circuit in Stanley v. University of
Southern California315 affirmed the district court's denial of the plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction seeking restoration of the plaintiffs
position as the women's basketball coach at the University pendente lite.
Marianne Stanley had commenced her lawsuit in 1993 seeking $8 million in
compensatory and punitive damages on a number of legal theories, includ-
ing: Title IX, the Equal Pay Act,316 the California Constitution, breach of
contract, and wrongful discharge.
The appellate court found the men's basketball coach had
"substantially" different responsibilities in raising revenue (the men's
basketball program generated 90% revenues compared to the women's
basketball program which generated 10%) and public relations responsibili-
ties on behalf of the University that could command a greater salary than
314. IL at 5.
315. 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994) (granting the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment). An appeal has been taken to the Ninth Circuit. Prior to this decision, there was only
one other decision concerning athletic employment pursuant to Title IX, O'Connor v. Peru
State College, 781 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1986), which did not reach the merits of the case, but
focused on the threshold issue of whether the athletic department was a recipient of federal
funds to ensure Title IX protection.
316. See Mike Candal, Equal Coaching for Unequal Pay, NEWSDAY, Apr. 2, 1995,
(Sports section), at 18 (concerning the difference in salary paid to the men's and women's
basketball coaches at the University of Connecticut). The male head coach of the women's
team guided his team to the 1994-95 NCAA Women's Basketball championship. See also Ira
Berkow, Auriemma Helps Pave the Way at UConn, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1995, § 8, at 2.
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provided to the women's basketball coach pursuant to the Equal Pay Act.
The Ninth Circuit found that "[e]mployers may reward professional experi-
ence.., without violating the EPA. 3 17 Furthermore, "[r]evenue generation
is an important factor that may be considered in justifying greater pay. We
are also of the view that the relative amount of revenue generated should be
considered in determining whether responsibilities and working conditions
are substantially equal.'
Interestingly, the only reference to Title IX was contained in a footnote,
where the Ninth Circuit stated, "Coach Stanley has not contended either in
the district court or before this court that this evidence [concerning the
revenue-generating ability of the men's versus women's basketball pro-
grams] would support an inference that USC violated Title IX."319 Further-
more, the mere fact that the University ultimately offered only a one-year
contract did not establish retaliation 320 where the men's basketball coach had
a multi-year contract, and Stanley's expired contract was a multi-year
contract. In both the Ninth Circuit decision and the following district court
decision, Title IX is essentially left out of the equation in determining
whether sex discrimination existed.
On March 10, 1995, the district court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment in its entirety, primarily on the determination that the
duties and responsibilities of the men's basketball coach were greater than
those required of the women's basketball coach, with the former position
requiring greater pressure to win, raise revenue, and satisfy greater public
relations requirements. 321 The district court found that
317. Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1322 (citing Soto v. Adams Elevator Equip. Co., 941 F.2d 543,
548 n.7 (7th Cir. 1991)).
318. Id. at 1323. See Naughton & Srisavasdr, supra note 6, at A45, referring to a recent
NCAA report that revealed that "more than 60 percent of Division I men's basketball
programs and Division I-A football programs lose money. The average deficits are $226,000
and $1.02 million respectively." Id. See also Jim Naughton, A Book on the Economics of
College Sports Says Few Programs are Financially Successful, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct.
11, 1996, at A57.
319. Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1323 n.3 (citations omitted). Cf. Heckman, supra note 15, at
1007-08.
320. 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (adopting by incorporation 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e)) (prohibiting
retaliation).
321. Stanley v. University of S. Cal., No. CV93-4708 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1995)
[hereinafter Slip. Op.]. See Jane Gottesman, An Odyssey of Championships and Hardships,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1995, § 8, at 11 (concerning Coach Stanley). Cheryl Miller, who was
hired as Stanley's replacement, submitted her resignation during September 1995 to pursue
television opportunities and more recently has become involved with the Women's National
Basketball Association. Stanley was hired during April 1996 as the head women's basketball
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Stanley still is unable to show the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact on the issue of whether the men's and women's bas-
ketball coaching positions are substantially equal and require equal
pay under the law. It is clear they are not. Both the men's and
women's head coaches recruit student athletes, coach basketball,
provide academic guidance to team members, and supervise their
coaching staffs. The men's coach, however, is under considerable
pressure to generate revenue for the university by attracting paying
spectators and producing a winning team.
32 2
The court noted that "[t]his pressure is created by the media, public, and the
school's administration and donors. 32 3
The court grouped the sex discrimination claims pursuant to the Equal
Pay Act, Title IX, and the California statute 3 24 in one discussion. A review
indicated that as with the prior appellate court decision, the focus was on an
explicit analysis of the Equal Pay Act. "To state a claim under this section,
the plaintiff's job must require substantially the same skill, effort, and
responsibility as the higher compensated job held by a member of the
opposite sex." 325 The only direct mentions of Title IX were in the next to
last paragraph of the subsection, where as an aside the district court stated
that "[s]imilarly, Title IX of the [Education Amendments] of 1972 prohibits
an educational program that receives federal financial assistance from
denying benefits to, or subjecting to discrimination, any person on the basis
of sex," 326 and "[the athletic director's] power as athletic director to hire and
fire athletic coaches does not make him an employer for purposes of individ-
ual liability under... Title IX,, 327 Once again, there was no discussion of
any of the Title IX regulations. First, there was absolutely no mention of the
Title IX regulations governing employment. Second, there was no recogni-
tion of the Title IX regulation establishing "equal opportunity" which
coach at University of California at Berkeley, after serving as temporary head coach at
Stanford University. Stanley will be paid a base salary comparable to that of the men's
basketball coach. Cf University of California, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics at
the University of California: A Report of the Gender Equity Committee of the Department of
Intercollegiate Athletics & Recreational Sports, Dec. 1, 1993 (on file with the Nova Law
Review).
322. Slip Op. at 14, Stanley, (No. CV93-4708).
323. Id. at 15.
324. Fair Employment & Housing Act, CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 12940-12950 (West Supp.
1993).
325. Slip Op. at 12-13, Stanley (No. CV93-4708).
326. Id. at 13.
327. Id. at 19.
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explicitly mandates equal opportunity in coaching for male and female
athletes when a school elects to provide separate teams for their male and
female student athletes. The court underscores that the women's basketball
coach was
not required to make any specific number of public appearances to
promote the women's basketball team .... The University did not
impose public relations responsibilities on her while she was head
coach .... In contrast, [the men's basketball coach's] required
participation in at least twelve outside speaking engagements per
year, that he be accessible to the media for interviews, and that he
participate in community activities. He was required to participate
in fund-raising activities benefiting the athletic department in gen-
eral and the men's basketball program in particular. 3
28
The court fails to recognize that generally it is the recipient of federal funds,
the academic institution, which is clearly controlling the issue of public
relations responsibilities, by explicitly imposing it as a requirement within a
contract of the men's basketball coach and not the contract of the women's
basketball coach, and then is permitted to use the absence thereof to penalize
the women's basketball coach when it comes to remuneration. As previ-
ously identified, surely a women's coach would not be against such minimal
additional public relations duties, with a possible additional compensation of
$60,000 per annum. The logic certainly seems flawed. Moreover, query
whether it triggers a direct attack as to whether the recipient of federal funds
was providing "equal opportunity" for its female student athletes, where the
school, adopting the court's rationale, was apparently not required to
promote this program with the same vigor.
Additionally, the court places significant stock in the revenue-
generating responsibilities of the men's coach. "Revenue generation is an
important factor in determining whether responsibilities and working
conditions are substantially equal and whether greater compensation is
justified., 329  Not surprisingly, the men's basketball program raised
$4,621,020.90 versus only $59,918.50 by the women's basketball program.
The court neglects to provide the dates when the men's and women's
basketball teams came into existence at the University. The court does
compare the spectators for the appropriate periods for the men's and
women's basketball teams. Not surprisingly, the statistics favored the men;
328. Id. at 16.
329. Id. (citations omitted).
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however, the men's team averaged merely 4103 spectators for the time
period in question, hardly. an overwhelming number for a major college
basketball program. 330  Of course, the argument can be made, that if the
judiciary is going to do a side-by-side comparison, then by necessity the
University must provide an "equal opportunity" for both programs, and so
the court would be required to insure that that standard was satisfied, before
the comparison can be made. This determination, resting as it does on the
Ninth Circuit decision, obscures the Title IX picture. As previously identi-
fied, revenue-generation is absent from the "equal opportunity" discussion.
Furthermore, the "[c]ourt addresses the retaliation claim as if it arises under
Title VII. 330 ' Again, what about retaliation pursuant to Title IX?
Instead, the court reiterated that "[t]he [c]ourt finds no discrimination
arising from USC's contract offers to Stanley. It thus was not required to
pay her a salary equal to that paid to the men's head coach. 332 The appel-
lee's brief recounted the Ninth Circuit's observation that "the uncontradicted
evidence shows that Coach Raveling's responsibilities, as head coach of the
men's basketball team, differed substantially from the duties imposed upon
Coach Stanley. 3 33 Coach Raveling has since retired. It is not known what
compensation arrangement exists with the current men's basketball coach.
Oral argument before the Ninth Circuit occurred on October 7, 1996. 334
330. The Appellee's Brief, in discussing one of plaintiffs experts' arguments, notes that
"[w]hat Frey appears to be saying, although he cites no source for his statement, is that,
compared with other men's programs, USC's men's program did not have relatively high
attendance; conversely, compared with other women's programs, the USC women's program
did have relatively high attendance." Stanley v. University of S. Cal., No. 95-55466,
Appellee's Brief, Aug. 25, 1995, at 21 n.17.
331. Slip Op. at 20, Stanley (No. CV93-4708).
332. Id. at 14.
333. Appellee's Brief, Stanley v. University of S. Cal., No. 95-55466, Aug. 25, 1995, at 2
(on file with the Nova Law Review). The brief also summarizes that as to the retalia-
tion/public policy wrongful discharge claims that "[t]he court found it was undisputed that
USC had offered Stanley a multi-year contract with very substantial pay increases after she
had demanded the same pay as Raveling.... Furthermore, Stanley was not terminated, but her
written employment contract expired June 30, 1993, and she rejected all offers USC made for
a new contract." Id. at 7. Furthermore, defendants argued, "Under the law set by this Court in
Stanley I, USC was not required to pay Stanley according to a marketing professor's view of
the potential of women's basketball, as distinguished from the underlying actuality of
spectator interest, media interest, revenue generation, and the like." Id. at 19-20.
334. The Ninth Circuit posed no direct questions about any of the specific Title IX regu-
lations governing employment. The plaintiff has also filed two other appeals in this case, one
challenging the alleged bias of the district court judge, No. 95-56250 (9th Cir. 1996) (briefs
have been filed), and another challenging the imposition of costs as of result of the summary
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Katalin Deli, the former head coach of women's gymnastics team,
alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title IX, Title VII, and the Equal
Pay Act in not having received pay comparable to that of the men's football,
basketball, and ice hockey coaches (but not the men's gymnastics coach) in
Katalin Deli v. University of Minnesota.335 The federal district court granted
the University's motion for summary judgment on all three federal stat-
utes.336 The Title IX claim was dismissed for failure to comply with the
statute of limitations. No appeal was taken.337
Gabor Deli, the former assistant women's gymnastics coach, also
commenced a federal lawsuit in Gabor Deli v. University of Minnesota,33
alleging discrimination, including sex discrimination in violation of Title IX
in not receiving pay comparable to that paid to assistant coaches of some
men's teams (other than his own sport). On August 18, 1994, the federal
district court granted the University's motion for summary judgment. First,
as to the Title VII assertion, the court concluded that "[t]he clear terms of the
statute prohibit discrimination in compensation based on the sex of the
recipient. The statute does not proscribe salary discrimination based on the
sex of other persons over whom the employee has supervision or oversight
responsibilities. 339  Second, the court rejected plaintiff's Equal Pay Act
contention based on the failure to compensate him at the same level as male
assistant coaches of certain men's intercollegiate teams. The court stressed
that under this statute, the crux must be a difference in what is paid members
of one sex compared to the opposite sex. Since the plaintiff here is a man
and the comparators (assistant coaches of the selected men's teams) are also
all male, this claim cannot advance. Moreover, the court would not entertain
such a claim based on the sex of the students coached. 340 "Such compensa-
tion differentials are based on a 'factor other than sex' and thus are not
judgment awarded, No. 96-55004 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiff's
petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to have a district court judge disqualified, No. 95-
70704 (9th Cir. 1996).
335. 863 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn. 1994).
336. lL at 963.
337. See also Deli v. Hasselmo, 542 N.W.2d 649 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); Deli v. Univer-
sity of Minn., 511 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
338. No. 3-93-501 (D. Minn. Aug. 18, 1994) (Memorandum and Order) (on file with the
Nova Law Review) [hereinafter Mem. & Order].
339. Mem. & Order, at 11, Deli, (No. 3-93-501) (emphasis added) (citing Jackson v.
Armstrong Sch. Dist., 430 F. Supp. 1050, 1052 (W.D. Pa. 1977)).
340. Mem. & Order, at 12-13, Deli, (No. 3-93-501) (citing EEOC v. Madison Comm.
Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 581,584 (7th Cir. 1987)).
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proscribed by the EPA.,,341 Third, as to the Title IX violation raised, the
court ruled the plaintiff did not have standing to pursue a Title IX claim on
behalf of student athletes he had coached, and assuming arguendo that he
had, such standing evaporated when his coaching position was terminated,
thus rendering any such standing moot.342 Moreover, the court eviscerated
the Title IX claim by addressing merely the "equal opportunity" regulations
which require equivalency as to coaching. 343 The rationale was based, in
part, on the failure of the plaintiff to assert in his complaint that the athletes
he coached received lesser quality coaching as a result of the difference
between his salary and the salary paid to the men's assistant coaches. In
Deli v. University of Minnesota,34 the state Court of Appeals ruled that the
dismissals of the assistant coach, Gabor Deli, and the head women's gym-
nastics coach, Katalin Deli (Gabor Deli's wife), were predicated upon just
cause.
During December 1995, the jury issued a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiffs, former coaches, and athletic administrator employees in Meadows v.
State University of New York at Oswego.346 However, during February 1996,
the judge overturned it. Subsequently, motions were filed seeking restora-
tion of the verdict. The case was ultimately settled during 1996. 347
341. Mem. & Order, at 14, Deli, (No. 3-93-501).
342. Mem. & Order, at 14 n.4, Deli, (No. 3-93-501). The regulations allow anyone to file
an administrative complaint on behalf of aggrieved beneficiaries of Title IX protection, and
such an administrative complaint may even be filed confidentially. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7 (1996).
343. Mem. & Order, at 15, Deli, (No. 3-93-501) (referring to 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)).
Specifically subsections 5 ("Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring") and 6
("Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors") pertain to coaching.
344. 511 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
345. Il- at 54.
346. No. 92-CV-1492FJS (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1993) (denying plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction) (complaint filed during Nov. 1992).
347. For other cases commenced prior to 1994, see Huffman v. Gordon, No. 701610 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Orange County 1992) (parties settled suit brought by terminated women's
volleyball coach at California State University at Fullerton); Suwara v. Day, No. 659577 (Cal.
Super. Ct. San Diego 1992) (parties settled suit brought by former women's volleyball coach
at San Diego State University, who was terminated); California Nat'l Org. for Women v.
Evans, No. 728548 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara 1993) (parties settled suit brought by former
associate athletic director of San Jose State University); Dowell v. College of Mt. St. Joseph,
No. C-1-93-0826 (S.D. Ohio) (settled) (discussed in Heckman, supra note 15, at 1014, 1017).
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2. Cases Commenced During 1994-96
On January 20, 1994, Marty Hawkins, the former coach of the women's
basketball team filed suit in Hawkins v. University of Loyola at Chicago,348
seeking compensatory damages of $1 million and punitive damages of $3
million for his firing which he alleged was predicated on his speaking out for
gender equity at the school in violation of Title DC. The federal complaint
was voluntarily withdrawn. Thereafter, a lawsuit was commenced in state
court.
34 9
On April 6, 1994, a former women's basketball coach filed a complaint
in Bowers v. University of Baylor,350 alleging sex discrimination and retalia-
tion in violation of Title IX. The plaintiff sought $1 million compensatory
damages and $3 million punitive damages, and injunctive and declaratory
relief. Thereafter, on April 13, 1994, the district court denied plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction restoring her to the head coaching
position of women's basketball during the pendency of the lawsuit.3 1 On
August 11, 1994, the district court denied the defendant University's motion
to dismiss the plaintiff's Title IX claim, holding that an employee may assert
a private right of action under this statute.35 2 However, it granted the motion
as to the individually named defendants,35 3 relying principally on Doe v.
Petaluma City School District.
354
During April 1994, Mary Jane Telford, former women's basketball
coach for seventeen seasons brought suit in Telford v. St. Bonaventure
University alleging sex discrimination pursuant to Title IX, Title VII, and the
Equal Pay Act. On April 28, 1995, the case was settled, reportedly for at
least $100,000. 355
348. No. 94CV00245 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (On Mar. 22, 1994, the case was dismissed without
prejudice.).
349. Hawkins, No. 94L03300 (Cook County, Ill. Mar. 18, 1994) (The case was pending
as of January 24, 1997, and is subject to nonbinding mediation. The parties have selected a
mediator and are arranging a date for mediation.).
350. No. A94-CA-239JN (W.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 1994).
351. Id. (W.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 1994).
352. Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 145 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
353. Id at 146.
354. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993). In this case alleging sexual harassment of a
female student by her peers in creating a hostile environment, the district court determined
that "it is the educational institution that must be sued for violation of Title IX." Id. at 1577.
Accord R.L.R. v. Prague Pub. Sch. Dist. 1-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526, 1530 (W.D. Okla. 1993)
(dismissing the action against the alleged coach charged with the actual sexual abuse).
355. Arena, NEWSDAY, July 15, 1995, at A27.
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On May 11, 1994, Ellyn Bartges, a former part-time assistant women's
basketball coach and women's softball coach, who was terminated during
June 1993, filed an amended complaint seeking $5 million damages and
injunctive relief in Bartges v. University of North Carolina at Charlotte,356
pursuant to Title IX, Title VII, and Equal Pay Act, based on allegations of
sex discrimination, constructive discharge, and retaliation.357 Bartges had
resigned from her position as women's head softball coach. On November
6, 1995, the federal district court granted the University's motion for
summary judgment as to all causes of action alleged by the plaintiff.358 The
decision in Bartges focused on the Equal Pay Act considerations, as opposed
to Title IX, similar to the Ninth Circuit decision in the Stanley case.
Bartges had volunteered to be an assistant coach for the women's
basketball team during 1988-89."' She was then paid an hourly rate for the
following season, and hired by the female athletic director, Judith Rose, as
the part-time head women's softball coach during the summer of 1990-91.
Rose paid Bartges more than she had paid the former women's softball
coach, a man, despite her having less experience. Bartges has no prior head
coaching experience on the collegiate level, six months of experience as a
volunteer assistant basketball coach at another university, six months of
experience as head coach of a high school girl's team, and no prior experi-
ence as a softball coach. Bartges continued as part-time assistant women's
basketball coach and part-time head softball coach for the University for the
academic years 1990-91, 1991-92, and 1992-93. 36
"Later, Bartges lost her job as Assistant Women's Basketball Coach
when that position was converted to a full-time position and she was not
hired for the full-time slot. '361 She applied for the women's assistant
basketball coach's position "only after she was invited to do so" by the
athletic director and current coach.362 Although she was one of the three
finalists, she was not selected. Instead, the University chose another woman
who had three years head coaching collegiate experience elsewhere and was
a former basketball player at the University. In order to comply with NCAA
356. 908 F. Supp. 1312 (W.D.N.C. 1995), aff'd, 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996). On April
4, 1994, she had filed her original complaint. She did not resign from her position as part-
time head softball coach until July 26, 1994.
357. Id. at 1320.
358. Id. at 1334.
359. Id. at 1317.
360. Id. at 1318.
361. Bartges, 908 F. Supp. at 1319.
362. Id.
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regulations, the University created positions for two full-time assistant
coaches and one part-time "restricted earnings" coach,363 who was limited to
$12,000 a year in total compensation from the University.
364
Bartges agreed to change the term of her employment as softball coach
from a twelve-month to nine-month position to retain her health insurance
coverage. During her employment, she filed two administrative complaints
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Bartges
also filed an administrative claim with the OCR alleging sex discrimination
pursuant to Title IX. She submitted her letter of resignation on July 26,
1994.365
The court declined the Equal Pay Act claim that Bartges received lower
pay than other coaches. 366  The court observed that the full-time head
baseball coach "is responsible for a thirty-two member team as opposed to
the fifteen member softball team. Therefore, the Head Baseball Coach must
recruit, monitor, and coach more than twice as many student-
athletes... [and] is also responsible for supervising one full-time coach. 367
The court found the same situation existed with the head volleyball coach,
which was also a full-time position. 36 Moreover, Bartges was paid more
than the head golf coach. A comparison with the men's assistant coaches
illustrated the plaintiff's prior limited coaching experience in basketball and
non-existent prior experience with softball, compared to the corresponding
assistant coaches.369 Additionally, the men's assistant basketball coaches
were full-time positions, compared to position of the women's assistant
basketball coach, which was only a part-time position.
The court highlighted that
the uncontested evidence is that men's basketball is the most mar-
ketable and largest revenue producing sport at UNCC. This makes
the position considerably more important to the University, and
363. The court did not discuss the pending litigation concerning the permissibility of the
"restricted earnings" coaches. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 902 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Kan. 1995)
(men's "restricted earnings" basketball coaches instituted an antitrust action against the
NCAA); Schreiber v. NCAA, 167 F.R.D. 169 (D. Kan. 1996) (concerning whether class
action status would be conferred upon members of NCAA men's "restricted earnings"
baseball coaches, who instituted an antitrust action against the NCAA).
364. Bartges, 908 F. Supp. at 1319 n.1.
365. Id. at 1320.
366. Id. at 1326.
367. Il at 1323.
368. Id at 1325.
369. Bartges, 908 F. Supp. at 1325.
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also means the position entails greater public relations, recruiting
and other coaching responsibilities, and means the position carries
with it much more pressure to produce winning teams.
370
In addition, "[t]he University has given several reasons why Bartges
was paid less than the coaches of other programs: her limited experience,
the relative importance of the sport she coached in the University's sports
program, and the prevailing wage for coaches in her sport. 37' Thus, the
court concluded that "[b]ecause UNCC has established that its compensation
decisions were based on a factor other than sex ... , the University is
entitled to summary judgment on Bartges' claim under the Equal Pay
Act. , 372
In regard to Title IX, the University argued that the legislative history
was not intended to provide a private cause of action for individual educa-
tional employees, who were relegated to Title VII. This was based primarily
on the assertion that Congress has amended Title VII to include educational
employees, within the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, merely
three months prior to the enactment of Title IX and thus, the "legislative
history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which amended
Title VII," is part of the legislative history of Title IX.33 Thus, the defen-
dant argued that Congress omitted any intention of including a private rights
of action for educational employees because it had already been ad-
dressed.374 While that is accurate, can it be interpreted that any omission in
a new statute enacted three months later is the tabula rasa? Moreover, the
argument ignores the fact that in 1975 Congress enacted specific Title IX
regulations solely for educational employees. If Title VII was the exclusive
remedy then such regulations would have been superfluous, or Congress
could have instead merely incorporated by reference the actual Title VII
requirements, as it did for example when referring to retaliation, when it
adopted Title VI. However, this was not done. The defendant continued
that, assuming arguendo, Title IX did allow for such a private cause of
370. Id. at 1323 (citing Jacobs v. College of William and Mary, 517 F. Supp. 791, 795-
98 (E.D. Va. 1980), aft'd, 661 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1981); Stanley v. University of S. Cal., 13
F.3d 1313, 1321-24 (9th Cir. 1994); Deli v. University of Minn., 863 F. Supp. 958, 961 (D.
Minn. 1994)).
371. Bartges, 908 F. Supp. at 1324.
372. Id. at 1326.
373. Wilson v. University of Va., 663 F. Supp. 1089, 1091 (W.D. Va. 1987).
374. Defendant University's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
May 15, 1995, at 48, Wilson v. University of Va., 663 F. Supp. 1089 (W.D. Va. 1987).
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action,375 the Title VII standard of intentional discrimination must be
established. Since no evidence of intentional discrimination was found, no
Title IX cause of action could be maintained.
From a Title IX perspective, assuming arguendo a Title IX private right
of action for educational employees, the issue should have been framed as
whether the University discriminated on the basis of sex, when: a) compar-
ing the full-time head coaching position for men's baseball vis-a-vis the part-
time head coaching position for the women's softball team; b) comparing the
full-time men's assistant basketball coaches vis-a-vis the part time women's
assistant basketball coach; 376 and c) whether an examination of the entire
men's athletic program vis-a-vis the entire women's athletic program
revealed sex discrimination in the assignment, compensation, and opportu-
nity to receive coaching. 377  The court eschewed such an analysis. On
August 14, 1996, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision for
the reasons advanced therein. 378 No appeal was filed seeking certiorari with
the Supreme Court.
375. The Fourth Circuit sanctioned such a position in Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New
river Community College, 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994) (discussed infra p. 615).
376. The University asserted that "UNC Charlotte does not pay the coaches in the basket-
ball program more because they coach men." Appellees' Brief, 1996, at 22 n.3, Bartges v.
University of N.C. at Charlotte, No. 95-3157 (4th Cir. Dec. 18, 1995).
377. Subsequently, the OCR found no violation in the assignment or compensation of
coaches, but did find a violation in the availability of coaches for women's teams. Appellees'
Brief, at 48. Even in the appellees' brief, the University extolled that
[o]ne significant factor is the priority UNC Charlotte places on the sport in ques-
tion.... In prioritizing the sports in which it offers intercollegiate competition,
UNC Charlotte has simply decided which sports, and consequently which
coaches, are most important to the university. In light of those facts, UNC
Charlotte's decision to pay the more important coaches more money is a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the difference between their salaries and the
plaintiff's.
Appellees' Brief, at 17-18. High priority sports were men's basketball, men's baseball, men's
golf, and women's volleyball. Noticeably absent was women's basketball from the school's
internal assessment. See Heckman 1992 commentary, supra note 15, at 970, warning against
the practice of school's "emphasizing" certain sports for a Title IX analysis. The court made
no reference to the inequity in the number of participation opportunities (and teams)
emphasized for male student athletes at this University, compared to the female student
athletes.
378. 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996). The University's appellate brief stated that "[t]hough
Bartges may believe the she worked as hard as a full-time head coach, her belief is immaterial.
She has presented no evidence that the UNC Charlotte required the same effort from its part-
time head coaches that it did from its full-time head coaches. It is only when the employer
19971
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In Plotzke v. Boston College,379 the former coach of the women's
basketball team at the college commenced a federal lawsuit alleging, inter
alia, Title IX sex discrimination and retaliation during November 1994. On
March 27, 1995, the court granted Boston College's motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's complaint in part, and denied it in part.380 The Title IX claim
remained, with the court relying on Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico.381
Likewise, the motion of the individually named University President and
athletic director was granted in part, and denied in part.382 The Title IX
claim was also allowed against the two aforementioned individual defen-
dants, again citing Lipsett.383 This stance of retaining the individually named
defendants is at odds with the decisions in other cases, which have dismissed
such claims. The parties entered into a confidential settlement during 1996.
In Harker v. Utica College of Syracuse University,384 the women's
basketball coach's contract was not renewed, and she brought suit pursuant
to Title VII, Title IX, and the Equal Pay Act. On April 24, 1995, the court
dismissed her complaint on all theories, finding, inter alia, that she failed to
create an inference of discrimination under Title IX.385
Only one case dealt with termination of a female athletic employee of a
men's team. On July 18, 1995, JoAnn Hauser, former men's basketball
teams' athletics trainer at the University of Kentucky, filed a state court
action in Hauser v. University of Kentucky,386 alleging sex discrimination
concerning her discharge. No Title IX claim was alleged. During Septem-
ber 1996, the judge dismissed the causes of action directed at the athletic
director and men's basketball coach, in their individual capacities, in this
lawsuit seeking $2 million.
D. Retaliation
Most of the termination cases also contained retaliation aspects.
Stephanie Schleuder, the women's volleyball coach at the University of
requires the same effort or responsibility for two positions that the jobs are substantially
equal." Appellees' Brief, at 12.
379. No. 94-12329-EH (D. Mass. Nov. 1994) (defendants' Motion for Dismissal was
granted in part and denied in part during 1995).
380. Plotzke, No. 94-12329-EH (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 1995).
381. 864 F.2d 881 (lst Cir. 1988).
382. Id at 884.
383. ItL
384. 885 F. Supp. 378 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
385. Id. at 392.
386. No. 95-2252 (Cir. Ct., Fayette Cty., Ky. July 18, 1995) (on file with clerk of court).
See Governmental Affairs Report, NCAA NEws, Aug. 30, 1995, at 5.
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Minnesota for thirteen seasons, had been without a contract since 1993. She
was fired during December 1994. "She alleges the firing was due to her
crusading for pay equity in the women's athletic department." 3s7  She
originally brought suit in a federal district court claiming violations of Title
IX and the Equal Pay Act. After her motion for temporary restraining order
restoring her as coach was denied, she voluntarily dismissed the suit3  and
filed a claim with the state agency responsible for sex discrimination. On
January 30, 1995, a state court judge in Minnesota v. Regents,38 9 issued an
injunction preventing the University of Minnesota from hiring a new
women's volleyball coach while the Minnesota Department of Human
Rights investigated a claim of retaliation pursuant to the Minnesota Human
Rights Act. The Commissioner of the agency asserted that the state predi-
cate was broader than the federal one.
The case of Clay v. Board of Trustees of Neosho Community College,390
concerned allegations of retaliation by the male coach of the women's
basketball team, whose contract of employment was not renewed.39' He had
spoken about the lack of Title IX compliance with the male athletic director.
The district court noted that "[t]he question of whether Title IX provides a
private cause of action for damages for retaliation against a whistle blower,
under circumstances similar to the instant case, has not been decided by the
Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit.' 392 The court found that "[i]n short,
discrimination against women by a community college in its sports pro-
gramming is a matter of public interest. 3 93 The district court found that a
plaintiff may maintain a Title IX claim for retaliation. 394 Furthermore, the
common law wrongful discharge claim would be preempted by Title IX.395
387. Arena, NEWSDAY, Feb. 3, 1995, at A65.
388. Governmental Affairs Report, NCAA NEws, Apr. 26, 1995, at 1.
389. No. EM94-289 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 1995)
390. 905 F. Supp. 1488 (D. Kan. 1995).
391. Id. at 1491-93.
392. Id. at 1494.
393. l. at 1498.
394. Id. at 1495. The court also held that 'Title IX actions may only be brought against
an educational institution, not an individual acting as an administrator or employee for the
institution." Clay, 905 F. Supp. at 1495.
395. Id. at 1501.
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E. Reverse Discrimination Cases
The first reverse discrimination case was commenced during February
1995 in Reinhart v. Georgia State University.396  Bob Reinhart, former
men's basketball coach at the University commenced the suit, "claiming he
was fired because he refused a pay cut intended to bring his salary in line
with that of the women's basketball coach. 3 97
VI. EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION OR RETALIATION
GENERALLY
The predominant issue evidenced herein is a threshold issue of whether
Title IX provides a private cause of action for employees of educational
institutions, or are they limited to a Title VII action, with any prosecution of
violations of Title IX involving educational employees confined to the
federal government by the Department of Justice or the OCR. On June 13,
1994, an University of Toledo female employee brought an action against
the University for sex and age discrimination in Wedding v. University of
Toledo.3 98 The district court held that no private cause of action existed
under Title IX for sex discrimination in employment.399
396. Sidelines, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 10, 1995, at A35.
397. Id.
398. 862 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ohio 1994), overruled by Ivan v. Kent State Univ., 92 F.3d
1185 (6th Cir. 1996).
399. Id. at 203. Accord Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 754 (5th Cir. 1995) (Title IX did
not confer a private cause of action to a female medical professor denied tenure), cert. denied
sub nom. Lakoski v. University of Tex., Med. Branch at Galveston, 117 S. Ct. 357 (1996).
But see Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Comm. College, 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994);
Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (see discussion supra p. 607);
Ward v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 861 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1994); Henschke v. New York
Hospital-Comell Med. Ctr., 821 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Paddio v. Board of Trustees
for State Colleges & Univs., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 86 (E.D. La. 1993) (wherein the
district court disregarded the argument of Southeastern Louisiana University that Title IX did
not provide relief for sex discrimination alleged by the former women's volleyball and softball
coach). Several cases have discussed Title IX causes of action in educational employment
cases involving athletic employment at educational institutions. See Stanley v. University of
S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussed supra p. 600); Deli v. University of Minn.,
863 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn. 1994) (discussed supra p. 605); Deli v. University of Minn., No.
3-93-501 (D. Minn. Aug. 18, 1994) (discussed supra p. 605). Based on the Supreme Court
decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979) (allowing a Title IX
private right of action implied for a student), North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,
521 (1982) (upholding the constitutionality of the Title IX educational regulations in a case
brought by the federal government against a school district, as opposed to a plaintiff who was
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The plaintiff, a community college student support services counselor,
alleged Title IX and Title VII retaliation in Preston v. Virginia ex rel New
River Community College4° when she was not elevated to the activities
counselor position. She had filed an employment discrimination claim when
she was the support services counselor.4°' On August 3, 1994, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of her claim.4°2 The appellate
court recognized that a Title IX implied private right of action extends to
employment discrimination at educational institutions receiving federal
funds.4°3 However, prior to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 0 the
prevailing case law involving Title VII retaliation was "that an employer is
not liable if it would have reached the same employment decision 'in the
absence of the protected conduct. ' ' '4°5 In 1994, the Supreme Court held the
Civil Rights Act should not be retroactively applied.4°6 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit determined that "Title VII principles should be applied to Title IX
actions, as least insofar as those actions raise employment discrimination
claims." 4 7 Therefore, since the actions complained of occurred prior to the
effective date of the Civil Rights Act, the Title VII standard would be
applied and retaliation would not be found where the protected activity
"played a part-even a substantial part-in the decision-making process."
4 8
In Fairbairn v. Board of Education of South Country Central School
District,4°9 the plaintiff, a female school administrator, was terminated.10
She brought a claim under a number of legal theories, including Title IX. On
January 13, 1995, the district court ruled:
an educational employee) (Title IX should be afforded "a sweep as broad as its language,"),
and explicit Title IX regulations dealing with employment, namely 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.51, .52,
.54, the decisions finding a Title IX right of action for educational employees would seem to
be the more supportable approach.
400. 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994).
401. Id at 204-05.
402. Id at 209.
403. Id at 206.
404. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994).
405. Preston, 31 F.3d at 206.
406. Id. at 207.
407. Id. at 206. See Roberts v. Colorado St. Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.
1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 902 (lst Cir. 1993); Lipsett v. University of
P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 869-97 (1st Cir. 1988); O'Connor v. Peru State College, 781 F.2d 632,
642 n.8 (8th Cir. 1986).
408. Preston, 31 F.3d at 206.
409. 876 F. Supp. 432 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
410. Id. at 435.
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The burdens of proof and production which govern disparate
treatment claims under Title VII .... likewise are applicable
to... Title IX.... Accordingly, Fairbairn initially was required to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination that (1) she belonged
to a protected class, (2) she applied and was qualified for a job for
which her employer sought applicants, (3) that despite her qualifi-
cations, she was rejected, and (4) that after rejection, the post re-
mained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of plaintiff's qualifications.
411
A female plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the Board and some
individuals in Howard v. Board of Education of Sycamore Community Unit
School District No. 427412 on a number of legal theories premised on her
allegations of constructive discharge and being replaced with a man who was
not minimally qualified.413 The Title IX claim was directed only against the
Board concerning claims of sexual discrimination, harassment, and retalia-
tion.41 4 The district court cited the definition of "program or activity" and
determined that such definition does not include the agents of such an entity.
The court recognized:
Several other cases, on the other hand, have applied the agency
principles under Title VII cases to sexual harassment actions under
Title IX.... This court is persuaded by the reasoning in Floyd.
While it is not entirely clear what the precise parameters are on
employer liability, it is at least evident that agency principles pro-
vide guidance in Title VII cases.
415
"Absent the use of traditional agency principles, the court is left with
two alternatives: strict liability based on the conduct of school employees or
liability premised only upon the direct knowledge or involvement of the
school or educational institution. 4 16 The court opined:
Absent knowledge or direct involvement by the school or educa-
tional agency, it is difficult to characterize any form of sex dis-
crimination as an authorized program or activity of the school edu-
411. Id. at 437.
412. 876 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
413. Id. at 964-65.
414. Id. at 974.
415. Id. (citations omitted).
416. Id.
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cational agency.... Thus, this court finds that absent allegations
that the Board knew of, or was directly involved in, any of the al-
leged discriminatory conduct in Counts IV-VI, plaintiff can not
maintain a claim against the Board under Title JX1
7
Thereafter, on July 21, 1995, the district court issued another decision,41
stating:
[T]his court does not read the Cannon, Bell and Franklin decisions
as supporting the conclusion that the legislative history of Title IX
demonstrates Congress' intent to have Title IX serve as an addi-
tional protection against gender-based discrimination regardless of
the available remedies under Title VII. Accordingly, this court
dismisses plaintiffs Title IX claim as being precluded by Title
VII.
41 9
During May 1995, three female professors alleged sex discrimination
against the University of Iowa in Brine v. University of Iowa,420 concerning
the closing of the school's dental hygienist program, which was primarily
composed of females.421 The hygienist program was part of the dental
program, which was taught by and had a significant number of men. The
female professors were allegedly reassigned to lower paying positions.
While the jury rejected their sex discrimination allegations, the jury awarded
the women $210,000 in back pay and damages for retaliation in connection
with the situation.
On October 3, 1995, the Fifth Circuit, in Lakoski v. James,422ruled that
Title VII is the proper vehicle to bring an employment discrimination claim
417. Howard, 876 F. Supp. at 974.
418. Howard v. Board of Educ. of Sycamore Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 427, 893 F.
Supp. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1995). See also Howard, 876 F. Supp. at 959 (regarding defendant's
motion to dismiss the plaintiff's original complaint).
419. Howard, 893 F. Supp. at 815. The court agreed with several other decisions on this
point, including Wedding v. University of Toledo, 862 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ohio 1994) and
Storey v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 604 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (W.D. Wis, 1985)
(holding that an employee of an educational institution cannot bring a private cause of action
for gender discrimination under Title IX).
420. 90 F.3d 271 (8th Cir. 1996). See also Robin Wilson, Federal Jury Rejects Sex-Bias
Discharge at University of Iowa, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 12, 1995, at A20.
421. Brine, 90 F.3d at 272.
422. 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Lakoski v. University of Tex.,
Med. Branch at Galveston, 117 S. Ct. 357 (1996) (inviting the Solicitor General to file a brief
expressing the view of the United States). Accord Howard v. Board of Educ. of Sycamore
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and that "individuals seeking monetary damages for employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex in federally funded educational institutions may
not assert Title IX either directly or derivately through § 1983. "423 The case
concerned a female professor who sued a hospital at the University of Texas
for sex discrimination when she was denied tenure. Thus, the appellate court
concluded that Title IX did not provide a private cause of action.424 The
Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal in this case during the October
1996 term.
In Nelson v. University of Maine System,425 the district recognized that
"[w]hile the First Circuit has yet to address a Title IX retaliation claim, the
court's treatment of Title IX discrimination claims supports an extension of
this analysis to Title IX retaliation claims, 426 and the court utilized Title VII
standards.427 It stated that "[t]o satisfy the first prong of a prima facie case
for retaliation, the conduct opposed need not necessarily violate Title IX;
rather, the plaintiff need only have a good faith belief that a Title IX viola-
tion was occurring.
'428
VII. SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The area of sexual harassment in educational institutions is divided into
two main areas, harassment involving students and harassment involving
educational employees. Title VII, which concerns only employment sexual
harassment, is being heavily relied upon in Title IX situations. A consensus
is developing that the Title VII standards for sexual harassment, including
Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 427, 893 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Wedding v. University of
Toledo, 862 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
423. 66 F.3d at 758 (emphasis added). But see Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151 (5th
Cir. 1993) (applying Title VI standard); Nelson v. University of Me. Sys., 914 F. Supp. 643,
649 (D. Me. 1996) (stating that 'Title IX was specifically modeled after Title VI.") (citing
Grove City College v. Bell, 456 U.S. 555, 586. (1984)).
424. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754.
425. 923 F. Supp. 275 (D. Me. 1996).
426. kL at 279.
427. It noted further that
an adverse employment action need not rise to the level of discharge to be ac-
tionable.... It must, however, at a minimum, impair or potentially impair the
plaintiff's employment in some cognizable manner.... This Court is weary of
defining an adverse employment action in a manner which discourages open
communication, critical or otherwise, between employers or supervisors and their
employees as to the employee's employment performance.
Id. at 281.
428. Id. at 284.
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both quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile environment sexual harass-
ment, will be used for determining the Title IX causes of action.429 As to the
latter situation, the Supreme Court, during 1986, issued its landmark deci-
sion expounding upon Title VII hostile environment sexual harassment in
Meritor Savings Bank F.S.B. v. Vinson,430 wherein the Court rejected a strict
liability standard upon employers for sexual harassment involving their
employees.431 However, mere ignorance or lack of knowledge of the
officious actions would not insulate the employers from complicity. Instead,
as the court in Pinckney v. Robinson432 stated, relying on Vinson:
[Fior an employer to avoid [absolute] liability for its supervisor's
sexual harassment creating a hostile work environment, an em-
ployer must not only show that it lacked actual or constructive
knowledge of the harassment, but the employer must demonstrate
that it had an effective and responsive system ("energetic meas-
ures") in place at the time of the alleged harassment and that this
429. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896-97 (1st Cir. 1988)
(applying Title VII standard to a Title IX complaint by medical student-employee alleging
hostile environment discrimination created by supervisors and fellow medical students);
Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that
hostile environment sexual harassment may be asserted by students against teachers pursuant
to Title IX); Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), affd,
800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment
may be asserted by medical student concerning actions by her professor); Alexander v. Yale
Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Garza v.
Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437, 1438 (S.D. Tex. 1994) ("Additionally, a
student can not bring a hostile environment claim under Title IX.") (citing Bougher v.
University of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 882 F.2d
74 (3d Cir. 1989)). The only case cited which permits such an action is Doe v. Petaluma City
Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1583 (N.D. Cal. 1993), but even the Petaluma court requires
evidence of intentional gender-based discrimination allegations that the school district knew
or should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate corrective action are
insufficient. Even though Garza dealt with peer sexual harassment at an educational
institution, Patricia H. was not cited therein.
430. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)
(imposing a "reasonable person" standard in ascertaining whether a hostile or an abusive work
environment existed pursuant to a Title VII sexual harassment claim); Bradley Golden, Note,
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: The Supreme Court Takes One Step Forward and Two Steps
Back on the Issue of Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, 1994 DEr. C.L. REV.
1151 (1994); Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the Work-
place? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEo. L.J. 399
(1996).
431. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72.
432. 913 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1996).
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system was one of which the victim knew or should have known
and which he or she could have relied upon for a prompt and ef-
fective remedy.433
The EEOC issued regulations, defining sexual harassment as:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitutes sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either ex-
plicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's em-
ployment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an in-
dividual is used on the basis for employment decisions effecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.
434
Within those parameters, this issue will be categorized into six areas:
1) coaches/athletes; 2) teachers/students (including physical education
teachers); 3) supervisors/students; 4) others/students; 5) student/student
(peer sexual harassment) imputed to the educational institution or school
board; and 6) educational employment sexual harassment. Within this
paradigm, three levels of sexual harassment are developing, including: 1)
sexual abuse (including statutory rape); 2) quid pro quo harassment; and 3)
hostile environment harassment.
While there is also a consensus that the actions by the offending
individuals are intentional actions, the critical issue is what standard will be
applied to analyze whether the recipient of federal funding will be held
legally responsible for such conduct pursuant to Title IX. For example, two
federal courts within the same jurisdiction within a matter of days came to
opposite conclusions. The district court in Rosa H. v. San Elizario Inde-
pendent School District435 utilized a negligence standard to answer the
question of whether the school district would be responsible for allegations
of sexual abuse of a fifteen-year-old female student by a male after-school
karate instructor.4 36 Conversely, a few days prior to that decision, the district
court in Leija v. Canutilla Independent School District 437 applied a strict
433. Id. at 34.
434. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996).
435. 887 F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, No. 95-50811, 1997 WL 66087 (5th Cir.
Feb. 17, 1997).
436. Id. at 143.
437. 887 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996).
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liability standard to the school district concerning allegations of sexual abuse
of a second grade female student by a male physical education teacher, who
was incidentally a coach. 438 The twist was that the district court would
severely restrict the amount of Title IX damages that could be awarded. Of
course, to complicate the matter even further, on June 26, 1996, the federal
district court in Nelson v. Almont Community Schools439 applied the Title VI
standard to a case involving allegations of Title IX sexual harassment of a
female student by a male teacher.440 This lack of uniformity poses real
problems to both the victims and the educational institution. There is also
lack of uniformity when a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is asserted by students,
based on sexual harassment, claiming liability by the educational institu-
tion.441 The crux of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is that the offending action is
"state" action or done by a state actor.442
438. Id. at 948-49.
439. 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
440. Id. at 1355.
441. See, e.g., Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 1395, 1406 (5th Cir. 1996)
(ruling that there was a basis for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the school district based on
allegations that a custodian had raped a female student at the school); Becerra v. Asher, 921 F.
Supp. 1538, 1548 (S.D. Tex. 1996), aff'd, No. 96-2041, 1997 WL 35402 (5th Cir. July 25,
1997) (concluding that there was no state action by the school district based on the allegation
of sexual abuse committed by a teacher, who was employed by the school district and was
providing instruction to a child, being schooled at home); Diverglio v. Skiba, 919 F. Supp.
265, 269 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Garza v. Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437, 1438
(S.D. Tex. 1994); Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1461 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (discussed supra p. 628); Doe v. Rains Indep. Sch. Dist., 865 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Tex.
1994), rev'd, 66 F.3d 1402 (5th Cir. 1995). In Doe, a female high school student alleged that
her male physical education teacher and coach had sexually abused her, thereby depriving her
of her Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in bodily integrity, pursuant to a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action. Id. at 377. On September 30, 1994, the district court found that "liability under
section 1983 cannot be based on a theory of respondeat superior." Id. at 379. The Fifth
Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that another teacher's alleged failure to report the
incidents of sexual abuse pursuant to a Texas statute which required teachers to report child
abuse in a timely manner, would not alone trigger the "state" action required for a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 violation. Id. at 1417. See also Doe v. Rains County Indep. Sch. Dist., 76 F.3d 666 (5th
Cir. 1996). For 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases discussing peer sexual harassment, see Nabozny v.
Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996) (male student sued his school based on allegations of
verbal and physical abuse by a fellow male student for an extended period of time, starting in
the eighth grade, due to the plaintiffs homosexual orientation); Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d
1297 (5th Cir. 1995) (male student with a hearing impairment brought suit against the
superintendent of his school pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the sexual assaults inflicted by a
fellow male student during on-campus living at the dormitory); and Garza v. Galena Park
Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1994). In Nabozny, the school district
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In the employment area, the individuals are generally adults and enter
into the employment relationship presumably on equal planes. However,
when the situation involves minor students, the scrutiny and protection
should be greater. Therefore, while dependence on Title VII may be
appropriate for the employment situation, should Title IX completely
duplicate such Title VII protection, or should Title IX provide greater
protection for its unique constituency?
In a record-breaking number, seventy-nine administrative complaints
were filed in 1995 claiming sexual harassment in an educational setting.
During February 1995, the OCR revised a pamphlet, "Sexual Harassment:
It's Not Academic," exploring sexual harassment involving students. It
states that "[s]exual harassment in educational institutions is not simply
inappropriate behavior, it is against the law." 443 It defines sexual harassment
as "consist[ing] of verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, imposed on
the basis of sex, by an employee or agent of a recipient that denies, limits,
provides different, or conditions the provision of aid, benefits, services or
treatment protected under Title IX."444 It advises that
[a]n institution can either utilize its general grievance procedure,
required by Section 106.8 of the Title IX regulation, or develop
and implement special procedures for handling sexual harassment
allegations. Given the especially sensitive nature of this form of
sex discrimination, some institutions have opted for the latter
course of action and/or have instituted specific training in handling
reportedly settled the case for $900,000. Associated Press, Gay Student Gets $900,000 for
Harassment, NEWSDAY, Nov. 21, 1996.
442. For pre-1994 decisions focusing on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions involving students and
educational employees, see D.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1183 (10th
Cir. 1990) (concerning allegations of molestation of boys participating in summer basketball
camp by a male teacher. The court placed emphasis on the fact that the boys were participat-
ing in a voluntary activity, which was not sponsored by the school). See also Jane Doe v.
Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 770 F.
Supp. 591 (D. Colo. 1991); Sowers v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 694 F. Supp. 125 (W.D. Pa.
1988), aff'd, 869 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1989).
443. Office for Civil Rights, "Sexual Harassment: It's Not Academic" (Feb. 1995), at 1
[hereinafter OCR Pamphlet].
444. Id. at 2. During August, 1996, the OCR issued guidelines on peer sexual harassment
which defined sexual harassment, stating "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when the conduct is sufficiently severe, persistent or pervasive to limit a student's ability to
participate in or benefit from the education program, or to create a hostile or abusive
educational environment." Tamar Levin, Kissing Cases Highlight Schools' Fear of Liability
forSexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at 22.
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these cases. Title IX requires that grievance procedures be prompt
and equitable.4
5
Another area under exploration is whether Title IX sexual harassment arises
in same-sex situations.
446
Nationally, the debate on proper sexual harassment policies at educa-
tional institutions arose out of a kindergarten boy who kissed a girl in his
class and was charged with violating the school sexual harassment policy.
The youngster when interviewed as to whether he knew what sexual harass-
ment was, responded in the negative. The court in Cohen v. San Bernardino
Valley College447 explored a University's sexual harassment policy, con-
cluding that it was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the First Amend-
ment concerning freedom of speech and, therefore, did not put the English
professor, charged with violating the policy, on proper notice.44  The
University's sexual harassment policy prohibited sexual harassment, which it
defined as
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal, written, or physical conduct of a sexual nature, it [sic] in-
cludes, but is not limited to, circumstances in which... [inter alia]
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an indi-
445. OCR Pamphlet, supra note 443.
446. See, e.g., Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996), (discussed
supra p. 636); Nelson v. Almont Community Schs., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
,(discussed supra p. 635). For 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases, see, e.g., Becerra v. Asher, 921 F.
Supp. 1538 (S.D. Tex. 1996), affd, No. 96-2041, 1997 WL 35402 (5th Cir. July 25, 1997);
Divergilio v. Skiba, 919 F. Supp 265 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
447. 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996). Judge Merhige issued the decision in Kadiki v. Vir-
ginia Commonwealth Univ., 892 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Va. 1995) (discussed supra p. 628).
448. Cohen, 92 F.3d at 972.
The court stated that:
Neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit has determined what scope of First
Amendment protection is to be given a public college professor's classroom
speech... There are three objections to vague policies in the First Amendment
context. First, they trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second,
they impermissibly delegate basic policy matters to low level officials for resolu-
tion on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary
and discretionary application. Third, a vague policy discourages the exercise of
first amendment freedoms.
Id. at 971-72.
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vidual's academic performance or creating an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive learning environment.
449
In that case, a female student charged a male professor with sexual harass-
ment in violation of the school's policy. The male professor taught a
remedial English class in which the female student was enrolled. It was
reported that during a class on pornography the professor "stated in class that
he wrote for Hustler and Playboy magazines and he read some articles out
loud in class. [The professor] concluded the class discussion by requiring
his students to write essays defining pornography. 450
A. Coach/Student Athlete
Since Title IX's inception, there has been only one substantive Title IX
decision examining sexual harassment between a coach and a student
athlete.45' However, during the 1990s the headlines have been replete with
incidences of allegations of sexual harassment, uniformly concerning the
improper activities of male coach's with their female student athletes,
452
449. Id. at 971.
450. Id. at 970. In addition, other "students came forward to testify about the sexual
nature of Cohen's teaching material and his frequent use of derogatory language, sexual
innuendo, and profanity." Cohen, 92 F.3d at 971.
451. See R.L.R. v. Prague Sch. Dist. 1-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526 (W.D. Okla. 1993). See
Heckman, supra note 15, at 1018-21 (discussing cases involving allegations of sexual
harassment by coaches against student athletes). In the following cases, the offending male
teachers, accused of sexual harassment involving a female student, were also, incidentally,
coaches: Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Bolon v. Rolla Pub.
Schs., 917 F. Supp. 1423 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th
Cir. 1994) (discussed infra 627). In the following cases, the offending male teacher, accused
of sexual harassment involving a female student, were physical education teachers: Rosa H. v.
San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, No. 95-50811,
1997 WL 66087 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 1997) (discussed supra p. 620 and infra p. 632); Divergilio
v. Skiba, 919 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Doe v. Rains Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402
(5th Cir. 1995) (discussed supra p. 621).
452. See also John T. Wolohan, Title IX and Sexual Harassment of Student Athletes, J.
PHYSICAL EDUC. RECREATION & DANCE, Mar. 1995, at 52; Filip Bondy, When Coaches Cross
the Line, N.Y. TiMES, May 2, 1993, § 8, at 1, 3. The University of Florida fired its swimming
coach, Mitch Ivey, a former Olympian, reportedly for using offensive language; however,
there was reported concern regarding his relationship with his female swimmers. See Linda
Robertson, Motivation and Manipulation: Athlete-Coach Bond Occasionally Leads to
Temptation, Sexual Harassment, MIAMI HERALD (1994) (discussing reported incidents
involving other individuals and indicating that the American Swimming Coaches Association
was the only coaches' association to adopt guidelines on ethical behavior in this area) (on file
with the Nova Law Review); Don Sabo, Ph.D. & Carole Ogelsby, Ph.D., Ending Sexual
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although female coaches are not exempt from such unsavory actions4 53 As a
result, certain governing bodies, such as the American Volleyball Coaches
Association, are issuing ethical guidelines. 454 Parenthetically, the cases
involving the relationship between teachers and students are also instructive.
On February 21, 1996, the Sixth Circuit, in Lillard v. Shelby County
Board of Education,455 examined a number of allegations of sexual harass-
ment based on Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by three high school females
against a male high school coach, who was also a physical science teacher.
The teacher held a doctorate and coached the girls' soccer team, on which
one of the plaintiffs participated. The coach allegedly slapped one of his
athletes, a fourteen-year-old female plaintiff, across the face. The child's
father informed the school principal of the incident. An FBI agent who
learned about this incident informed the school principal that he had ob-
served the coach "cursing and verbally abusing the girls at practices and
games, and had 'observed [the coach] hitting the girls on their buttocks.'
456
It was further alleged that he intentionally rubbed one of the other female
plaintiff's stomach, while passing her in the hall, with a "remark that could
be reasonably be interpreted as ... inappropriate. 457
The Sixth Circuit addressed a number of issues. First, it concluded that
Title IX does not override a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action.458 Second, it
held that the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions would be
Harassment in Sports, 4 WoMEN IN SPORT & PHYSIcAL Acrrvrry J., Fall 1995, at 84-104. "It
is also helpful to see sexual harassment in athletics as a form of child abuse." Id. at 95. This
subsequent article also indicated that the United States Olympic Committee Coaching Ethics
Code now includes a statement on sexual harassment. Id. at 98.
453. See, e.g., Landreneau v. Fruge, 676 So. 2d 701 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
684 So.2d 930 (La. 1996) (concerning allegations of sexual misconduct against the school
district and a female physical education teacher/coach of a female high school student; no
Title IX claim was presented).
454. The American Volleyball Coaches Association's "Coaches Code of Ethics and
Conduct" requires that the member coach abide by the following:
Principle II - Coach/Athlete Relationship. G. Recognize that all forms of sexual
abuse, assault or harassment with athletes are illegal and unethical, even when an
athlete invites or consents to such behavior or involvement. Sexual abuse and
harassment is defined as, but not limited to, repeated comments, gestures or
physical contacts of a sexual nature. I will report all suspected cases of sexual
assault or abuse to law enforcement as required by law.
American Volleyball Coaches Ass'n., Coaches Code of Ethics and Conduct (adopted
December 1996).
455. 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996).
456. Id. at 719.
457. Id at 726.
458. Id. at 723.
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applied.4 5 9 As to the first incident, it found that "it is simply inconceivable
that a single slap could shock the conscience" so as to be actionable.46 In
addressing the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, it found that as to the hallway
incident, which the court described as "wholly inappropriate, and, if proved,
should have serious disciplinary consequences.... But without more, it is
not conduct that creates a constitutional claim. It is highly questionable
whether a single, isolated incident of this magnitude could even rise to the
level of sexual harassment under Title VII. '46' The obtuse decision, while
noting the FBI's unsolicited testimony, appeared to totally discount it in
reaching its conclusion. The court emphasized that it was not reaching the
merits of the Title IX claims alleged. Thus, it remains to be seen how the
finder of fact will classify the incidents within the penumbra of Title IX.
During May 1996, members of the women's crew team filed a lawsuit
against Temple University alleging sexual harassment based on a hostile
environment created by coaches and members of the men's crew team. The
lawsuit informs "that the room where the crew teams train was decorated
with pornographic pictures and that male athletes made lewd gestures and
comments to the women. ' 462 It was also reported that this was not the first
lawsuit instituted against Temple University concerning the crew program.
During 1994, a female student athlete charged that a male assistant part-time
coach of the men's team made lewd gestures at the woman. The University
fired this coach in 1993, when another athlete informed the school about
another incident concerning this coach. The case was settled with the
University agreeing to pay that plaintiff $5,000 and her dropping the charges
and supposedly apologizing for the suit.463
It is difficult to ascertain how many lawsuits may have been com-
menced by female or male student athletes for sexual harassment actions by
their coaches, especially when no publicity surrounds the filing of the
lawsuit, and many settlement agreements routinely contain confidentiality
clauses.
459. Id. at 729.
460. Lillard, 76 F.3d at 726.
461. Id. (emphasis added).
462. Sidelines, CHRON. HIGHER EDuC., June 7, 1996, at A33.
463. Id.
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B. Teacher/Student
The lead case in this area is the 1992 Supreme Court decision in
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,464 which focused on the
remedies that Title IX provides, based on allegations of sexual harassment of
a female student by a male teacher. The first decision to substantively deal
with the issue of whether Title IX confers protection for students for hostile
environment sex discrimination was Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified School
District, 46 involving allegations of sexual molestation of female students by
a male band teacher. The plaintiffs asserted that the teacher's continued
presence at the school alone established a hostile environment.
In Doe v. Taylor Independent School District,466 a fifteen-year-old
female student alleged sexual abuse by a male teacher (a biology teacher and
coach) and abridgment of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
protecting liberty interests by the school district. On March 3, 1994, the
Fifth Circuit held the plaintiff was deprived of her substantive due process
protections. 467 No Title IX claim was alleged. The plaintiff's "due process
claim is grounded upon the premise that schoolchildren have a liberty
interest in their bodily integrity that is protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and upon the premise that physical sexual
abuse by a school employee violates that right."M68 However, the federal
appellate court noted that a "school official's liability arises only at the point
when the student shows that the official, by action or inaction, demonstrates
a deliberate indifference to his or her constitutional rights."469 The court
elaborated:
It is incontrovertible that bodily integrity is necessarily violated
when a state actor sexually abuses a schoolchild and that such mis-
conduct deprives the child of rights vouchsafed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Obviously, there is never any justification for sexu-
ally molesting a schoolchild, and thus, no state interest, analogous
464. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
465. 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
466. 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994).
467. kiL at 451.
468. Id. at 450.
469. Taylor, 15 F.3d at 454. See Armstrong v. Lamy, 938 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Mass.
1996). In Lamy, there was no 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action to impute liability to the school board
for an inadequate hiring policy based on allegations of sexual abuse by a teacher of a student.
The court noted that "[a] supervisory official may, however, be held liable under § 1983 on
the basis of his or her own acts or omissions." Id. at 1033.
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to the punitive and disciplinary objective attendant to corporal
punishment, which might support it.
4 70
Allegations of sexual harassment of a female sixth grade student by a
student-teacher and fellow male students were presented in Oona R.-S. v.
Santa Rosa City Schools.47' The court declined to grant the individual
student-teacher's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 motion to dismiss, as well as to certain
classroom teachers and some other named school officials. The district court
underscored that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim does not foreclose a Title IX
private cause of action.472 Additionally, the court found that the conduct of
an educational employee who engages in sexually harassing activities toward
a student may be held culpable, provided that intentional discrimination is
established, stating that "the Court finds that intentional discrimination is an
element of a claim that an individual official has violated a plaintiff student's
rights under Title IX by engaging in or allowing sexual harassment of that
student." 473 However, the "plaintiff student must show that each defendant
official either intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of sex or is
liable under standard section 1983 supervisory liability principles for his
own wrongful conduct in supervising a subordinate who intentionally
discriminated. 474  The same standard would be applied to each school
official concerning allegations by a student's peers or non-officials.475
On June 23, 1995, the district court in Kadiki v. Virginia Common-
wealth University47 6 held that a university could be held strictly liable under
Title IX if a student successfully provided that her biology professor's
470. Id. at 451-52. See also Wilson v. Webb, 869 F. Supp. 496 (W.D. Ky. 1994). In
Wilson, two female students asserted a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause concerning their liberty interests based on allegations of sexual
molestation by one of their male teachers on school grounds. The teacher argued that the
liberty interests protected were limited to those involving undue restraint. However, the court
noted that "[s]choolchildren have a liberty interest in their bodily integrity that is protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and physical sexual abuse by a school
employee violates that right." Id. at 497.
471. 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
472. Id. at 1461. But see Mann v. University of Cincinnati, 864 F. Supp. 44 (S.D. Ohio
1994) (discussed supra p. 551).
473. Id. at 1464 (emphasis added).
474. Id. at 1465.
475. Id. at 1466. See also Bosley v. Keamey R-I Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D.
Mo. 1995) (involving peer sexual harassment).
476. 892 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Va. 1995). See also Slater v. Marshall, 906 F. Supp. 256
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (discussed infra p. 633).
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conduct constituted quid pro quo sexual harassment.47 The court stated that
"knowledge of the quid pro quo harassment may be imputed to a univer-
sity/employer need ... ",,478 Furthermore, "[g]iven the purpose of Title IX
and Congress' mandate that Title IX be broadly interpreted, it is essentially
inconsequential that Title IX does not expressly adopt agency principles. 479
Allegations of sexual abuse by a male physical education teacher of a
female second grade student pursuant to Title IX were the focus in Leija v.
Canutilla Independent School District.480 While the child's primary teacher
was told of some of the incidents, none of the members of the school board
were notified. First, the district court found that only the educational
institution, not the individual teacher, could be liable for Title IX viola-
tions. 481 The court dismissed the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action because the board
had "no knowledge of the abuse she suffered and therefore could not have
been deliberately indifferent to her rights. 482  Query: Why should the
student's informing the primary teacher not have constituted constructive
knowledge by the school board? Assuming that the primary teacher was not
required to inform the school principal and that the school principal was not
required to bring this to the attention of the board, then should the lack of a
proper policy not have been a question of fact for the jury as to the school
board's failure to have a proper policy in place, in the first instance?
However, on the issue of whether the school district would be liable for
the intentional actions of sexual abuse of this young girl, the court eschewed
agency principles and instead applied strict liability standard. Thus, while
"the court believes that the actions of a teacher should be strictly imputed to
an educational institution. Concurrently, the court believes that limitations
should be placed on damages." 43 In defending his position, the court stated
that "[t]he young student, vulnerable in every way, should not be the only
477. Kadiki, 892 F. Supp. at 755.
478. IM. at 754.
479. Ma
480. 887 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996). The Fifth
Circuit reversed, finding that the school district was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because the school district "had neither actual nor constructive notice of the sexual abuse."
Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 402-03 (5th Cir. 1996). See also John
Does 1, 2, 3, and 4 v. Covington County Sch. Bd., 884 F. Supp. 462, 464-65 (M.D. Ala.
1995) (holding that a Title IX cause of action exists against the school board, principal, and
superintendent for allegations of sexual abuse committed by a teacher against elementary
school students).
481. Leija, 887 F. Supp. at 957.
482. Id. at 950.
483. Id. at 948.
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effective line of defense or the policing authority. The job of the student,
especially the elementary student, is to learn in a trusting environment.
' 484
This is the first court to so adopt a restricted position as to compensa-
tory damages. The jury had awarded the plaintiff $1.4 million.481 Interest-
ingly, the district court indicated that the Fifth Circuit has clearly utilized
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act486 in determining Title IX cases. 48 7 How-
ever, the court distinguished that the Fifth Circuit did not address the issue
of imputed liability under Title IX.
The court enunciated that "[t]here can be several types of school
discrimination: (1) denial of access to the school or school's programs,
normally but not always at the higher education level, (2) physical sexual
abuse, or (3) non-physical but sexist harassment., 488  The court further
elaborated that
[t]he problem in teacher-student sexual abuse cases is therefore as
follows: (1) only the school district can be liable under Title IX;
(2) only intentional acts of discrimination are reached by Title IX;
(3) the intentional acts can be committed by the district's employ-
ees who will never have authorization to act; so (4) unless the acts
of the employees of the district are fully and strictly imputed to the
district, Title IX becomes potentially inoperative.
489
In balancing this strict liability, the court in the cases only of teacher-
student sexual abuse would limit the damages to compensatory damages for
merely expenses for medical treatment, expenses for mental health treat-
ment, and expenses for special education, specifically omitting any monetary
damages for pain and suffering. Identifying that unlimited damages, such as
the million dollar verdict in this case, can bankrupt school districts, the court
stated that "[p]ublic education is of critical importance to our Nation.
Limited damages under Title X protect the schools and simultaneously
provide relief to sexually abused students .... In cases where rights are
implied, 'appropriate' remedies will also be implied." 49° The Title IX statute
484. Id. at 955.
485. Id
486. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (1994).
487. Leija, 887 F. Supp. at 950 (citing Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151 (5th Cir.
1993)).
488. Id. at951.
489. M at 953.
490. ld. at 956.
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contains no restriction on the amount of compensatory damages. Moreover,
the court did not discuss at all the Title VII maximum cap of $300,000
damages as another possible option in this situation. Expect an appeal, as
the court ordered a new trial on the issue of damages. Thus, while the
analysis of the strict liability standard in this case is defensible, the limited
damages, as promoted herein, stand on shaky grounds.
On October 17, 1995, the district court, in Canutillo Independent
School District v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,491 ruled that an
insurance contract did not specifically exclude Title IX claims against a
school district.492 Another judge issued this decision based on the underly-
ing facts in Leija. The court exemplified that holding a school district in
violation of Title IX for sexual harassment of a student by an employee
required satisfaction of two elements. It requires
that there be two distinct actions or inaction, at least one of which
is intentional in nature, on the part of an employee and on the part
of the school district .... Title IX does require proof of negligent,
reckless or intentional acts by the school district, independent of
the intentional conduct of the employee. This Court believes that
to hold otherwise is to place the school district in the untenable po-
sition of being liable for conduct which it was, or is unable to rem-
edy or rectify. Simply put, case law does not allow the school dis-
trict (the insured) to be liable for the wrongful act of an employee
under either Title IX or § 1983. There must be further wrongful
conduct by a school district to prove a Title IX case.493
Note, the court did not require an intentional act by both the offending
employee and the school district. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and
rendered judgment in favor of the insurance company, relying principally on
the fact that the underlying actions which prompted the lawsuit by the
students against the school district were the actions of the physical education
teacher, and noted that "the sexual assaults constitute criminal acts under
Texas law. 494 It required some discriminatory act on the part of the school
491. 900 F. Supp. 844 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 99 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1996). See also
Board of Educ. of E. Syracuse-Minoa Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Continental Ins. Co., 604 N.Y.S.2d
399 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding a teacher's allegations of sexual harassment against the
school district, for actions of the principal, not to constitute an "occurrence" within the
meaning of the district's general liability policy).
492. Canutillo, 900 F. Supp. at 847.
493. Ma (emphasis added).
494. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1996).
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district or its agents. Moreover, "we note that while injunctive relief may be
available for failure to adopt Title IX's grievance policies and procedures,
such a failure is not itself an act of discrimination that may be the basis of an
award of damages. 495
Three days after the Leija decision, another judge in the Western
District of Texas issued his decision in Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent
School District496 concerning allegations of sexual abuse of a fifteen-year-
old female student by a twenty-nine-year-old male after school karate
instructor, where karate was being offered by the school district. The jury
awarded the plaintiff damages. First, the district court, as in Leija,497
dismissed the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the school district and the
Title IX action against the offending school instructor. Second, there was no
doubt that "any school district employee molesting students is acting outside
the course and scope of his or her employment." 498 However, this court
would also require a negligence standard to find the educational institution
liable under Title IX. Thus, while "sexual abuse of a student is always an
intentional act. However, to impute liability to the school district there must
be some further action or inaction on the part of the school district which
would give rise to liability." 499 The court stated that
[t]o prevail on a claim of intentional discrimination under Title IX,
the plaintiff must show that: 1) the school district is subject to Ti-
tle IX; 2) plaintiff was sexually harassed or abused (the intentional
conduct); 3) by an employee of the school district; 4) the school
district had notice, either actual or constructive, of the sexual har-
assment or abuse; 5) the school district failed to take prompt, ef-
fective, remedial measure; and 6) the conduct of the school district
was negligent.
5W
This court also did not require an intentional act by both the offending
employee and the school district itself. In this construct, the notice provision
allows the school district an opportunity to do something about the situation.
In addition, the fifth element entails "that the school district be given
495. Id. at 706.
496. 887 F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
497. Leija, 887 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996)
(discussed supra p. 629).
498. Id. at 142.
499. lM. at 143.
500. Id. (emphasis added).
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opportunity to act on behalf of the student, that is, terminate the discrimina-
tory conduct, before being subject to liability. 501
In Slater v. Marshall,50 2 a female student's complaint against the
Montgomery County Community College created a claim under Title IX for
quid pro quo sexual harassment by a male professor, based on her being
foreclosed from meaningful course work on the basis of gender. However,
the complaint failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
American with Disabilities Act,503 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.5
4
The January 5, 1996, district court decision in Bolon v. Rolla Public
Schools05 carved out the four standards that the courts are using to deter-
mine a school district's liability for sexual harassment by teachers of their
students. The courts stated that
[c]ourts have adopted several different approaches, including the
following: (1) the agency principle ... (essentially a 'negligent or
reckless' standard)...; (2) knowledge or direct involvement by
the school district .... ; (3) the Title VII standards of employer li-
ability in sexual harassment cases (i.e., 'knew or should have
known' for hostile environment and strict liability for quid pro quo
harassment)... ; and (4) strict liability.5°
After reviewing the aforementioned, the court concluded:
This Court, guided by the Supreme Court's Franklin decision in-
terpreting Title IX, holds that intentional discrimination by teachers
is imputed to the school district under the principles of respondeat
superior, regardless of whether the intentional discrimination is the
creation of a hostile environment, the demand for sexual favors, the
501. Id.
502. 906 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
503. IL (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1995)).
504. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1985 & Supp. 1995)).
505. 917 F. Supp. 1423 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
506. Id. at 1427. In Nelson v. Almont Community Schs., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich.
1996), the district court applied the Title VI intentional discrimination standard to a Title IX
case involving allegations of sexual harassment of a male student by a female English teacher.
1997]
120
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
removal of females from the classroom, or any other intentional
action based on sex in violation of Title IX. 0 7
The court explained:
If Title IX is to have any effect, school districts must be held
strictly liable for the actions of a teacher who engaged in blatant
sex discrimination, for example, requiring all females to sit in the
hall during class. Otherwise, the school would be effectively insu-
lated from all Title IX liability.
508
Furthermore,
[i]n light of the Supreme Court's holding in Franklin that sexual
harassment constitutes intentional sex discrimination in violation of
Title IX, there is simply no reason to apply a different standard of
liability when a teacher discriminates by engaging in a sexual rela-
tionship with a student rather than by denying him or her an educa-
tion.
509
Thus, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The district court in Pallett v. Palma1 0 elaborated on institutional
responsibility when allegations of sexual harassment are raised involving
actions by a professor at a university, stating that "[t]he institution of higher
learning satisfies its legal obligation under facts similar to these cases unless
it provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment
but did nothing about it."511  The court seemed satisfied that a sexual
harassment prohibition notice was provided to the students and employees,
as well as a grievance procedure, commenting that
the College upon learning of the plaintiffs sexual harassment alle-
gations took appropriate remedial action and to the extent that it
was unable to or failed to take appropriate remedial action the
College was prevented from doing so by the failure and active re-
fusal of the plaintiffs to cooperate with the College administration
in pressing formal charges and testifying at the necessary faculty
507. Id. at 1427-28 (emphasis added). The court noted, however, that it was not required
to address the standard concerning peer sexual harassment. Id. at 1428 n.2.
508. Id at 1429.
509. Id.
510. 914 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
511. Id. at 1024.
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hearing to terminate [the professor's] tenure upon the required
finding of gross misconduct.
512
In this case, upon learning of allegations of separate incidents of sexual
harassment involving a female undergraduate student and a female graduate
student (who was also a University employee), the school suspended the
offending tenured professor.
The plaintiffs elected to forego the University's own process, which
could have resulted in the professor's termination, and commenced a lawsuit
instead. The court noted:
That a faculty member on occasion will violate the published poli-
cies of an institution and do so clandestinely, as here, is not a basis
for students or employees who have eschewed the established pro-
cedures for rectifying the wrong done to them, to run instead to the
courts, to mulct the charitable funds of a non-profit teaching insti-
tution. These funds could be used better for the instruction of other
students.
513
In situations of sexual harassment and abuse, the offending individuals often
rely on the silence of their victims; however, Title IX does not require that
an individual first exhaust a school's internal grievance process or even
exhaust an administrative process before instituting a lawsuit. Therefore, it
would appear that the ad hominem criticism of the plaintiffs' elected course
of action seems gratuitous and unnecessary, as according to the court the
issue was simply whether the educational institution had a policy in place.
Furthermore, it is not the nonprofit status of the educational institution that
is the main concern herein, as almost exclusively, educational institutions are
nonprofit institutions. Rather, the focus of Title IX is that federal funds
should not be used to promote or condone sexual harassment and sex
discrimination by these educational institutions, who voluntarily elect to
receive such federal funding or allow their students to do so regardless of
whether the institution is non-profit or for-profit.
In Nelson v. Almont Community Schools, 514 a male high school student,
who attempted suicide allegedly because his female English teacher would
not allow him to end their relationship, claimed Title IX sexual harassment
against the school board. On June 26, 1996, the district court, recognizing
512. Id. (emphasis added).
513. Id.
514. 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
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the conflict in the standard being applied to analyze Title IX sexual harass-
ment, summarized the standards being applied as follows:
Some courts follow the agency principles continued in the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(6) (essentially a "two-
tort" negligent or reckless conduct standard showing the intentional
tort of the employee and the negligence of the school dis-
trict) .... Others, persuaded by the Franklin Court's reference to
Meritor... which was a Title VII employment discrimination case,
have applied the Title VII standard of employer liability (i.e.,
"knew or should have known" for hostile environment claims, and
strict liability for quid pro quo harassment) .... A number of
courts, because of the above-quoted discussion in Franklin of
"intentional" discrimination, have adopted the Title VI intentional
discrimination standard, and require a showing of knowledge stan-
dard, and require a showing of knowledge or direct involvement by
the school district in the discrimination or failure of the school to
take appropriate remedial action .... A few courts have applied a
"strict liability" standard. 5
This court ultimately determined:
This Court agrees with those courts which apply the Title VI inten-
tional discrimination standard. Intentional discrimination requires
either (A) a showing of direct involvement of the school district in
the discrimination, or (B) a showing of (1) actual or constructive
knowledge on the part of the district of the sexual harassment of a
student and (2) that the school failed to take immediate appropriate
action reasonably calculated to prevent or stop the harassment.
516
The August 26, 1996, Eighth Circuit decision in Kinman v. Omaha
Public School District5 17 is notable because the court found that a Title IX
sexual harassment hostile environment action can be brought when it
involves the same sex. Kinman involved allegations of a homosexual
relationship between a female English teacher and a female high school
student.518 The appellate court found "no reason to apply a different stan-
dard under Title IX. The uncontroverted evidence shows that McDougall
515. Id. at 1355.
516. Id.
517. 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996).
518. Id. at 465.
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targeted Kinman because she was a woman.' 519 As to what standard should
be applied in this Title IX case, the court instructed that:
We recently held that Title VII standards for proving discrimina-
tory treatment should be applied to employment discrimination
cases brought under Title IX. We now extend that holding to apply
Title VII standards of institutional liability to hostile environment
sexual harassment cases involving a teacher's harassment of a stu-
dent.... In such cases, the employer should not be held liable un-
less the employer itself has engaged in some degree of culpable be-
havior. For example, the employer could be held liable if it knew
or should have known of the harassment and failed to take appro-
priate remedial action. 52
0
Thus, the "'knew or should have known' standard is the appropriate standard
to apply .... v7521
C. Supervisor/Student
In Randi W. v. Livingston Union School District,522 a thirteen-year-old
female commenced a lawsuit in a California state court, alleging sex dis-
crimination as the result of molestation by a male vice principal of the
school.523 This court found that Title IX did not extend statutory liability on
the school district for the Vice Principal's actions. 524  Aside from the
Karibian v. Columbia University525 case, there were no other decisions
rendered concerning allegations of sexual harassment by a supervisor during
the three-year time period.526
519. Id. at 468.
520. Id. at 469 (citations omitted).
521. Id.
522. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471 (1996).
523. Id. at 473.
524. Id at 488.
525. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussed infra p. 649).
526. See Hastings v. Hancock, 842 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Kan. 1993). The case featured
allegations of Title IX sexual harassment of a female student by a male director of a vocational
educational school. The court recognized "that in many cases decided under Title VII, courts
have held that an act of a supervisor with direct authority over the harassee makes an employer
directly liable for any violations of Title VII." Id at 1320 (citations omitted).
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D. Other/Student
In Murray v. New York University College of Dentistry,527 a male
patient at the dental clinic where the plaintiff, a female dental student, was
required to provide services as part of her clinical curriculum was badgering
and stalking the plaintiff, according to the allegations. Another dental
student informed the chief of the dental clinic that the patient was "unstable"
and was sexually harassing the plaintiff.5 28 The chief informed the patient to
desist with his activities. The plaintiff never advised her professors or the
clinic chief that the actions were continuing until after she received a notice
from the College informing her that, due to her failure to successfully
complete ten out of twenty-eight courses, she would be required to redo her
second year. Subsequently, in a letter to the review board, she explained that
the subpar performance was due to the illness of a family member, having to
work another job to finance her tuition, and the actions of the clinic patient.
After receiving the letter, the board did not rescind its determination. The
plaintiff contended that the college violated Title IX by "(1) allowing the
discriminatory abusive environment created by [the patient] to persist after
the College had notice of it, and (2) retaliating against her for asserting her
right under Title IX to be free from discrimination on the basis of gender." 529
The Second Circuit reviewed the conclusions of the district court and
held that
the facts alleged in the complaint would not support a finding either
(1) that NYU had notice of ongoing harassment sufficiently severe
and pervasive to give rise to a "hostile environment" under Title
VII standards or (2) that after receiving notice that harassment had
occurred, the College took any action disadvantageous to Murray
527. 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995). See Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867 (M.D. Ga.
1993) (holding that no Title IX claim was established against the school district for sexual
assaults committed by a male security guard against female students). The court in Floyd did
not address whether the educational institution had a responsibility to properly investigate the
background of this individual employee and whether any complaints had been filed against
him during his employment. See also Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446 (8th Cir. 1996). In
Larson, the district court set aside a jury verdict of $475,000 in favor of a handicapped female
student who was sexually abused by a male driver who drove the van which brought the
plaintiff to her school. The driver was imprisoned as a result of his actions. However, the
appellate court found that the school district was not civilly liable for failing to thoroughly
investigate the plaintiffs first complaint of sexual abuse. Id, at 1457.
528. Murray, 57 F.3d at 275.
529. Id. at 247.
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from which an inference of discriminatory retaliation could be
drawn.5 3
0
First, the Second Circuit indicated that "Title IX has been construed to
prohibit gender discrimination against both students enrolled in federally
supported educational programs and employees involved in such pro-
grams."53' Second, the court noted that "[i]n reviewing claims of discrimi-
nation brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment
or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are
applied to such claims under Title VII.'' 532 In analyzing Title VII sexual
harassment claims, the Second Circuit noted that "[w]hether the harassing
conduct of a supervisor or coworker should be imputed to the employer is
determined in accordance with common law principles of agency."
5 33
However,
[i]n contrast, employer liability for a hostile environment created
by coworkers, or by a low-level supervisor who does not rely on
his supervisory authority in carrying out the harassment, attaches
only when the employer has 'either provided no reasonable avenue
for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it.
534
Since the plaintiff "fail[ed] to allege that even NYU's agents knew or should
have known of the continued harassment in the present case,"535 the Second
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.
In an unusual case, Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Productions, Inc,536
students contended that compulsory attendance and some of the conduct at
an AIDS awareness program put on by an outside company at the school
constituted a Title IX violation due to the establishment of a hostile envi-
530. Id.
531. Id. at 248 (citations omitted).
532. Id. The court did make reference to the fact that it "looked primarily to Title VII, as
well as to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (1988)
(prohibiting racial discrimination in federally supported educational programs), in defining the
contours of a student's private right of action under Title IX for gender discrimination
occurring in college discriminatory proceedings." Murray, 57 F.3d at 248. (citing Yusuf v.
Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994)).
533. d at 249 (citations omitted).
534. Id (citations omitted).
535. Id at 250.
536. 68 F.3d 525 (lst Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996).
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ronment based on sexual harassment.537 On October 23, 1995, the First
Circuit noted that, because the Title IX case law was sparse, it would apply
the Title VII standards. 538 As such, "the court must consider not only the
actual effect of the harassment on the plaintiff, but also the effect such
conduct would have on a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position. 539
The court concluded, based on facts involved herein, "[i]f anything then,
they allege discrimination based upon the basis of viewpoint, rather than on
the basis of gender, as required by Title IX".,4 Thus, the appellate court
affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint.
On April 23, 1996, the Fifth Circuit, in Doe v. Hillsboro Independent
School District,54' a case involving allegations of the rape of a female
student by a male custodian, determined that it did not have appellate
jurisdiction to review whether Title IX causes of action were valid in this
interlocutory appeal.542 The school district was not a party to this appeal,
which was brought by individually named defendants. The court, in dicta,
noted that there is no Title IX claim against individuals.543 However, the
court held that the plaintiffs could go forward with their 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims against individual officials based on allegations of inadequate hiring
policies and inadequate supervision stemming from the officials' deliberate
indifference to the custodian's criminal record. 5
E. Student/Student (Peer Sexual Harassment)
1. Interscholastic Students
In Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Board of Education,545 an action for
Title IX peer sexual harassment brought by a female fifth grade student
537. Id. at 529.
538. Id. at 540 (citations omitted).
539. Id.
540. Id. at 541.
541. 81 F.3d 1395 (5th Cir. 1996).
542. Id. at 1407.
543. Id. at 1400 n.9.
544. Id. at 1403. See also Armstrong v. Lamy, 938 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Mass. 1996). In
Lamy, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the district court stated that "[t]o prove that a hiring policy
violated her rights, [the plaintiff] must show that (1) the hiring procedures were inadequate;
(2) the school officials were deliberately indifferent in adopting the hiring policy; and (3) the
inadequate hiring policy was a cause of his injury." Id. at 1036. See also supra note 469.
545. 862 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub. nom. Davis
v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.), vacated, 91 F.3d 1418 (1lth Cir.
1996). See also Houston v. Mile High Adventist Academy, 872 F. Supp. 829 (D. Colo.
640 [Vol. 21:545
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against the school board for the alleged actions of a fellow male fifth grade
student, included the touching of her breasts and vaginal area, and using
vulgar language toward the plaintiff. The plaintiff reported these incidents
to her teacher, who only verbally admonished the offending student. The
alleged sexual harassing activities continued. The principal had also been
notified. On August 29, 1994, the district court determined that
the sexually harassing behavior of a fellow fifth grader is not part
of a school program or activity. Plaintiff does not allege that the
Board or an employee of the Board had any role in the harassment.
Thus, any harm to [the plaintiff] was not proximately caused by a
federally-funded educational provider.
5 46
The court, disregarding the decision in Doe v. Petaluma School District,
547
thus found "no basis for such a cause of action in Title IX or case law
interpreting it'548 for the imposition of Title IX liability on the Board for
peer sexual harassment of which the school becomes aware.
During 1996, the Eleventh Circuit explored the issue of whether a
violation of Title IX occurs when allegations of sexually hostile environ-
ments are created due to the actions of a fellow student, and thus impute
liability to the school board. On February 14, 1996, the circuit court in
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,549 ruled it would apply Title
1994). In Houston, a female plaintiff alleged that a teacher allowed students to use his home
for sexual relations. The plaintiff was sexually assaulted by a male student at the teacher's
residence. No Title IX claim was raised. The district court held that under Colorado law there
was no fiduciary duty between the private school and student. Id. at 835. Cf Bruneau v.
South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 169 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). In Bruneau, the district
court applied a modified Title VII standard for peer sexual harassment to a Title IX claim. Id.
at 169. This court rejected utilization of constructive notice and instead required that "[t]he
plaintiff must show that the school and/or school board received actual notice of the sexual
harassing conduct and failed to take action to remedy it." Id. at 173. The trial occurred
during November 1996. The attorney for the school district argued in closing summations that
"[nlame-calling and inappropriate touching among sixth-graders amounts to misbehavior, not
sexual harassment ...." Associated Press, Gay Student Gets $900,000 for Harassment,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 21, 1996, at A18. See also Levin, supra note 444, at 22.
546. Aurelia D., 862 F. Supp. at 367.
547. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir.
1995). See also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (1lth Cir.), vacated and
reh'g en banc granted, 91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
548. Aurelia D., 862 F. Supp. at 367.
549. 74 F.3d 1186 (1 lth Cir. 1996).
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VII standards to determine this type of Title IX sex discrimination case.5 It
stated:
Thus, we conclude that as Title VII encompasses a claim for dam-
ages due to a sexually hostile working environment created by co-
workers and tolerated by the employer, Title IX encompasses a
claim for damages due to a sexually hostile educational environ-
ment created by a fellow student or students when the supervising
authorities knowingly fail to act to eliminate the harassment.
551
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that
[t]he elements a plaintiff must prove to succeed in this type of sex-
ual harassment case are: (1) that she is a member of a protected
group; (2) that she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment;
(3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of
her education and create an abusive educational environment; and
(5) that some basis for institutional liability has been established. 52
Moreover, the Title VII use of the common law principles of agency
will be applied to determine the fifth element.5 53 Finally, the court informed
that
[i]n determining whether a plaintiff has established that an envi-
ronment is hostile or abusive, a court must be particularly con-
cerned with (1) the frequency of the abusive conduct; (2) the con-
duct's severity; (3) whether it is physically threatening or humili-
550. Id. at 1191 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75-76
(1992)).
551. Id. at 1193 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Burrow v. Postville
Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996). In Burrow, the female plaintiff
had a party at her parents' farmhouse, without their presence, which resulted in property
damage approximating $1,500. The plaintiff apprised the school of the names of the
individuals responsible. Subsequently, according to her allegations, she and her family
informed the school of a slew of verbal and physical assaults and alleged that the defendants
"failed to take any meaningful action to end the harassment and protect" the plaintiff. Id. at
1196. The plaintiff further alleged that she graduated a semester early to escape the ongoing
hostile school environment. "[P]rior to October of 1992, the School District had no official
policy to deal with cases of sexual harassment.., and that prior to June of 1993, the School
District had no grievance procedure for claims of sexual harassment." Id. at 1198.
552. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194 (citations omitted).
553. Id. at 1195.
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ating rather than merely offensive; and (4) whether it unreasonably
interferes with the plaintiff's performance. The Court has ex-
plained that these factors must be viewed objectively and subjec-
tively.554
Doe v. Petaluma School District 55 concerned allegations of verbal
sexual harassment of a female student by a male junior high school student,
as well as from female students, where the school counselor did nothing after
being informed. The allegations included sexual comments, references to
her breasts, and lewd writings about the plaintiff on the bathroom walls.
First, the district court held that student-to-student harassment is actionable
under Title IX.556 Second, in elaborating on what standard should be
applied, it noted that
[t]he 'knew or should have known' standard is in essence a negli-
gence standard.... Discriminatory intent (or discriminatory ani-
mus) means that one actually meant to discriminate.... Thus, a
plaintiff student could proceed against a school district on the the-
ory that its inaction (or insufficient action) in the face of complaints
of student-to-student sexual harassment was a result of an actual
intent to discriminate against the student on the basis of sex.
557
Third, "individuals may not be held personally liable under Title IX.... [I]t
is the educational institution that must be sued for violations of Title IX. 5
On May 12, 1995, the Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, encapsulated the
issue to whether the high school counselor had a legal duty at the time of the
1990-92 incidents which would have required him in his official capacity to
do something about it. The court stated that "[wle must examine the state of
Title IX law as it existed between the rulings of Cannon and Franklin. In
doing so, we conclude that it was not clearly established, at the time of [the
counselor's] alleged inaction, that he had a duty to prevent peer sexual
harassment."559 The court also concluded that an opinion letter (letter of
findings) issued by the OCR was insufficient enough to establish such a
duty. The appellate court, however, cautioned that if the counselor "engaged
554. Id. at 1194.
555. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
556. Id. at 1563.
557. Id. at 1576.
558. Id at 1576-77.
559. Doe, 54 F.3d at 1451.
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in the same conduct today, he might not be entitled to qualified immu-
nity."560
The dissent noted that while there was no Title IX case explicating that
a school official would be liable for failing to stop peer sexual harassment,
the court should not have provided the counselor with immunity. 561 "Just as
an employer must take remedial action 'reasonably calculated to end' co-
worker harassment ... so too must school officials take remedial action
reasonably calculated to end peer harassment."
5 62
In another case, Seamons v. Snow,563 after the plaintiff, the backup
quarterback, had exited the shower area, members of the high school football
team used athletic tape to bind him to a towel rack in the boys' locker room.
While the plaintiff was restrained, another male student brought a female
student, whom the plaintiff had taken to a homecoming dance, into the
locker room where she observed the undressed plaintiff. The football coach
then suspended and dismissed the plaintiff from the team. Thereafter, the
superintendent canceled the remaining football season. The plaintiff alleged
a hostile educational environment in violation of Title IX. On October 4,
1994, the federal district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the
action, including the Title IX claim. 4
The court came to a number of conclusions. First, as a general obser-
vation, the court stated that "Title IX's protections arise when sex is the
motive behind a harmful discriminatory act. Title IX was not intended to
create a genderless society in which every act gives rise to a cause of action
simply because it affects a male or female." 565 Second, the court emphasized
the three elements necessary to establish a Title IX claim: "(1) that he or she
was excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to
discrimination in an educational program; (2) that the program receives
560. Id. at 1452.
561. Id. at 1453-54 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). The dissent cited the following Title IX
cases: Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Lipsett v. University of P.R.,
864 F.2d 881 (Ist Cir. 1988); Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges and Occupational
Educ., 813 F.2d 311 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987); Moire v. Temple Univ.
Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986); and
Alexanderv. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id
562. Id at 1455.
563. 864 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Utah 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 84 F.3d 1226
(10th Cir. 1996).
564. Id. at 1123.
565. Id. at 1116.
[Vol. 21:545
131
: Nova Law Review 21, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Heckman
federal assistance; and (3) that his or her exclusion from the program was on
the basis of sex. 566
Third, the court found the parents of the plaintiff did not have standing
as beneficiaries of Title IX protection, which is in accord with R.L.R. v.
Prague Public School District 1-103.567 Fourth, the court also concluded that
the plaintiffs in a Title IX action must establish discriminatory intent.568
Fifth, the court concluded that the defendants' failure to either adopt a
sexual harassment policy or to designate a Title IX coordinator and griev-
ance policy affects both the females and males equally. Therefore, as a
matter of law, the plaintiffs did not demonstrate an intent to discriminate.
5 69
Finally, the district court went further and determined that Title IX does
not create a cause of action based on negligence for a hostile environment.570
Furthermore, since the defendants' conduct was not sexual in any way, the
plaintiffs allegations were not sufficient to constitute a claim of sexual
harassment. 571 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision as it concerned the
Title IX determination on May 8, 1996, but reversed as to the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiff's claim regarding freedom of speech. 2
In Mennone v. Gordon,573 the female plaintiff, a high school senior,
alleged sexual harassment by a male high school student. He repeatedly
insulted and assaulted her, "making remarks about her breasts, grabbing her
hair, legs, breasts and buttocks, and threatening to rape her. [The teacher]
did nothing to stop [the student's] actions.... [and t]he school administra-
tion took no action against [the male student]. 5 74 The district court stated
that
566. Id. (citing Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139, 143-44 (W.D. Pa.
1989), affd on other grounds, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989)).
567. 838 F. Supp. 1526 (W.D. Okla. 1993).
568. Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1117 (D. Utah 1994) (citing Guardians Ass'n
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 603; Doe v. Petaluma Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560,
1563 (N.D. Cal. 1993)). But see Heckman, supra note 15, discussing sexual harassment under
Title IX, and specifically the text accompanying notes 354-56 discussing Guardians. The
position articulated in Seamons is apposite the stance in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Pfeiffer
v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 788 (3d Cir. 1990); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678
F. Supp. 517, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1987). Haffer is discussed in Heckman, supra note 92, at 22-23.
569. Seamons, 864 F. Supp. at 1122.
570. Id. at 1118.
571. Id. at 1119.
572. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1239 (10th Cir. 1996).
573. 889 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1995).
574. Id, at 54-55.
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[l]ogically, the language of Title IX demands that a defendant must
exercise some level of control over the program or activity that the
discrimination occurs under. Thus, the plain language of the stat-
ute sets forth a functional restriction that does not preclude indi-
vidual defendants, as long as they exercise a sufficient level of
control.575
Furthermore, the court concluded that "Title IX has a sufficiently compre-
hensive enforcement scheme to demonstrate that Congress intended to
foreclose enforcement through § 1983 .' ' 76 Allegations of peer sexual
harassment of a female student by fellow male students were also addressed
in the May 2, 1995, decision in Oona R.-S. v. Sant Rosa City Schools.
577
In another case, Bosley v. Kearney R-I School District,578 a female
student complained that other students were sexually harassing her. She
brought suit against the school district on a number of grounds, including
violation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title X. 579 The district court ruled on
October 19, 1995, that the plaintiffs parent was not a proper party plain-
tiff.580 The court determined there was no Fourteenth Amendment viola-
tion58' and enunciated that "compulsory school attendance does not create
the custodial relationship necessary to impose constitutional liability on the
defendant school district for failing to protect [the plaintiff] against alleged
sexual harassment by her fellow students." 582 It also found that Title VII law
provided the standards for enforcing the anti-discrimination provisions of
Title IX. 583 The court stated that "[d]iscriminatory intent is a fluid concept
that is sometimes subtle and difficult to apply. 584  Additionally, there
575. Id. at 56.
576. Id. at 59-60.
577. 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussed supra p. 628).
578. 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
579. Id. at 1013.
580. Id. at 1020.
581. Id. at 1019.
582. Id. at 1018.
583. Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1022. "Franklin supports the conclusion that Title VII law
provides standards for enforcing the anti-discrimination provisions of Title IX." Id. 'The
Office for Civil Rights also uses Title VII's hostile environment standard in determining that
an educational institution's failure to take appropriate remedial action regarding known
student-to-student sexual harassment is a violation of Title IX." Id.
584. Id. at 1020 (citations omitted). "It implies that the decision maker... selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. at 1021.
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existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the school district
intentionally discriminated against the female student based on her sex. It
cautioned that, "[o]nce a school district becomes aware of sexual harass-
ment, it must promptly take remedial action which is reasonably calculated
to end the harassment.,, 585 "[There is no notice problem where a school
intentionally discriminates."
586
The district court stated that "[d]iscriminatory intent is not synonymous
with discriminatory motive. Neither does it require proof that unlawful
discrimination is the sole purpose behind each act of the defendant being
scrutinized." 58 7  The court elaborated that discriminatory intent may be
demonstrated by "direct" evidence, or by inference as "an invidious dis-
criminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts."5
88
The court set forth the elements required to establish a claim of sex
discrimination for student-on-student (peer) sexual harassment in any
educational program or activity receiving federal funds as follows:
1) the plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; 2)
the harassment was based on sex; 3) the harassment occurred dur-
ing the plaintiff's participation in an educational program or activ-
ity receiving federal financial assistance; and 4) the school district
knew of the harassment and intentionally failed to take proper re-
medial action. If the finder of fact makes these findings, the finder
of fact may infer that defendant intentionally failed to take appro-
priate remedial action because of plaintiff's gender.
589
585. Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1023.
586. Ia at 1025.
587. Il at 1020.
588. Id. at 1021 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). See also Wright v.
Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996). In Wright, the court
stated:
In light of the preceding analysis, this court agrees with the majority view that
Title IX encompasses a claim for peer-to-peer sexual harassment. However, the
court does not believe that a school district can be held liable under Title IX for
its negligent failure to remedy the sexually harassing behavior by a student's
peers despite its knowledge of such behavior. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Franklin explicitly demands more than mere negligence to create liability for
monetary damages for a violation of Title IX-it requires plaintiffs to show in-
tent to discriminate.
liL at 1419.
589. Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1023 (emphasis added).
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2. Intercollegiate Athletes
In addition to Title IX, female co-eds are beginning to assert violations
of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act. 59  Examples of such assertions
by female co-eds can be found in two 1996 cases in which the females
alleged that they had been raped by male football athletes at their respective
schools.591
F. Employment Sexual Harassment
In Ward v. Johns Hopkins University,592 two female employees at Johns
Hopkins University instituted suit claiming sexual harassment by a fellow
male employee in violation of Title IX.593 One of the plaintiffs also alleged
sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title Vii.594 The University
moved for summary judgment. On April 22, 1994, the district court noted
that "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that the sexual harassment of an
employee may give rise to a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII.
595
The court discussed the two theories utilized to predicate such a claim: quid
590. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13981-14040 (1994), Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902-55 (1994). This Act provides for compensatory damages and
was promulgated under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
591. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D.
Va. 1996) (dismissing the plaintiff's Title IX claim against the University). The female co-ed
at the University claimed she was raped by two male football players (who were not indicted
by the grand jury) who she claimed received preferential treatment by the University. In
Brzonkala, the court stated that "[i]n the final analysis, Brzonkala has alleged a flawed
judiciary proceeding, the outcome of which disappointed her, but she has failed to allege facts
that would support the necessary gender bias to state a claim under Title IX." Id. at 778-79.
The case presented a cause of action alleging violation of the 1994 Violence Against Women
Act. During July 1996, in the first case to assert a violation of the new law, the district court
judge ruled that the Act was unconstitutional. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State
Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 801 (W.D. Va. 1996). The United States Justice Department had
filed a brief in support of the law. Id at 781.
The second case was commenced during 1996 by a female student, who sued the Univer-
sity of Nebraska and Christian Peter, a former defensive tackle for the school and fifth-round
draft choice in the 1996 National Football League draft. The woman alleges that she was
raped by Peter in 1991, and that she has asserted a violation of the Act. Arena, supra note
298, at A63.
592. 861 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1994).
593. Id. at 369.
594. Itd (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (1995)).
595. Ward, 861 F. Supp. at 372.
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pro quo or hostile environment. The Supreme Court recently elaborated on
the hostile environment basis as a "middle path":
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objec-
tively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title
ViI's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively per-
ceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually
altered the conditions of the victim's employment and there is no
Title VII violation. 96
The court further determined that the substantive law involved with Title VII
sexual harassment would apply to a Title IX claim. 7
On June 13, 1994, the Supreme Court, in Karibian v. Columbia Univer-
sity,598 denied the University's petition for writ of certiorari regarding a
collegiate female student-employee's Title VII claim against the University
based on allegations of sexual harassment by her supervisor, pursuant to the
theories of quid pro quo and hostile environment.5 99 The Second Circuit
held actual economic loss was not required to establish quid quo pro sexual
harassment. °° During June 1996, based on the University's failure to
reasonably investigate the employee's sexual harassment claim, the district
court judge vacated the jury's award of $450,000 in favor of the plaintiff
against Columbia University? °1 However, the jury found no sexual harass-
ment by the supervisor? °2 An appeal can be expected?' 3
596. Id. at 373.
597. Id at 375.
598. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994). See Cohen v. Litt, 906
F. Supp. 957, 962-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (ruling that the probationary elementary teacher's
claim of hostile environment sexual harassment was not sustained pursuant to Title VII, where
there was only a single unwelcomed sexual advance without any physical contact).
599. Karibian, 114 S. Ct. at 2693.
600. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 779.
601. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 930 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
602. Id at 150.
603. See also Redman v. Lima City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 889 F. Supp. 288 (N.D. Ohio
1995) (discussing the suit instituted by a custodian against a school district for actions by the
principal predicated upon Title VII sexual harassment). Another case, Pinkney v. Robinson,
913 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1996), involved allegations of sexual harassment, based on hostile
environment pursuant to Title IX and Title VII, which the female plaintiff, the confidential
executive secretary of the dean of the University of the District of Columbia, claimed the dean
of the law school committed. The woman had been terminated for allegedly poor performance
on the job. The district court ruled that the Title VII standards would be applied to the Title
IX claim. Id. at 32, The district court rejected a strict liability application. Id. at 33.
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G. Cases Commenced by Individuals Charged with Sexual
Harassment
In Coplin v. Conejo Valley Unified School District,604 an unusual case,
the accused predator in a sexual harassment action, a male high school band
member who had been charged with twenty incidents concerning female
students and who further admitted to certain actions in a written document,
subsequently sued various school administrators and the school district
claiming a violation of due process. 6°5 The district court issued a judgment
in favor of the defendants finding no violation, which the court based on its
finding that the plaintiff and his parents knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to a hearing.6°6 The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the
school had to identify the plaintiffs accusers.
60 7
VIII. LEGISLATIVE AND ExEcUTIVE ACTION
A. Congressional Action
On May 9, 1995, the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education,
Training & Life-Long Learning, chaired by Representative Howard "Buck"
McKeehon (R-CA), held oversight hearings on Title IX and intercollegiate
However, the court found that a material issue of fact existed as to the law school's proce-
dures, which prevented the granting of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Id. at
34.
604. 903 F. Supp. 1377 (C.D. Cal. 1995). See also Motzkin v. Trustees of Boston Univ.,
938 F. Supp. 983 (D. Mass. 1996) (rejecting the theory set forth by an assistant professor, who
had been terminated due to sexual harassment charges alleging violation of the American with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994), claiming a psychological disorder, called
disinhibition, for which he was being treated); Silva v. University of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293
(D.N.H. 1994) (regarding a male professor who commenced a lawsuit challenging the
University's determination of his alleged sexual harassment remarks, pursuant to the issue of
academic freedom and violation of the First Amendment freedom of speech and abrogation of
due process rights afforded pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment); Yusuf v. Vassar College,
827 F. Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (concerning a male student who questioned the school's
internal sexual harassment policy which had charged him with sexual harassment of a female
co-ed), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994). See also Title IX Tickler,
NCAA NEws, Apr. 29, 1996, at 17 ("Former San Diego State University's women's volleyball
coach, Myles Gabel filed suit April 2 against the institution and individuals involved in the
termination of his employment last year... [based on] alleged unprofessional conduct and a
violation of the school's sexual harassment policy."). See also Cohen v. San Bernardino
Valley College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussed supra p. 623).
605. Coplin, 903 F. Supp. at 1379.
606. Id. at 1387.
607. Id.
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athletics at the urging of the College Football Coaches Association and
members on men's nonrevenue intercollegiate teams, especially wrestling
teams.608
On August 3, 1995, Representatives Hastert and Johnson introduced a
Title IX amendment. The bill would require that congressional funds could
not be used by the OCR, unless it issued a new policy guidance to post-
secondary institutions, which includes objective criteria clarifying how such
institutions can demonstrate a history and continuing practice of program
expansion for members of the underrepresented sex. No action has been
taken on the bill, beyond being assigned to the appropriate committee. The
issue should be moot with the issuance of the new OCR "Clarification of
Intercollegiate Policy Guidance: The Three Part Test."
The General Accounting Office issued a report during October 1996
investigating Title IX compliance by schools nationally.0 9 It was reported
that the House of Representatives Committee on the Budget issued a report,
608. See Report, Hearing on Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 Before the
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ., Training and Life-Long Learning, 104th Cong. (1995).
Witnesses included: Norma Cantu, Assistant Secretary of the OCR; Representative Cardiss
Collins; Representative Dennis Hastert; Rick Dickson, Director of Athletics of Washington
State University; Dr. Christine H.B. Grant, Director of Women's Athletics at the University of
Iowa; Dr. Vartan Gregorian, President of Brown University; Wendy Hilliard, President of the
Women's Sports Foundation; Dr. David L. Joins, President of Eastern Illinois University; T.J.
Kerr, wrestling coach at California State University of Bakersfield; and Charles M. Neinas,
Executive Director of the College Football Association. Providing a national forum to
presidents of two institutions, who were involved in ongoing Title IX actions (litigation at
Brown University, and a compliance review initiated by the OCR examining Eastern Illinois
University), should not have been permitted. There were no witnesses representing the female
student athletes involved in those cases.
The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation held hearings on Octo-
ber 18, 1995 on the Amateur Sports Act and the development of United States Olympic
athletes. The representative of the National Association of Collegiate Women Athletic
Administrators commented:
[I]t is important to bear in mind the critical role that Title IX has played and must
continue to play in order to ensure young women the opportunity to participate
in competitive athletics.... [B]ut after Title IX was passed and opportunities be-
came available, women's participation skyrocketed. If we have learned anything
from this experience, it is that women are interested in playing sports and that
interest expands as opportunities expand,
Amateur Sports Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign
Commerce, and Tourism of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United
States Senate, 104th Cong. 200-03 (1995) (emphasis added) (testimony of Peggy Bradley-
Dopps, Univ. of Mich.).
609. GAO Report Cites Gender-Equity Advance, NCAA NEws, Nov. 4, 1996, at 5.
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dated May 14, 1996, containing a proposal which "would essentially prohibit
dollars being taken from an existing program and reallocate the money to
efforts for gender equity. 610 Such a directive would be gilding the lily, as
Title IX does not presently require that equivalent funding be afforded
separate men's and women's athletic programs, but merely "necessary"
funds.61'
B. Executive Action
On November 29, 1995, the Department of Education issued its regula-
tion, 34 C.F.R. § 668, entitled "Student Assistance General Provisions"
(Final Rule)612 implementing the 1994 "Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act,"
which became effective on July 1, 1996. The information that colleges and
universities are required to provide must have been available by October 1,
1996, and must be available by October 15th of each of the following
years.61
3
The school's report must contain the following information: 1) the
number of male and female full-time undergraduate students that attended
the institution; 2) a listing of the varsity teams that competed in intercolle-
giate athletic competition, and for each team the following data: i) the total
number of participants, by team; as of the day of the first scheduled contest
of the reporting year for the team, and ii) the total operating expenses
attributable to those teams.614 "Operating expenses" is defined as expendi-
tures on lodging and meals, transportation, officials, uniforms, and equip-
ment.
615
It also directs information as to "[w]hether the head coach was male or
female and whether the head coach was assigned to that team on a full-time
or part-time basis." 616 It requires the average annual institutional salary of
the head coaches and assistant coaches of the men's and women's teams.
617
610. Andrew Pittman, Ph.D., ed., Dicta, SSLASPA NEWSLETTER, Sept. 1996, at 5.
611. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).
612. 60 Fed. Reg. 61,424 (1996).
613. 34 C.F.R. § 668.41(e)(2) (1996) (originally published at 60 Fed. Reg. 61,424,
61,433 (1995)).
614. Id. § 668.41(c)(1)-(2) (originally published at 60 Fed. Reg. 61,434 (1995)).
615. Id. See also Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, effective July 1,
1994, which also requires that post-secondary institutions provide revenue and expense
statistics within their athletic departments. New Federal Regulations Require Schools to
Compile Equity Reports, SPORTS LAW., Vol. XIV, Spring 1996, at 3.
616. 34 C.F.R. § 668.48(c)(iii)(A).
617. Id. § 668.48(c)(7)-(8) (originally published at 60 Fed. Reg. 61,424, 61,434 (1995)).
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Additionally, it mandates the total amount of money spent on athletically-
related student aid, the total amount of expenditures on recruiting aggrega-
tely for all men's and women's teams, and the total annual revenues gener-
ated by the men's and women's teams.
618
During January 1996, the OCR issued the official "Clarification of
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three Part Test." 619 The
January 16, 1996 letter from Assistant Secretary Cantu accompanying the
final Clarification informs that:
[T]he Clarification now has additional examples to illustrate how
to meet part one of the three-part test and makes clear that the term
'developing interests' under part two of the test includes interests
that already exist at the institution. The document also clarifies
that an institution can choose which part of the test it plans to meet.
In addition, it further clarifies how Title IX requires OCR to count
participation opportunities .... 620
Secretary Cantu summarized the three-part test by explaining that
[t]he first part of the test--substantial proportionality--focuses on
the participation rates of men and women at an institution and af-
fords an institution a 'safe harbor' for establishing that it provides
nondiscriminatory participation opportunities.... The second
part--history and continuing practice-is an examination of an in-
stitution's good faith expansion of athletic opportunities through its
response to developing interests of the underrepresented sex at that
institution. The third part-fully and effectively accommodating
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex-centers on the
inquiry of whether there are concrete and viable interests among
the underrepresented sex that should be accommodated by an in-
stitution.
621
618. Id. § 668.48 (c)(3), (5), (6). The district court judge ordered the NCAA to submit,
by July 5, 1996, detailed information concerning the salaries of coaches and budgets of the
athletic programs of member institutions in association with the case of Law v. NCAA, 902 F.
Supp. 1394 (D. Kan. 1995). The case challenged the Association's ruling restricting the
amount of compensation certain part-time coaches of Division I schools can receive.
619. Letter from Norma Cantu, Assistant Secretary, Office for Civil Rights, Clarification
of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three Part Test (Jan. 16, 1996) [hereinafter
Clarification].
620. 1& at 2.
621. Id.
1997]
140
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
For satisfaction of prong one, substantial proportionality between the
percentage of student athletes and full-time undergraduate enrollments, the
Clarification states that, in determining participation opportunities, OCR
counts the number of actual athletes participating in the athletic program.
622
The final Clarification provides a working definition. 623 It notes that, "[a]s a
general rule, all athletes who are listed on a team's squad or eligibility list
and are on the team as of the team's first competitive event are counted as
participants by OCR., 624 Additionally, "an athlete who participates in more
than one sport will be counted as a participant in each sport in which he or
she participates.,, 625 The OCR stated that the requirement of "substantially"
proportionate would be made "on a case-by-case basis.
626
As to the second prong of a history and continuing practice of program
expansion for the underrepresented sex, the OCR
looks at the institution's past and continuing remedial efforts to
provide nondiscriminatory participation opportunities through pro-
gram expansion .... [T]he focus is on whether the program expan-
sion was responsive to developing interests and abilities of the un-
derrepresented sex. In addition, the institution must demonstrate a
continuing (i.e., present) practice of program expansion as war-
ranted by developing interests and abilities.
6 27
However, the OCR will accept as evidence of the second prong "an
institution's current implementation of a nondiscriminatory policy or
procedure for requesting the addition of sports (including the elevation of
club or intramural teams) and the effective communication of the policy or
procedure to students ..... 628 While it will not be acceptable to merely
622. Id. at 2-3.
623. Id. at 3.
624. Clarification, supra note 619, at 3.
625. IL
626. Id at 4. However, the OCR notes that it
would also consider opportunities to be substantially proportionate when the
number of opportunities that would be required to achieve proportionality would
not be sufficient to sustain a viable team, i.e., a team for which there is a suffi-
cient number of interested and able students and enough available competition to
sustain an intercollegiate team.
Md at 4-5.
627. Id. at 5-6.
628. Clarification, supra note 619, at 6. "[Plart two considers an institution's good faith
remedial efforts through actual program expansion.... Cuts in the program for the underrep-
resented sex, even when coupled with cuts in the program for the overrepresented sex, cannot
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promise to expand the program for the underrepresented sex at some time in
629the future, merely having a policy in place should not be permitted to
satisfy prong two.
630
Finally, as to the third prong, "the Policy Interpretation does not require
an institution to accommodate the interests and abilities of potential stu-
dents. 631 The Clarification also states that
[i]n making this determination, OCR will consider whether there is
(a) unmet interest in a particular sport; (b) sufficient ability to sus-
tain a team in the sport; and (c) a reasonable expectation of com-
petition for the team. If all three conditions are present OCR will
find that an institution has not fully and effectively accommodated
the interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex.
632
Furthermore, "[a]n institution may evaluate its athletic program to assess the
athletic interest of its students of the underrepresented sex using nondis-
criminatory methods of its choosing.... These assessments may use
straightforward and inexpensive techniques, such as a student questionnaire
or an open forum, to identify students' interests and abilities."
633
Proposed revisions to the OCR Title IX Athletics Investigator's Manual
are still under review. Additional comments were solicited during the
beginning of 1995. Moreover, there has been no updated Policy Clarifica-
tion concerning coaches compensation.
During the period from March 22, 1988 (when the 1988 Amendments to
the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 was adopted) to September 30,
1995, the OCR conducted only 50 Title IX compliance reviews of intercolle-
giate athletics programs among it's ten regional offices. 6 34 Also, individuals
be considered remedial because they burden members of the sex already disadvantaged by the
present program." Id. at 7.
629. Ma
630. See, e.g., Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (concerning
repeated attempts by female students over a period of about eight years, to establish a
women's varsity ice hockey team at the University through the administrative process;
however, they were consistently rebuffed), vacated, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993). See also
Bryant v. Colgate Univ., No. 93-CV-1029, 1996 WL 328446 (N.D.N.Y. June 11, 1996)
(discussed supra p. 579).
631. Clarification, supra note 619, at 9.
632. Id.
633. Id. at 10-11.
634. Based on information supplied by the OCR on November 8, 1995, pursuant to a
Freedom of Information Act request of the Women's Sports Foundation (on file with the Nova
Law Review).
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filed ninety administrative complaints against post-secondary institutions. 635
For example, during May 1995, the OCR allowed Eastern Illinois University
another opportunity to fashion a compliance action plan. This plan will
permit the University to retain two men's teams and establish a women's
golf team during the 1996-97 academic year.636 On August 30, 1995, the
administrative complaint filed by female athletes against the University of
Pennsylvania was settled. It was reported that the University agreed, among
other things, "to enhance its facilities and to bolster coaching staffs for
women's sports. 637
An administrative complaint was filed against Dearborn High School
protesting the closing of a significant number of bathrooms in order to
diminish student smoking.638 It was alleged that this subjected the female
students to urinary tract infections, thus discriminating against the female
students in violation of Title JX.639 The school reopened the bathrooms.
Subsequently, based on the school district's actions, the OCR closed the
case.
640
635. The OCR indicated it was concluding its monitoring activities overseeing the com-
pliance action plan agreed to by the University of Toledo. The administrative complaint was
filed on May 8, 1990. It took almost four years for the OCR to agree to a plan dated
December 8, 1993. The University added two new varsity teams for women, golf and soccer,
and also expanded the size of some of the existing women's intercollegiate teams. OCR File
No. 5-90-2070 (Region V) (Final Monitoring Letter, Apr. 17, 1996) (on file with the Nova
Law Review). The University of Minnesota indicated that during October 1995, the women's
club ice hockey team would be elevated to a varsity team effective during the 1996-97
academic year. Jody Smith, University of Minnesota Adds Women's Ice Hockey, WOMEN'S
SPORTS EXPERIENCE, Feb. 1996, at 13. During May 1996, Johns Hopkins University
announced it was elevating its women's lacrosse program from Division III to Division I
beginning during the 1998-99 academic year. The University of Pittsburgh "announced it
was eliminating its men's tennis and gymnastics programs in a move motivated by Title IX."
Title IX and the Elimination of Men's Athletic Programs, SPORTS LAW., Vol. XIV, Spring
1996, at 5.
636. Sidelines, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 5, 1995, at A43.
637. Douglas Lederman, Athletic Notes: U. of Pennsylvania Settles Sex-Bias Dispute,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 8, 1995, at A61.
638. Maryanne George, Dearborn Schools Sued for Locking Bathrooms, DETRorr FREE
PRESS, May 11, 1995, at lB, 2B.
639. "Because women contract urinary tract infections at 30 times the rate of men and
need more time for personal hygiene, [attorney, Jean Ledwith] King charges the locked
restrooms subject the 600 female students to a much higher risk of health problems than male
students." Id. King has been an advocate for gender equity on the state and national level for
25 years. She represented the students in the administrative complaints filed against
University of Toledo and Eastern Kentucky University.
640. OCR File No. 15-95-1139 (closing letter from the OCR Region V, June 7, 1995).
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IX. CONCLUSION
The Title IX decisions rendered since 1994 illustrate, in some instances,
polar or contradictory results on the same issues. This is in part fostered by
the cursory language of the Title IX statute and the absence of legislative
history, or even of regulatory guidance concerning the myriad conditions
that may give rise to a claim of sex discrimination involving educational
institutions which are recipients of federal funds. The 1992 Supreme Court
decision in Franklin continues to have a significant fallout. In allowing
monetary damages, the number and breadth of Title IX issues has increased
dramatically, as evidenced by the decisions reviewed herein, compared to the
total case law issued prior thereto. The cases clearly exemplify that female
students and educational employees are still subject to second class status on
a nationally. The unveiling of the odious examples of sexual abuse of
female students predicated by male educational employees is a disturbing
aspect. The "glass sneaker ' 64, still exists in the area of interscholastic and
intercollegiate athletics for female students and prospective female coaches
and athletic directors.
First, while the decisions uniformly demonstrate a greater reliance on
Title VII to fill in the gaps or to borrow the standards and relevant case law
in the sexual harassment area, there is also prior case law instructing that
Title VI should be the focal point for reliance in explicating Title IX claims.
Second, since the Title IX statute contains no express statute of limitations,
the courts have been forced to borrow state statutes of limitations based on
differing related causes of actions (predominantly personal injury actions, as
was adopted by the Eighth Circuit in the EgerdahI ruling and the Sixth
Circuit in Lillard, versus civil rights actions), which may give potential
plaintiffs dramatically different time frames within which to initiate their
lawsuits. Third, the courts are ready to recognize a claim of retaliation
pursuant to Title IX, as was implicitly done by the Second Circuit in Murray
and explicitly done by the district courts in Clemes and Clay. Fourth,
interestingly Title IX exempts same sex public military schools from its
ambit. However, the "separate but equal" argument utilized by these schools
was deployed by the 1996 Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Virginia,642 thus rendering moot any argument as to whether the statute
should be amended to eliminate the exception.
641. The author coined this term in her first law review article. See Heckman supra note
92, at 63.
642. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
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Fifth, while the Ninth Circuit in Jeldness recognized a Title IX cause of
action for female prisoners at state prisons, the district court in Archer found
no Title IX cause of action for female prisoners at federal prisons, which are
clearly recipients of federal funds and belies the whole notion of prohibiting
sex discrimination in education. This also raises the question as to whether
some provision should be made to bring educational programs at federal
prisons within the ambit of sexual discrimination protection, whether
pursuant to Title IX or independently.
Sixth, in the area of athletic programs and activities, the cross-over
cases which had been so instrumental, especially on the interscholastic level
during the first twenty years of Title IX's existence has dwindled signifi-
cantly to a handful of cases during the 1990s, with minimal case law during
this three-year period. Rather, the "equal opportunity" cases, especially on
the intercollegiate level, have since come to the forefront in a dramatic way
during the 1990s. During 1996, the First Circuit in Cohen again favorably
resolved an appeal in favor of the female student athletes. 43  The First
Circuit recognized the impact of Title IX stating:
There can be no doubt that Title IX has changed the face of
women's sports as well as our society's interest in and attitude to-
ward women athletes and women's sports. In addition, there is
ample evidence that increased athletics participation opportunities
for women and young girls, available as a result of Title IX en-
forcement, have had salutary effects in other areas of societal con-
cern....
One need look no further than the impressive performances of
our country's women athletes in the 1996 Olympic Summer Games
to see that Title IX has had a dramatic and positive impact on the
capabilities of our women athletes, particularly in team sports.
These Olympians represent the first full generation of women to
grow up under the aegis of Title IX. The unprecedented success of
these athletes is due, in no small measure, to Title IX's beneficent
effects on women's sports, as the athletes themselves have ac-
knowledged time and again. What stimulated this remarkable
change in the quality of women's athletic competition was not a
643. 101 F.3d 155, 188 (1st Cir. 1996). The University filed a petition for writ of certio-
rari during February 1997. The Supreme Court denied review in two prior "equal opportu-
nity" cases on behalf of collegiate athletes-Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 998 F.2d 824
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993) and Kelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill.,
35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995).
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sudden, anomalous upsurge in women's interest in sports, but the
enforcement of Title IX's mandate of gender equity in sports.6"
The uniformity of the circuit courts in adopting or condoning the three-
part "effective accommodation" test, as was done by the First, Third, Sixth,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, was disregarded in January 1996 by a federal
district court in Pederson, yielding for a possible appellate determination by
the Fifth Circuit. However, even in Pederson, the female student athletes
were successful in proving that the University had violated Title IX, which
continues the results of all the "equal opportunity" cases brought on behalf
of collegiate female students who have been successful in persuading the
courts of their gender equity plights. Conversely, the male collegiate
athletes, who have sought restoration of their varsity teams, have all struck
out in the judicial arena. Interestingly, no cases were instituted during the
applicable time frame seeking reinstitution of women's varsity intercolle-
giate teams. Perhaps the post-secondary institutions are examining the issue
of Title IX compliance and the NCAA gender equity certification require-
ments before embarking on the elimination of established women's inter-
collegiate teams, especially when the percentages of female students and
female student athletes as compared to the male student athletes is so
skewed.
Seventh, while females continue to be shortchanged in gaining em-
ployment as coaches of men's teams, or as athletic directors running men's
or women's athletic programs, or as head sports information directors, no
litigation has been brought to spotlight this anomaly. Instead, the battlefront
concerns the equal pay and termination and/or retaliation claims brought by
coaches of women's teams (male and female) or female athletic administra-
tion employees. The three federal predicates are Title IX, Title VII, and the
Equal Pay Act. The 1993 Ninth Circuit decision in Stanley, which focused
solely on the Equal Pay Act, continues to garner stature as a basis for finding
that the duties and responsibilities of the coach of men's intercollegiate
(basketball) team were different than the duties and responsibilities of the
coach of women's intercollegiate (basketball) team. The decision was relied
upon by the federal district courts in the Deli and Bartges decisions and the
District of Columbia Superior Court in the Tyler decision. To date, no
courts have examined the Title IX regulations operative in this area and the
exact import that they possess. The Ninth Circuit heard another appeal in
Stanley during 1996. During 1996, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower
644. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 188 (lst Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
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court's decision in Bartges without commenting on the Title IX regulations,
and the parties settled the Tyler case. The two Deli decisions addressed
comparisons of the women's gymnastics and assistant gymnastics coaches
with non-gymnastics coaches. The Bartges case was a hybrid seeking
comparison of the women's softball coach with the men's baseball coach, as
well as other coaches. The first reverse discrimination suit was brought by a
former men's basketball coach, dissatisfied about receiving the salary that
the women's basketball coach was getting. The OCR should issue a revised
policy clarification concerning the compensation area, especially when
differences hinge on the sex of the athletes coached, rather the sex of the
coaches.
Eighth, none of these decisions held that an athletic employee of a
University or college that received federal funds was precluded from setting
forth a Title IX cause of action. However, this is at variance with a number
of other decisions involving educational employees generally.
Ninth, there is a lack of consensus on whether an individually named
defendant, who is an employee or a representative of the governing authority
such as a school board member, may be named as a party in a Title IX
action. Tenth, a number of courts would apply the Title VII standards to
Title IX cases of sexual harassment and even retaliation claims.
Finally, when sexual abuse or molestation of a student occurs, as
opposed to when nonphysical sexual harassment, should the educational
institution be held to a negligence standard of failing to properly act after
notice (whether actual or constructive) based on the clearly intentional and
egregious actions by their employees or agents; or should strict liability be
imposed? Presently, the majority posture as represented in Canutillo
Independent School District calls for "two distinct actions or inaction, at
least one of which is intentional in nature, on the part of an employee and on
the part of the school district ... Title IX does require proof of negligent,
reckless or intentional acts by the school district, independent of the inten-
tional conduct of the employee." 645 While arguably the minority position,
the logic for assigning strict liability in Title IX sexual abuse cases, as in
Leija, has merit. Clearly, as the judge issued in Leija, the educational
institution should be sacrosanct from any and all sexual abuse of students.
However, a restriction on the amount of compensatory damages, as the judge
urged in exchange for imputing the strict liability standard, remains open to
attack for the reasons advanced herein. On whom should the burden lie to
645. Md at 847.
[Vol. 21:545
147
: Nova Law Review 21, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Heckman
obviate the liability of the educational institution in the employment and
monitoring of its employees: the second grade student or the educational
institution? As the Eleventh Circuit in Davis cogently stated, "a female
student should not be required to run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for
the privilege of being allowed to obtain an education."
In the hostile environment cases, the Title VII standard appears to
continue in the Title IX cases, including the peer sexual harassment cases.
However, the courts should carefully scrutinize whether the actions by the
educational institutions are protective, timely, and comprehensive enough
after being informed of possible unwanted sexual harassment. Assuming the
reliance on Title VII, it will be interesting to watch for the first judge to
modify a Title IX award to the $300,000 maximum that an individual may
collect in a Title VII case. Title IX presently contains no restriction on the
amount of monetary damages that may be awarded. The OCR should also
issue an updated policy clarification on sexual harassment in education,
analyzing the myriad types of harassment that may occur.
Thus, the 1990s will continue to unfold the parameters of Title IX
protection, through the judicial process and possibly through the legislative
process, especially in light of some of the erratic decisions rendered during
the applicable time frame. The gender line in athletics continues to be the
kryptonite vault line. The Title IX paradigm remains a work-in-progress.
646. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes,2 the Supreme Court of Florida
held that the corporate veil may not be pierced absent a showing of improper
conduct. The Dania court quoted lengthy passages from prior Supreme
Court of Florida cases dealing with this issue, including Riley v. Fatt,
4
Advertects v. Sawyer,5 and Roberts' Fish Farm v. Spencer6 to support its
holding. However, the court made no attempt to reduce the passages into a
workable formula that could be used to determine what types of conduct
might be considered improper, and furthermore, did not indicate from where
the improper conduct standard was derived. 7
As a result, Florida courts and practitioners faced with the piercing
issue do not have a clear set of guidelines or elements that can be used to
evaluate whether the shareholder conduct in question will warrant piercing
the corporate veil. Consequently, the purpose of this article is to examine
Dania and the cases cited therein, as well as post-Dania decisions, in an
effort to define a set of factors or guidelines that can be used with some
consistency to determine what type of conduct might be considered im-
proper.
In addition, the article will examine Oregon law, which also requires a
finding of improper conduct to pierce the corporate veil, to show the rela-
tionship between equitable estoppel and piercing the corporate veil, and how
the elements of equitable estoppel might be used to prove improper conduct.
Before beginning to evaluate the Dania decision or Oregon law, however, a
brief overview of the history and theories behind piercing the corporate veil
is necessary.
2. 450 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1984).
3. Id. at 1121.
4. 47 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1950).
5. 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
6. 153 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1963).
7. It is of some interest that the phrase "improper conduct" was mentioned in two other
piercing the corporate veil cases in Florida long before the Dania decision; however, those
cases do not seem to lend any support in deciphering what type of conduct can be considered
improper. See Advertects, 84 So. 2d at 24; Coryell v. Pilkington, 39 F. Supp. 142, 145 (S.D.
Fla. 1941), afrd, 317 U.S. 406 (1943). Of further interest, is the fact that the seventeenth
century chancery courts used improper conduct as a standard in denying requests for specific
performance. The chancery courts defined improper conduct as, among other things,
negligent misrepresentation. See also Kevin M. Teeven, Decline of Freedom of Contract
Since the Emergence of the Modem Business Corporation, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 117, 145
(1992).
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II. THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
"Piercing the corporate veil is the most litigated issue in corporate law
and yet it remains among the least understood."8  Notwithstanding the
inherent confusion, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is easily
understood by acknowledging that incorporation's single valuable attribute
is limited liability. "Limited shareholder liability was extended to corporate
shareholders to encourage risk capital investments." 9  In describing the
necessity of limited liability, William 0. Douglas once said that "[i]t is
legitimate for a man or group of men to stake only a part of their fortune on
an enterprise."' 0 Behind these theories, the attribute of limited liability did
in fact encourage investment and have a positive effect on the economy; but
as incorporation became more popular, limited shareholder liability led to
abuses of the corporate forum.'1 As a result, courts began to disallow
shareholders limited liability protection when they used the corporation as a
vehicle to achieve some type of inequity, and in a manner not contemplated
by law. This process became known as piercing the corporate veil.
Probably the most important point to be made about the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil is that it is not itself a cause of action.12 In most
cases, a plaintiff cannot seek to pierce the corporate veil until the corporation
itself is found liable13 and the judgment against it is returned unsatisfied.14
This process is most easily explained in that the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil originated in courts of equity.15 Historically, a prerequisite to
seeking relief in a court of equity was that there be no adequate remedy at
law.
16
8. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991) (footnote omitted).
9. Amfac Foods, Inc. v. International Sys. & Controls Corp., 654 P.2d 1092, 1097 (Or.
1982).
10. Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39
YALE L.J. 193, 193-94 (1929).
11. Amfac, 654 P.2d at 1097.
12. See Turner Murphy Co. v. Specialty Constructors, Inc., 659 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995); WELIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41 (1990).
13. FLETCHER, supra note 12, § 41.
14. Elizabeth Diane Clark, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Florida: The Requirement of
"Improper" Conduct, 16 STETSON L. REv. 59,61 (1986).
15. See FLETCHER, supra note 12, § 41.
16. HENRY L. MCCLINTOK, PRINCIPALS OF EQUITY 47 (1948).
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For example, if a plaintiff is successful in a suit against a corporation
but the judgment rendered against the corporation is returned unsatisfied,
due to the fact that the corporation is insolvent, the plaintiff despite receiving
the judgment, would not have an adequate remedy at law because the
corporation's insolvency would not permit the legal remedy to be carried
through. In this situation, a plaintiff could then seek equitable relief because
the remedy at law is inadequate. Equity principals, under the proper circum-
stances, would then be used to pierce the corporate veil and hold the share-
holders, who would otherwise have limited liability to the amount of their
investment in the corporation, personally liable for the judgment against the
corporation. In sum, piercing the corporate veil is simply a means of
enforcing a judgment against a corporation.
The confusion surrounding application of the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil, and possibly other doctrines or causes of action that origi-
nated in equity, may well have to do with the merger of law and equity. It
has been said that "[w]hen the principles of equity force their way into the
common law they lose their cohesiveness and fly apart."'17  As further
analysis indicates, the standards and metaphors that have resulted from the
application of the once purely equitable remedy of piercing the corporate
veil in courts of law are no exception.
Ill. METAPHORS USED FOR PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
There have been a number of formulations suggested by courts as to the
proper standard for piercing the corporate veil.' 8 The most typical standards
17. RALPH A. NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 258 (1961).
18. See generally PHILLIP BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS § 6.01 (1987), a
multi-volume treatise on piercing the corporate veil. Professor Blumberg asserts that there are
three main variants in piercing jurisprudence-instrumentality, alter ego, and identity. The
"instrumentality" doctrine has three factors-"excessive exercise of control; wrongful or
inequitable conduct; and [a] causal relationship to the plaintiffs loss." Id. § 6.02. The "alter
ego" doctrine holds that piercing is proper when:
(1) such unity of ownership and interest exits that the two affiliated corporations
have ceased to be separate and the subsidiary has been relegated to the status of
the 'alter ego' of the parent; and (2) where recognition of them as separate enti-
ties would sanction fraud or lead to an inequitable result.
Id. § 6.03.
[The "identity" doctrine] is such a diffuse and relatively useless approach that it
does not deserve extended discussion.... [The standard is] "that there was such
a unity of interest and ownership that the independence of the corporations had
in effect ceased or had never begun, an adherence to the fiction of separate iden-
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used in piercing the corporate veil cases seem to be the mere instrumentality
doctrine and the alter ego doctrine. 19 The mere instrumentality approach is
most often associated with parent-subsidiary cases.20 Florida courts have
characterized the mere instrumentality doctrine as "'total domination of the
subservient corporation, to the extent that the subservient corporation
manifests no separate corporate interests of its own and functions solely to
achieve the purposes of the dominant corporation."'
21
The alter ego approach is more appropriate when the corporation is
made up of one or two shareholders.22 The alter ego theory is usually
invoked by demonstrating that the shareholders have failed to separate their
personal affairs from that of the corporation.23 Notwithstanding these more
common approaches, there are numerous other rules and formulations that
courts have relied on to pierce the corporate veil.24 Most courts and com-
mentators agree, however, that the labels used to describe piercing the
corporate veil are useless metaphors.
Another area of conflict in piercing the corporate veil law revolves
around the concept of fraud. On one extreme is the view that "fraud" must
be pleaded and proven.2 5 On the other extreme is the view that proof of
plain fraud is not a necessary prerequisite to pierce the corporate veil.26
tity would serve only to defeat justice and equity by permitting the economic en-
tity to escape liability arising out of an operation of one corporation for the
benefit of the whole enterprise."
Id. § 6.04 (quoting Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552,558 (Conn. 1967)).
19. J. Penn Carolan, III, Disregarding the Corporate Fiction in Florida, 27 U. FLA. L.
REv. 175, 175-76 (1974); see generally BLUMBERG, supra note 18.
20. See Vantage View, Inc. v. Bali E. Dev. Corp., 421 So. 2d 728, 735 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982).
21. Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 425 So. 2d 594, 598 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1982), affirmed in part and quashed in part, 450 So. 2d 1114 (1984) (quoting Krivo Indus.
Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1106 (5th Cir. 1973),
modified per curiam, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974)).
22. See Biscayne Realty & Ins. Co. v. Ostend Realty Co., 148 So. 560, 565-66 (Fla.
1933); see also Clark, supra note 14, at 67; BLUMBERG, supra note 18, § 6.03 (discussing
generally the elements of each test).
23. MICHAEL W. GORDON, 2 FLA. CORP. MANUAL § 13.25 (1996).
24. Cathy S. Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the In-
quiry, 55 DENv. L.J. 1, 1-7 (1978).
25. See, e.g., Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., 127 N.E.2d 832 (N.Y. 1955). The Bartle
court stated "[g]enerally speaking, the doctrine of 'piercing the corporate veil' is invoked 'to
prevent fraud or to achieve equity'.... But in the instant case there has been neither fraud,
misrepresentation, nor illegality." Id. at 833 (citation omitted).
26. See Vantage View, 421 So. 2d at 734 (citing Levenstein v. Sapiro, 279 So. 2d 858
(Fla. 1973) (footnote omitted). See also Krendl & Krendl, supra note 24, at 21.
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Under this second view, the fact that a corporation is a "mere instrumental-
ity" of another corporation is, in most cases, sufficient to pierce the veil.
The Dania decisions exemplify the lack of uniformity and general
confusion associated with piercing the corporate veil standards mentioned
above. The district court in Dania applied the "mere instrumentality" test
and held "it was not necessary to establish fraud or other wrongdoing on the
part of Saturday [the parent] under the mere instrumentality doctrine." 27 The
Supreme Court of Florida, as discussed infra, quashed this formulation,
holding instead that the district court decision directly and expressly con-
flicted with decisions of the supreme court which held that the corporate veil
could not be pierced absent a showing of improper conduct.28 In other
words, satisfying the "mere instrumentality" test alone was insufficient to
pierce the corporate veil. 29
What is equally significant is that the court did not say that "fraud"
must be proven, only that "improper conduct" must be proven.30 While it is
clear that proof of fraud would satisfy the improper conduct test, it is far
from clear what other conduct might also satisfy that test. It is submitted
that the Supreme Court of Florida's formulation was designed to chart a
middle course between those tests requiring proof of fraud and those that
allow piercing without proof of either fraud or wrongdoing. Although the
supreme court gave no precise formula, no exact parameters, and no list of
elements to the test, a review of the Dania opinion, and the cases cited
therein, assists in creating a standard that can be used to indicate what type
of conduct may be considered improper.
IV. THE DANA DECISION
In Dania, a woman was hit by a car in the parking lot of a jai-alai
fronton owned by Dania Jai-Alai, Inc.31 The car that hit the woman was
driven by a valet who was employed by Carrousel, Inc. 32 Carrousel was the
sister corporation of Dania Jai-Alai that handled valet parking and other
27. Dania, 450 So. 2d at 1116.
28. Id. at 1121.
29. See In re Homelands of DeLeon Springs, Inc., 190 B.R. 666, 670 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1995) (stating that the mere instrumentality doctrine cannot be used without a showing of
improper conduct).
30. Dania, 450 So. 2d at 1121.
31. Id. at 1115-16.
32. Id. at 1116.
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aspects of the jai-alai business.33 Both Dania and Carrousel were wholly-
owned subsidiaries of Saturday Corporation.34
The woman chose to sue all three corporations as a result of the injuries
she sustained from being hit by the car. Specifically, she sued Carrousel for
the negligence of its parking attendant and independent negligence, Dania
for alleging that Carrousel was its mere instrumentality or alter ego, and
Saturday for alleging Carrousel and Dania were its mere instrumentalities. 3
The trial court found that Dania and Carrousel were Saturday's mere
instrumentalities "and that it was not necessary to establish fraud or other
wrongdoing on the part of Saturday under the mere instrumentality doc-
trine. 36 The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed that it is not necessary
to show improper conduct in order to pierce the corporate veil.37 Therefore,
the issue posed for the Supreme Court of Florida was whether it was neces-
sary to show fraud or wrongdoing in order to pierce its corporate veil.
The supreme court reversed the Fourth District's holding.38 The court
held that absent some showing of "improper conduct" the corporate veil
could not be pierced.39 The court relied on Riley v. Fatt,40 Advertects, Inc. v.
Sawyer Industries,4' and Roberts' Fish Farm v. Spencer,42 previously
decided Supreme Court of Florida cases on piercing the corporate veil and
general corporate law, as authority for its holding.43 Accordingly, a review
of these cases will help reveal what types of conduct can be considered
improper.
Riley v. Fatt44 was the first case the Dania court relied on for its holding
that "improper conduct" must be shown in an action to pierce the corporate
veil.45 In that case, Fatt contracted with Riley Builders to make improve-
ments to his property. When Riley Builders breached the contract, Fatt
33. l at 1115.
34. L
35. Dania, 450 So. 2d at 1116.
36. Id
37. l
38. Id. at 1121.
39. Id
40. 47 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1950).
41. 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
42. 153 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1963).
43. Dania, 450 So. 2d at 1119-21.
44. 47 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1950).
45. Dania, 450 So. 2d at 1119-20.
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obtained a judgment against the corporation to be satisfied out of the assets
of the corporation in the amount of the value of the breach.
46
When the judgment was returned unsatisfied, Fatt sought to hold the
sole stockholder and president of Riley Builders, Alonzo Riley, personally
liable for the value of the judgment he obtained against the corporation.47
The court however, said that although Riley Builders was a one-man
corporation completely dominated by Alonzo Riley, and the corporate funds
were not handled with the degree of care expected from a well managed
corporation, the facts were insufficient to warrant piercing the corporate
veil.48 "In the absence of pleading and proof that the corporation was
organized for an illegal purpose or that its members fraudulently used the
corporation as a means of evading liability with respect to a transaction that
was, in truth, personal and not corporate, Fatt cannot be heard to question
the corporate existence ... ."49 The Riley court held that "the corporate veil
will not be pierced, either at law or in equity, unless it be shown that the
corporation was organized or used to mislead creditors or to perpetrate a
fraud upon them.,
50
Riley cited Biscayne Realty & Insurance Co. v. Ostend Realty Co. 51 as
authority for its holding. Interestingly, the Dania court did not directly rely
on Biscayne for the proposition that "improper conduct" must be shown in
order to pierce the corporate veil, however, certain language in Biscayne is
seemingly squarely on point.
If the stockholders of a corporation enter into a transaction in their
individual and private interests, and utilize the name of the corpo-
ration merely as a convenience for the completion of the transac-
tion, where the legal entity as such has no interest in the matter, but
the name is used to mislead creditors or perpetuate a fraud upon
them, the legal entity in the name of which the transaction was car-
ried will be ignored and the parties held to individual liability.
52
46. Riley, 47 So. 2d at 770-71.
47. d at 771.
48. Id. at 773.
49. Id.
50. Id (citations omitted).
51. 148 So. 560 (Fla. 1933).
52. d at 564 (citation omitted).
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The Biscayne court also noted that "'[tihe directors of a private corporation
have no right under any circumstances to use their official position for their
own individual benefit."'
5 3
The Dania court next relied on Advertects, Inc. v. Sawyer Industries.
5 4
In that case, Advertects recovered a money judgment against Sawyer
Industries, which was returned unsatisfied.55 Thus, Advertects sought to
have the judgment satisfied out of the personal assets of Neil and Kay
Sawyer, the stockholders of Sawyer.56 Advertects alleged that the Sawyers
organized Sawyer as a convenient means of doing business without subject-
ing themselves to personal liability.57 However, the court stated that unless
Advertects could show that Sawyer
was organized or after organization was employed by the stock-
holders for fraudulent or misleading purposes, or in some fashion
that the corporate property was converted or the corporate assets
depleted for the personal benefit of the individual stockholders, or
that the corporate structure was not bona fidely established or, in
general, that property belonging to the corporation can be traced
into the hands of the stockholders[]
the corporate veil could not be pierced. 8 As a result, the Advertects court
refused to pierce the corporate veil, even though the Sawyers: 1) habitually
operated through numerous corporations, many of which were unsuccessful;
2) were the sole stockholders; and 3) handled the business affairs poorly,
because there was no showing that the stockholders improperly converted
any of sawyer's property for their own use or abused their relationship with
Sawyer. 9
Roberts' Fish Farm v. Spencer,60 the last case cited by the Dania
court as authority for its holding, may be the most helpful in determining
what type of conduct can be considered improper. Dania cited Roberts' Fish
53. Id. at 565 (quoting Donovan v. Purtell, 75 N.E. 334, 337 (Il1. 1905) (summarizing
Hoffman v. Reichert, 35 N.E. 527 (II. 1893))).
54. 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
55. Id. at 23.
56. IM
57. IU
58. Id. at 24.
59. Advertects, 84 So. 2d at 24.
60. 153 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1963).
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Farm for its remarks on the purpose of corporate entities and the rationale
for the law controlling piercing the corporate veil.
61
The corporate entity is an accepted, well used and highly regarded
form of organization in the economic life of our state and na-
tion. . . . "Their purpose is generally to limit liability and serve a
business convenience." Those who utilize the laws of this state in
order to do business in the corporate form have every right to rely
on the rules of law which protect them against personal liability
unless it be shown that the corporation is formed or used for some
illegal, fraudulent or other unjust purpose which justifies piercing
of the corporate veil. This is the reason for the rule, stated in all
Florida cases, that the courts are reluctant to pierce the corporate
veil and will do so only in a court of competent jurisdiction, after
notice to and full opportunity to be heard by all parties, and upon
showing of cause which necessitates the corporate entity being dis-
regarded in order to prevent some injustice.62
By citing Roberts' Fish Farm in this capacity, the Dania court indicates
that a shareholder's conduct will be considered improper if it contravenes
the corporate enterprise system's purpose for existence. As Roberts' Fish
Farm indicates, a corporation's purpose is not to limit personal liability in
personalized transactions but to promote commerce and industrial growth,
and encourage investment by limiting personal liability in business transac-
tions.
V. STANDARD FOR PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL AND DETERMINING
IMPROPER CONDUCT
The equitable nature of the piercing the corporate veil doctrine, 63 and
certain statements made by the Dania court, including the rationales of Riley,
Biscayne, Advertects, and Roberts' Fish Farm, can be combined to create a
standard for piercing the corporate veil and indicating what types of conduct
might be considered improper. In determining whether or not to pierce the
corporate veil the analysis should proceed as follows.
61. Dania, 450 So. 2d at 1120-21.
62. Roberts' Fish Farm, 153 So. 2d at 721 (citation omitted).
63. See discussion supra Section II.
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First, a plaintiff must seek a judicial determination of whether or not the
corporation is liable on the underlying cause of action.6 If the corporation is
found liable, the plaintiff must then try and have the judgment against the
corporation satisfied out of the corporation's assets.65 If the corporation's
assets are sufficient to satisfy the judgment, there is no need for the plaintiff
to pierce the corporate veil.6 6 If however, the judgment against the corpora-
tion is returned unsatisfied, the plaintiff may then seek to pierce the corpo-
rate veil and hold the shareholders liable for the judgment against the
corporation.
67
The first step in piercing the corporate veil is to ask why is the corpora-
tion unable to satisfy the judgment rendered against it. If the corporation is
unable to pay simply because its business affairs were poorly managed by
the shareholder(s), resulting in the corporations insolvency, the plaintiff may
not be able to pierce the corporate veil.68 However, if the corporation is
unable to satisfy the judgment due to some improper conduct on the share-
holders part, the plaintiff should be permitted to pierce the corporate veil.
The final question, then, is what type of conduct can be considered im-
proper.
It seems that a plaintiff may be able to identify improper conduct by
keeping in mind a few different statements and pervading themes mentioned
throughout the Dania opinion. First, a corporation's general purpose is to
limit personal liability and serve a business convenience, 69 and that the
64. In Dania, for example, the underlying cause of action was for personal injury sus-
tained by Ms. Sykes.
65. This will be the primary factor in determining if there is an adequate remedy at law.
66. As the Dania court noted, "'[i]f this requirement were not made then every judgment
against a corporation could be exploited as a vehicle for harassing the stockholders and
entering upon fishing expeditions into their personal business and assets."' Dania, 450 So. 2d
at 1120 (quoting Advertects, Inc. v. Sawyer Indus., 84 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1955)).
67. See Advertects, 84 So. 2d at 23; Riley v. Fatt, 47 So. 2d 769, 770 (Fla. 1950). See
supra note 14 and accompanying text. It is very important to keep in mind that a prerequisite
to equitable relief is that there be no adequate remedy at law. Until a judgment against a
corporation is returned unsatisfied, there may be no basis for piercing the corporate veil in that
there may be an adequate remedy at law, namely, enforcing the judgment against the
corporation. This may well have been one of the problems with the plaintiffs case in Dania.
The plaintiff sought to pierce the corporate veil before a judgment was returned unsatisfied. It
would seem therefore, that the corporate veil cannot, and should not, be pierced unless the
corporation has no means of satisfying a judgment against it. See Riesen v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 14 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla. 1943).
68. Riley, 47 So. 2d at 773 (indicating that the courts do not consider the fact that a cor-
poration was poorly run alone sufficient to constitute improper conduct).
69. Roberts' Fish Farm, 153 So. 2d at 721.
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shareholders of a corporation have no right to use their corporate positions
for their own personal benefit.7° Under this basic principle of corporate law,
if there is proof that the shareholders, or parent as the case may be, used the
corporation in order to mislead creditors,7 ' or shield themselves from
liability in a transaction that was in truth personal and not corporate, then the
privilege of incorporation has been abused and the requisite improper
conduct should be found to exist.72 Evidence of the foregoing may be
established if the corporate entity had no interest in the matter due to the
fact that the subject matter of the transaction was unrelated to the nature of
73the corporation's business,  or corporate property was converted to, or
depleted for, the personal benefit of the stockholders.74
The analysis can now proceed with a look at post-Dania decisions to
view what kind of conduct the district courts consider to be improper in
piercing the corporate veil cases. Analyzing the later cases will also indicate
how accurate the proposed standard might be in defining improper conduct.
VI. THE DISTRICT COURTS' NITERPRETATIONS OF DANIA
A. First District Court of Appeal
In Futch v. Head," Head was employed by Realty Center, Inc., a
company owned by Futch. Futch promised Head that if he helped her sell
the "Melroe" property he would receive a commission. Head found a buyer
and the deal went through. In the terms of final sale, Futch received a
twenty-percent interest in the Melroe property for her efforts. Futch ulti-
mately sold her interest in the Melroe property for $1,300,000 and paid one
of her companies a $130,000 commission from the proceeds. Head filed a
breach of contract and fraud claim when Futch failed to pay him his prom-
ised commission.76
The trial court found that the sale was consummated for Futch's benefit
and that Futch converted the interest she received in the Melroe property to
70. Biscayne Realty & Ins. Co. v. Ostend Realty Co., 148 So. 560, 565 (Fla. 1933).
71. Riley, 47 So. 2d at 773.
72. The general underlying theme should be that a corporation cannot be used as a per-
sonal convenience to shield its shareholders from personal liability in personalized transac-
tions.
73. Biscayne, 148 So. at 564.
74. Advertects, 84 So. 2d at 24.
75. 511 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
76. Id. at 316.
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her own name, with the intent to deprive Head of his portion of the sale.77
The first district affirmed the trial court's findings and added that the fact
that Futch merged her corporation's liabilities and assets with her own
personal funds also constituted improper conduct. 78 Therefore, the corporate
veil was pierced and Futch was forced to pay Head's commission out of the
money she received from the sale of her portion of the property that she
converted to her own use.
79
In USP Real Estate Investment Trust v. Discount Auto Parts, Inc.,80 #90
North was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Discount Auto Parts. The property
was leased by #90 North from USP, in order to operate an auto parts busi-
ness. The premises were abandoned before the lease expired and USP sued
#90 North for breach of contract and lease agreement and was awarded a
judgment. Evidence showed that the officers of both corporations were the
same, #90 never had a bank account, filed no tax returns, could produce no
written sublease between it and Discount Auto Parts, and never kept any
receipts of expenditures. Therefore, the court found that Discount Auto
Parts simply created #90 for the purpose of holding the lease in order to
shield itself from any liability if the lease was broken. 8' In light of these
findings, the court held that the improper conduct requirement was satisfied
and the corporate veil could be pierced.82
The first district's reasoning in both cases is aligned with the proposed
standard for finding improper conduct. In Futch, the district court agreed
with the trial court that the transaction was consummated for the benefit of
the stockholder and not the corporation.8 3 Furthermore, evidence supported
the court's finding that corporate property was converted to personal use,
because Futch sold her interest in the property and converted the money to
her own use, in order to deprive Head of his commission."4 Thus, Futch used
the corporation to evade liability in a transaction that was of a personal and
not corporate nature.
In USP, the court found improper conduct when a parent created a
subsidiary for the sole purpose of holding a lease. The convincing evidence
77. Id. at 316-17.
78. Id. at 323.
79. Id.
80. 570 So. 2d 386 (Fa. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
81. Id at 392-93.
82. Id. at 393.
83. Futch, 511 So. 2d at 323.
84. Id. at 317, 322-23.
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was that the subsidiary did not have any assets or conduct any business.
Again, the court would not allow the parent to use a subsidiary for the sole
purpose of shielding itself from liability where the subsidiary had no interest
in the transaction.
B. Second District Court of Appeal
In Hester v. Tucker,86 J.L. Hester, the president of International Trade, a
closely held corporation, contracted with Tucker to build a residence on
property owned by International. Hester signed the construction contract in
his capacity as president of International. When Hester refused to make
payments on the contract price, Tucker sued International and Hester
individually. Tucker stated that when he entered into the contract, he was
told that the residence would be the asset of International. However, upon
substantial completion, the house was transferred from International to
Hester.
The second district found that there was no improper conduct because
the transfer of the house from International to Hester did not establish fraud
at the time the contract was entered into.87 The court premised its decision
on the fact that International had been in business since 1966, as well as the
fact that Hester carried on extensive business projects and construction by
way of the corporation.
88
Another second district case dealing with the issue was Southeast
Capital Investment, Corp. v. Albemarle Hotel, Inc.89 In this case, Southeast
Investment, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Southeast Capital, contracted with
Albemarle to purchase the Albemarle Hotel. The contract was finalized on
the agreement that Southeast Investment would make payment of the full
purchase price at the closing. When Southeast Investment did not have the
money at the closing, Albemarle sued Southeast Capital for specific per-
formance of Southeast Investment's contractual obligations. The court held
that since the subsidiary entered into a contract for the benefit of the parent
without the present ability to perform, the requisite improper conduct was
present and the corporate veil could be pierced.90
85. USP, 570 So. 2d at 393.
86. 465 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 476 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1985).
87. Id. at 1262.
88. Id.
89. Southeast Capital Inv. Corp. v. Albemarle Hotel, Inc., 550 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1989).
90. Id. at51.
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The second district's reasoning in Hester does not seem to follow the
proposed standard but may indicate a possible misreading of Dania. There
does not appear to be any reason for Hester to have signed the contract in his
capacity as president of International. The contract was for the construction
of a residence. There were no facts presented that indicated why the
corporation would need a residence and no explanation of why it was
transferred to Hester after its completion. Hester clearly converted corporate
property to his own use, which is a clear example of improper conduct as
stated in Advertects.91 Moreover, Tucker certainly satisfied the requirement
of being a mislead creditor. The court's statement that fraud was not
established at the time the contract was entered into lends no support to
whether or not Hester acted improperly. Nothing in Dania indicates that the
improper conduct must take place the time a contract is entered into. The
Hester decision seems to turn Dania on its head.
Southeast Capital's reasoning is much more in line with Dania and the
proposed standard. The standard indicates that a parent cannot use a
subsidiary for the sole purpose of shielding its liability in a transaction that
the subsidiary has no interest in. The court used an identical rationale to
find of improper conduct on Southeast Capital's part.
C. Third District Court of Appeal
In Resorts International v. Charter Air Center,92 Resorts entered into
contract negotiations with Charter regarding the possibility of Charter
providing air transportation to a casino owned by Resorts. On the day the
parties sat down to sign the contract, Resorts substituted its subsidiary GB,
as the named party in the contract with Charter. When GB violated the
terms of the contract, Charter sued Resorts for damages. The court held that
GB was a mere instrumentality of Resorts, and Resorts use of GB to avoid
liability on the contract with Charter was sufficient improper conduct to
pierce the corporate veil. 93
In Estudios Proyectos e Inversiones de Centro America, S.A. v.
Swiss Bank Corp., S.A., 94 Granados, who owned a controlling interest in
EPICA individually, personally guaranteed the repayment of loans given by
BNP, the creditor, to ACIA, the debtor. BNP assigned an interest in some of
these notes to Swiss Bank Corp., appellee. When ACIA and Granados
91. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
92. 503 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
93. Id.
94. 507 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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defaulted on payment of the notes, the trial court issued an order on SBC's
behalf allowing attachment of a farm owned by Estudios. 95 The court of
appeals held that although Estudios was not a debtor of SBC, Estudios was
Granados' alter ego because Granados had a history of transferring his
property to Estudios to shield it from creditors. 96 This was considered
improper conduct and the attachment was allowed.97
In Ally v. Naim,98 Naim was injured during his employment with
Hialeah Vending, a company owned by Ally. Naim made a workers com-
pensation claim against Hialeah and Ally individually. 99 However, Naim
only received a judgment against Hialeah.1 °°  When the judgment was
returned unsatisfied, Naim sought to pierce the corporate veil of Hialeah and
impose personal liability on Ally for Hialeah Vending's obligations.' 0' The
court noted that although Hialeah's business affairs were poorly handled by
Ally, there was no showing that Ally improperly converted its property to his
own use or abused his relationship with the corporate entity.1
0 2
The third district cases indicate the accuracy of the proposed standard,
and provide factual scenarios which exemplify where improper conduct is,
and is not, present. In Resorts, the fact that the parent tried to substitute its
subsidiary as the contracting party at the last minute is clear evidence of an
attempt to evade liability if the contract was breached. Furthermore, the
subsidiary had no interest in the transaction other than to shield the parent
form liability. In Estudios, there was evidence that the shareholder had a
history of transferring property to his corporation to shield it from creditors.
This is clear abuse of the purpose of the corporate entity. In Ally, the
shareholder did not act improperly just because the small company did not
produce enough income to cover the amount of a judgment against it.
Therefore, the third district decisions seem to indicate that the proposed
standard correctly states the criteria for defining improper conduct.
95. Id. at 1120.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1121.
98. 581 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
99. Id. at 962.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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D. Fourth District Court of Appeal
In Eagle v. Benefield-Chappell, Inc., °3 Eagle contracted with Bene-
field-Chappell to design and furnish a condominium unit. Derrell Benefield
and Virginia Chappell were sole shareholders of Benefield-Chappell.
Benefield-Chappell arranged for Daro Builders to do the construction work
on the condominium. Daro completed the work and submitted the costs to
Benefield-Chappell. Benefield-Chappell obtained some of Daro's stationery
and prepared an identical breakdown, but increased the costs by thirty-
percent. This invoice was sent to Eagle.
Next, Eagle sent two $50,000 payments to Benefield-Chappell for
furniture deposits. However, shortly thereafter the parties had a falling out
and terminated the contract, but Benefield-Chappell refused to return the
deposits. Prior to trial, the corporate account that Eagle's $100,000 was
deposited in was depleted to as low as $22,000.
Eagle sued the corporation and Benefield and Chappell individually.
The court held that the retention of funds belonging to the Eagles constituted
conversion and the deliberate increase of actual construction costs, contrary
to the terms of their contract, constituted improper conduct. 104 The court did
remark that failure to issue stock and keep proper corporate records, standing
alone, was insufficient grounds to render the individuals personally liable.10 5
In 111 Properties, Inc. v. Lassiter,10 6 Vara was the sole shareholder of
111, a corporation that purchased property from Lassiter's corporation
A&M. Vara acknowledged that 111 Properties was formed in part because
Lassiter, a partner of A&M, disliked Vara and would not sell the property to
him. 111 Properties and Vara were later sued by A&M on a breach of
contract theory based on assertions made in the contract by 111 Properties
and Vara. The court held that the corporate veil could not be pierced on the
grounds that 111 Properties was formed to keep the seller A&M from
knowing who they were selling to. 10 7 The court said that although Vara's
use of the corporate entity was "clever," it was not the kind of improper
conduct referred to in Dania.'0°
Eagle does not provide much help in interpreting what type of conduct
might be considered improper because the facts clearly show conversion and
103. 476 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
104. Id. at718-19.
105. Id. at 719 (citations omitted).
106. 605 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
107. Id. at 125-26.
108. Id. at 126.
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fraud on behalf of the shareholders which will always warrant piercing the
corporate veil. 111 Properties, however, is more interesting. Although there
was no evidence that the corporation was being used to evade liability, it was
admittedly used to mislead the seller of the property. Notwithstanding, the
case does not present the proper factual scenario for piercing the corporate
veil or implementing the proposed standard.
E. Fifth District Court of Appeal
In Walton v. Tomax, Corp.,1°9 McGuire was the manager of Tomax
Construction. His wife was the sole shareholder but did not participate in
the management of the corporation. Walton paid Tomax $20,000 as a
deposit for a home that Tomax was to construct for Walton. After Tomax
received the deposit it never again contacted Walton. Tomax filed for
bankruptcy in 1990, a few months after it received Walton's deposit. The
court found that the property that Tomax was to build Walton's house on
was never owned by Tomax and that McGuire mishandled funds through the
corporation." 0 Therefore, improper conduct was found and McGuire could
be held liable for the return of Walton's deposit that was paid to Tomax."'
The Walton decision is reminiscent of the fourth district's Eagle
decision. The officer of Tomax accepted a deposit for the purchase of
property that was not even owned by the corporation and would not return it.
This exceeds "improper conduct" and borders on fraud or conversion. Since
fraud and conversion are much more egregious than improper conduct, the
fifth district had no trouble finding that McGuire acted improperly.
After reviewing the district court decisions, it seems that the proposed
standard for finding improper conduct could effectively be used in piercing
the corporate veil cases. The district courts seem to agree that so long as a
party can show that the corporation was used as a tool to evade liability, with
respect to a transaction in which the corporation has no interest, improper
conduct will be found.
109. 632 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
110. Id. at 180.
I111. Id. at 18 1.
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VII. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMPROPER CONDUCT AND
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
Treatises and case law agree that one of the theories most frequently
employed to justify piercing the corporate veil is equitable estoppel.' 2 This
makes perfect sense in that piercing the corporate veil was developed as an
equitable doctrine. ' 3 As will be seen, the phrase improper conduct takes on
a more definite identity when viewed in the context of equitable estoppel.
The relationship between the two is brought to light, in the piercing the
corporate veil context, in Oregon case law. Oregon courts, in fact, used the
improper conduct requirement in piercing the corporate veil cases long
before Florida. ' 4 The leading case in Oregon that explains and applies the
improper conduct standard is Amfac Foods, Inc. v. International Systems &
Controls Corp.l'"
The Amfac court stated that misrepresentation, commingling, and
holding out, are types of conduct that have been held to be improper in
piercing the corporate veil cases.1 6 Interestingly, the Amfac court noted that
some of the cases it cited for the proposition that misrepresentation consti-
tutes improper conduct would also allow recovery on an estoppel theory."
7
In essence, the Amfac court illuminated the relationship between improper
conduct and equitable estoppel. By definition, "[e]quitable estoppel is a
judicially-developed doctrine that precludes a party to a lawsuit, because of
some improper conduct on that party's part, from asserting a claim or
112. See Anderson v. Kennebec River Pulp & Paper Co., 433 A.2d 752, 756 n.5 (Me.
1981) (citing cases and treatises supporting the proposition that equitable estoppel is
frequently employed to pierce the corporate veil); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v.
Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 610, 617 n.7 (N.D. Me. 1977) (citing cases and treatises
supporting this proposition). It is important to make the distinction that the estoppel theory is
also used for another purpose in piercing the corporate veil cases. In piercing cases that
involve defrauded or misled creditors, counsel representing the corporation will sometimes
argue that the creditor is estopped from alleging that the shareholders are liable, since the
creditor chose to contract with the corporation and did not get personal guarantees from the
shareholders or further investigate the corporation's credit worthiness.
113. See discussion supra Section II.
114. The reader should be aware that Dania does not cite any Oregon authority as prece-
dent for developing the improper conduct standard; however, since Oregon is the only state
that used improper conduct as a standard in piercing the corporate veil actions before Florida,
Oregon case law cannot be ignored in trying to decipher the meaning of improper conduct.
115. 654 P.2d 1092 (Or. 1982).
116. Id at 1102.
117. Id at 1098, 1102 n.17.
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defense, regardless of its substantive validity.""' 8 If equitable estoppel can
be triggered by improper conduct, it is plausible to posit that the elements of
equitable estoppel may be used to prove improper conduct.
Although the Amfac court did not mention the doctrine of equitable
estoppel by name to describe the elements it requires to show improper
conduct and pierce the corporate veil, the Amfac court's requirements and
the elements of equitable estoppel are virtually the same. The Amfac court
started with the contention that misrepresentation is a type of improper
conduct."19 The Amfac court continued that the shareholder's conduct must
have been improper in relation to the plaintiff entering the transaction, 20 and
there must be a relationship between the improper conduct and the plaintiff's
injury.' 21 Essentially, the court said that improper conduct occurs when: 1)
there is a misrepresentation; 2) that causes the plaintiff to enter into a
transaction; and 3) the misrepresentation interferes with the corporation's
performance of its obligation toward the plaintiff.' 22 A comparison of the
Amfac court's elements to those of traditional equitable estoppel will
indicate the similarities.
Equitable estoppel as defined by the Supreme Court of Florida requires:
1) a misrepresentation of material fact; 2) reliance on that misrepresentation;
and 3) which causes injury to the party claiming estoppel. 123 In sum, the
118. Combs v. United States, 790 F. Supp. 850, 852 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (citing Phelps v.
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 785 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1986) (emphasis added)).
See generally Hamilton v. Komatsu Dresser Indus., Inc., 964 F.2d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 1992);
State Bank of Coloma v. National Flood Ins. Program, 851 F.2d 817, 819 (6th Cir. 1988);
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Roldan Fonseca, 795 F.2d 1102 (1st Cir. 1986); Long v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 1320, 1332 (N.D. Ill. 1991); United States v. Paez, 866 F.
Supp. 62 (D.P.R. 1994);United States v. Murwin, No. 90-2309-0, 1990 WL 254984, at *2 (D.
Kan. 1990); United States v. Government Dev. Bank, 725 F. Supp. 96 (D.P.R. 1989);
Independent Fire Co. No. 1 v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E. 2d 612 (W.
Va. 1988); In re Upset Sale, Tax Claim Bureau of Wayne County, 510 A.2d 1291 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1986).
119. Amfac, 654 P.2d at 1102. The Amfac court also indicated that "misrepresentations
which may not be sufficient to constitute fraud would support a recovery against a shareholder
on a misrepresentation theory." Id.
120. Id. at 1101.
121. Id. at 1103. In regard to this causation requirement, the Amfac court noted that the
improper conduct must have either caused the plaintiff to enter into the transaction with the
corporation or caused the corporation to default on the underlying obligation. Id. at 1101.
122. Amfac, 654 P.2d at 1101-02.
123. State Dept. of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1981) (citing Green-
hut Constr. Co. v. Henry A. Knott, Inc., 247 So. 2d 517, 524 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1971)).
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elements of improper conduct required by the Oregon courts are almost
identical to the elements of equitable estoppel as stated by Florida courts.
In the absence of clearer guidance from the Florida courts on what type
of conduct can be considered improper, an argument based on what Oregon
considers to be improper conduct, although not controlling, would seem to
be extremely persuasive. Moreover, because authorities in the field agree
that equitable estoppel can be used to pierce the corporate veil and the
elements required to prove equitable estoppel in Florida are the same as
those required by the Oregon courts to prove improper conduct, the Florida
practitioner might possibly use the elements of equitable estoppel to prove
that improper conduct is present, instead of simply trying to argue what
improper conduct is without any clear guidelines at all.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although the Dania court did not make it completely clear what type of
conduct could be considered improper, the proposed standard or the equita-
ble estoppel theory should provide a persuasive means by which to prove
improper conduct. Regardless, absent further clarification from the courts,
piercing the corporate veil cases, and the metaphors used therein, may
continue to be as elusive as they have been in the past.
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Bennis v. Michigan: Does the Innocent Owner Have a
Defense to Civil Forfeiture?
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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 4, 1996, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
surprising' opinion in Bennis v. Michigan ("Bennis 111,).2 The 5-4 opinion,
1. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Critics: Forfeiture Ruling Certain to Spur Reform, NAT'LL.J.,
March 18, 1996, at A12 (stating that the decision surprised forfeiture proponents and
opponents); Carol McHugh Sanders, Looking for Drama Among the Shadows, CHm. DAILY L.
BULL., March 18, 1996, at 3 (stating that Justice Ginsburg's majority-making vote was
surprising); Robert Reno, Reno at Large: Victim Sideswiped By Rolling Wreck of Justice
System, NEWSDAY, March 7, 1996, at A49 ('The 5-4 ruling was not the [C]ourt's finest
hour."); J. Kelly Strader, Taking the Winds Out of the Government's Sails?: Forfeitures and
Just Compensation, 23 PEPP. L. REv. 449 (1996) (commenting on the severe restrictions that
had been recently imposed upon governmental seizures and forfeitures); Joan Biskupic,
Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Disputes on Seized Automobile; Protection Against Property
Forfeitures May Be Widened, WASH. PoST, June 6, 1995, at A6 (pre-decision prediction that
the case would "lead to new protection for potentially innocent owners who lose their property
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authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld the forfeiture of property that
had been used during the commission of a statutory violation.3 Additionally,
the opinion established that the Constitution affords no protection to an
innocent owner of that property.
In Bennis III, the Court was presented with the opportunity to clearly
establish the guidelines by which the government may seize property that has
been used to facilitate a crime.5 While the Court has rarely disallowed the
forfeiture of such property, it has often reserved the question of whether a
forfeiture would be upheld in the case of an innocent owner, while indicating
an anticipated reluctance to do so.6 However, when faced in Bennis III with
through forfeiture"); Robert M. Sondak, Justice to Rule on Forfeiture of Innocent Owner's
Property, 5 No. 10 MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP. 1, 5 (June 1995) (predicting that the Court
was "ready to rule that.., the Constitution requires some protection for the truly innocent
owner of property").
2. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) [hereinafter Bennis III].
3. Michigan v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731, 732-33 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 527
N.W.2d 483 (Mich. 1994) [hereinafter Bennis I]. Section 600.3801 of the Michigan nuisance
statute states in pertinent part: "Any... vehicle.., used for the purpose of lewdness,
assignation or prostitution... is declared a nuisance.... and all... nuisances shall be
enjoined and abated .. " Bennis 11, 116 S. Ct. at 996 n.2 (citing Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §
600.3801 (Supp. 1995)).
Section 600.3825 of the Michigan abatement statute states in pertinent part:
(1) Order of abatement. If the existence of the nuisance is established... an or-
der of abatement shall be entered.., which order shall direct the removal from
the building or place of all ... contents therein and shall direct the sale thereof in
the manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution....
(2) Vehicles, sale. Any vehicle ... found by the court to be a nuisance within the
meaning of this chapter, is subject to the same order and judgment as
any... contents as herein provided."
MiCH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.3825 (1987).
4. Bennis 111, 116 S. Ct. at 995-96.
5. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729)
(LEXIS, Genfed, Briefs, "name (Bennis and Michigan)"); Brief of Amicus Curiae United
States in Support of Position of Respondent at 7, Bennis III (No. 94-8729) (LEXIS, Genfed,
Briefs, "name (Bennis and Michigan)") [hereinafter Brief of United States]. Two standards
were presented to the Court for adoption for application in future forfeiture cases. Although
the Court addressed the standards during oral arguments, it failed to discuss or adopt a
standard for application in Bennis III or any future cases. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10,
53, Bennis III (No. 94-8729), 1995 WL 712350 (Nov, 29, 1995).
6. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974)
[hereinafter Calero-Toledo] (stating that "it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim
of an owner.., who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful
activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
proscribed use of his property"); J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S.
505, 512 (1921) [hereinafter Goldsmith-Grant].
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the question of whether the Constitution protects the rights of an innocent
owner whose property has, without his or her knowledge or consent, been
used in violation of the law, the Court abandoned its reluctance, found that
no constitutional protections exist, and declined to establish any guidelines
by which to adjudge future forfeiture cases.7
Although the Court's decision was sharply divided, producing two
concurring opinions8 and two dissenting opinions, 9 the potential ramifica-
tions are great. In Bennis II, a vehicle co-owned by a married couple was
forfeited due to the husband's unlawful actions, despite the wife's lack of
knowledge or consent.10 Thus, while the husband's interest in the car was,
arguably, appropriately forfeited, the wife's interest in the car was also
forfeited, without compensation. The Court, in essence, has imposed a
punitive sanction on a woman for trusting her husband enough to purchase a
car with him.
By failing to establish any guidelines by which to adjudge future
forfeitures, and by further failing to establish the rationale it was relying
upon in deciding Bennis III, the Court has left itself, and courts nationwide,
with no apparent way to preclude most forfeitures. In fact, the Court has
seemingly denied itself the option of proscribing even the forfeiture of
property against the innocent owner whose property was stolen and subse-
quently used in the commission of a statutory violation. The Constitution
apparently provides no safeguard for any innocent owner, and to hold
otherwise would be irreconcilable with the holding in Bennis IlL
In examining the Court's decision, Part II of this case comment ad-
dresses civil forfeiture, examining the history and various purposes ascribed
to the practice of forfeiture. Part III explains the factual and procedural
background of the case. The facts of this case, although brief, are important
to understanding how Bennis III is distinguishable from the cases which the
Court cited in its opinion. Part IV of the case comment scrutinizes the
rationale of the Court's decision. Specifically, this section demonstrates that
the cases relied upon by the Court are distinguishable from Bennis III. This
section argues that by relying upon distinguishable cases dating back to the
early 1800s, the Court reached an imprudent conclusion. Part V explores the
standards which the parties advocated for adoption by the Court for use in
7. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 996.
8. Id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring); Id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
9. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
10. Michigan v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483,486 (Mich. 1994), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996)
[hereinafter Bennis II].
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future forfeiture cases. These standards were not addressed in the Court's
opinion; however, in light of the sharply divided Court in Bennis III, the
adoption of a standard by which to adjudge future forfeitures would help
establish a guideline to fairly, uniformly, and constitutionally apply to
forfeiture statutes and would impose limitations on the government's ability
to seize the property of individuals.
II. CIvIL FORFEITuRE: THE HISTORY AND PURPOSES
In our legal system, civil forfeiture has a history beginning in England.'
The practice began to take hold in the United States by the late 1700s.12 In
England, there were three justifications upon which forfeitures were based,
each viewed as imposing punishment: 1) deodand; 2) forfeiture upon
conviction of felonious or treasonous crimes; and 3) statutory forfeiture.'
3
At common law, the law of deodand was the forfeiture of property
considered to have "directly or indirectly caus[ed] the accidental death of a
King's subject."'14 This type of forfeiture had its historical origins in
"[b]iblical and pre-Judeo-Christian practices, which reflected the view that
the instrument of death was accused and that religious expiation was
required."' 5  When forfeiture eventually became a source of revenue,
forfeiture became known to serve as punishment for carelessness.' 6 How-
ever, the institution of deodand was abolished in England by an act authored
by Lord Campbell in 1846.17
The second justification of English forfeiture was based upon convic-
tion for felonies or treason.' 8 Under this type of forfeiture, "[t]he convicted
felon forfeited his chattels to the Crown and his lands escheated to his lord;
the convicted traitor forfeited all of his property, real and personal, to the
Crown."' 19 The justification for this forfeiture was that it served "to punish
felons and traitors, and [was] justified on the ground that property was a
right derived from society which one lost by violating society's laws. 20
11. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611 (1993).
12. Id. at 613.
13. Id. at 611.
14. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-81.
15. Id. at 681 (citing 0. Holmes, The Common Law, c. 1 (1881)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 681 n.19.
18. Austin, 509 U.S. at 611.
19. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
20. Austin, 509 U.S. at 612 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 21:685
173
: Nova Law Review 21, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
1997]
The third basis of English forfeiture, and the only type to take hold in
the United States, was premised upon a statutory violation.21 It provided for
the forfeiture of "offending objects used in violation of the customs and
revenue laws-likely a product of the confluence and merger of the deodand
tradition and the belief that the right to own property could be denied the
wrongdoer."22 Since the- adoption of the Constitution, it is upon this premise
that the practice of forfeiture has been based in the United States.
2 3
Civil forfeiture in the United States dates back to early admiralty cases
in which the United States government seized ships that were involved in
activities such as piracy, slave trade, or smuggling contraband goods.24
There are two significant admiralty cases involving the forfeiture of ships
found to have engaged in piracy that helped to set the precedent by which
civil forfeiture is applied today: The Palmyra25 and Harmony v. United
States.
26
In Palmyra, the ship had been commissioned by the King of Spain to
cruise as a privateer and was subsequently engaged in acts of piracy against
a United States vessel.27 The ship was captured by the United States and
was sent to Charleston, South Carolina for adjudication.2 8 In 1827, the Court
determined that the ship was properly forfeited to the government and that
the owner of the ship, however innocent or guilty, need not be convicted of
the offense for the forfeiture to be permissible.29 The opinion of the Court,
delivered by Justice Story, stated that the reason for holding the owner
accountable for the actions of his crew was that "[a] commission to cruise
[as a privateer] [was] a delegated authority, and c[ould] only proceed from
the sovereign.,, 30 Thus, once the King commissioned a ship, he became
vicariously responsible for the activities in which the ship was engaged
during the ship's commission. The premise of the rule permitting the
forfeiture of the ship is that "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the
21. Id.
22. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
23. Id. at 683. It is worth noting that the "First Congress viewed forfeiture as punish-
ment," and "'forfeit' is the word Congress used for fine." Austin, 509 U.S. at 613-14.
24. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683.
25. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
26. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
27. Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 2.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 14-15.
30. Id. at 4.
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offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing., 31 The
rationale for this is quite apparent: one cannot commit piracy without a ship.
Almost twenty years later in Harmony, Justice Story again delivered the
opinion of the Court which upheld the rule of Palmyra: "The vessel which
commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or
thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to
the character or conduct of the owner., 32 However, the Court in Harmony
proceeded to explain the rationale behind the rule as being "done from the
necessity of the case, as the only adequate means of suppressing the offence
or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party. 33
The forfeited ship in Harmony, the Malek Adhel, belonged to the firm
Peter Harmony and Co., of New York.34 However, the Malek Adhel was
used, without the knowledge or consent of its owners,35 to commit acts of
piracy upon ships whose owners were British, American, and Portuguese.
36
Because some of the owners were foreign, their governments would have no
jurisdiction over the crew of the Malek Adhel and would, therefore, have
little success in procuring compensation for the owners' losses.37 Thus, in
addition to the fact that forfeiture of the ship would undoubtedly suppress
the crew's ability to commit further acts of piracy, forfeiture served the
purpose of insuring compensation for injured parties who may not otherwise
have been compensated.
In both of these cases the ships, despite the guilt or innocence of the
owner, were forfeited "[b]ecause the entire mission of the ship was unlaw-
ful[;] admiralty law treated the vessel itself as... the offender., 38 Further-
more, in many instances, especially those of piracy, such forfeiture was
considered inherently necessary. Thus, admiralty cases present two policy
aims behind civil forfeiture: 1) to eradicate the vessel which was itself the
offense by virtue of being too closely attached to the offense to be severed
from it and 2) to insure compensation to those injured by the vessel's
actions.
The application of forfeiture was eventually expanded to other forms of
property, and its purposes became "to punish, for deterrence and perhaps
31. Id. at 14.
32. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 229.
35. M at 221.
36. Id. at 229.
37. See Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233-34.
38. Id. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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also for retributive purposes, persons who may have colluded or acquiesced
in criminal use of their property, or who may at least have negligently
entrusted their property to someone likely to use it for misfeasance. 39 In the
more modem cases,
forfeiture has been justified on two theories-that the property it-
self is "guilty" of the offense, and that the owner may be held ac-
countable for the wrongs of others to whom he entrusts his prop-
erty. Both theories rest, at bottom, on the notion that the owner has
been negligent in allowing his property to be misused and that he is
properly punished for that negligence. 4
0
In 1877, Justice Clifford delivered an opinion in which the Court
expanded the applications of forfeiture set forth in admiralty to other
properties. In Dobbins's Distillery v. United States,4 1 an owner lost his
property when it was discovered that his lessee was "defraud[ing] the
revenue" 42 by avoiding federal alcohol taxes regarding the distillery upon the
property.43 In this case, the Court upheld the forfeiture despite the innocence
of the owner because "he knowingly suffer[ed] and permit[ted] his land to be
used as a site for a distillery...."44 Thus, "the law places him on the same
footing as if he were the distiller and the owner of the lot where the distillery
is located."45 The Court then asserted that "[c]ases often arise where the
property of the owner is forfeited on account of the fraud, neglect, or
misconduct of those [e]ntrusted with its possession, care, and custody, even
when the owner is otherwise without fault."46 The Court proceeded to
establish, however, that "if [the lessee] abuses his trust, it is a matter to be
settled between him and his lessor."47 Furthermore, the Court elicited the
reasoning in Harmony that "the necessity of the case requir[es] it as the only
adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or of insuring an
indemnity to the injured party. 48 Thus, the Court remained reliant on the
justifications of forfeiture set forth in the admiralty cases and began to
39. Bennis II, 116 S. Ct. at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
40. Austin, 509 U.S. at 615.
41. Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
42. Id. at 396.
43. Id. at 397.
44. Id. at 399.
45. Id.
46. Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 401.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 400 (citing United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844)).
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develop a focus on the "negligent entrustment" 49 of property by innocent
owners to persons who may, unbeknownst to the owner, involve the property
in the commission of a statutory violation.
In 1921, the Court heard J.W. Goldsmith, Jr. -Grant Co. v. United States
("Goldsmith-Grant").50 In this case, the seller of an automobile retained an
interest in the vehicle for the unpaid balance of the purchase price; however,
the purchaser engaged the vehicle in the illegal act of transporting liquor to
evade taxes.51 In its opinion, authored by Justice McKenna, the Court
upheld the forfeiture of the seller's interest in the vehicle despite his lack of
knowledge of the illegal activities.52 Again, the Court cited the rule that "the
thing is primarily considered the offender 53 as justification for the forfei-
ture. The Court went on to state that the vehicle was appropriately forfeited
as "[i]t is a 'thing' that can be used in the removal of 'goods and commodi-
ties' and the law is explicit in its condemnation of such things. 54
The Goldsmith-Grant Court then acknowledged that forfeiture statutes,
taken literally, could often result in the forfeiture of property belonging to
completely innocent owners and that
[t]here is strength... in the contention that, if such be the inevita-
ble meaning of the [statute], it seems to violate that justice which
should be the foundation of the due process of law required by the
Constitution. It is, hence, plausibly urged that such could not have
been the intention of Congress .... And it follows, is the conten-
tion, that Congress only intended to condemn the interest the pos-
sessor of the property might have to punish his guilt, and not to for-
feit the title of the owner who was without guilt.
55
However, the Court noted that "there are other and militating consider-
ations. 56 As such, the Court examined the purposes of forfeiture which
were premised on the idea that the "'misfortunes are in part owing to the
49. "Negligent entrustment" is a term which indicates that an owner, although innocent of
any wrongdoing, has been in some way negligent in entrusting their property to another who
has misused the property. Brief for Petitioner at 9 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §
308 (1965)).
50. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
51. Id. at 509.
52. Id.
53. Id. at511.
54. Il at 513.
55. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 510.
56. Id.
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negligence of the owner, and therefore he is properly punished by such
forfeiture.' ' 57  Thus, while the Court also noted the "guilty-property"
theory,58 the Court began to firmly recognize the punitive aspect of forfeiture
that began with the law of deodand.5 9 The Court upheld the forfeiture on the
several theories it examined and determined that the idea of forfeiture as
punishment for even the innocent owner's negligence is "too firmly fixed in
the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now dis-
placed. ' 60 However, in response to the concerns that forfeiture statutes
might someday be applied in violation of constitutional provisions, the Court
stated that "[w]hen such application shall be made it will be time enough to
pronounce upon it."' 6' Thus, the Court began to recognize the potential for
improper forfeitures and reserved the question, as it repeatedly did, for the
appropriate case.
In 1926, the Court turned its attention to Van Oster v. Kansas,62 a case
very similar to Goldsmith-Grant. However, in Van Oster, it was the seller
who engaged the vehicle in the illegal activity and the buyer who lost her
interest in the vehicle.63 In the opinion authored by Justice Stone, the Court
upheld the forfeiture of a vehicle purchased by Van Oster but left it in the
possession of the sellers as partial consideration for use in their business.6
The car was, with the knowledge and permission of Van Oster, frequently
operated by an associate of the seller;65 however, unbeknownst to Van Oster,
the associate used the vehicle to unlawfully transport liquor in violation of a
Kansas statute.66 The Court upheld the forfeiture on the premise that even
innocent owners may become liable for the negligent operation of vehicles
by those to whom they entrust their property.67 Thus, in Van Oster, the
Court furthers the theory that innocent owners who negligently entrust their
property to those who misuse it may be held accountable for the misuse.
57. Id. at 511 (citations omitted).
58. Id.
59. Id. at510-11.
60. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 511.
61. Id. at 512.
62. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
63. Id. at 466.
64. Id. at 465-66.
65. Id. at 466.
66. Id. (citations omitted).
67. Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467.
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In the much more modem 1974 case, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co.,68 a leased yacht was forfeited when authorities discovered
marijuana aboard the yacht in violation of a statute that provided for the
forfeiture of "vessels used to transport, or to facilitate the transportation of,
controlled substances, including marihuana." 69 The Court, in its opinion
authored by Justice Brennan, upheld the forfeiture, rejecting the contention
that to forfeit the property of innocent owners without just compensation is
unconstitutional.70  The Court here, as in previous cases, examined the
history and purposes of forfeiture, accepting the theories that the "thing" is
the offender; 71 that forfeiture is "'the only adequate means of suppressing the
offence or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party;'' 7 2 and that
forfeiture serves punitive and deterrent purposes that "may have the desir-
able effect of inducing [property owners] to exercise greater care in transfer-
ring possession of their property. 73 However, the Court then qualified its
decision by stating:
[I]t would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an
owner ... who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and un-
aware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude
that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly op-
pressive.74
The Court refrained from rendering an opinion on whether it would accept
this argument until presented with a more appropriate case.75 The Court
further qualified its decision by emphasizing that in Calero-Toledo the
property owner had "voluntarily entrusted the lessees with possession of the
yacht, and no allegation has been made or proof offered that the company
did all that it reasonably could to avoid having its property put to an unlaw-
ful use."
76
68. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
69. Id. at 665-66 (citing Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico, P.R. LAws ANN. tit.
24, § 2101 (Supp. 1973)).
70. Id. at 680.
71. Id. at 684.
72. Id. (quoting United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 238 (1844)).
73. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688.
74. Id. at 689-90 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 689.
76. Id. at 690.
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Thus, the Court reaffirmed the justifications of forfeiture that have
evolved from admiralty, while providing an indication that it would consider
the establishment of a standard, the "all reasonable steps" standard men-
tioned in this case, by which to adjudge future forfeitures. The Court also
recognized that forfeiture is most often typified by the negligent entrustment
of property.
In 1993, the Court decided the most recent case on point, Austin v.
United States.7 7 In Austin, the Court refused to uphold the forfeiture of a
body shop and mobile home that was seized by the government after Austin
was found to have engaged in a single drug transaction within them.78 In this
case, the government presented the argument that civil forfeiture was not, as
the Court had held for well over a century, punitive, but rather it is remedial
in nature.79 The remedial purposes served by forfeiture, the government
contended, were the removal of the "'instruments' of the drug trade 'thereby
protecting the community from the threat of continued drug dealing,"' 80 and
compensation for the government's expenses of "law enforcement activity
and for its expenditure on societal problems such as urban blight, drug
addiction, and other health concerns resulting from the drug trade."81
However, the Court flatly rejected the government's contentions.
The reasons upon which the Court based its decision were two-fold: 1)
because, just as "'[t]here is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an
automobile,'" 8 2 the possession of a body shop and mobile home are similarly
not criminal and, therefore, the contention that they are "'instruments' of the
drug trade" must be rejected8 3 and 2) because "'forfeiture of property... [is]
a penalty that ha[s] absolutely no correlation to any damages sustained by
society or to the cost of enforcing the law,"' 84 any contention that the
forfeiture provides compensation for such law enforcement is undercut by
"dramatic variations in the value of conveyances and real property"8 5 that
may be forfeitable.8 6 Therefore, the forfeiture of the properties was punitive,
77. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
78. Id. at 605.
79. Id. at 620.
80. Id. (quoting Brief of United States at 32).
81. Id. (citing Brief of United States at 25, 32).
82. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621 (quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693, 699 (1965)).
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980)).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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serving neither the remedial goal of removing an instrumentality of crime
nor the goal of compensating the government for expenses relating to law
enforcement, and was subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.87 The Court
emphasized its holding by stating that '"[a] civil sanction that cannot fairly
be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained
as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we
have come to understand the term,', 88 and that "it consistently has recog-
nized that forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the owner.,
89
Thus, the justifications of civil forfeiture, beginning with Palmyra in
1827, have evolved into two: 1) the "guilty-property" theory, and 2) the
theory that the owner, although innocent, may be held accountable for the
misuse of his property by those to whom he entrusts it. Further, the Court
has derived a "negligent owner" premise that seemingly underlies both of
these theories. The "negligent owner" premise underlying the first theory,
that "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender," 90 is that "the
owner who allows his property to become involved in an offense has been
negligent,"9' which is in turn premised upon Blackstone's explanation of the
law of deodand, which states that "'such misfortunes are in part owing to the
negligence of the owner, and therefore he is properly punished by the
forfeiture.,,,
92
The "negligent owner" premise underlying the second theory, that an
innocent owner may still be held accountable for the misuse of his property
by those to whom he entrusts it, is similar. "Like the guilty-property fiction,
this theory of vicarious liability is premised on the idea that the owner has
been negligent."93 However, this theory has specifically reserved to the
innocent owner the power to recover, from the wrongdoer, his losses.94
Thus, because both theories have been relied upon by the Supreme Court,95
and because the concept of negligent entrustment is fundamental to both, the
Court has determined that forfeiture is, at least in part, punitive.96
87. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
88. Id. at 621 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
89. Id. at 618. See, e.g., Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 510-11; Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S.
at 686.
90. Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14.
91. Austin, 509 U.S. at 616.
92. Id. at 616 (quoting Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 510-11).
93. Id. at618.
94. Id. at 617 (citing Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 401).
95. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684; Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 510-11.
96. Bennis 111, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
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Ill. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
A. The Facts ofBennis v. Michigan
In October of 1988, Detroit police officers observed a known prostitute,
Kathy Polarchio, standing on a street comer "flagging" 97 passing vehicles.98
Shortly thereafter, the police officers observed a 1977 Pontiac, driven by
John Bennis, approach Ms. Polarchio, at which time she entered the vehi-
cle.99 The officers then witnessed the vehicle proceed one block, make a U-
turn, and stop. 1°° From the rear, the officers could see the heads of Ms.
Polarchio and Mr. Bennis. When they saw her head disappear toward Mr.
Bennis's lap, they approached the car and observed Ms. Polarchio perform-
ing fellatio on Mr. Bennis.' 01 Although the officers observed Ms. Polarchio
"flagging" and subsequently performing a sexual act in a vehicle, acts which
would be indicative of prostitution, the officers never witnessed an exchange
of money.10 2 Therefore, Mr. Bennis was arrested for gross indecency, 103 and
Ms. Polarchio was arrested the following day for accosting and soliciting. 0
Prior to Mr. Bennis's conviction for gross indecency, John and Mrs.
Bennis lost their jointly-owned 1977 Pontiac when a judge declared the
vehicle a public nuisance and ordered its abatement and subsequent sale. 05
The judge then stated that Mrs. Bennis, despite the fact that she was an
innocent owner, was not entitled to any compensation for her interest in the
vehicle because, after assessing various costs, "'[t]here's practically nothing
left.
,,,06
97. "Flagging" is a term used to describe the act of a prostitute signaling passing vehicles
to stop in an effort to solicit customers. Bennis 11, 527 N.W.2d at 486 n.2.
98. Id. at 486.
99. Id.
100. IUi
101. Id.
102. Bennis 1, 504 N.W.2d at 735.
103. Id. Mr. Bennis was initially charged with "indecent and immoral conduct," and the
complaint alleged that he engaged in the services of a prostitute and gross indecency between
a male and a female. However, Mr. Bennis was eventually only charged with gross indecency,
presumably due to the lack of evidence that Mr. Bennis did or intended to pay Ms. Polarchio
for her services. Id. at 735 n.1 (citing MicH. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 750.338b, .449a (West
1992)).
104. Bennis II, 527 N.W.2d at 486 n.3.
105. Bennis I, 504 N.W.2d at 732.
106. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 997 (citation omitted). But see id. at 1010 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("[N]othing supports the suggestion that the value of her co-ownership is so
insignificant as to be beneath the law's protection.").
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Approximately three weeks prior to the October incident,'w Mr. Bennis
and his wife purchased the car for $600 with money that Mrs. Bennis had
earned through baby-sitting and other odd jobs.10 8 The car was jointly-
owned by the couple and was driven that evening by Mr. Bennis to and from
work.' °9 Mrs. Bennis, believing her husband would return directly home
from work that evening, as he did every other evening, had no reason to
suspect or know that Mr. Bennis would instead be arrested for gross inde-
cency.110
B. Procedural Posture
After the trial court abated the interests in the car of both Mr. Bennis
and Mrs. Bennis,' 11 despite her lack of knowledge that her husband had ever
used the car in violation of any statutes,'1 2 and following Mr. Bennis's
conviction for gross indecency,'13 the Bennises appealed the abatement of
their vehicle to the Court of Appeals of Michigan." 14
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment on three bases:
1) the prosecutor was required, but failed, to prove knowledge on the part of
Mrs. Bennis that the vehicle was being used in violation of the abatement
statute; 2) a single incident of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution in
violation of the abatement statute was insufficient to constitute a public
nuisance subject to abatement; and 3) the prosecution failed to prove an act
of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution by Mr. Bennis in violation of the
abatement statute.1
1 5
However, upon appeal by the Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney, the
Michigan Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals," 6 and in doing so,
stretched the realm of civil forfeiture beyond any previous application. The
court summarily held that: 1) while "lewdness" as used in the statute is
limited to acts that are committed in furtherance of prostitution, and further
107. Bennis 1, 504 N.W.2d at 734.
108. BISKUPIC, supra note 1, at A6.
109. Bennis 1, 504 N.W.2d at 737.
110. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 1008 ("She had no knowledge of her husband's plans to do
anything with the car except 'come directly home from work,' as he had always done before;
and that she even called 'Missing Persons' when he failed to return on the night in question.").
111. Bennis I, 504 N.W.2d at 732.
112. Id. at 733.
113. Id. at732.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 733-34.
116. Bennis 11, 527 N.W.2d at 487-88.
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that although there was no exchange of money, Mr. Bennis's gross inde-
cency constituted "lewdness" for purposes of the statute; 2) a single act of
"prostitution" occurring in a vehicle in a neighborhood known for prostitu-
tion is an abatable nuisance, despite the court's notation that if the vehicle
had been driven to another neighborhood the vehicle would not have been
abatable;" 7 and 3) Mrs. Bennis's knowledge or consent of Mr. Bennis's
actions was unnecessary to abate the entire interest of the co-owned vehi-
cle.
8
At this point, Mrs. Bennis appealed her case to the United States
Supreme Court, challenging the constitutionality of the government's ability
to forfeit the property of completely innocent owners." 9 Mrs. Bennis's
appeal was based upon both a facial challenge and an as-applied challenge:
WHETHER A MICHIGAN NUISANCE ABATEMENT STAT-
UTE THAT PERMITS THE FORFEITURE OF A PERSON'S
PROPERTY IF IT IS USED IN A PROSCRIBED MANNER BY
ANOTHER PERSON EVEN IF THE OWNER HAD NO
KNOWLEDGE OF, OR CULPABILITY IN CONNECTION
WITH, THE MISUSE OF THE PROPERTY VIOLATES THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT AND/OR THE TAKINGS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT (AS APPLIED TO THE STATES BY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT); AND
WHETHER THE APPLICATION OF THAT STATUTE TO DE-
PRIVE A WIFE OF HER INTEREST IN AN AUTOMOBILE
SHE JOINTLY OWNED WITH HER HUSBAND VIOLATED
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT (AS APPLIED TO THE STATES BY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT), WHERE THE FORFEITURE
RESULTED FROM A FINDING THAT THE HUSBAND EN-
GAGED IN A SEX ACT WITH A REPUTED PROSTITUTE IN-
SIDE THE AUTOMOBILE, AND WHERE THE RECORD ES-
TABLISHED THAT THE WIFE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF
117. Id. at 491 n.22 ("We note that our position is limited to situations in which a nui-
sance condition exists, regardless of the city. Therefore, a vehicle could not be abated if the
same situation arose in another area of Detroit, such as Palmer Woods, where certainly no
such nuisance condition exists.").
118. Id. at 492.
119. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 995.
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OR CULPABILITY REGARDING HER HUSBAND'S PRO-
SCRIBED USE OF THE VEHICLE. 12°
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Michigan Supreme
Court in a 5-4 decision. 12 1 The Court held that, based on a line of cases in
which various forfeitures were upheld, neither the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 22 nor the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
were violated: 123 Because "the forfeiture proceeding here in question did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the property in the automobile was
transferred by virtue of that proceeding from petitioner to the State,"' 24 and
did not violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'2s However, in
its decision, the Court relied upon distinguishable cases based upon medi-
eval rationale which affords no consideration to modem societal conditions
and failed to establish a standard by which to decide future forfeiture cases.
IV. THE CASES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE
A. Admiralty Cases: Forfeiture on the High Seas
Each of the several principal cases relied upon in the lead opinion is
arguably distinguishable from Bennis IlI. Furthermore, the aims of the
forfeitures in these cases are not advanced by the forfeiture in Bennis III.
The Court's opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, establishes
support for the forfeiture of Mrs. Bennis's interest in her and her husband's
jointly-owned vehicle by comparing the forfeiture to the forfeiture of ships
involved in piracy. 126 The Court begins its inquest with Palmyra and
Harmony.
In both Palmyra and Harmony, the Court upheld forfeitures of ships
that were found to have engaged in piracy based upon the principle that
"[tjhe thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the
offence is attached primarily to the thing."' 27 The rationale supporting the
forfeitures is plausible. When the "thing" is so necessary and attached to the
120. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
121. Bennis II, 116 S. Ct. at 996.
122. Id. at 997.
123. Id. at998.
124. Id. at 1001.
125. Id.
126. Bennis 111, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
127. Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14.
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offense that the offense could not be committed without it, it is reasonable
that forfeiture is an appropriate course of action with which to proceed.
However, unlike in Palmyra and in Harmony, in Bennis the vehicle in which
the act of gross indecency occurred was not necessary to commit the offense,
nor was the vehicle so attached to the offense as to be inseparable from it.
As stated by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion, "the forfeited property
bore no necessary connection to the offense committed by petitioner's
husband."'128 While the vehicle proved convenient, it certainly was not
necessary or attached to the offense, as were the ships in the admiralty cases.
Without the ships, the crews would have been hard pressed to have reached,
let alone engaged in "piratical aggression, search, depredation, restraint, and
seizure ... upon[,] the high seas.' ' 29
In support of the State of Michigan, it was posited that, like the ships in
Palmyra and Harmony,
[t]he forfeited car underlying the instant litigation was intimately
related to the offense punished. Mr. Bennis could not have found
other means of transportation adequate for acquiring Ms. Polar-
chio's services. The car was uniquely necessary both for getting to
the prostitution market and in 'hosting' the illicit sexual act. The
state should be allowed to focus on both the individual engaged in
the illicit conduct and the vehicle which facilitated that conduct.
130
However, contrary to this argument, Mr. Bennis could have committed the
act of gross indecency without the aid of the Bennis's 1977 Pontiac or any
other car. While the vehicle did provide transportation to the street comer
upon which he found Ms. Polarchio, he could have walked or taken a bus.
Once he had engaged the company of Ms. Polarchio, they could have
commenced their activities in an alley, on a bus bench, or in any secluded (or
public) place. It is implausible that every person who solicits the services of
prostitutes both has a car and uses it as the locale for their subsequent
activities. Furthermore, the Court accepted that had Mr. Bennis simply
driven the vehicle to a different neighborhood where a "nuisance condi-
128. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 2.
130. Brief of the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities, The Alliance for a
Safer, Greater Detroit, The Eleventh Precinct Police-Community Relations Council, and The
Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7,
Bennis III (No. 94-8729) (LEXIS, Genfed, Briefs, "name (Bennis and Michigan)")
[hereinafter Brief of American Alliance].
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tion"'131 did not exist the car no longer would have been abatable. However,
if the car were "primarily considered as the offender,"' 32 as were the ships in
Palmyra133 and in Harmony,134 it would be abatable regardless of the
neighborhood in which it was parked. Obviously, the car is not so necessary
and so attached to the offense.
In Harmony, while the Court upheld the rule in Palmyra, that the vessel
is considered the offender and is subject to forfeiture without regard for the
guilt or innocence of the owner, it also offered a rationale for such forfeiture
which provides further support for the proposition that these cases are
distinguishable from Bennis. The two reasons for permitting forfeiture, as
espoused in Harmony, are: 1) forfeiture is the only way to suppress the
wrongful activity and 2) forfeiture is the only way to insure that injured
parties will be compensated for their losses.
1 35
First, because the vehicle in Bennis is not necessary for engaging in the
act of fellatio, forfeiture of the vehicle will not necessarily prevent or
incapacitate Mr. Bennis from engaging in such acts in the future. Thus,
forfeiture of the Bennis vehicle is not even an, let alone the only, "adequate
means of suppressing the offence or wrong." 136 Undoubtedly, incarceration,
or perhaps a stiffer fine, would produce a more deterrent effect.
Second, because there was no "injured party ' 137 in Bennis III, the idea
of "insuring an indemnity"' 38 to one is incongruous. Furthermore, the reason
for forfeiting the ships for compensatory purposes was premised on the fact
that many of the ships' owners were located in other countries. Therefore,
the United States quite often lacked jurisdiction over the owners for the
purpose of awarding indemnity to the injured parties. 39 Thus, because the
illegal acts will not necessarily be suppressed by the forfeiture, and because
there are no victims to compensate, the necessity of the forfeiture in the
admiralty cases relied upon by the Court is not present in Bennis III, and the
rationale supporting the forfeitures in Palmyra and Harmony is inconsistent
with any rationale supporting the forfeiture of the Bennis vehicle.
131. Benis II, 527 N.W.2d at 491 n.22.
132. Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14.
133. Id.
134. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233.
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B. Forfeiture Comes Ashore
The next set of cases relied upon by the Court begins with Dobbins's
Distillery, in which an innocent owner lost his property due to the illegal
business practices of his lessee. 140 In that case, the owner was aware of the
use to which his land was being put-a distillery.141 Thus, the possibility
that the lessee might undertake illegal activities in the process of running the
business is a risk the lessor consequently accepted. In Bennis III, however,
Mrs. Bennis was completely ignorant of the use to which the couple's
vehicle was being put.142 And while, as the Dobbins's Distillery Court
noted, forfeiture cases often arise as the result of the "[e]ntrustment' 43 of
property, as one Justice asserted at the Bennis III oral argument, "[Mrs.
Bennis] didn't have to entrust it. It's half [Mr.-Bennis's] car."'144 Addition-
ally, it is unlikely that Michigan would permit Mrs. Bennis to sue her
husband to recover her losses, 45 an option provided the lessor in Dobbins's
Distillery,146 and if Michigan so permits, it would be futile for a wife to
attempt to recover from her husband money to which she is already entitled.
And, once again, the reasons proffered for upholding forfeitures' 47 do not
apply in Bennis III: Forfeiture of the vehicle will not necessarily suppress
the wrong, and there is no victim to compensate. Thus, as were the admi-
ralty cases, Dobbins's Distillery is distinguishable from Bennis IlL
The Court next relied on Van Oster, in which it upheld the forfeiture of
an automobile that was involved in the illegal transportation of liquor,
regardless of the innocence of the owner. 148 The decision was based upon
the premise that innocent owners may be held accountable for the misuse of
their property by those to whom they negligently entrust their property.'49
However, as established, Mrs. Bennis did not entrust the vehicle to her
140. 96 U.S. 395, 396 (1877).
141. Id. at 399.
142. Bennis Ii, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
143. 96 U.S. at 401.
144. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11.
145. It was implied during oral argument that Michigan would permit such an action
between spouses only in conjunction with a divorce action. Id. at 30. Despite their difficul-
ties, Mr. and Mrs. Bennis remain married; thus, recovery by Mrs. Bennis from her husband is
precluded. Aaron Epstein, Should Property Be Seized When Owner is Blameless? High
Court to Hear Forfeiture Case, SEATTrLE Tires, November 25, 1995, at A3.
146. 96 U.S. at 404.
147. Id. at 400.
148. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
149. Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467.
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husband;'5 ° he had every right to use the car as he was the co-owner; and,
even if she had become aware of his illegal activities, "she would have had
no right to stop him from using the car."15'
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the circumstances in Van
Oster bear a distinct resemblance to the circumstances in the aforementioned
admiralty cases: As in the admiralty cases where the ship was so necessary
and attached to the offense as to be considered the offender itself, 52 the
vehicle in Van Oster also was as necessary and attached to the offense. The
Kansas statute that was violated in Van Oster prohibited the "transportation
of intoxicating liquor."'' 53 While other modes of transportation could have
been used in the commission of this activity, a vehicle is a "thing" that is
used for the purpose of transportation which is necessary for the violation of
the statute. Had the liquor been discovered in a "thing" that could not
facilitate its "transportation," then the offense of "transportation of intoxi-
cating liquor" could not have been committed.1 54 Discovered in a non-
mobile entity, the pertinent "transportation" element of the statute would
have been missing. Thus, for these reasons, Van Oster is distinguishable
from Bennis III.
Next, the Court attempted to analogize Goldsmith-Grant and Bennis
111.55 In Goldsmith-Grant, a vehicle that had been misused by the purchaser
was forfeited. The seller, who had retained an interest in the car to secure
the unpaid balance, lost his interest, as well, despite his lack of consent to or
knowledge of the illegal activity. The Court upheld the forfeiture on the
several theories it had espoused in previous cases, concluding that forfeiture
of an innocent owner's property as punishment for the negligent entrustment
of it to others is "too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence
of the country to be now displaced."' 56 At this point, the Goldsmith-Grant
Court addressed concerns that the application of forfeiture would extend to
unconstitutional lengths: "When such application shall be made it will be
time enough to pronounce upon it."157 The situation in Bennis III can be
analogized to a scenario the Goldsmith-Grant Court suggested might trigger
such a review: "It is said that a Pullman sleeper can be forfeited if a bottle
150. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11.
151. Id. at 12.
152. Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14.
153. 272 U.S. at 466 (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. Bennis 11, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5.
156. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 511.
157. Id. at 512.
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of illicit liquor be taken upon it by a passenger."'58 The forfeiture of an
entire automobile because a grossly indecent act was performed upon its
front seat is much more similar to the preceding scenario than to the forfei-
ture of a ship that was engaged in piracy or to a vehicle forfeited for trans-
porting illegal goods. As such, the Goldsmith-Grant Court might very well
have recognized Bennis III as the application upon which it should pro-
nounce. When there has been no violation so connected to the vehicle as to
declare the vehicle itself the offender, 159 and when there has been no negli-
gence on the part of the owner to be punished, perhaps it is time to review
the forfeiture that is so rooted in America's jurisprudence.
The next significant case relied upon by the Bennis III Court is Calero-
Toledo in which a leased yacht was forfeited upon discovery that drugs were
being transported in violation of a statute. 16° The Court premised its opinion
upon the theories of forfeiture established in the several previous cases.
However, once again, the reasoning of the case relied upon by the Court is
inapplicable to Bennis III: As previously established, the Bennis vehicle can
hardly be considered the offender, forfeiture of the vehicle will unlikely
prevent a recurrence of the unlawful activity, there is no injured party in
need of compensation, and because there was no negligent entrustment, there
can be no deterrent or acceptable punitive affect. However, while the Court
upheld the forfeiture of the yacht upon the basic principle that the owner
negligently entrusted his property to the lessees, it reserved the question of
whether such a forfeiture would be upheld in the case of a truly innocent
owner.161 In its Bennis III opinion, the Court acknowledges the passage from
Calero-Toledo upon which the petitioner, Mrs. Bennis, relies: "'[I]t would
be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of... an owner who proved not
only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but
also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
proscribed use of his property.' " 162 However, the Court opted to dismiss the
issue on the basis that the statement is "'obiter dictum,' and '[i]t is to the
holdings of [the] cases, rather than their dicta, that [the Court] must at-
158. Id.
159. Bennis 1I, 527 N.W.2d at 491 n.22 ("We note that our position is limited to situa-
tions in which a nuisance condition exists, regardless of the city. Therefore, a vehicle could
not be abated if the same situation arose in another area of Detroit, such as Palmer Woods,
where certainly no such nuisance condition exists.").
160. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 665-66.
161. Id. at 689-90.
162. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 999 (quoting Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689).
1997]
190
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
tend. ' , 163 It is seemingly pointless, then, for the Court to expend its energy
on an apparently inert abstraction.
The final significant case upon which the Bennis III Court relied is
Austin.164 Despite being the most recent case on point, the Court affords this
case no analysis.1 65 The Court merely acknowledged that in Austin, it had
''no occasion ... to deal with the validity of the 'innocent-owner defense,'
other than to point out that if a forfeiture statute allows such a defense, the
defense is additional evidence that the statute itself is 'punitive' in mo-
tive,"' 166 and held that because "forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish
the owner,"' 67 it is subject to the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause.' 68 However, the Court failed to mention that it therefore reversed
the forfeiture of property that, due to its punitive nature, was excessive.' 69 It
is confusing how the Court could then determine, in Bennis III, that
"forfeiture... serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive pur-
pose, 170 after having concluded in Austin that forfeiture serving any retribu-
tive or deterrent purposes is punitive.' 71 And it is further confusing that in
Bennis III the Court acknowledged its determination that forfeiture is at least
partially punitive,172 yet failed to explain how imposing a punitive action
upon a completely innocent person is constitutional, or even why it is not
unconstitutional.
Initially, the most apparent distinction between the two cases is that,
unlike Mrs. Bennis, Austin himself was convicted of the offense by which
his property was forfeited. Thus, he made (and had) no claim of innocence.
Moreover, based upon the blatant rejection of the government's two-part
argument for upholding the Austin forfeiture, it is difficult to decipher the
rationale of the Court's decision in Bennis IlL
The first contention the government asserted in Austin was that forfei-
ture of the mobile home and body shop would serve to remove
"'instruments' of the drug trade 'thereby protecting the community from the
163. Id. (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 379
(1994)).
164. Id. at 1000.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Bennis IlI, 116 S. Ct. at 1000 (quoting Austin, 509 U.S. at 618).
168. ML
169. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
170. Bennis 111, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
171. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621 (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 448).
172. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 1000 (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at 618).
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threat of continued drug dealing. ' , 173 However, the Court flatly rejected this
contention and determined that the punitive measure of forfeiture was
excessive because the possession of the property was "'nothing even
remotely criminal.' 174  This result should surely support the refusal to
impose such a punitive measure of forfeiture upon a completely innocent
person, since there is likewise "'nothing even remotely criminal"' in owning
a car. These decisions further appear readily conflicting: If the forfeiture of
the premises upon which a drug deal occurred would fail to "[protect] the
community from the threat of continued drug dealing,"'175 then the forfeiture
of a car in which an indecent act occurred surely will not serve to combat the
threat of continuing prostitution.
The second contention the government asserted was also rejected by the
Court. In Austin, the Court refused to permit the forfeiture of Austin's
properties for the purpose of compensating the government for costs in-
curred in performing its law enforcement duties176---the same costs that were
assessed against Mrs. Bennis. 177 The basis of the Court's rejection of this
contention was that the "dramatic variations in the value of [property]
forfeitable' 178 in these situations fails to provide "'a reasonable form of
liquidated damages, ' "1 79 thereby having "'absolutely no correlation to any
damages sustained by society or to the cost of enforcing the law."",A8 0 Thus,
the decision in Austin seems to provide support for rejecting the Court's
acquiescence in assessing "costs"' 8'1 against Mrs. Bennis's interest in the
forfeited vehicle. It seems incongruent for the Court to refuse the assess-
173. Austin, 509 U.S. at 620 (quoting Brief of the United States at 32).
174. Id. at 621 (quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 699).
175. Id. at 620.
176. Id. at 621.
177. See Bennis II1, 116 S. Ct. at 1002 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring).
178. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621.
179. Id. (quoting One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 407 U.S. 232, 237
(1972)).
180. Id. (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 254).
181. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 998. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas struggles
with the definition attributed to the term "costs" as used by the trial court judge. There is
evidence that the judge was referring to costs such as law enforcement and costs of keeping
the car. Justice Thomas stated that if these were in fact the costs referred to by the judge, "the
State would still have a plausible argument that using the sales proceeds to pay such costs was
'remedial' action, rather than punishment." Id. at 1002 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring). This
attribution is completely at odds with the Court's holding in Austin which reiterated its
previous holding that "'the forfeiture of property... [is] a penalty that ha[s] absolutely no
correlation to any damages sustained by society or to the cost of enforcing the law."' 509 U.S.
at 621 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980)).
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ment of costs in Austin, and subsequently conclude that it is appropriate to
assess against an innocent person these same costs, costs to which the
forfeiture of property was deemed to have "'absolutely no correlation."'
182
This assessment seems especially inappropriate when allegedly the proceeds
of the forfeitures often serve to compensate the law enforcement officers
directly, not the government for its expenditure on law enforcement.
18 3
Had the Bennis III Court determined the outcome of the case prior to its
analysis, it is not difficult to understand its reason for "ignor[ing] Austin's
detailed analysis of. . . case law without explanation or comment."
184
Austin, even without the previously discussed case law, offers no reason for
deciding as the Court did and every reason for deciding as the Court did not.
Had the previous analyses not been evidence enough that the cases upon
which the decision was based were distinguishable, Austin's completely
irreconcilable decision should sway those not yet convinced. Thus, in
Bennis III, the Court's decision was rooted solely in cases that are distin-
guishable. The facts are distinguishable, the reasons for upholding the
forfeiture are distinguishable, the purposes of the forfeitures are inapplicable
to the case, and the characterization of the forfeiture in Bennis III is com-
pletely inconsistent with even the Court's most recent decision on point.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS
A. Implications of the Standards
Although presented with two standards, 85 the Court failed to adopt, or
even address, an appropriate standard by which to adjudge future forfeiture
cases. Either standard would have limited the government's ability to seize
the property of completely innocent owners, safeguarding the property rights
of individuals while concurrently ensuring the police powers necessary to
deter crime, punish criminals, and nullify the profitability of crime.
182. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 254).
183. Readers' Views, CINN. ENQ., March 14, 1996, at A19.
184. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. Brief for Petitioner at 11; Brief of United States at 7.
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1. The "Negligent Entrustment" Standard
The petitioner, Mrs. Bennis, advocated a "negligent entrustment"
standard that was suggested by the Court in the Calero-Toledo dicta.186 She
urged that
[b]ecause of the historic importance of property rights, the need for
a clear, uniform standard to guide the lower courts, and the need to
avoid "unduly oppressive" confiscations of property from innocent
owners like [herself], the Court should adopt the negligent entrust-
ment standard as the measure of culpability required to satisfy due
process in these circumstances.
18 7
The "negligent entrustment" standard is adopted from section 308 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states:
It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage
in an activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor
knows or should know that such person intends or is likely to use
the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in (a manner pro-
scribed by law).'88
This standard would permit the forfeiture of property belonging to an
innocent owner only if the owner had been negligent in entrusting his
property to a third person. Furthermore, this standard would "place the
burden on the government to demonstrate that an owner negligently allowed
another to use his property for illegal purposes."'
189
It is argued that Mrs. Bennis would have met the "negligent entrust-
ment" standard and defeated the forfeiture.19° The record reflects uncontra-
dicted testimony that Mrs. Bennis had no knowledge that her husband would
use the vehicle in a proscribed manner,191 nor any reason to believe that he
would do so.19 2 Furthermore, Mr. Bennis, as established at oral argument,
had no need to be "entrusted" with the vehicle due to his right, by virtue of
186. Brief for Petitioner at 9.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 15. "[A] manner proscribed by law" reflects the change suggested by peti-
tioner. These words replaced the actual language "such a manner as to create an unreasonable
risk of harm to others."
189. Brief of The Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioner at 12.
190. Brief for Petitioner at 16.
191. ML
192. Id.
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being a co-owner, to use the car as he chose. 193 Thus, there is no "negligent
entrustment" for which Mrs. Bennis should be punished. Accordingly, Mrs.
Bennis met the "negligent entrustment" standard she advocated, and,
therefore, the punitive forfeiture of her interest in the vehicle without
compensation was inappropriate.'
94
While the respondent advocated the adoption of no particular standard
by which to adjudge forfeiture, both The American Alliance for Rights and
Responsibilities ("American Alliance") and the United States, in their amici
curiae briefs, encouraged the Court to reject the negligent entrustment
standard advocated by Mrs. Bennis,' 95 and the United States advocated the
adoption of an "all reasonable steps" standard. 196 The parties encouraged the
rejection of the "negligent entrustment" standard for two principal reasons.
First, it was suggested that such a standard would exempt many co-
ownership arrangements, placing a vast amount of property beyond the
hands of forfeiture, 197 including Mrs. Bennis's interest in her forfeited
automobile. This seemed unacceptable to the parties supporting the respon-
dent, for apparently their goal was to subject as much property as possible to
the threat of forfeiture. Second, it was suggested that the "negligent en-
trustment" standard is unacceptable because it limits the innocent owner's
liability to the time of entrustment. It was contended that this standard
should be rejected because "[i]n many cases, an owner can reasonably be
expected to take precautions against illegal use of his property after, as well
as before, entrusting it to someone else."'198 Thus, it was upon these grounds
that the parties believed the Court should reject the "negligent entrustment"
standard advocated by Mrs. Bennis.
2. The "All Reasonable Steps" Standard
While American Alliance was content to encourage the rejection of the
"negligent entrustment" standard, the United States advocated the adoption
of an "all reasonable steps" standard by which to adjudge future forfei-
tures.199 However, the goal of the United States was not to promote effi-
ciency in future forfeiture cases, rather the United States believed that "[t]he
193. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11.
194. Brief for Petitioner at 17.
195. Brief of United States at 8; Brief of American Alliance at 6.
196. Brief of United States at 7.
197. Brief of American Alliance at 14.
198. Brief of United States at 8.
199. Id. at 11.
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Constitution [b]ars [t]he [p]unitive [florfeiture [o]f [p]roperty [w]hen [t]he
[o]wner [a]lleges [a]nd [p]roves [t]hat [h]e [t]ook [a]ll [r]easonable [s]teps
[t]o [p]revent [i]llegal [u]se [o]f [t]he [p]roperty." 20°  Thus, the United
States, unlike the Supreme Court, believed that the Constitution affords a
degree of protection to the innocent owners of forfeited property. The
United States asserted:
[When an owner pleads and proves that he took all reasonable
steps to prevent the involvement of his property in the illegal con-
duct underlying the forfeiture .... [he] has, by definition, mini-
mized the foreseeable risk of illegal use and, in turn the risk of for-
feiture.... Moreover, an owner who can prove that he took all rea-
sonable, affirmative measures to prevent unlawful use is far less
likely to be in collusion with the person who uses the property ille-
gally than is an owner who merely asserts lack of knowledge or
participation in the illegal use.
201
Thus, because the United States contended that the Constitution does not bar
forfeiture of property when an innocent owner merely asserts lack of
knowledge or reason to know of the illegal use, adopting the "all reasonable
steps" standard would provide property owners an incentive to "take af-
firmative steps to detect and prevent the illegal use of their property,
[thereby] eliminat[ing] the need for judicial inquiry into the possibility that
the alleged innocent owner is in collusion with the person making illegal use
of the property.' 202
Although she contended that she would prevail under either standard,
Mrs. Bennis urged the Court to reject the "all reasonable steps" standard in
favor of the "negligent entrustment" standard.0 3 She so urged because the
vagueness of the former standard "has led to widely divergent innocent
owner determinations in federal and state cases, and to arbitrary forfeitures
of property."204 Furthermore, "because [the standard] does not require courts
to take account of the relationship between actual or constructive knowledge
of misuse and a duty to take preventive measures-courts have too often
applied that standard so as to permit a forfeiture in the absence of fault.
' 205
200. Brief of United States at 8.
201. Id. at 11.
202. Brief of United States at 11.
203. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 6.
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In other words, on its face, the "all reasonable steps" standard could aid in
the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property merely because the owner was
unaware that any steps could or should have been taken.
Mrs. Bennis contended that, were the "all reasonable steps" standard
applied, she would prevail on three principal grounds.206 First, Mrs. Bennis
asserted that her undisputed innocencea n precluded her ability to take any
steps to have prevented the act which led to the forfeiture of the Bennis
vehicle. 208
Whether one did all that could reasonably be expected to prevent a
misuse is necessarily a function of whether one knew or should
have known of another's criminal wrongdoing.... Indeed, if one
has no knowledge or reason to know of a wrongful use, then one
cannot be expected to take affirmative steps to prevent that use. As
to Mrs. Bennis, it hardly requires argument that a wife would, as a
matter of course, take all reasonable steps to assure her husband'sfidelity. 2W
While the state conceded that Mrs. Bennis had no knowledge of her hus-
band's illegal actions, 210 the United States contended that she failed to prove
that she took "all reasonable steps" to prevent it.21' Furthermore,
[t]he United States concedes that "it may be true in many cases that
a spouse who lacks reason to know that the other spouse will use
jointly owned property illegally cannot reasonably be expected to
take any precautions." And the amicus brief of the American Alli-
ance acknowledges that "an uninvolved co-owner would have to
know of the specific illegal use in order to take reasonable steps to
prevent it.2
12
Thus, the fact that Mrs. Bennis was ignorant of her husband's activity would
seem to exculpate her from proving that she had taken "all reasonable steps"
to deter the misuse. Hence, the contentions of the respondent, United States,
and amici curiae are completely inconsistent with Mrs. Bennis's innocence.
206. Brief for Petitioner at 17.
207. Bennis II, 527 N.W.2d at 486.
208. Brief for Petitioner at 17.
209. Id.
210. Bennis 1, 504 N.W.2d at 733.
211. Brief of United States at 15.
212. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8 n.7 (citations omitted).
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Second, Mrs. Bennis asserted the fact that "she did not stand to benefit
financially or otherwise from the particular use he was found to have made
of the car,, 213 as further supporting her contention that, had there been steps
she could have or should have taken, nothing would have discouraged her
from doing so. This contention addresses any supposition that she may have
been "in collusion with [her husband in] making illegal use of the prop-
erty.1
214
Third, "the fact that [Mrs. Bennis] lacked meaningful control over her
husband's use of the property is another factor supporting the conclusion
that [she] took all steps that 'reasonably could be expected' to prevent the
proscribed use. 215 As previously established, Mrs. Bennis did not entrust
2 16
the car to her husband on October 3, 1988.217 John Bennis, as co-owner of
the car, had every right to use the car when and how he chose, and Mrs.
Bennis had no right to impede him from doing so.2 18 Thus, without the
power and ability to prevent her husband from employing the car as he
pleased, Mrs. Bennis was without the power and ability to take "all reason-
able steps" to prevent the misuse of the property. As such, she took "all
[the] reasonable steps" that she could.
B. The Flaws
Based upon the preceding analysis, it is apparent that each standard
possesses inherent flaws which would aid in, rather than prevent, the
misapplication of forfeiture. Thus, while the Court may have properly failed
to adopt one of the proffered standards, the failure to address the issue or
adopt an alternative standard left the Court's opinion incomplete. Without a
standard, and without any indication of the Court's position on a standard,
courts will be hard-pressed to apply the Bennis III decision in any way other
than to uphold the array of forfeitures encountered. Without a standard, and
without any indication of the Court's position on a standard, courts will be
hard-pressed to derive from Bennis III the characteristics of forfeiture that
determine its constitutionality or unconstitutionality, or its permissibility or
impermissibility.
213. Brief for Petitioner at 17.
214. Brief of United States at 11.
215. Brief for Petitioner at 17.
216. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28.
217. Bennis II, 527 N.W.2d at 486.
218. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31.
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The "negligent entrustment" standard, which strives to achieve a
219principle purpose of forfeiture, may place a greater limitation on forfeiture
than the "all reasonable steps" standard, but may inadvertently provide
persons whose property should rightfully be seized a loophole by which to
escape the deterrence of forfeiture. The "negligent entrustment" standard, as
advocated by Mrs. Bennis, restricts the time of entrustment, in a co-
ownership situation, to the time at which a co-ownership is created.2 In
Mrs. Bennis's situation, for example, the time of entrustment occurred at the
time she and her husband purchased the car together. 22' Thus, Mrs. Bennis
could be held accountable for negligent entrustment only if she knew or had
reason to know of her husband's tendency to solicit prostitutes at the time
the car was purchased. Had Mrs. Bennis become aware of her husband's
activities at any time subsequent to the purchase, she could not be held
accountable solely on the premise that there was no entrustment.
While the fact that there was no entrustment in the Bennis situation
does distinguish it from previous cases, the lack of entrustment should not be
the sole determinative factor in proscribing forfeiture. The "negligent
entrustment" standard fails to consider whether the property owner had any
knowledge of misuse by a third party to whom they entrusted their property
subsequent to the entrustment but prior to the time the misuse occurred. If
the owner becomes apprised of the misuse post-entrustment, the "negligent
entrustment" standard imposes upon the owner no duty or incentive to take
steps to prevent or diminish the misuse. Thus, the application and deterrent
nature of the "negligent entrustment" standard is quite limited and does not
best serve the intentions of forfeiture.
Likewise, the "all reasonable steps" standard has inherent flaws that
would theoretically permit the forfeiture of stolen property more readily than
the forfeiture of property that had been negligently entrusted. The "all
reasonable steps" standard forces the petitioner to plead and prove the steps
he took to prevent the misuse of his property. However, the respondent may
then produce "reasonable steps" that had not, but arguably should have, been
taken.
Furthermore, as the "negligent entrustment" standard imposes upon the
owner no duty to take precautions, the "all reasonable steps" standard fails to
219. The primary purpose being referred to here is the idea of punishing persons who
negligently entrust their property to others who misuse it. This is seen as underlying each of
the several theories of forfeiture. Austin, 509 U.S. at 618.
220. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12.
221. Id.
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consider whether the owner was aware of any wrongdoing. In the Bennis
situation, Mrs. Bennis was completely unaware of the use to which her
husband was putting the car. The United States acknowledged that without
knowledge of any potential misuse of the property, an innocent owner is
limited in his ability to prevent that of which he is unaware. The United
States, advocate of the "all reasonable steps" standard, then failed to suggest
any steps that Mrs. Bennis could or should have taken to prevent her hus-
band's illegal activity. But the United States insists that she failed the test.
Thus, if not guilty of negligent entrustment, how could any truly innocent
owner meet the standard advocated by the United States?
Although a victim of car theft is arguably the epitome of the innocent
owner, it can reasonably be foreseen that a person's vehicle may at some
point be stolen. Thus, in order to prevent the forfeiture of a stolen vehicle
that was misused by the thief, the owner must take "all reasonable steps" to
prevent the vehicle from being stolen, the key to preventing its subsequent
misuse. Perhaps the owner left his car unlocked, placed a spare key in a
"hiding" spot on the car which the thief found, or failed to arm the car with
an alarm. Certainly locking the doors, refraining from placing a spare key on
the car, and installing a car alarm are "reasonable steps" that could or should
have been taken. Because there were "reasonable steps" that the owner
failed to take, under the "all reasonable steps" standard, the victim of car
theft fails, losing his property because it was misused by a thief. Perhaps the
government contends that it would use its "prosecutorial discretion" and not
proceed with such actions; however, the "all reasonable steps" standard does
not prohibit the government from imposing punitive forfeiture upon the
victims of car theft if it so chooses.
Furthermore, while the "all reasonable steps" standard completely
ignores a basic premise underlying the theories of forfeiture, the punishment
of negligent entrustment, both the "negligent entrustment" and "all reason-
able steps" standards disregard each of the major theories and purposes of
forfeiture: The "guilty property" theory is irrelevant to the standards, as are
the purposes of suppressing the wrong and ensuring indemnity to an injured
party. Thus, each standard would permit improper applications of forfeiture
and would fail to recognize the theories and purposes that have propelled
forfeiture into modem jurisprudence.
C. An Alternative: A Standard Comprising Both Concepts
However, were the Court to institute a standard which would encom-
pass both a "negligent entrustment" and an "all reasonable steps" faction,
both the theories and purposes of forfeiture could be recognized, and the
1997]
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property rights of truly blameless individuals could be protected against
inequitable forfeitures. Because a basic premise of forfeiture has been to
punish the negligent entrustment of property, such a standard is appropri-
ate-even necessary. This would punish those who truly were negligent,
while serving to protect those who did not entrust their property, negligently
or otherwise. Thus, those whose property had been stolen would be free
from the threat of forfeiture, and those who co-own property are not made a
"guarantor for the behavior of the person who misuses the property. 222
However, it is important to then impose upon the owner, whether or not the
property was found to have been negligently entrusted, a "reasonable steps"
standard.22 Imposing this subsequent standard would impose upon the
owner a duty to take "reasonable steps" to prevent or diminish any misuse or
potential misuse of his property, if the owner had, at any time, become
apprised of such. Thus, a truly innocent owner would be protected from the
threat of forfeiture, while an owner who either negligently entrusted his
property and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the misuse of it, or did
not negligently entrust his property but learned of a possible or actual misuse
of it and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or diminish the misuse,
would be properly punished for his failure to control his property in a
responsible manner. Such a standard would protect the property rights of
individuals against unnecessary and improper forfeiture and impose upon
property owners a duty to take precautions to ensure that their property will
not be misused.
D. Ramifications ofBennis v. Michigan
Although the institution of a standard by which to adjudge future
forfeitures would be preferable than lacking any obvious guidelines, the
Court did not comply. Thus, bearing in mind the reality, there undoubtedly
are post-Bennis III ramifications that will be experienced. As previously
addressed, there presumably will be cases in which a court finds itself bound
to order or uphold the forfeiture of property that belongs to a truly innocent
owner. There may very well be cases in which a court finds itself bound to
222. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 7.
223. The "all reasonable steps" standard has been altered slightly here, dropping the "all."
It seems that courts would be constricted with such a qualification, as it would be difficult for
any petitioner to plead and prove all reasonable steps. Thus, by omitting the qualification,
courts have greater discretion to judge whether the "reasonable steps" that were taken by a
petitioner are sufficient to prevent a forfeiture.
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order or uphold the forfeiture of property that has been stolen from a truly
innocent owner. These scenarios, however, have been intimated.
What has not been intimated is an example of a more practical ramifi-
cation that could be more expansively suffered. While the preceding
commentary considered situations most similar to the situation in Bennis,
those who most often have an interest in property belonging to another that
is apparently at great risk are financial institutions. The Bennis decision will
place money lenders in an extremely perilous predicament-for every loan
they approve, they incur the risk of losing their interest in the property upon
which they loaned money.Y4 Faced with this possibility, "financial institu-
tions will be forced to restrict credit and banking availability to many
individuals."m Thus, it will be essential for financial institutions to conduct
in-depth background checks on potential customers to detect those that are at
risk for being the subject of a forfeiture proceeding. 2 6 However, the most
extensive background check will undoubtedly be unable to detect a person's
potential to be the victim of a forfeiture due to misuse of their property by a
third person. Moreover, "no prudent lender could justify a loan against the
risk that an honest and good credit risk customer could have their property
seized because the government asserts that the property was used to facilitate
a crime by another individual."227
In denying a customer financing collateralized by property based upon a
determination that he is at greater risk for being the subject of a forfeiture,
the lender "might violate [a] duty to the customer or anti-discrimination
laws. Indeed, the lender could even be subjected to defamation claims and
lawsuits, all of which would raise the cost of borrowing money."m Thus,
while the decision will probably permit the forfeiture of property from
innocent owners, adversely affecting those faced with the inequitable
forfeiture, the most daunting effects of the decision could infiltrate aspects
of our society not yet considered, inflicting ramifications not yet fathomed.
224. See Steven L. Kessler, Forfeiture and the Innocent Owner, N.Y. L.J., November 27,
1995, at 1.
225. Ma
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
While it is difficult to deny that forfeiture, if properly applied, can be a
useful and successful tool in combating and deterring crime, it is important
that the individual rights of innocent people are not compromised in the
process. The respondent in this case asserts that the crux of the forfeiture
debate lies within the question, "[d]o an individual's property rights out-
weigh a government's ability to exist?"229 To this question the respondent
replies, "'No."' 0 While the respondent's answer to the question is seem-
ingly appropriate, the question misses the mark. The "government's ability
to exist" hardly hinges on its ability to forfeit the property of innocent
owners. More importantly and more accurately, there is absolutely no
reason that the government's ability to combat and deter crime should not
exist without infringing upon the rights of innocent individuals. While the
Court's decision in Bennis III has apparently impeded the path to such a co-
existence, perhaps legislators will take heed and initiate a few impediments
of their own-impediments to the government's seemingly unbridled power
to forfeit, that is. Conceivably the Court will detect its own error and rectify
the situation in due time. As pointed out by George Will, "[i]n 1896, in
Plessy v. Ferguson the [C]ourt held that 'separate but equal' public facilities
segregated by race were compatible with the 14th Amendment's guarantee
of equal protection of laws. Later, the [C]ourt staged a protracted retreat
from that position., 231 Does Bennis III await the same fate? As aptly stated
by Thomas Jefferson in his first inaugural speech exactly 195 years prior to
the Bennis III decision, "[1]et history answer this question.232
Brooke D. Davis
229. Brief for Respondent at 10.
230. Id.
231. George Will, It's Time to Fix Forfeiture Law, NEWSDAY, March 10, 1996, at A42.
232. President Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801, reprinted in
GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Richard Hofstadler ed., Vintage Books 1958).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent landmark decision of Jaffee v. Redmond,1 the United States
Supreme Court announced that confidential communications by a patient to a
psychotherapist are absolutely privileged. 2 Furthermore, the Court held that
confidential communications by a party to a social worker are within the
bounds of this psychotherapist-patient privilege.3 This comment examines
the Court's decision in Jaffee, focusing on the respective strengths and
weaknesses of the reasoning employed by the majority and the dissent.
Specifically, it is this author's position that the majority's decision in Jaffee
is sound, well-reasoned, and based on the realities of our current social
climate. On the other hand, Justice Scalia's dissent is ill-conceived, illogi-
cal, dogmatic, and flies in the face of common sense and reason.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
2. Id. at 1931.
3. Id.
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The Supreme Court has consistently been reluctant to create new
evidentiary privileges or to expand existing privileges. 4 The general ration-
ale the Court has used for refusing to recognize or expand privileges is that
to do so is to exclude relevant evidence from the trier of fact.5 In other
words, in a search for the truth, the public has a right to all relevant evi-
dence.6 Only when the public need for an evidentiary privilege substantially
outweighs the ordinary truth finding process will the Court deviate from this
rationale.
7
In Trammel v. United States,8 the Supreme Court demonstrated its
narrow view toward evidentiary privileges by cutting back the scope of the
spousal immunity privilege, holding that only the testifying spouse could
assert the privilege.9
The federal courts' authority to recognize new privileges is derived
from Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.'0 When the rules regarding
privileges were proposed, the drafters incorporated several common law
privileges, including a psychotherapist-patient privilege." However,
4. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980); United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,485-86 (1948).
5. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (stating that evidentiary privileges
usurp the fundamental truth finding process). See generally CHARLES TLFORD MCCORMICK,
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (5th ed. 1992) (discussing the effects of the rules of
privileges upon the judicial process).
6. Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331 (citation omitted).
7. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708-10.
8. 445 U.S. 40 (1980). Trammel was charged with conspiracy to import heroin into the
United States. Id. at 42. Trammel's wife was called to testify on behalf of the government in
order to implicate her husband. Id. at 42-43. Trammel sought to invoke the spousal
immunity privilege in an attempt to have his wife's testimony excluded. Id. at 42.
9. Id. at 53.
10. FED. R. EVID. 501. This rule provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or po-
litical subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision
thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Id.
11. See Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
240-41 (1972). The Supreme Court proposed 10 privileges including a proposed psycho-
therapist-patient privilege. Id. at 230-58.
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Congress rejected a rigid adoption of privileges, and instead, adopted a
general rule giving the federal courts discretion to create new privileges.
12
The cornerstone of the Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee was rule
501.13 In Jaffee, two important issues were presented. 4 One was whether
the Supreme Court should formally recognize the psychotherapist-patient
privilege under its powers granted by rule 501,15 and two, if such a privilege
were to be recognized, whether the privilege should extend to social workers
as well as to psychotherapists and clinical psychologists. 6 Some federal
courts had previously recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege at the
time Jaffee came before the Supreme Court for review. 17 However, there
was still considerable disagreement among the circuits as to whether the
privilege should be recognized at all.18  Moreover, prior to Jaffee, even
where the psychotherapist-patient privilege did exist, various federal courts
held conflicting views regarding the scope of the privilege.'9 Therefore,
when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jaffee,20 the issue of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege in the federal courts cried out for resolu-
tion.
The issues presented in Jaffee are important ones to our society, given
that many people in our population need therapy in some context or another,
at some point in their lives. Complete and candid disclosure is at the heart of
the relationship between patient and psychotherapist. 21  The Supreme
Court's decision in Jaffee will have a significant impact on this relationship,
for it will foster open communication between patient and therapist.
12. See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, ch. 157, 88 Stat. 1926 (adopting the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, but excluding proposed rule 504 containing 10 specific common law privileges, among
which was the psychotherapist-patient privilege).
13. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927; see also FED. R. EvID. 501.
14. Id. at 1925.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632,
639 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is recognized by the
federal courts).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 1994); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to recognize a psychotherapist-
patient privilege). See generally Bruce J. Winick, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence View, 50 U. MiAmi L. REV. 249 (1996) (discussing the general
disagreement in the federal system regarding the privilege).
19. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1939.
20. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 334
(1995).
21. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928.
1997]
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Without access to all of the "pieces to the puzzle," mental health profession-
als are impeded in their quest first to understand and then to help the
patient.22 The logical end result of the Court's failure to recognize the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, or to give it any significant breadth, can
only be that the full and honest disclosure, so vital to a successful course of
therapy, would be chilled.23 Thus, the Jaffee decision is extremely signifi-
cant because it will affect patients who see mental health professionals of all
kinds, despite whether or not these patients go on to become litigants. It will
bear upon the course of therapy indicated and provided by those profession-
als and it will surely influence the way lawyers try cases, as well as the
nature and extent of evidence that juries get to see. Indeed, the Jaffee
decision will affect the very outcome of some cases.
II. THE HISTORY OF JAFFEE V. REDMOND
A. Facts of the Case
On June 27, 1991, Officer Mary Lu Redmond was dispatched to a
"'fight in progress"' taking place at an apartment complex in her jurisdic-
tion.24 Upon arrival, Officer Redmond was greeted at her squad car by two
frantic individuals shouting that there had been a stabbing.2 After calling
for backup, Officer Redmond exited her squad car and proceeded to walk
toward the apartment complex.26 As Redmond approached the structure,
several men ran from the building, one of whom was waving a metal pipe. 7
Officer Redmond ordered the men to the ground, and upon their refusal drew
her weapon. 28 A moment later, two additional men burst from the building
29
Although the facts are in dispute,30 according to Officer Redmond, one of
22. Id. See also Brief for American Psychiatric Association at *12-17, Jaffee v. Red-
mond, No. 95-266, 1995 WL 767892 (U.S. Dec. 29, 1995) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
23. Id. at *14.
24. Brief for Petitioner at *3, Jaffee v. Redmond, No. 95-266, 1995 WL 723662 (U.S.
Nov. 30, 1995).
25. Id. at *4. The two individuals turned out to be relatives of the decedent Ricky Allen
and would later testify against Officer Redmond at trial. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Brief for Petitioner at *4.
29. Id.
30. The siblings of the Ricky Allen related a story that conflicted with Officer Redmond's
version of the events. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1349. For example, there was conflicting testimony
regarding what point in time Officer Redmond drew her weapon. Id.
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those men, Picky Allen, was brandishing a butcher knife while in pursuit of
another man.31 Despite Officer Redmond's repeated commands for Allen to
drop the weapon and get to the ground, he continued in pursuit.32 Finally,
when Officer Redmond believed Allen was about to stab the man he was
chasing, Redmond fired her service revolver, striking Allen. 33 Allen was
pronounced dead at the scene by emergency personnel.34
Picky Allen's surviving family members sued Officer Redmond and her
employer, the Village of Hoffman Estates, in federal court for civil rights
violations and wrongful death.35 During discovery, the plaintiffs learned that
Officer Redmond had attended numerous counseling sessions with a clinical
social worker named Karen Beyer.36 The plaintiffs attempted to discover the
content of the counseling sessions between Redmond and Beyer to use as
substantive evidence during the trial.37 The defendants objected to discovery
of the sessions between Redmond and Beyer, asserting that the communica-
tions were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege.38  The trial
court rejected the defendants' argument that the conversations were privi-
leged and ordered discovery of Beyer's notes of the conversations.39
The trial court's order was never fully complied with by Officer
Redmond or Karen Beyer.4° During depositions and at trial, Redmond and
Beyer either refused to answer certain questions or were entirely evasive. 41
Ultimately, over the defendants' objection, the trial judge instructed the
jury that the refusal to reveal the notes was not legally justified and that the
jury could presume that the subject matter of the conversations would have
been unfavorable to Officer Redmond and her employer, the Village of
31. Brief for Petitioner at *4.
32. Id
33. IM
34. Id at *5.
35. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1348. Ricky Allen's survivors sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and the State of Illinois' wrongful death statute. Id.
36. Brief for Petitioner at *5.
37. Id. at *5-6.
38. Id. at *6.
39. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1350-51. The district court judge determined that federal law
rather than state law governed the privilege issue. Id. In doing so, the judge relied on
proposed rule of evidence 504 and held that the rule did not extend to social workers. Id. at
1350 n.5.
40. Id. at 1351. See also Brief for Petitioner at *8.
41. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1351. Karen Beyer refused to hand over her notes of the counseling
sessions and provided limited answers regarding Officer Redmond's version of the shooting.
Id. Additionally, Officer Redmond, both at her deposition and during trial, responded "'I
don't recall"' numerous times. Id.
1997]
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Hoffman Estates. 42 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and judg-
ment was entered in favor of Allen's estate.43
B. Procedural History
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the trial court committed prejudicial error by compelling discovery of the
notes and giving the adverse jury instruction.44 Specifically, the court held
that the conversations between Redmond and Beyer were protected by the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, and therefore, were inadmissible.45
The court of appeals reasoned that the law of privileges could be
expanded by the federal courts in accordance with the Federal Rules of
Evidence.46 Furthermore, the rules call for recognition of a psychotherapist-
patient privilege.47 The court stated that the privilege is not absolute but
rather is a qualified privilege. In each case, the need for the privilege must
be balanced against the need to ascertain the truth through the introduction
of all relevant evidence at trial.
48
In the instant case, the need for private communications between a
psychotherapist and her patient outweighed the plaintiffs need for the
evidence. 49 Hence, the court concluded that the jury instruction, which
allowed the jury to draw an adverse inference against Officer Redmond and
the Village of Hoffman Estates, constituted prejudicial error.5°
C. Analysis of the Seventh Circuit Decision
The majority used rule 501 as the foundation for its decision.5 1 First,
the court stated that reason dictates the recognition of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege in the federal courts. 52 The court's rationale here was that
public policy mandates the existence of the privilege.53 Mental health is of
42. Id. at 1351 n.9.
43. Id. at 1352.
44. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1358.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1354 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)). See also supra
note 10.
47. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1355-56.
48. Id. at 1357.
49. Iet at 1357-58.
50. Id. at 1358.
51. Id. at 1357.
52. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1356-57.
53. Id
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great importance in our society and essential to mental health is open and
candid communication between a psychotherapist and her patient.54 Second,
experience dictates that the privilege should be recognized, since some form
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is recognized in all fifty states.5
However, as noted, the Seventh Circuit did not rule that the privilege
was absolute. 6 Rather, the court held that the privilege is qualified and must
be balanced against the need to find the truth during the judicial process.
In balancing these two competing interests, the court reasoned that without
the privilege, communications between a psychotherapist and her patient
would be chilled. 8 Most significantly, the court observed that the need for
open communications is essential for effective psychotherapy.5 9
On the other hand, the court noted that although the conversations
between Officer Redmond and Karen Beyer were relevant to the substantive
issues of the plaintiffs' case, the plaintiffs had alternative evidence which
was just as effective. 60
54. Id. at 1355-57.
55. Id. at 1356. See also ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (1975); ALASKA R. EVID. 504; ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2085 (1992); ARK. R. EVID. 503; CAL EVID. CODE ANN. § 1010
(1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(g)(1) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146c (1995);
DEL UNIF. R. EVID. 503; D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 90.503 (West
1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21 (1995); HAW. R. EVID. 504; IDAHO R. EVID. 503; ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 225 § 15.5 (1994); IND. CODE § 25-33-1-17 (1993); IOWA CODE § 622.10
(1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5323 (1985); KY. R. EVID. 507; LA. CODE EVID. ANN., art.
510 (West 1995); ME. R. EVID. 503; MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-109 (1995); MASS. GEN.
L. § 233:20B (1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.18237 (West 1996); MINN. STAT.
ANN § 595.02 (West 1996); MISS. R. EVID. 503; MO. REV. STAT. § 491.060 (1994); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 26-1-807 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 49.209 (Michie 1996); N.H. R. EVID. 503; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14B-28 (West 1995);
N.M. R. EVID. 504; N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 4507 (MeKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
8-53.3 (1995); N.D. R. EVID. 503; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (1995); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 12 § 2503 (1991); OR. R. EVID. 504.1; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5944 (1982); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 5-37.3-3 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95 (Law. Co-op. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 19-13-6 to 19-13-11 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-207 (1980); TEX. R.
CIV. EViD. 509, 510; UTAH R. EVlD. 506; VT. R. EVID. 503; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400.2
(1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 18.83.110 (1994); W. VA. CODE § 27-3-1 (1992); WIS. STAT.
§ 905.04 (1994); WYO. STAT. § 33-27-123 (1995).
56. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1357.
57. Id. at 1357-58.
58. Il
59. Id.
60. Id. There were several eyewitnesses who testified on behalf of the plaintiff. Jaffee,
51 F.3d at 1357-58. The testimony of these eyewitness accounts could possibly be used to
test Officer Redmond's credibility just as effectively as Beyer's notes from the counseling
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Accordingly, the court concluded that the need for the subject matter of
the conversations as evidence was outweighed by the public's need for the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.6'
Il. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. Plaintiffs' Argument Before the Supreme Court
The plaintiffs argued that, in light of the Court's cautious approach to
the creation of new privileges, the costs of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege outweighed any benefits that might be received by recognizing the
privilege.
62
First, the plaintiffs contended that the cost of a psychotherapist-patient
privilege would be substantial.63 The plaintiffs argued that since therapists,
unlike lawyers, are not officers of the court, they have no real legitimate
interest in the search for the truth. 64 Accordingly, there is a real danger that
a therapist may help to generate inconsistent recollections of a particular
incident through therapy.65 Moreover, the plaintiffs contended that to allow
such a broad privilege as was adopted by the appellate court would keep
highly relevant evidence from the jury.66  This case turned on Officer
Redmond's credibility, the plaintiffs argued, and to allow the privilege
would significantly hinder the plaintiffs' attempt to impeach her credibil-
ity.
67
Second, according to the plaintiffs, the benefits of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege are unclear and speculative at best.68  The plaintiffs in
Jaffee contended that there is no real science to prove that the absence of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege would chill effective psychotherapy, as was
urged by the appellate court and the defendants.
69
Third, the plaintiffs further argued that there is no indication that the
experience of the common law calls for an adoption of the psychotherapist-
sessions. Id. at 1358. Moreover, Officer Redmond herself testified at trial and was available
for cross examination. Id.
61. Id.
62. Brief for Petitioner at * 12.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *21-22.
67. Brief for Petitioner at *21. The plaintiffs alleged that Officer Redmond's memory of
the events surrounding the incident became clearer and more self-serving as time passed. Id.
68. Id. at *26.
69. Id. at *26-27.
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patient privilege in the federal courts. 70 They observed that although all fifty
states have adopted some form of the privilege,71 no state has adopted a
privilege as broad as that urged by the appellate court.7 2
Fourth, the plaintiffs pointed out that state laws which recognize a
privilege between a psychotherapist and her patient are inconsistent as to the
scope of the privilege.73 This is evidenced by the fact that the state laws are
littered with exceptions.74 Furthermore, the plaintiffs pointed out that nine
states do not recognize any evidentiary privilege between a social worker
and her patient.75
Finally, the plaintiffs contended that if the Court were to recognize an
evidentiary privilege between a psychotherapist and patient, the Court
should not expand that privilege of confidentiality to social workers.76 Here,
the plaintiffs relied on the psychotherapist-patient privilege proposed by the
Federal Rules of Evidence.77  Proposed rule 504 speaks only of a
"psychotherapist" and makes no mention of the term "social worker.
'78
Hence, plaintiffs argued, Congress did not intend that the privilege extend to
social workers as well as psychotherapists.79
B. Defendants' Argument Before the Supreme Court
The defendants argued that not only should there be a psychotherapist-
patient privilege but that the privilege should extend to social workers as
well.80 The defendants asserted that the decision by the Seventh Circuit was
harmonious with rule 501, as well as with the congressional intent behind
the rule.81 The defendants further contended that under rule 501 both reason
and experience dictate the creation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 2
70. Id. at *31.
71. See statutes cited supra note 55.
72. Brief for Petitioner at *31.
73. Id. at *37.
74. Id. at *31-33.
75. Id. at *35 n.66.
76. Id. at *39.
77. Brief for Petitioner at *39-40. See also Rules of Evidence for United States Courts
and Magistrates, supra note 11, at 240-41 (proposing rule 504 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence).
78. Brief for Petitioner at *39.
79. Id.
80. Brief for Respondent at *11, Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-
266).
81. Id. at *9.
82. Id. at *9-10.
1997]
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As for reason, the defendants relied heavily on the public policy underlying
the privilege. Like the court of appeals, the defendants pointed out that
psychotherapy serves a very important interest in our society. The premise
here is that society encourages its citizens to seek mental health assistance
freely and openly.84 Essential to these sessions is the confidentiality be-
tween the patient and therapist.85 Without confidentiality, citizens would be
reluctant to candidly disclose crucial information needed to assure effective
counseling.86 This is especially true with regard to police officers.87 Police
officers such as Mary Lu Redmond are subjected to stressful situations in the
line of duty on a daily basis.88 Many times, officers will need to seek
counseling in regard to specific incidents that occur while on duty, as did
Officer Redmond in this case.89 Critical to an officer's mental health is the
need for that officer to reveal the facts surrounding the incident without fear
that his or her communications will be disclosed to third parties.90 There-
fore, argued the defendants, in order for there to be effective therapy for a
police officer or an ordinary citizen, the courts must assure the patient
confidentiality at all cost.91
The defendants also contended that experience requires the Court to
adopt the psychotherapist-patient privilege,92 noting that all fifty states have
adopted some form of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.93 The defen-
dants responded to the plaintiffs by pointing out that although some states do
have exceptions to the privilege, it is not logical to reject entirely the
psychotherapist-patient privilege for this reason.94
Moreover, the defendants urged that the privilege should apply to
clinical social workers, such as Karen Beyer, as well as to psychothera-
83. Id. See generally Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical
Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 175, 184-85 (1960).
84. Brief for Respondent at *22.
85. Id. at *22-23.
86. Id. at *23. See generally Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege
Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV.
893 (1982) (discussing the importance of confidentiality for effective treatment of mental
health).
87. Brief for Respondent at *20.
88. Id.
89. Id. at * 19-20.
90. Ide at *20.
91. Id. at *22.
92. Brief for Respondent at *28-29.
93. See statutes cited supra note 55.
94. Brief for Respondent at *30.
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pists.95 In rebuttal to the plaintiffs' argument in regard to proposed rule 504,
the defendants pointed out that at the time Congress drafted rule 504, the
social work profession was in "early adolescence." 96 However, since that
time, the social worker has become prevalent in the field of mental health.97
This is especially true since many people who cannot afford a psychologist
or psychiatrist will often seek out the help of a social worker at a lesser
expense.98 In light of the social worker's increased role in the field of
mental health, it would be unfair to allow the privilege for psychotherapists
and not social workers.99
Finally, agreeing with the court of appeals, the defendants conceded
that the privilege was not absolute.' In every case, in order for the privi-
lege to apply, the need for confidential communications between a psycho-
therapist and patient must be outweighed by the desire to include all relevant
evidence at trial.101 In this case, the appellate court concluded, the plaintiffs
had alternative evidence which would have served the same purpose as the
notes of Karen Beyer.Ic 2 Specifically, numerous eyewitness accounts of the
shooting were used to impeach Officer Redmond's testimony.103 Con-
versely, as indicated, Officer Redmond's need to have her conversations
protected are essential to her work as a police officer.1 4 Hence, the defen-
dants concluded that the Court should affirm the decision of the appellate
court. 10 5
C. The Majority Opinion
As it had been for the appellate court, the framework for the Supreme
Court's decision in Jaffee was the Federal Rules of Evidence.1 6 The Court
reasoned that rule 501 was not intended to freeze the law of privileges but
95. Id
96. Id. at *30-31.
97. Id. at *31.
98. Id.
99. Brief for Respondent at *32.
100. Id at *12.
101. Id
102. Id. at *35-37.
103. Id. at *37.
104. Brief for Respondent at *35-36.
105. Id.
106. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1925.
1997]
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rather to encourage the federal courts to continue to develop evidentiary
privileges in light of reason and experience. 10 7
First, the majority conceded that past decisions indicated there should
be a strong presumption against creating new evidentiary privileges. 08
However, the Court noted that new privileges can be justified by "'public
good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all
rational means for ascertaining the truth." ' 10 9
Like the appellate court, the majority relied heavily on public policy. 0
The Court stated that like other privileges that have been adopted at common
law, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is "'rooted in the imperative need
for confidence and trust."'"1" The majority concurred with the defendants'
proposition that like the attorney-client privilege, effective therapy depends
on open and candid communications.1
2
The Supreme Court also adopted the defendants' view, and that of the
court of appeals, that experience mandates the creation of the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege." 3 The fact that the states have unanimously agreed
that some form of the privilege should exist strongly suggests that experi-
ence with the privilege has been positive."
14
The majority also ruled the privilege should apply to clinical social
workers as well as psychotherapists." 5 Again, the rationale for extending
the parameters of the privilege was that the privilege would not serve its
purpose to society if not extended to social workers."
6
Up until this point, the majority was in agreement with the court of
appeals ruling; however, the majority did not agree with the appellate court's
finding that the privilege should be a qualified one." 7 The Court expressed
that the privilege would be undermined if judges were to subject the privi-
lege to a balancing test in each and every case as the appellate court had
suggested. 1 8 In order for the privilege to be effective, the parties to the
107. Id. at 1927.
108. Id. at 1928.
109. Id. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960)).
110. Id. at 1929.
111. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1930.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1931.
116. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct at 1931.
117. Id. at 1932.
118. Id.
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conversation "'must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected."' 1 19 The Court concluded, however,
that there was no need to develop the full scope of the privilege nor would it
be feasible to do so here and left that for future courts to decide. 20
D. The Dissenting Opinion
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Scalia accused the majority of having
incorrectly framed the main issue.121 Most of the majority opinion was
devoted to the question of whether the federal courts should, generally
speaking, recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege. 22 Justice Scalia
contended that the only proper question before the Court was whether there
should be a social worker-patient privilege.123 Further, Justice Scalia argued
that to frame the issue as the majority had was deceptive and countermanded
the Court's earlier decisions requiring it to proceed with caution when
developing new evidentiary privileges. 124
The dissent contended that there is no real evidence to support the
assertion that refusing to recognize the privilege would hinder effective
psychotherapy, as the majority suggested.'2 Justice Scalia thought it
unlikely that an individual will be deterred from seeking counseling merely
because he fears his conversations will be disclosed during litigation. 126
Even if the privilege were to exist, the effect it would have on encouraging
open communications is at best speculative, urged Justice Scalia. 27 While
Justice Scalia, with the majority, agreed that psychotherapy is indeed an
essential part of our society, he contended that relevant evidence, in order to
ascertain the truth at trial, outweighs that need.
28
In addition, Justice Scalia asserted that the disagreement among the
states as to the nature and scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
indicates that this is a job for Congress rather than the courts. 29 He pointed
to the fact that several states have expressed many exceptions to the privi-
119. Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
120. Id.
121. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1933 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. laL
124. Id. at 1933-34.
125. Id. at 1934.
126. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1934.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1935-36.
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lege and that at least ten states have refused to recognize an evidentiary
privilege at all for a social worker.130 To the dissent, this lack of uniformity
suggests that experience with the privilege varies widely among the states.'
31
Justice Scalia pointed out that no state has adopted the psychotherapist-
patient privilege without restriction as the majority did here.132 Therefore,
according to Justice Scalia's dissent, the majority's reliance on the experi-
ence of state legislatures in adopting the privilege was inadequate.
33
Justice Scalia conceded that, theoretically, perhaps there should be a
privilege for social workers and their patients. 134 However, considering the
federal courts' authority under rule 501, and the presumption against
privileges in general, any need for an evidentiary privilege is outweighed by
the need for accurate truth finding at trial.1 35 There were fourteen amicus
briefs submitted on behalf of the defendants in this case.136 Most of those
briefs came from mental health organizations in support of confidential
communications between a mental health worker and her patient.' On the
other hand, there was not a single amicus in favor of the plaintiffs. 38
According to Justice Scalia, perhaps this is because "[t]here is no self-
interested organization out there devoted to pursuit of the truth in the federal
courts."' 
3 9
In closing, Justice Scalia expressed disenchantment with what he
believed was the Court's failure to live up to the expectation that it will
pursue truth, and as a result, Justice Scalia believes, federal courts will
become "tools of injustice.' '14°
E. Analysis of Jaffee v. Redmond
One would be hard pressed to find fault with the majority's view that
full, open, and honest disclosure by patients to mental health professionals is
crucial to effective therapy and recovery. 141 Unlike doctors, psychiatrists,
130. Id. at 1940.
131. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1936.
132. Id at 1940.
133. Id.
134. Il
135. Id.
136. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1940.
137. Id.
138. kIL
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1941.
141. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929.
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psychologists, and social workers do not rely heavily upon physiological
indicia to analyze a patient's problem or to determine an appropriate course
of therapy. While biological factors sometimes play a part in certain mental
illnesses like schizophrenia or depression, a tongue depressor in the mouth, a
stethoscope to the heart or a computerized axial tomography are not methods
of exploration primarily employed by mental health professionals. Rather, it
is largely talk-what the patient says-that provides the mental health
professional with the key that unlocks the door to the patient's particular
problems. When, out of fear of reprisal, the subject is highly motivated to
suppress information that would otherwise help to give a clear and accurate
picture to the therapist, the therapist is vastly impeded from providing
effective therapy. 142 According to a report of the Group for the Advance-
ment of Psychiatry, "'confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful
psychiatric treatment."' 43 It would be like a tailor trying to make a suit for
somebody without knowing all of the subject's measurements. Counseling
that is given in the wake of concealment of the facts or the provision of half
truths by the subject renders that counseling a product of ignorance. It is
axiomatic that a mentally sound populace is an absolute prerequisite to a
stable and productive society. 44 Therefore, given the plethora of mental
health problems, ranging from the serious to the extremely acute, that have
plagued Americans in recent times, 45 rules of law that profoundly impair
effective mental health treatment must be questioned and carefully scruti-
nized.
We probably will never know what Officer Redmond told her social
worker in the aftermath of a terrible tragedy wherein Officer Redmond was
the direct instrument of another human being's demise. We do know,
however, that most people in Officer Redmond's shoes who harbored even
the slightest degree of uncertainty as to whether some act or omission could
result in significant penal or pecuniary repercussions to them, would remain
silent as to those particulars. It may be that the act or omission in question
was completely justifiable from an objective standpoint, yet as the Jaffee
majority wisely noted, the fear of uncertainty that what patients say will
142. Id. See also Amicus Brief, Jaffee v. Redmond, No. 95-266, 1995 WL 767892 (U.S.
Dec. 29, 1995).
143. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928 (citations omitted).
144. See generally Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996); Jaffee v. Redmond, 51
F.3d 1346 (1995); Amicus Brief, Jaffee, (No. 95-266).
145. See GROUP FOR ADVANCEMENT OF PsYCHIATRY, REPORT 45, CONFIDENTIALITY AND
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 92 (1960).
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come back to haunt them will cause them to remain mute or distort the
facts. 146 Therapy sessions would then often be relegated to exercises in
futility with the therapist flying blind and the subject deriving little or no
benefit since the root of the problem never comes to light. 47
Zeroing in on the situation of police officers in particular, the Jaffee
majority's line of reasoning is persuasive. Implicit in this reasoning is a
premise that few would challenge. That is, society needs to have its police
officers in a good state of mental health.1 48 In order to maintain this state of
mental health among these protectors of society, one must encourage them to
divulge each and every aspect of the particular stressful situation which led
to the need for counseling in the first place.' 49 Thus, one must not adhere to
rules of jurisprudence which will have a chilling effect upon complete
disclosure. From this point of departure, there is certainly no great leap in
logic involved in applying this reasoning to our citizenry as a whole. For
who would dispute that society is nothing more than a collective of individu-
als and that the mental health of these individuals determines, in turn, the
degree of stability of that society? The majority's logic in Jaffe is unassail-
able if one accepts the premise that complete candor to the therapist is
necessary to effective therapy.
However, there is at least one very vocal opponent to that premise,
namely Justice Scalia, whose dissent will be discussed.150 The central thesis
of Justice Scalia's dissent is weak on its face. His contention is that regard-
less of any benefit that may inure to society through recognition of a psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege, the "purchase price" of that benefit is too
high.' 5' What is this metaphorical "purchase price" to which Justice Scalia
refers? According to him, it is that of "occasional injustice.' 52 Not rampant
injustice, or even frequent injustice, but rather "occasional injustice." What
Justice Scalia must be referring to are those instances where the only proof
that one engaged in culpable conduct is his or her admission to a therapist
and where there is no separate and independent evidence of culpability. The
flaw in the dissent's approach, however, is that if no privilege is recognized,
the whole truth will not be disclosed to therapists during counseling.
146. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928.
147. Id. (citations omitted).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1929.
150. Id. at 1932 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932.
152. d
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Therefore, justice will not be served anyway because therapists cannot
testify about that which they do not know. And certainly, if, in a given case,
there were to exist some independent evidence, the mere fact that a defen-
dant had made incriminating admissions to a therapist would not shield that
defendant from the inculpatory effect of such independent evidence. Thus,
with or without the privilege, in the vast majority of cases, the state or
plaintiff will have to prove the case without resort to the testimony of the
defendant's therapist. Moreover, "occasional injustice" is not an unduly
high price to pay for the benefit of maintaining solid mental health among
members of society. Only if one accepts the notion that professional therapy
is not an effective means of dealing with mental health problems can he buy
Justice Scalia's apparent assertion that the cost of recognizing a privilege
here is too high. In fact, it is Justice Scalia's position that a talk with "mon"
has more therapeutic value than professional counseling.153 No wonder that
to him instances of injustice for the few cannot be tolerated for the sake of
facilitating professional treatment for the many. Scalia contends that the
"average citizen," if questioned, would say that his mental health would be
more impaired if he were prevented from getting advice from his mother
than by being prevented from talking to a psychotherapist.1 54 The response
to this is, so what? Justice Scalia's assertion completely begs the question.
It is akin to saying: X is more valuable than Y; therefore, Y has little or no
value. Furthermore, people do not have to choose between their mother and
a therapist. Indeed, there may be a significant portion of the population
which would admit that, notwithstanding filial love and devotion, they were
actually driven into therapy by too much unsolicited advice from their
mothers!
Justice Scalia goes on to compare the psychotherapist-patient privilege
to the situation where evidence is excluded because a criminal defendant has
not been properly "Mirandized."' 155 In the latter situation that pontificates
Justice Scalia, "the victim of the injustice is always the impersonal State
[sic] or the "faceless 'public at large. ' 156 However, this is far from true.
Certainly, it is an extremely bitter pill for the family and friends of the victim
of a cold-blooded homicide to see the perpetrator "walk," simply because the
153. Id. at 1934.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1932. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. IsRAET, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 3.1 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the effects of the exclusionary rule in criminal
cases).
156. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932.
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police made a procedural mistake. The loved ones of the decedent must go
on each day haunted by the legacy of the private injustice which they have
suffered. These loved ones are far more the victims of this injustice than an
abstract "impersonal State" [sic] or "faceless public at large."' 57 These
victims have faces and they certainly have feelings. This is not to suggest
that Scalia is any great patron of the exclusionary rule and, true to his ultra-
conservative judicial philosophy, both the psychotherapist-patient privilege
and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination' 58 would be
unceremoniously dragged out to the chopping block if he had his druthers.
In the end, the price of perfect justice, as it would be in Justice Scalia's
grand design, could ultimately be nothing short of complete eradication of
constitutional protections for all defendants. The "purchase price" (to use
Justice Scalia's term) of this would be monumentally higher than the price of
"occasional injustice" about which he struts and frets. 59
Another main contention by the dissent is that even assuming that the
federal courts should somehow recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege,
communications to "social workers" should not be embraced within that
privilege. 60 Why does Justice Scalia feel that way? His answer is that
through the annals of history, we have "worked out [our] difficulties by
talking to, inter alios, parents, siblings, best friends and bartenders-none of
whom was awarded a privilege against testifying in court. '' 61 First of all, a
privilege is not an "award," it is a rule of evidence based on reason and
social policy reflecting the complex realities of contemporary society,'62 not
of some antiquated agrarian society. Second, even if a privilege were an
award, it is not the recipient of the information that is awarded the privilege;
rather, it is the communicator of the information who enjoys the benefit, and
by proxy, all members of society, who could someday find themselves
needing counseling just as Officer Redmond did in this case. Third, unlike
licensed social workers, bartenders, parents, and siblings are not profession-
als trained to deal with mental problems which are often complicated, acute
and deeply rooted. When one is thirsty and wants to relax, one does not go
to a social worker to mix a drink, just as they would not seek out a bartender
157. Id.
158. U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("No person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself .... ).
159. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932.
160. Id. at 1936.
161. Id. at 1934.
162. See generally McCORMICK, supra note 5, § 72 (discussing the purpose of eviden-
tiary privileges).
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to get their head on straight following some traumatic experience. Indeed, if
one chose the mixologist as their psychological mentor in lieu of a trained,
experienced professional, then one's judgment would be open to serious
question. And regarding one's mother, one doubts that a bowl of chicken
soup and a loving hug would provide more than a temporary fix to a prob-
lem.
Justice Scalia further contends that to broaden the psychotherapist-
patient privilege to include a social worker is like broadening the lawyer-
client privilege to include a "legal advisor." 163 While it is not clear what the
Justice means when he uses the term "legal advisor," he is implicitly
drawing an analogy-to wit, social workers are to psychotherapists as legal
advisors are to lawyers. This analogy cannot withstand even minimal,
logical scrutiny. Social workers are trained, tested, and then authorized by
the state through licensure to provide mental health therapy to people.
TM
Conversely, there is no such thing as a "legal advisor," other than an attor-
ney, in the eyes of the state. Only lawyers can give legal advice, and states
have statutes making it a crime for anyone other than a lawyer to dispense
legal advice. 65 Social workers are in the trenches. They often work with
children and the disadvantaged, those who cannot afford a high priced
"shrink" who takes notes and nods empathetically as the patient on the couch
spills his or her guts.' 66 Unlike Justice Scalia, one should not believe it is in
the spirit of rule 501, to exclude social workers from the ambit of a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege merely because the drafters of the rules specifi-
cally included psychologists and psychiatrists. 67 There is nothing in the
committee's recommendations excluding social workers. 68  Splitting
linguistic hairs serves no one. In substance, social workers are positive
forces in fostering the mental health of our people, arguably as much, or
even more so than psychiatrists and psychologists do. 169 Moreover, the
163. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1933.
164. Id. at 1931 n.16. See also AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF STATE SOCIAL WORK BOARDS,
SOCIAL WORK LAWS AND BOARD REGULATIONS: A COMPARISON STUDY 29 (1996).
165. See John F. Sutton Jr., Symposium, Unauthorized Practice of Law By Lawyers: A
Post-Seminar Reflection on "Ethics and the Multijurisdictional Practice of Law," 36 S. TEX.
L. REV. 1027, 1028 (1995) (stating that all 50 states regulate the practice of law in some
form).
166. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931.
167. Id. at 1932.
168. FED. R. EVID. 501. See Senate and House committees' notes following the rule, in
which there is no express language indicating a desire to exclude social workers from any
future adoption of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id.
169. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931.
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Supreme Court was given the elasticity by Congress to recognize those
privileges which "experience" and "reason" show should be recognized.
170
The scientific evidence shows that in the last few decades the need for and
usefulness of social workers has increased dramatically, way beyond what it
was in 1972 when the committee drafted the proposals and recommenda-
tions.17 1 Therefore, in accordance with reason and experience, confidential
communications to social workers should not be excluded from the protec-
tion of the privilege. Instead, given the deluge of mental health services
provided by these, for the most part, dedicated professionals, experience has
taught us that there is every reason to extend the privilege to include them.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of Jaffee, there exists in the federal courts an eviden-
tiary privilege between a psychotherapist and her patient.172 More expan-
sively, Jaffee also means that the psychotherapist-patient privilege will
extend to social workers as well. 173 The privilege is not a qualified privilege
but an absolute privilege protecting all confidential communications between
a therapist and patient.1
74
What does this mean to the future of evidentiary privileges in the
federal court system? The Supreme Court made it clear that the contours of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege were to be developed by future courts
applying Jaffee to specific situations. 175 This statement paves the way for
future courts to chip away at the holding in Jaffee by creating exceptions and
limiting its scope. Conversely, it opens the door to even further broadening
of the privilege.
However, Justice Scalia seems to think that a "search for the truth"'176 is
such that everything must be uncovered and laid bare regardless of the cost
to privacy or mental health. This type of absolutist thinking is dangerous.
Where will this "search for the truth" end? If we speak of truth without
counterbalancing important societal interests like mental health, we can
170. See FED. R. EvID. 501, supra note 10; Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932; see also Wolfle v.
United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934). The language incorporated in rule 501 was actually
borrowed from the majority opinion in Wolfle. See Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 12.
171. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931 n.16.
172. Id. at 1932.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1940 (citations omitted).
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begin to justify more systematic incursions by our government. Ultimately,
our rationale of "search for the truth" could become irrational and irrecon-
cilable with democracy and reason. The direct result of this could be that at-
will, warrantless searches of citizens' houses and persons would become the
order of the day. The majority's view, vis-h-vis the dissent's here, is
somewhat of a line drawing game. It boils down to values, which are of
course, subjective. There may not be a "right" answer to the question of
whether a psychotherapist-patient privilege is a benefit worth the cost of
Scalia's "occasional injustice." Many different values have been repre-
sented by many different judicial compositions of the various Supreme
Courts throughout our history. However, Justice Scalia (along with Justice
Rehnquist who joined Justice Scalia's dissent in, part) is distinctly in the
minority among his colleagues, who have wisely allowed experience and
reason to prevail in Jaffee.
Jason L. Gunter
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L INTRODUCTION
In recent history, courts have been repeatedly confronted with issues
involving indecency in literature, on the telephone, over the radio, and on
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television. As purveyors of indecent messages, both visual and audio,
become more adept at communicating their messages to an increasing
number of people, much concern has been expressed over those who
inadvertently receive communications of sexually explicit adult material.
Although the target audience of pornography peddlers, and of those entre-
preneurs whose products are of a more benign nature, may be mature adults,
there is little question that this target is not always accurately hit.
Children are receiving products and messages from which they should
be protected until such time as they are mature and old enough to legally and
morally decide what they want to see, hear, and do. The majority of dis-
tributors of indecent materials are undoubtedly lawful and moral business-
men and entrepreneurs, striving to make a profit by making accessibility to
their products by an adult audience as easy as possible. Amidst this frantic
race for profits, however, sexually explicit materials and messages are often
carelessly distributed by mail, broadcast over airwaves, and transmitted over
telephone wires. The individuals who create these messages are either
ignorant of this budding problem or disinclined to adjust their marketing
practices for fear of economic repercussions. Regardless, the inadvertent
exposure of sexually explicit materials to minors has become a problem of
epidemic proportion, forcing the issue to be confronted by the United States
Supreme Court on more than one occasion.
Few of the Supreme Court decisions regarding indecency offer clear
standards by which to resolve comparable issues. Those cases which are
decided are often done so in terms exclusive to that medium, be it telephone,
radio, or television. This practice of narrowness in Supreme Court decisions
involving First Amendment protection indicates an unwillingness on the part
of the Court to enforce restrictions on specified types of speech in all media.
This reluctance further indicates an inclination by the Court to preserve the
constitutionally protected right to free speech held invaluable by each citizen
of the United States. The downside of this practice is that each subsequent
court that is faced with a First Amendment issue is forced to determine
which bits and pieces of previous decisions are applicable to the situation at
hand and to piece those bits into a coherent decision. Recent decisions,
therefore, often involve incongruous combinations of established doctrine
and modern technology. As a result, the resolution of disputes in this area of
the law are often unpredictable.
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One of the most recent Supreme Court decisions regarding indecency is
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC.' In
this case, a statute authorizing cable operators to prohibit indecent speech
was, challenged by a group of cable programmers and viewers. Part II of this
article will examine recent Supreme Court cases which have confronted
obscenity and indecency, since many of the issues discussed in these cases
reemerge in the context of cable television in Denver. These cases have
defined the terms and established the levels of First Amendment protection
afforded indecent and obscene messages. It is from this foundation that the
United States Supreme Court will derive its principles to analyze the Denver
case. Part III will explain the substance and effect of sections 10(a), 10(b),
and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi-
tion Act of 1992, the Act challenged in Denver. Part IV will follow the case
history of Denver prior to the Supreme Court granting a writ of certiorari.
Part V will examine the decision of the Court, paying careful attention to the
plurality opinion written by Justice Breyer and examining separate opinions
written by Justice. O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas, each of
whom differ in their views regarding how this case should have been
decided. Finally, Part VI will argue that, although the plurality attempted to
strike a balance between the protection of children and the exercise of free
speech, it overlooked the most effective and inexpensive means of protecting
children from exposure to indecent cable television programming and may
have inadvertently set the stage for future First Amendment legal battles.
I. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
A. The Threshold of Obscenity: Miller v. California
Before determining the standard by which to regulate indecent materi-
als, the United States Supreme Court was faced with the task of evaluating
the regulation of obscene materials. The threshold determination in deciding
how to prevent inadvertent exposure to obscene materials by children was
defining the term "obscene." This issue was decided by the Supreme Court
in Miller v. California.2 Miller advertised the sale of adult literature by mass
mailing sexually explicit brochures, one of which was received, unsolicited,
by a man and his mother.3 Miller was convicted of violating section 311.2(a)
1. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
2. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
3. Id. at 16-18.
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of the California Penal Code, which deemed any person distributing obscene
materials through the mail guilty of a misdemeanor.4 The Court began its
analysis in Miller by reaffirming the established tenet that obscene material
is not protected by the First Amendment. 5 Acknowledging the inherent risks
involved in regulating an individual's freedom of expression, the Supreme
Court limited the scope of the regulation to materials which describe or
display sexual conduct only.6 The Court proceeded to establish guidelines
by which to determine what constitutes obscenity. Among the considera-
tions are: 1) whether an average person applying contemporary community
standards would find the material to have a "prurient appeal;" 2) whether the
material depicts sexual activity in a patently offensive manner; and 3)
whether the material lacks significant literary, cultural, or scientific value.7
Perhaps the most important attribute of obscene materials under this formu-
lation is the degree of prurient content as judged by contemporary commu-
nity standards. The Court reasoned it would be unrealistic and futile to
attempt to articulate a single standard, given the expansive and diverse
American population.8 This Miller standard of obscenity impacts future
decisions regarding indecency, including Denver, as it sets forth definitive
guidelines by which to judge constitutionally unprotected materials.
4. ld at 16-17. This section at the time read:
Sending or bringing into state for sale or distribution; printing, exhibiting, dis-
tributing or possessing within state "(a) Every person who knowingly: sends or
causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought, into this state for sale or dis-
tribution, or in this state prepares, publishes, prints, exhibits, distributes, or offers
to distribute, or has, in, his possession with intent to distribute or to exhibit or
offer to distribute, any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor ......
IL See CAL PENAL CODE § 311.2 (1985).
5. Id. at 23 (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1992); United States v. Reidel, 402
U.S. 351, 354 (1971); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)). In Roth, the
Supreme Court upheld a conviction under a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of obscene,
lewd, lascivious, or filthy materials. The opinion stated:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opin-
ion-have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they
encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the
history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without re-
deeming social importance.
Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
6. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24.
7. 1a at 24.
8. I1. at 30.
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B. A Pervasive Medium: FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
The regulation of potentially offensive communications was further
examined in the medium of radio broadcasting in FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
tion.9 A New York radio station, owned by Pacifica Foundation, aired a
monologue entitled "Filthy Words" during an afternoon broadcast as
performed by comedian George Carlin.'0 A man wrote a letter of complaint
to the FCC a few weeks later, explaining that he and his young son heard the
broadcast and expressing his discontent with the FCC for allowing the
program to be aired.1" In an effort to address growing concerns about
indecent speech over the airwaves, the FCC turned to 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
which provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane lan-
guage by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."'12 The FCC
determined the monologue to be indecent, defining "indecent" as "intimately
connected with the exposure of children to language that describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for
the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of
the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audi-
ence."13 Utilizing many of the same terms used to define obscenity in
Miller, the FCC implemented a community based standard by which to judge
indecency. This definition was tailored to protect children from indecent
broadcasts to the greatest extent possible. Recognizing the possibility of its
order violating the First Amendment, the FCC issued an opinion following
its declaration of the monologue as indecent. The FCC stated that it never
intended to absolutely prohibit indecent broadcasts, but rather it sought to
reduce the risk of exposure to children by channeling that type of program-
ming into time periods when children are least likely to be listening.' 4
In determining the broadcast to be indecent, the FCC identified several
words and phrases in the monologue that repeatedly described sexual and
9. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
10. Id. at 729. Carlin's monologue began: "I was thinking about the curse words and the
swear words, the cuss words and the words that you can't say, that you're not supposed to say
all the time, [']cause words or people into words want to hear your words." Id. at 751. He
proceeded to repeat curse words over and over, using them in different contexts and as
colloquialisms.
11. Id at 730.
12. Id. at731. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464(1976).
13. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731-32.
14. IdL at 732-33.
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excretory activity. 15 Furthermore, the broadcast was aired in the afternoon
when children were likely to be listening, therefore making the broadcast
patently offensive and indecent.' 6  Pacifica Foundation conceded the
broadcast was patently offensive but argued the broadcast was not indecent
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, claiming the term "indecent" is
synonymous with "obscene.' 1 7 The essential element of "obscenity," and
thus "indecency," under Pacifica's reasoning, is prurient appeal.' 8 Upon
examining the text of the monologue, it is apparent no such prurient appeal
exists. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, however, noting the
language of 18 U.S.C § 1464 prohibits "obscene, indecent, or profane"
language, implying each phrase was meant by Congress to be construed
separately. 19
The Court further determined the statute was not overbroad because it
was issued in a specific, factual context, which is an important consideration
when reviewing the regulation of indecent communications.2" The Court
explained 'that radio broadcasting has received the most limited constitu-
tional protection of all media thus far, justifying this limitation in the context
of the broadcasting medium. 2' Broadcasting, stated the Court, has
"established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.' 22
This pervasiveness is so great that citizens, including children, may be
subjected to unexpected indecent programming while listening at home due
to the tendency of listeners to tune in and out.23 Section 1464 was subse-
quently deemed a constitutionally permissible method of regulating the
broadcasting medium.
C. Narrowing the Means: Sable Communications of California, Inc.
v. FCC
More recently, the Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of
section 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended in 1988,
15. Id. at 739.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 739-40.
18. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739.
19. Id. at 739-40.
20. Id. at 742. The Court justified this method by explaining that "indecency is largely a
function of context-it cannot be adequately judged in the abstract." Id.
21. Id. at 748. The Court explained that a broadcaster may have his license revoked if it
would serve the "public interest, convenience, and necessity." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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which imposed an outright ban on indecent and obscene interstate commer-
cial telephone messages. 24 This issue was decided in Sable Communications
of California, Inc. v. FCC. 25 Sable operated a dial-a-porn business offering
prerecorded sexually explicit phone messages. Sable sought to enjoin the
FCC from prosecuting the company under section 223(b).
The Court began its opinion by reiterating the message that First
Amendment protection does not protect obscene speech.26 The Court
proceeded to reject Sable's contention that section 223(b) attempts to
mandate a national standard of obscenity in violation of the "community
standards" requirement established in Miller.27 The Court asserted that, in
light of this varying standard, Sable would have had to bear the costs of
conforming its interstate messages to local community standards if it sought
to continue providing obscene messages. The Court declined to determine
whether the messages provided by Sable were, in fact, obscene, but rather
attempted to determine whether Congress may prohibit those messages,
whether viewed to be indecent or obscene.
28
In order for Congress to permissibly restrict this type of speech, it must
first demonstrate it is attempting to further a compelling government interest.
The Court identified the compelling interest that was being served by the
statute as the "physical and psychological well-being of minors." 29 While
this interest is compelling, to withstand strict scrutiny, the statute must also
be narrowly drawn and designed to serve this compelling interest without
unnecessarily interfering with the exercise of the First Amendment.30 In
support of the statute, the government argued that a total ban on indecent
telephone messages was justified because it was the least restrictive means
of preventing children from gaining access to those messages. 31 The Court
rejected the argument that alternatives to an outright ban, such as credit
cards, access codes, and scrambling devices, would not effectively promote
24. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988).
25. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
26. Id. at 124.
27. Id. at 124-25. In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), the Court stated:
"The fact that distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be subjected to varying
community standards in the various federal judicial districts into which they transmit the
materials does not render a federal statute unconstitutional because of a failure of application
of uniform national standards of obscenity." Id. at 106.
28. Sable, 492 U.S. at 124.
29. Id. at 126.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 128.
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the compelling interest, noting that no evidence had been presented to
support this conclusion.3 2 The statute therefore denied adult access to
indecent phone messages in a manner which far exceeded the precautions
33
necessary to protect children from receiving those messages.
In an attempt to support the validity of the statute, the government cited
Pacifica as an example of the Supreme Court upholding the regulation of
indecent programming. The Court rejected this comparison, noting that the
Pacifica Court emphasized the narrowness of that decision. The Court
further differentiated between the contexts of the two decisions. Pacifica
did not involve a total ban on indecent broadcasting. Rather, the FCC
wanted to broadcast indecent programming during time periods that would
be less likely to promote exposure to children. 34 Section 223(b), meanwhile,
mandated an outright ban on the dial-a-porn service. In addition, the media
of broadcasting and telephone communications inherently differ in degrees
of pervasiveness. Whereas radio broadcasting is extremely pervasive and
intrudes into the privacy of the home, making a telephone call involves an
affirmative action, thus reducing the risk that an unwilling or underage caller
35
might accidentally be exposed to sexually explicit messages.
I1. REGULATING THE CABLE TELEVISION MEDIUM
A. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
Cable television channels originated in the late 1960s, as cable opera-
tors received franchises from local governments. As the cable industry
grew, Congress enacted the Cable Communications Policy Act in 1984 in an
effort to "promote competition in the delivery of diverse sources of video
32. Id. at 128-29. The lack of evidence supporting this conclusion was due to the fact
that the FCC implemented these safeguards in 1988, and the effects of these measures have
not yet been calculated. Sable, 492 U.S. at 128.
33. Id. at 131. Justice White, delivering the opinion of the court, described the effect of
section 223(b) as another case of "bum[ing] the house to roast the pig." Id. (quoting Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
34. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 733.
35. Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28. The Court addressed inadvertent exposure by children to
indecent programming, stating: "Unlike an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the
message received by one who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so invasive or
surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to it." Id. at 128. In
regards to children who intentionally seek out those messages, the Court conceded: "It may
well be that there is no fail-safe method of guaranteeing that never will a minor be able to
access the dial-a-porn system." Id. at 130.
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programming and to assure that the widest possible diversity of information
sources are made available to the public .... ,36 The Act required the cable
operators to set aside a certain number of channels, depending upon the total
number of channels available in that area, for commercial lease by unaffili-
ated third parties.37 These channels reserved fori private parties became
known as leased access channels. The Act further permitted local govern-
ments to require operators to set aside certain channels for "public, educa-
tional, or governmental use." 38 These channels became known as public
access channels.39 When Congress initially enacted the Act, it forbade cable
operators from regulating programming on both leased access and public
access channels. 40
B. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992
Years later, Congress confronted what it believed to be a serious threat
to the well-being of the American public. Senator Jesse Helms of North
Carolina explained "that cable companies are required by law to carry, on
leased access channels, any and every program that comes along-no matter
how offensive and disgusting." 4' These programs often included indecent
material of a sexually explicit nature. Congress was concerned that "early
and sustained exposure to hard core pornography can result in significant
physical, psychological, and social damage to a child. 42
36. 47 U.S.C. § 532(a) (Supp. V 1988).
37. 47 U.S.C. § 532(b) (1988). The terms of section 532 require cable operators with 36
or more channels to designate 10% for commercial lease and 55 or more channels to designate
15%. Id. Cable operators with fewer than 36 active channels are exempt from these
requirements. Id.
38. See 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1988).
39. Public access channels are also called PEG channels.
40. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 531(e), 532(c)(2).
41. 138 CONG. REC. S646 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Helms). Senator
Helms continued: "The end result is perverted and disgusting programs mixed with religious
and health shows. These leased access channels were intended to promote diversity, but
instead they promote perversity." Id.
42. 138 CONG. REC. S649 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Coats). In support
of this correlation, Senator Coats referred to the sexually exploited child unit of the Los
Angeles Police Department who have "long known that pornography is often employed by
offenders in the extrafamilial sexual victimization of children." Senator Coats also cited a
study conducted by Dr. Zillman of Indiana University, in which pornography was reported to
promote the victimization of women and a more lenient view of rape and bestiality. Id.
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In response to the growing threat to American children, Congress
enacted sections 10(a), 10(b), and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Communication
Policy Act ("Cable Act"). Section 10(a) of the Cable Act permitted cable
operators to enforce "a written and published policy of prohibiting pro-
gramming that the cable operator reasonably believes describes or depicts
sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as
measured by contemporary community standards" on leased access chan-
nels.43 Section 10(b) required cable operators who permit indecent pro-
gramming on leased access channels to place the programming on a separate
channel and to block a subscriber's access to that channel until the sub-
scriber requests in writing that the channel be unblocked.44 The plague of
indecent programming was not limited to leased access channels. Section
10(c) further permitted cable operators to prohibit the use of public access
channels for any programming which contained obscene material, sexually
explicit conduct, or material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct. 45 The
section concerning public access channels was not accompanied by a
segregate and block requirement for those indecent programs the operator
46
chooses not to ban.
IV. JuDIcIAL HISTORY OF DENVER AREA EDUCATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONSORTIUM, INC. V. FCC
A. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC: The Panel Decision
In Alliance for Community Media v. FCC,47 four groups of cable
programmers, listeners, and viewers petitioned for review of sections 10(a),
10(b), and 10(c) of the Cable Act. The petitioners were individually com-
prised of representatives from: 1) Alliance for Community Media, Alliance
for Communications Democracy, and People for the American Way; 2)
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium; 3) American
Civil Liberties Union; and 4) New York Citizens Committee for Responsible
Media, and Media Access New York, Brooklyn Producers' Group. Each
filed suit seeking review of the statute. The four petitions were consolidated
43. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. V 1988).
44. Id. § 5320).
45. Id. § 531.
46. Id.
47. 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Alliance 1], cert. granted, Denver Area
Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 471 (1995), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
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and heard by a panel consisting of three United States Court of Appeals
judges on September 14, 1993. The panel identified two primary constitu-
tional issues that could be extrapolated from the case. First, when the
government passes a law requiring cable operators to reserve a certain
number of access channels for general use without regard to content, may the
government then constitutionally permit cable operators to prohibit indecent
programming from being televised?48  Second, if cable operators do not
exercise their power to ban indecent programming, may the government
require the cable operator to segregate and block indecent programming on
access channels? 49 The panel rejected the government's argument that the
statute authorizing cable operators to ban indecent programming does not
implicate the First Amendment because no state action exists.50 The gov-
ernment claimed that the action is being performed by private individuals,
namely the cable operators, and not the government. 51 The panel asserted
that a private individual may be subject to First Amendment scrutiny if the
state significantly encourages the private individuals to commit the act in
question.52 The panel determined that sections 10(a) and 10(c) constituted
an adequate amount of encouragement on the part of the government and
therefore involved state action.
53
The panel then turned to the sections of the Cable Act themselves to
determine what level of scrutiny should apply. Sections 10(a) and 10(c)
attempt to regulate and prohibit programming based solely on whether that
programming may be deemed indecent. These sections were therefore
48. Id. at 816.
49. Id. at 817.
50. Id. at 818.
51. ld.
52. Alliance I, 10 F.3d at 818. In support of this assertion, the panel cited Franz v.
United States, 707 F.2d 582, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1983), in which the court held that the govern-
ment's encouragement, through the witness protection program, of a mother's decision to keep
children away from their father constituted state action. Id. The Franz court stated:
It is clear that the defendants, by accepting Catherine and the children into
the program along with Allen, are largely responsible for the success of Cather-
ine's effort to deny William access to his offspring. Without the aid of the ad-
ministrators of the program in providing her with a new identity, Catherine al-
most certainly would not have been able to frustrate William's attempts to exer-
cise and enforce his visitation rights; with that aid, she has been able to act with
impunity.
Id. at 591-92.
53. Alliance 1, 10 F.3d at 818.
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interpreted by the court as content-based restrictions on free speech.54 The
restrictions may have been constitutionally permissible, however, if the
means promoted a compelling interest and constituted the least restrictive
means to promote that interest.
55
The protection of children from indecent materials has long been
recognized by the court as a compelling interest.56 The panel was not
convinced, however, that sections 10(a) and 10(c) provided the least restric-
tive means to promote this interest. The total denial of access to indecent
material, a ban which would affect children and adults alike, could result in
the adult television viewing population receiving only programming that is
fit for children.57 The panel further pointed to the fact that Congress has
provided a less restrictive means to promote its objective within the text of
the Cable Act itself.58 The panel asserted that by providing the cable
operator with the choice of either totally banning indecent programming or
segregating that programming to a separate channel and blocking it, Con-
gress has suggested that there may exist a less restrictive but completely
adequate alternative to an outright ban.59 Sections 10(a) and 10(c), there-
fore, did not constitute the least restrictive means of promoting a compelling
interest and did not withstand strict scrutiny by the panel.
While analyzing section 10(b), the panel pointed out that a restriction
on speech may not "single out a class of speakers on the basis of criteria that
are wholly unrelated to the interest sought to be advanced.,, 60 The panel
determined that leased access channels were being singled out and regulated
in such a manner, while other commercial channels were left relatively
undisturbed.6' This discrepancy was unacceptable. Nonetheless, the panel
54. Id. at 822-23.
55. Id. at 823 (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989)).
56. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
57. Alliance I, 10 F.3d at 823 (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
58. Id. at 823-24.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 825. The panel drew an analogy between this case and City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), in which the removal of commercial news-
stands for the purpose of promoting safety and aesthetics was found to violate the First
Amendment because noncommercial news racks causing the same problems remained
unregulated. Id. at 430-31.
61. Alliance 1, 10 F.3d at 826.
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declined to strike down the section, choosing instead to remand it to the FCC
to justify this preferential treatment. 62
B. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC: The En Banc Decision
In reviewing the panel decision, the United States Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, determined that the constitutionality of sections 10(a) and
10(c) turned on the absence or presence of state action. 63 While acknowl-
edging that sections 10(a) and 10(c) promoted cable operators' free speech
by empowering them with greater editorial control, the court questioned how
these same sections impair the petitioners' freedom of speech.64 The court
viewed the power struggle between cable operators and programmers as an
inherent characteristic of cable television. The more discretion a cable
operator has over what programs will be aired, the less power the program-
mer has to choose what programs to air.65 The court argued that to hold that
the restoration of editorial control that has resulted from the enactment of the
statute is automatically state action would cripple Congress' ability to
correct previous mistakes and prevent Congress from attempting to regulate
for good cause. 66 Furthermore, section 10(a) does not mandate the prohibi-
tion of indecent programming. Rather it gives cable operators a choice. In
the eyes of the court, the regulations prescribed by the Cable Act are not an
exercise of governmental authority but are instead an empowerment of
individual discretion. The court determined that this empowerment did not
constitute state action and the section did not warrant First Amendment
62. Id. at 831.
63. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
[hereinafter Alliance II], cert. granted, Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 471 (1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
64. Id. at 114. The court used stronger language to characterize the petitioners' position,
stating that "petitioners are merely complaining about section 10(a)'s and section 10(c)'s
restoring to cable operators' their option to reject indecent programming on their cable
systems." Id.
65. Id. at 115.
66. Id. During the debates over the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act, Senator
Helmes addressed the ability of Congress to correct its own mistakes by stating:
Congress undoubtedly meant well in requiring cable operators to operate public
and leased access channels as a public forum open to any and all speakers. Even
in a "traditional public forum" [e.g., a public street], however,.., the privacy of
the home is at stake. If Congress is serious about correcting abuses in the provi-
sion of cable television programming, it cannot continue to ignore the problem of
pornographic programming on public and leased access channels.
138 CONG. REc. S648 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Helms).
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protection.67 Sections 10(a) and 10(c), consequently, were upheld in their
entirety.
In analyzing section 10(b), the court turned to principles established in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation and FCC v. Sable Communications of Califor-
nia. From these cases, the court derived two applicable tenets: 1) the
constitutionality of regulating indecent programming is dependent upon a
medium's characteristics; and 2) the government must strive to accommo-
date both the interest of society by limiting children's exposure to indecent
materials and the interest of adults who choose to obtain and utilize those
materials. 68 Cable television programming is similar to radio broadcasts in
many aspects, noted the court. 69 Both media are incapable of maintaining an
adequate early warning system that would alert the audience of upcoming
indecent programming, due to the constant tuning in and out of the listeners
70and viewers. In addition, both radio broadcasts and leased access channels
come automatically into the home of the audience, without additional
subscription or request beyond what is already present in most homes. 7' For
these reasons, the court determined that alternative methods of protecting
children from indecent broadcasts, such as airing indecent programs late at
night or viewer controlled channel blocking systems, do not adequately
combat the pervasiveness of the cable television medium.72 Thus, the court
determined that section 10(b) was the least restrictive means to achieve the
established compelling government interest 73 and therefore, withstood strict
scrutiny.
In response to petitioners' allegation that section 10(b)'s segregate and
block system discriminates against leased access channels, the court pointed
out that little would change from the perspective of the viewer if section
10(b) were implemented. The only difference is that prior to the Cable Act,
indecent programming was broadcast into the subscriber's home unless it
67. Alliance II, 56 F.3d at 123.
68. Id. at 124.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. Justice Randolph, writing the opinion, portrayed the unwary cable subscriber as
analogous to the motorists in Pacifica by stating that "[a] cable subscriber no more asks for
such programming than did the offended listener in Pacifica who turned on his radio."
Alliance II, 56 F.3d at 124.
72. Id. at 125. The court denounces two alternatives, voluntary blocking systems and
lock boxes, stating the former are certain to cause a programmer error due to the constant
maintenance required, and the latter would block leased access programming altogether. Id.
73. Id.
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was affirmatively blocked out.74 Under section 10(b), the indecent pro-
gramming is not broadcast into the subscriber's home unless it is affirma-
tively invited in. Therefore, the court decided that no discrimination was
being perpetrated through section 10(b) of the Cable Act.
The court rejected the petitioners' argument that section 10(b)'s
allowance of a thirty day period in which the cable operator must unblock a
segregated channel at the subscriber's request constituted a prior restraint on
free speech.76 The programming will air eventually, reasoned the court, and
the subscriber has no basis to demand immediate unblocking.77 The court
analogized this waiting period to that often endured while waiting for cable
television to be initially hooked up in one's home, asserting that both of
these waiting periods are completely acceptable.78 The court finally rejected
the petitioners' claim that section 10(b) is void for vagueness because it
defers responsibility to the leased access programmer to determine which
programs are indecent, thereby providing no definitive standard to identify
those programs affected by the Cable Act.79 The court found that the FCC
definition was similar to the subjective standard established in Pacifica and
adequately sets forth an acceptable guideline that would aid the programmer
in making that determination.80 The court determined that section 10(b)
satisfied the least restrictive means test, did not single out leased access
channels for regulation, did not constitute a prior restraint on free speech,
and was not void for vagueness. Section 10(b) was consequently deemed
constitutional, and all of the sections in question were found consistent with
the Constitution by -the United States Court of Appeals.
V. DENVER AREA EDUCATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONSORTIUM,
INC. V. FCC
A. Justice Breyer: Setting a New Standard
Two of the cases challenging the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, Denver Area Educational Telecommunica-
74. Id. at 126.
75. Alliance II, 56 F.3d at 126.
76. Id. at 128.
77. Id.
78. Id. The court admonished that "[s]ubscribers wishing to see indecent speech may not
have their wishes fulfilled instantaneously .... " Id.
79. Alliance II, 56 F.3d at 129.
80. Id.
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tions Consortium, Inc. v. FCC and Alliance for Community Media v. FCC,
were consolidated and heard by the United States Supreme Court as Denver
Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC.81 Justice
Breyer wrote a plurality opinion concerning sections 10(a) and 10(c), and a
majority opinion concerning section 10(b). Turning first to section 10(a),
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, and Justice
Souter, (the "Breyer Group"), believed the threshold determination in
deciding whether section 10(a) violated the First Amendment to be whether
the action being scrutinized could be considered state action.8 2 The United
States Court of Appeals found no state action being perpetrated by section
10(a), citing an insufficiently close nexus between the government action
and the cable operators to make such a determination.83
The plurality overturned the Court of Appeals finding that section 10(a)
does not constitute state action but rather reaffirms the authority of the
individual cable operators to exercise their choice of programming.84 Cable
operators are intertwined with government, argued Justice Breyer, as they
exist with government permission and utilize government facilities, i.e.
streets and rights of way, to string and lay cables.85 In addition, most
communities are served by only one cable system operator.86 If the sections
in question were upheld, cable operators could conceivably yield a great
amount of censorship power, as there usually are no alternatives for cable
viewers who could be subject to the editorial whims of the cable operator. 87
According to Justice Breyer, these characteristics establish the action of
cable operators as a government function.
Freedom of speech is a constitutionally protected right. The essence of
that right, according to Justice Breyer, "is that Congress may not regulate
speech except in cases of extraordinary need and with the exercise of a
degree of care that we have not elsewhere required. 8 Justice Breyer noted,
however, that the Court's interpretation of this protection has not rendered
81. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
82. Id. at 2382.
83. Alliance II, 56 F.3d at 113.
84. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2382-83.
85. Id. at 2383.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2384.
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either Congress or the states powerless to address societal problems.8 9 In the
plurality opinion, Justice Breyer discussed at length the necessity for
flexibility while evaluating First Amendment protection cases. Although
several analogies existed between this case and other cases involving the
communication media, the Breyer group refused to accept an immutable
standard by which to judge all such questions of constitutionality. 90 Rather,
the question as posed by Justice Breyer was whether section 10(a) addressed
"an extremely important problem, without imposing, in light of the relevant
interests, an unnecessarily great restriction on speech." 91
Justice Breyer acknowledged that the issue addressed by this case is
extremely important and is one that "this Court has often found compel-
ling-the need to protect children from exposure to patently offensive sex-
related material."92  In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,93 for example, the
Supreme Court upheld the prohibition by the FCC of an indecent broadcast
by a radio station, finding that such a prohibition did not violate the station's
First Amendment rights.94 Justice Breyer identified several similarities
between Pacifica and Denver: 1) the accessibility of both media to children;
2) the pervasiveness of both media in the lives of the American public; 3) the
lack of warning prior to the broadcast of indecent material; and 4) the
availability of such materials on tapes and records and at theaters and
nightclubs.95
As public media, both radio and television are easily accessible to
adults and children. A minuscule number of American homes are without a
television, and a large number of those with television are subscribers to
89. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2384 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
90. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2385. Justice Breyer believed the tradition of the First Amend-
ment "embodies an overarching commitment to protect speech from Government regulation
through close judicial scrutiny, thereby enforcing the Constitution's constraints, but without
imposing judicial formulae so rigid that they become a straightjacket that disables Government
from responding to serious problems." Id.
91. Id. at 2385.
92. Id. at 2386 (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
639-40 (1968)).
93. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
94. I& at 750.
95. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2386-87.
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cable programming. 96 Furthermore, the technology of cable television is
user-friendly, as small children can easily turn it on and off. As previously
noted, George Carlin's monologue in Pacifica was aired at about two
o'clock in the afternoon by a New York radio station and was heard by a
motorist and his young son.97 This occurrence was illustrative to the court of
common listening practices and was one factor that influenced the Court's
decision to regulate programming. The Court reasoned:
Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out,
prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer
from unexpected program content. To say that one may avoid fur-
ther offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent lan-
guage is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away
after the first blow.
98
The listening habits of the audience added an additional degree of difficulty
in protecting listeners from unwanted material in Pacifica. In a similar
analysis, Justice Breyer concluded that cable viewers sample more channels
than viewers without cable television before watching a program for a
sustained period of time, making them even more susceptible to inadver-
tently viewing unwanted and indecent programming."
Justice Breyer further evaluated section 10(a) in light of the ban in
Pacifica, finding it less restrictive than the latter, and therefore constitutional
in light of case precedent. Section 10(a) is permissive and allows cable
operators a certain degree of flexibility. 1°° This section does not order an
outright ban but rather allows the cable operators to reschedule certain
programs to serve the needs of its adult viewing audience, while protecting
its younger viewers.'(' Although cable operators retain the discretion to ban
indecent programming, they may or may not choose to do so. Justice Breyer
noted:
[T]he same may be said of Pacifica's ban. In practice, the FCC's
daytime broadcast ban could have become a total ban, depending
upon how private operators (programmers, station owners, net-
96. Id. Nearly 56,000,000 homes, more than 60% off all homes with television, have
cable (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 862, 102d Cong. 2d Sess. 56 (1984)).
97. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729-30.
98. Id. at 748-49.
99. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2386-87.
100. Id. at 2387.
101. Id.
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works) responded to it. They would have had to decide whether to
reschedule the daytime show for nighttime broadcast in light of
comparative audience demand and a host of other practical factors
that similarly would determine the practical outcomes of the provi-
sions before us.10
2
The result is that the uncertainty as to the "practical consequences" of both
regulations makes it difficult to determine whether the regulation imposed by
section 10(a) of the Cable Act is any more severe than the FCC order in
Pacifica.10 3 This similarity. with the Pacifica ban was one factor convincing
the Breyer Group of section 10(a)'s constitutional validity.
The petitioners also argued that section 10(a) is unconstitutional
because of the public forum doctrine. "Public forums" are places which
have been created by the government for use by the public as a forum for
expressive and creative activity. 1°4 In a public forum, "all parties have a
constitutional right of access and the State must demonstrate compelling
reasons for restricting access to a single class of speakers, a single view-
point, or a single subject."105 The government's reasoning, therefore, was
that leased access channels are public forums, as they have been opened up
for use by the public for television programming. The petitioners added
"that the statute's permissive provisions unjustifiably exclude material, on
the basis of content, from the 'public forum' that the government has created
in the form of access channels." 1°6
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). Perry
characterizes public forums as "places which by long tradition or government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply
circumscribed." Id. at 45. The Perry Court continued:
In a public forum, by definition, all parties have a constitutional right of access
and the State must demonstrate compelling reasons for restricting access to a sin-
gle class of speakers, a single viewpoint, or a single subject.
When speakers and subjects are similarly situated, the State may not pick and
choose. Conversely on government property... not all speech is equally situ-
ated, and the State may draw distinctions which relate to the special purpose for
which the property is used. As we have explained above, for a school mail facil-
ity, the difference in status between the exclusive bargaining representative and
its rival is such a distinction.
Id. at 55.
105. Id.
106. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2388.
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Justice Breyer rejected the application of the public forum doctrine to
this case. °7 First, claimed Justice Breyer, the public forum doctrine should
not be "imported wholesale into the area of common carriage regulation."'
0 8
Throughout the plurality opinion, Justice Breyer displayed reluctance to
analogize between this case and different areas of the law. The evolving and
expanding state of the telecommunications field, reasoned Breyer, hinders
the application of previously developed doctrines to such a changing
arena.' 09 The public forum doctrine is further inapplicable, as the public
forum "is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the
facility."' 10 The parameters of a public forum have not yet been defined,
added Justice Breyer, noting:
Our cases have not yet determined, however, that the Govern-
ment's decision to dedicate a public forum to one type of content
or another is necessarily subject to this highest level of scrutiny.
Must a local government, for example, show a compelling state in-
terest if it builds a band shell in the park and dedicates it solely to
classical music (but not to jazz)? The answer is not obvious. 1
The public forum doctrine, therefore, even if applicable, would not auto-
matically render section 10(a) constitutional.
Rather than address these potentially problematic issues, Justice Breyer
decided that the Court need not necessarily address the public forum issue to
resolve this case. 12 This is because:
[T]he effects of Congress' decision on the interests of program-
mers, viewers, cable operators, and children are the same, whether
we characterize Congress' decision as one that limits access to a
public forum, discriminates in common carriage, or constrains
speech because of its content. If we consider this particular limita-
tion of indecent television programming acceptable as a constraint
on speech, we must no less accept the limitation it places on access
to the claimed public forum or on use of common carrier."
13
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2389.
109. i at 2388-89.
110. Id at 2389 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46).
111. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2389.
112. M at 2388.
113. IdM at 2389.
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According to the Breyer Group, this issue need not be decided in terms
related to the public forum doctrine.1 4  Justice Breyer stated that "the
government's interest in protecting children, the 'permissive' aspect of the
statute, and the nature of the medium," sufficiently justifies upholding
section 10(a) of the Cable Act, and the "label" under which this case is
decided is irrelevant.'
15
Finally, Justice Breyer rejected the petitioners' argument that the
section's definition of indecent materials is void for vagueness, as it grants
too much editorial authority to the cable operator." 6 A statute is void for
vagueness if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.' 17 Section 10(a) does provide a
significant degree of leeway, as it permits cable operators to prohibit
"programming that the cable operator reasonably believes describes or
depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive
manner as measured by contemporary community standards."'" 8  Justice
Breyer found this definition to be similar to that used in Miller v. Califor-
nia, 119 in which obscene material was defined in terms of:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest ... (b) whether the work depicts or de-
scribes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically de-
fined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. 1 20
The Breyer Group found that each of these regulations are "vague," in the
sense that they offer no strict guidelines by which to judge obscenity and
indecency but rather fit into "the category of materials that Justice Stewart
114. Id.
115. Id
116. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2390.
117. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). The Court explained:
[Tihe terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit
to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with or-
dinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law.
Md at 391.
118. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h).
119. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
120. Id. at 24.
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thought could be described only in terms of 'I know it when I see it."",12 1 The
identification of these materials therefore depends in large part on degree,
context, and time. 122 Justice Breyer therefore decided that the "vagueness,"
which the petitioners fault as rendering section 10(a) unconstitutional, is a
necessary lack of strict guidelines that must be accepted when evaluating
materials of this kind.
The Breyer Group further argued that the "vagueness" of section 10(a)
further protects against overbroad application by permitting cable operators
to ban programming only pursuant to a written policy drawn up by the cable
operator.'2 This section provides some degree of uniformity, as it required
the identical application of the policy to all programs, thus diminishing the
threat of arbitrary censorship by misguided cable operators.
24
The Breyer Group then justified the qualifier within the statute which
allows the cable operator to prohibit programming which he "reasonably
believes" to be indecent. This qualifier, claimed Justice Breyer, is designed
not to expand the category of programming affected by the statute, but rather
to provide some degree of justification for an honest, good faith mistake by
the cable operator.1 5 Section 10(a), therefore, was not rendered unconstitu-
tional for vagueness by the plurality.
Justice Breyer was joined by Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, Justice
Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsberg in a majority opinion which
found section 10(b) unconstitutional. Section 10(b) constitutes a signifi-
cantly more aggressive attack on indecent cable television programming.
Whereas section 10(a) permitted cable operators to block indecent program-
ming, section 10(b) requires cable operators to segregate "patently offen-
sive" sexually explicit programming to a particular channel and to block that
channel.126 The channel may be unlocked only by a written request from the
cable subscriber. 27 In addition, leased access channel programmers would
be required to notify cable operators of upcoming programming considered
121. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2390 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
122. Id.
123. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h).
124. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2390.
125. Id. The Court further claimed the reasonableness section constrains the cable op-
erator as much as it protects them. An operator would have difficulty proving an exercise of
discretion was reasonable, if a similar exercise had been deemed unreasonable by an earlier
court decision. Id.
126. 47 U.S.C. § 532(j).
127. Id.
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patently offensive thirty days prior to air time. 128 The government argued
that this "segregate and block" policy is constitutional because it provides
the least restrictive means of addressing a compelling interest, this being
"the physical and psychological well-being of minors." 129 Justice Breyer
rejected this argument, finding section 10(b) to be much more extensive and
restrictive than necessary.
130
In support of this, the majority observed that current methods of
protecting children from inadvertent exposure to indecent programming
already exist and are much less intrusive into adult viewing practices.
Among the current methods are the requirement of cable operators to
scramble programming on channels "primarily dedicated to sexually-
oriented programming,"'13 the ability of any cable subscriber to have
channels blocked at their request, and the application of the V-chip which,
when installed in a television, automatically blocks excessively violent or
sexual programs.
1 32
Justice Breyer further questioned how section 10(b) is less restrictive
than a phone call based system which would block channels by subscriber
request, when in fact each method would achieve the same end, the protec-
tion of younger viewers from adult-oriented programming. 33 Therefore,
section 10(b) imposed an unnecessarily great restriction on free speech and
was struck down by the majority.
Finally, Justice Breyer was joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Souter
in a plurality opinion finding section 10(c) unconstitutional. The final
section challenged, section 10(c), is similar in content to section 10(a), as it
also permitted the cable operator to block offensive programming. Section
10(c), however, was directed at public access channels, whereas section
10(a) affects only leased access channels. Justice Breyer observed that
public access channels have generally been reserved to the city that has
awarded the cable franchise to a particular cable operator as partial consid-
eration for the franchise.1 34 The cable operators have historically had very
little editorial control over the content of public access channel program-
ming.135 These channels have usually been managed by various private and
128. Id.
129. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2391.
130. Id.
131. Id at 2392.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2394.
135. Id.
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public entities, often composed of community leaders and sponsors. The
result of these characteristics, according to the Breyer Group, is that section
10(c) did not restore any power to the cable operator over public access
programming.' 36 This is because very little power, if any, ever resided
within the cable operator regarding public access channel programs.
Justice Breyer also noted that there already exists a policing agency
over public access programming, usually a supervising board or government
access manager. 137 This agency would likely monitor the content of pro-
gramming and avoid airing offensive programming when easily accessible to
children. 138 The function of the cable operator as a gatekeeper to offensive
materials would, therefore, be redundant, as that function is already being
performed by the governmental agency in control of the public access
channel. The Breyer Group feared that by empowering the cable operator to
decide which programs are not offensive when the interests of the children
are already being safeguarded, there was a risk that programming which
could be considered "borderline" could be prevented from airing.'
39
As a result of the preceding analysis, section 10(a) was found constitu-
tional, and sections 10(b) and 10(c) were deemed unconstitutional. In
rendering its final judgment, the plurality had to consider whether sections
10(a), 10(b), and 10(c) were severable, or whether the three sections were to
be interpreted as an inseparable package, all or none of which must pass or
fail. In making this determination, the Breyer Group looked to the legisla-
tive intent of Congress and asked whether Congress would still have passed
section 10(a) had it known the other two sections would be struck down.' 4°
The Breyer Group felt that sections 10(a) and 10(c) clearly stand alone, as
each deals with a separate type of cable channel, specifically leased access
and public access.
14 1
Sections 10(a) and 10(b) have a tighter nexus. Section 10(b) requires
the cable operator who was exercising his right under section 10(a) to either
ban offensive programming or segregate and block it.142 Absent section
10(b), cable operators would be afforded greater discretion over program-
ming deemed patently offensive. Justice Breyer alleged that by striking
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2395.
139. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2395. The Court notes this misuse could occur either from the
use or threatened use of the cable operator's veto power. Id.
140. Id. at 2397.
141. Id.
142. 47 U.S.C. § 532(j).
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down section 10(b), the majority may have promoted the exercise of free
speech, as the cable operator will no longer have to bear the cost of segre-
gating and blocking channels which they decide not to ban, increasing the
likelihood that the operator will choose to ban fewer programs.' 43 Thus,
given Congress' stated objective, there was no basis for Justice Breyer to
conclude Congress would have preferred no regulation as compared to
section 10(a) alone. 44 Section 10(a) was therefore severable and deemed
constitutionally valid by the plurality.
B. Justice O'Connor: Keeping an Eye on the Children
Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality opinion that section 10(a)
was constitutionally valid and section 10(b) was not. 45 Justice O'Connor
disagreed with the majority decision striking down section 10(c) in spite of
several similarities between sections 10(a) and 10(c); similarities which she
believed warranted upholding section 10(c) for the same reasons which
required a finding that section 10(a) was constitutional.'4" Both sections
attempt to serve a vital interest, the protection of children from indecent
materials; both sections are permissive as neither mandate an outright ban of
indecent programming but rather leave the power of discretion up to the
cable operator; and both sections are within the degree of restrictiveness
allowed in Pacifica 47
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the determination that because
sections 10(a) and 10(c) are directed at two different classifications of cable
channels, leased access and public access, this differentiation was significant
enough to warrant different outcomes in terms of constitutionality. The
interest at stake, the protection of children, remained the same for each
section, and to Justice O'Connor this interest was significant and compelling
enough to outweigh any differences in the origins of the channels in ques-
tion. 4  The fact that public access programming is usually subject to a
certain amount of policing by the manager or agency in charge was of little
significance, and was of too speculative a nature to justify deeming section
10(c) unconstitutional. 149
143. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2397.
144. Id.
145. Iad at 2403 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 116 S. Ct. at 2404.
149. Id.
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C. Justice Kennedy: Adherence to Strict Scrutiny
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Ginsberg, concurred that sections
10(b) and 10(c) are unconstitutional but disagreed with the conclusion that
section 10(a) is constitutionally valid.1 50 The primary criticism expressed by
Justice Kennedy concerned not only the plurality decision, but the method of
reasoning, or lack thereof, used to reach that conclusion. Justice Kennedy
criticized the plurality for "balking" at taking the next logical step after
determining that the sections in question constitute state action. 5' This step,
stated Justice Kennedy, is the determination of what standard is applicable to
decide if the sections are consistent with the Constitution.'5 2 According to
Justice Kennedy, the regulations in the Cable Act were attempts by govern-
ment to identify certain types of speech and exclude them from a public
forum, specifically public access and leased access channels. 53 It is repug-
nant to the Constitution to allow any content-based discrimination against
free speech by a government body, unless that discrimination can withstand
strict scrutiny. 54  According to Justice Kennedy, none of the sections
withstand strict scrutiny, and all should be struck down by the Court.' 55
Justice Kennedy found it disturbing that the plurality declined to adopt
the strict scrutiny standard.156  Whereas Justice Breyer was reluctant to
declare a rigid formula when confronting this First Amendment issue, Justice
Kennedy claimed the utilization of a strict scrutiny test has often been used
effectively by the Court and that such a test would insure the protection of
free speech without hindering the government's efforts to address societal
problems. 57 Justice Kennedy feared the Court's reluctance to declare in
advance that the standard of judicial review will result in inequities in the
decision making process, unfairness to the petitioners and respondents who
150. Id. at 2404 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
151. Id. at 2405.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2405.
155. Id.
156. Id. Justice Kennedy defended strict scrutiny by stating: "Indeed, if strict scrutiny is
an instance of 'judicial formulae so rigid that they become a straightjacket that disables
Government from responding to serious problems,' this is a grave indictment of our First
Amendment jurisprudence, which relies on strict scrutiny in a number of settings where
context is important." Id. at 2406 (citation omitted).
157. Id. Kennedy claims that strict scrutiny ensures governmental solutions and does not
sacrifice free speech to a greater extent than is necessary to achieve a compelling goal.
Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2406.
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attempt to predict court decisions, and irregularities among similar cases
dependent upon minute changes in situation, technology, and popular
opinion. 58 The standard which the plurality ultimately adopted was whether
the Cable Act "properly addresses an extremely important problem, without
imposing, in light of the relevant interests, an unnecessarily great restriction
on speech." 159 According to Justice Kennedy, this standard represents little
more than a futile semantics game, as it is remarkably similar to the estab-
lished strict scrutiny test, but does not commit to the historical language of
the latter. 60 The result is confusion and disarray within First Amendment
litigation, a result with which Justice Kennedy is dissatisfied.
In regard to section 10(c), Justice Kennedy argued that public access
channels are a public forum. Public access channels are within the definition
of "public forum" set forth by the Court in 1992. The Court has previously
held a public forum to be "property that the State has opened for expressive
activity by part or all of the public. '161 Public access channels have been
called the "electronic soapbox of the next-soon to be current-
communication age," an indication of cable television's emerging role as an
expressive and accessible medium.' 62 Once the existence of public access
channels as a public forum had been established, it became clear to Justice
Kennedy that the public expressive activity being broadcast on those
channels may not be regulated on the basis of content by the government
without withstanding strict scrutiny.
163
The result of this scrutiny, Justice Kennedy argued, is that section 10(c)
must be declared unconstitutional.164  According to Justice Kennedy,
Congress cannot empower cable operators with editorial control over public
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2385.
160. Id. at 2406-07.
161. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992) (holding an airport terminal, operated by a public authority, is not a public forum; thus
a ban on solicitation must satisfy only a reasonableness standard). The Court further stated:
[I]ndividuals have a right to use "streets and parks for communication of
views," ... such a right flowed from the fact that "streets and parks ... have im-
memorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citi-
zens, and discussing public questions."
Iii at 679 (quoting Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939)).
162. Wally Mueller, Note, Controversial Programming on Cable Television's Public
Access Channels: The Limits of Governmental Response, 38 DEPAuL L. REv. 1051 (1989).
163. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2416.
164. Id.
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access channels because the nature of those channels as public forums
prevents the vesting of editorial rights in cable operators in the first place.'
65
Although a compelling interest does exist in protecting children from
indecent programming, section 10(c) is not narrowly tailored to achieve this
end. 66 Some cable operators may choose not to ban obscene programming,
thus leaving some children unprotected and failing to achieve, in full, the
prescribed goal. 67 In addition, adults will be inadvertently victimized by a
comprehensive ban. Section 10(c), therefore, represents too intrusive a
method to be characterized as narrowly tailored.
68
Justice Kennedy began his analysis of section 10(a) by drawing an
analogy between cable television programming and indecent telephone
communication, as explored in Sable. 69 Justice Kennedy asserted that the
strict scrutiny which applied to laws prohibiting a common carrier from
transmitting phone sex over the telephone wires should also be applied to
obscene cable programming. 70  Whereas the former was an attempt by
Congress to preclude the transmission of protected speech, section 10(a) is
an attempt by Congress to permit a carrier to ban certain forms of speech.
Justice Kennedy further stated that the access rules plainly impose common
carrier obligations on cable operators, noting that common carriers serve
much the same function as a public forum and are deserving of the same
level of protection.17' This is because each strives to ensure a means of
communication free from restriction and censorship.
7 2
The analogy between common carriers and public forums formed the
foundation for Justice Kennedy's analysis, a foundation which he berates the
plurality for refusing to acknowledge:
The plurality acknowledges content-based exclusions from the
right to use a common carrier could violate the First Amendment.
It tells us, however, that it is wary of analogies to doctrines devel-
oped elsewhere, and so does not address this issue. This newfound
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2416.
169. Id. at 2412 (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131
(1989)).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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aversion to analogical reasoning strikes at a process basic to legal
analysis.17
3
If the plurality were to apply an analysis based on comparing public forums
to common carriers, it would find content-based restrictions on public forum
expressions have been permitted, but only when those restrictions were
necessary to achieve a specific institutional goal. 74 This limitation on the
ability to restrict public forums assures the people that a legitimate purpose
exists for the limitation and inhibits arbitrary and unjustified restrictions by
government. 17  The restrictions imposed by section 10(a) warrant strict
scrutiny, as it is an attempt by government to inhibit forms of expression it
feels are indecent and unnecessary. 176 Justice Kennedy stated that section
10(a) does not represent a sufficient governmental interest, that of restoring
editorial discretion over leased access channels to cable operators, to warrant
upholding this statute.
177
In addition to faulting the plurality for failing to adopt a strict scrutiny
standard when evaluating the constitutionality of these sections, Justice
Kennedy further disagreed with the conclusion reached by the plurality. 178
Among the reasons for finding section 10(c) constitutional, the plurality
noted the tendency of public access channels to be "subject to complex
supervisory systems of various sorts, often with both public and private
elements."'179  Justice Kennedy questioned the effectiveness, if not the
existence, of these safeguards in public access channels, noting that "[m]ost
access centers surveyed do not prescreen at all, except, as in [two named
localities], a high speed run-through for technical quality.' 80
Although Justice Kennedy doubted the validity of these claims, the fact
that the plurality relied upon these facts indicates an even greater flaw in the
plurality's reasoning concerning section 10(a). Justice Kennedy acknowl-
edged that the policies, if indeed inherent in public access programming,
would withstand strict scrutiny as they are narrowly tailored to protect
children from indecent programming.' 8' Such a system, if implemented in
173. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2413.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2414.
176. IU.
177. Id. at 2416.
178. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2417.
179. IaM at 2394.
180. Id. at 2417 (citation omitted).
181. Id.
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leased access channel programming, would achieve the same goal, and thus
serve the same compelling interest, and constitute a less intrusive measure of
policing than that presented in section 10(a). 82 Given this less intrusive and
more narrowly tailored means, Justice Kennedy concluded that section 10(a)
should be declared unconstitutional.1
8 3
D. Justice Thomas: Supporting the Cable Operators
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rhenquist and Justice Scalia,
agreed with the plurality's finding that section 10(a) is constitutionally valid,
but disagreed with the conclusion that the remaining two sections, 10(b) and
10(c), are constitutionally invalid. 8 4 Justice Thomas, like Justice Kennedy,
disparaged the plurality for refusing to declare a definite standard by which
to judge the First Amendment validity of the sections in question. The Court
has attempted to declare such a standard in previous cases, and Justice
Breyer's refusal disregarded the reasoning of that previous declaration.
Justice Thomas further discounted the standard adopted by Justice Breyer as
"heretofore unknown" and "facially subjective" and faulted this standard for
inviting a "balancing of asserted speech interests to a degree not ordinarily
permitted."'' 8 5  Justice Thomas also expressed a need for adherence to
precedents, precedents which were not of his making but must, nonetheless,
provide form and focus for current cases.1
8 6
Justice Thomas began his opinion regarding the substance of the statute
by noting the distinctions between the print, broadcast, and cable television
media that the Court has made in previous decisions. 187 Justice Thomas
noted that the level of government control that has been exercised over
broadcasting has been struck down as unconstitutional when attempted to be
exercised over newspaper reporting.188 This discrepancy has placed "cable
in a doctrinal wasteland in which regulators and cable operators alike could
not be sure whether cable was entitled to the substantial First Amendment
protections afforded the print media or was subject to the more onerous
obligations shouldered by the broadcast media."'' 8 9  However, Justice
182. Id.
183. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2417.
184. Id. at 2419 (Thomas, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185. Id. at 2422.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2419.
188. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2419.
189. Id. at 2420.
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Thomas recognized a trend in recent decisions towards affording cable the
same protections as those enjoyed by print and non-broadcast media.190
Based on this principle of higher scrutiny for cable operators, Justice
Thomas further discounted the petitioners' claims that their rights have been
infringed upon by the Act. The petitioners have to realize, stated Justice
Thomas: "IT]hat cable access is not a constitutionally required entitlement
and that the right they claim to leased and public access has, by definition,
been governmentally created at the expense of cable operators' editorial
discretion."'19' The provisions, therefore, restrict the exercise of free speech
by cable operators and actually expand the exercise of free speech by cable
programmers who have no constitutional right to speak here.
192
A First Amendment challenge must be made by the party whose
constitutionally protected free speech has been circumvented.' 93 Justice
Thomas felt it is the cable operator, and not the access programmer, whose
freedom of speech has been inhibited by these sections.' 94 Justice Thomas
stated the "constitutional presumption properly runs in favor of the opera-
tors' editorial discretion, and that discretion may not be burdened without a
compelling reason for doing so."'195 Justice Thomas determined that sections
10(a) and 10(c) are not infringements upon the programmers' ability to
freely speak, but are instead restorations of the editorial discretion cable
operators would have had but for government regulations that required them
to allow leased and public access programmers to program at their pleas-
ure. 196 Justice Thomas further noted that cable operators have retained the
right to exercise editorial control over both types of channels, although
historically, they have not done so with public access channels. 197  The
190. Id. (citing Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Leathers v.
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979)).
191. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2424.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2425. The "gist of the question of standing" is whether the party seeking relief
has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962).
194. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2425.
195. Id. at 2424.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2425. Justice Thomas faults the plurality for mistaking the inability to exercise
a right for the absence of the right altogether. Although cable operators have not historically
exercised their editorial control, that absence does not diminish the operator's power to do so.
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petitioners in these cases, concluded Justice Thomas, cannot reasonably
request the Court to strictly scrutinize the statutes in question in such a
manner that diminishes the cable operator's discretion while maximizing the
programmer's ability to program at will.'
98
Justice Thomas rejected the argument that section 10(c) is invalid
because it imposes a content-based restriction on the right to speak in a
public forum, specifically public access channels.199 Cable systems, noted
Justice Thomas, are not public property but rather are privately owned and
managed entities."z° Furthermore, the additional obligations imposed on the
private cable operators, i.e., access scheduling and production assistance,
characterize public access channels as very different from traditional public
fora, effectively rebutting any claim made by the petitioners that public
access channels might be considered a public forum.20' As such, the public
forum doctrine governs access only to private property and does not extend
to property, such as public access channels, that is outside the scope of
governmental control. Sections 10(a) and 10(c), therefore, were both
deemed constitutionally valid by Justice Thomas.202
Analyzing section 10(b), Justice Thomas believed it must be subject to
strict scrutiny, as the section places a content-based restriction on private
speech programming by requiring cable operators to segregate and block
indecent programming. 2°3 Justice Thomas asserted that the government may
reinforce parental authority to guide the moral and spiritual well-being of
their children. 204 The alternatives which the plurality asserts are as equally
198. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2425.
199. Id. at 2426.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2428.
202. Id. at 2432.
203. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2429.
204. Id. As examples of parental reinforcement, Justice Thomas cited Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), which prohibited the sale of indecent literature to minors and
imposed default rules intended to protect children from telephone pornography. Id. at 639.
The Ginsberg Court noted:
The well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State's con-
stitutional power to regulate, and, in our view, two interests justify the limitations
in [the statute challenged] upon the availability of sex material to minors under
17, at least if it was rational for the legislature to find that the minors' exposure
to such material might be harmful. First of all, constitutional interpretation has
consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own house-
hold to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society.
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effective as section 10(b) in protecting children, i.e., lock boxes and V-chips,
are not adequate alternatives and do not support parental authority as
effectively as the section in question.2 5 Questionable programs are likely to
be shown with little or no warning. This attribute of television programming
makes it virtually impossible for a parent to supervise and adjust such
devices in accordance with indecent programming.
The plurality further struck down section 10(b) for fear that the written
requests necessary for the cable subscriber to gain access to indecent
programming will result in societal stigma, and a subsequent reluctance for
viewers to subscribe to previously available programming.20 Justice
Thomas questioned this assumption, as the text of section 10(b) does not
mention the creation or governing of such a list.207 Justice Thomas believed
this to be an unsupported assumption, one which attributed to section 10(b)
evils which it did not possess. The requirement of a written rather than oral
request for access to blocked channels has advantages as well, i.e., prevent-
ing fraudulent attempts on the part of minors to gain access to channels
deemed unsuited for children by their parents.20s
VI. CONCLUSION
A. Keeping an Eye on the Future
The division within the Supreme Court in deciding Denver illustrates
the complexity and the importance of this issue. Denver concerns not only
cable television viewing, but also addresses the ability of the government to
intrude into the private lives of American citizens. Justice Breyer, writing
the plurality opinion, expressed reluctance in applying previous decisions
and tests to an area of communications that is constantly changing such as
cable television. 2°9 Other Justices, however, comfortably rely on precedent
and established levels of scrutiny in making their own determinations as to
the constitutionality of these regulations. 210 The difference between these
205. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2429.
206. Id. at 2392.
207. Id at 2430.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2385. Justice Breyer stated that "aware as we are of the changes taking place
in the law, the technology, and the industrial structure, related to telecommunications, we
believe it unwise and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of words
now." Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2385 (citations omitted).
210. See id. at 2404 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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methods of reasoning indicates the difficulty of weighing two very important
interests: the protection of children from sexually explicit communications
and the protection of First Amendment rights coveted by American citizens.
Justice Breyer avoided the difficulty of addressing this unique case with pre-
existing precedent by creating his own constitutionality test.211 This method,
no doubt, seemed appropriate to Justice Breyer because no medium is as
pervasive or as diverse as cable television. 12 Other Justices, however,
believed that precedent must be followed to assure just rulings in accordance
with established doctrine. 13
As technology continues to evolve, however, new problems will
certainly arise as to what may or may not be communicated over new media.
For instance, the relatively new forum of cyberspace will most likely become
an area of concern. One author has commented that "[w]hile cyberspace
offers great educational opportunities for child and adult users alike, the
minimal effort needed to gain access to cyberspace haunts those Americans
concerned about the availability and accessibility of cybersmut to chil-
dren. 21 4 With this new issue on the horizon, it is impossible to predict how
it will be resolved given the plurality's recent aversion to established
principles.
Furthermore, the American public deserves to know on what grounds
their constitutional arguments will be evaluated, a point raised by Justice
Kennedy.1 Justice Breyer, no doubt, considered his analysis innovative and
flexible, attempting to do justice to all media by recognizing the uniqueness
of the cable communication forum.2 16 In fact, the plurality has decided this
issue in a vacuum, seriously debilitating the impact this decision will have
on future First Amendment litigation.
211. Id. at 2385. This test was articulated by Justice Breyer as follows: "[W]e can decide
this case more narrowly, by closely scrutinizing § 10(a) to assure that it properly addresses an
extremely important problem, without imposing, in light of relevant interests, an unnecessarily
great restriction on speech." Id.
212. Il at 2385-86.
213. Denver, 116 S. CL at 2406. Justice Kennedy stated that "[s]tandards are the means
by which we state in advance how to test a law's validity, rather than letting the height of the
bar be determined by the apparent exigencies of the day." Id.
214. Debra D. Burke, Note, Cybersmut and the First Amendment: A Call for a New
Obscenity Standard, 9 HARV. J.L. & tCH. 87, 94 (1992).
215. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2406.
216. Id. at 2385.
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B. The Benefits of Parental Authority
The protection of children is a compelling interest, indeed.217 In
upholding regulations which seek to protect children, however, the Court
runs the risk of diminishing the availability of materials to such an extent
that adults will be reduced to watching only those programs which are fit for
children. One commentator has noted:
Solicitude for children, then, justifies neither the regulation of in-
decency on television nor different regulation for broadcasting and
cable. Such regulation inevitably abridges adults' first amendment
rights, improperly usurps a discretionary parental function with
broad governmental fiat, and ignores less restrictive means to pro-
tect children equally available in broadcasting and cable.218
The passage of the Cable Act was an attempt by Congress to protect chil-
dren.219 Yet during all of the proceedings concerning this Act, both legisla-
tive and judicial, very little consideration was given to the parents. Certainly
parents are charged with the physical and psychological safety of their
children. The Cable Act is an effort to usurp this function and replace the
traditional role of parenting with government mandates. The power of
effective parenting has been described by one author:
In the home ... parents are in a better position to make individual-
ized judgments regarding household viewing habits of both sexual
material and graphic violence. The Supreme Court long has de-
ferred to a parent's right to control the development and upbringing
of his children. Thus, parental control is not only the most effec-
tive method, but the most protective of first amendment rights. 2
The plurality virtually ignored the role of parents in deciding this issue,
apparently assuming parents are either unwilling or unable to supervise their
children. While the Breyer Group questioned the effectiveness of current
technological devices that may limit television viewing by children, the
217. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
218. Laurence H. Winer, Note, The Signal Cable Sends, Part II - Interference from the
Indecency Cases, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 459, 521 (1987).
219. 138 CONG. REc. S645 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992). The stated purpose for the Act is
"[t]o protect children from indecent cable programming on leased access channels." Id.
220. Jay A. Gayoso, Note, The FCC's Regulation of Broadcast Indecency: A Broadened
Approachfor Removing Immorality from the Airwaves, 43 U. MIAMI L. RaV. 871, 911 (1989).
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combination of parenting and technology may provide the answer. One
author articulated the potential of coupling present technology with effective
parenting in addressing this problem with:
When children are unsupervised, program guides and the electronic
technology available for both cable and broadcasting can provide
the desired control. Indeed, the availability of a simple lock to
prevent all unsupervised television watching, even without more re-
fined technology, should be an adequate, less restrictive means of
control sufficient to preclude any broader government regula-
tion . '
It would be naive to assume that every child is continually supervised by his
or her parents. The economic and domestic situation of most American
families precludes this possibility. Certainly, however, this should be a
consideration when weighing the interest of society in protecting children
from inadvertent exposure to indecent programming against another interest
as compelling as free speech. In upholding section 10(a) of the Cable Act,
the plurality has infringed upon the rights of adult viewers to watch what
they want on cable television. Although this measure seems the least severe
alternative to Justice Breyer, it is an infringement nonetheless. The plurality
has overlooked the most effective protective measure, however, the measure
that comes at no cost to every person. The plurality has overlooked the
responsible parents.
Christopher D. Ritchie
221. Winer, supra note 218, at 522-23.
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